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ABSTRACT!
 
This dissertation examines the problem of the mistaken killing of civilians in armed 
conflict. This occurs when a civilian is intentionally killed by armed forces because he or she is 
mistakenly believed to pose a threat of harm. The requirement that armed forces distinguish 
between combatants and civilians who are immune from being attacked is known as ‘the 
principle of distinction’ in the international humanitarian law. The problem posed by 
distinguishing irregular fighters from ordinary civilians has long been recognized in the law, and 
the modern laws of war were developed, in part, to respond to this problem. At present, two of 
the more influential approaches to resolving the problem of distinction are the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on Civilian Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, which sets out the ICRC’s opinion on the circumstances under which civilian 
participants may be targeted, and modern Rules of Engagement, which regulate the use of force 
by soldiers and security forces during combat operations. This dissertation argues that both 
methods are inadequate to resolving the problem of distinction, because they are overbroad, in 
that they authorize the killing of civilians who have done nothing to forfeit their immunity, and 
therefore violate this key requirement of the international laws of war.  
This dissertation proposes a definition of ‘civilian direct participation in hostilities’ that is 
based upon ordinary rules governing self-defense. In this way, a civilian will forfeit his or her life 
only when there is clear and convincing evidence that he or she is engaged in an act of aggression 
that wrongfully poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to civilians or members 
of armed forces, and the use of force is necessary and proportionate to prevent that harm. Force 
will be necessary and proportionate only after de-escalation of force procedures have been 
diligently applied, and the consequences of the use of force on the surrounding population would 
not be indiscriminate or disproportionate, or be such as to spread terror. 
Merging the rules for defensive force with the laws of armed conflict possesses several 
advantages over the present practice of treating self-defensive killings as being separate from, 
and largely superseding, international law and its norms protecting civilians. First, this approach 
solves the problem of providing a principled definition of civilian direct participation in 
hostilities, which has long been the subject of controversy and contention among states and 
international organizations. Second, this approach provides an explanation for why pre-emptive 
and status-based interpretations of civilian direct participation result in unjustified killings. 
Hopefully, this will be a first step in quelling the growing practice of targeting persons based 
upon group affiliations, both real and perceived, that is gaining legitimacy.  At the same time, this 
approach also addresses the growing problem of mistaken killings during escalation of force 
incidents. At present, the international laws of armed conflict do not obligate states to use 
minimal force when dealing with civilians and suspected civilian participants. However, if 
civilian direct participation were to be based upon rules for defensive force, then minimal force 
and escalation of force procedures would become mandatory, rather than merely recommended, 
as they ensure that the killing is necessary – a fundamental component of justified defensive 
force.  Furthermore, this provides an analytical framework that can be used to analyze novel or 
controversial cases of civilian participation, rather than allowing states to make these decisions 
on an ad hoc, and largely discretionary, basis.  
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The Rules of Engagement: Self-Defense and the Principle of Distinction in 
 International Humanitarian Law 
 
1.0 The Rules of Engagement and Mistaken Self-Defense 
In an armed conflict, how do soldiers distinguish between ordinary civilians and irregular 
fighters, who might wear no uniforms, and blend into the civilian population? The requirement 
that armed forces distinguish between combatants and civilians who are immune from attack is 
known as ‘the principle of distinction’ in the international humanitarian law; Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions defines this by stating that civilians are immune from attack unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities, and that belligerents must take steps to 
distinguish civilians from military objectives.1 The problem posed by distinguishing irregular 
fighters from ordinary civilians has long been recognized in the law, and the modern laws of war 
were developed, in part, to respond to this problem.2 At present, two of the more influential 
approaches to resolving the problem of distinction are the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on Civilian Direct Participation in Hostilities,3 which sets 
out the ICRC’s opinion on the circumstances under which civilian participants may be targeted, 
and modern Rules of Engagement, which regulate the use of force by soldiers and security forces 
during combat operations. However, both methods are inadequate to resolving the problem of 
                                                
1 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 
UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] at Articles 51(3), which states “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”; see also Article 51(4), which states, 
“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific 
military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed against a specific 
military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.” These are the most recent treaty rules that describe what is often 
called the “principle of distinction”, or the “principle of discrimination”. This is the general rule that privileges the 
killing of and by qualified belligerents, while prohibiting intentional attacks either by or on civilians. See e.g., 
Jeremy Waldron, “Civilians, Terrorism and Deadly Serious Conventions” (2009) New York University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 122 [hereinafter Deadly Serious Conventions] at 1-2. 
2 While there is some disagreement, the phrases “the laws of war”, “the laws of armed conflict” and the 
“international humanitarian law” are generally taken to be interchangeable, and they shall be so used in this 
dissertation. See: Dale Stephens, “Human Rights and Armed Conflict – The Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case” (2001) 4 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1 at 2, note 5.  
3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law” (December 2008) 90:872 International Review of the Red Cross 
991 [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance]. 
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distinction; they are over broad, in that they authorize the killing of civilians who have done 
nothing to forfeit their immunity, and therefore violate this key requirement of the international 
laws of war. It is the purpose of this dissertation to review these current approaches to the 
problem of distinction, and to propose a solution which preserves legitimate recourse to self-
defense, while better protecting civilians.  
The present standards in place for distinguishing civilians are vague and permissive of the 
discretionary use of military force, and therefore they can facilitate what are termed mistaken 
defensive killings.4 Mistaken killings are those in which a person mistakenly believes a set of 
facts obtains which, if they were true, would give that person permission to kill another in self-
defense or defense of another.5 In cases of mistaken self-defense, the target is believed by the 
defender to pose a threat of death or grievous bodily harm but is, in fact, innocent of having 
posed a threat.6 This might occur in war, for example, if a soldier suspects that an individual 
digging in a field near an army base is planting an explosive device that threatens the lives of 
nearby soldiers,7 or that an individual who approaches a convoy is a militant engaged in an act of 
sabotage.8 If true, then the soldier may have permission to kill the individual on defensive 
grounds, but in reality the person targeted is an ordinary civilian who is simply engaged in 
planting their crops, or driving down the highway, and poses no threat. Unlike killings that are a 
                                                
4 Reid Griffith Fontaine, “An Attack on Self-Defense” (2010) 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 57 at 59.  
5 Ibid. Here, no distinction will be drawn between force used in self-defense and defense of another, and both are 
encompassed here within the term ‘defensive force’. ‘Security forces’ will be used to describe army, police, and/or 
private security forces generally, while ‘army’ or ‘armed forces’ will refer to regular army troops.  
6 Michael Louis Corrado, “Self-Defense, Moral Acceptability, and Compensation: A Response to Professor 
Fontaine” (2010) 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 91 at 96 [hereinafter Self-Defense and Moral Acceptability].  
7 See e.g., Yaroslav Trofimov, “New Battles Test U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Focus on Safeguarding Civilian 
Lives Frustrates Troops in Taliban Territory” The Wall Street Journal (9 February 2010), available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/Articles/SB10001424052748704140104575057630668291288 (accessed 26 November 2014). 
In a similar case, the U.K. Service Prosecuting Authority declined to lay charges against Fusilier Duane Knott of the 
Territorial Army for shooting and killing an unarmed Afghan man digging near the military base. Superiors 
suspected that he might have been an innocent farmer, but Bruce Holder, the head of the Special Prosecuting 
Authority stated that, after consulting a barrister, he was satisfied that “no evidence exists to justify criminal 
proceedings being taken against this soldier”. See: Rob Evans and Richard Norton-Taylor, “British Soldier Will Not 
be Charged After Killing of Afghan” The Guardian (16 April 2012), available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/16/british-soldier-not-charged-afghan-murder (accessed 26 November 
2014); see: infra Chapter Four at note 62 and accompanying text. 
8 United States Army, Incident Report, Reference ID IRQ20050302n1519 (2 March 2005), available at: 
http://wikileaks.org/irq/report/2005/03/IRQ20050302n1519.html (accessed 5 April 2013); see also: infra Chapter 
Four at note 62 and accompanying text. 
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result of collateral damage,9 or a proportionality calculus,10 mistaken killings take place when 
soldiers intentionally target individual civilians whom the soldiers subjectively believe pose some 
threat of harm, but who in fact do not. This also distinguishes cases of mistaken self-defense from 
cases in which the target poses a threat, but does so innocently, or unknowingly. It has been 
argued that such innocent, or non-responsible, threats may be permissibly targeted in self-
defense.11 In contrast, mistaken killings are unjustified, as the victim has done nothing to forfeit 
his or her life and does not deserve to be killed.12 For this reason, mistaken killings of civilians by 
soldiers also violate the international law’s prohibitions against the intentional killing of civilians 
who are not participating in hostilities, and may constitute a war crime. 
Much of the literature that has examined the ICRC Interpretive Guidance and its 
approach to targeting civilians has criticized the ICRC for the restrictions it has placed on 
targeting, characterizing the problem as one of finding the correct “balance” between the 
competing rights of security forces versus those of civilians.13 In a special issue of the NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics devoted to the Interpretive Guidance, the editors 
explicitly characterized the debate in these terms. Goodman and Jinks state that in the struggle to 
define civilian direct participation, humanitarian and human rights interests on the one hand are 
                                                
9 ‘Collateral’ or ‘incidental’ damage are deaths and injuries to civilians and civilian objects that are not caused 
intentionally, but are incidental to a lawful attack. See: Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 
3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008) at 149 [hereinafter Law of Armed Conflict]. 
10 Ibid. To be proportionate, collateral damage caused by the attack must be proportionate to the purpose of the 
attack, and to the military advantage to be gained therefrom. See: Protocol I, supra note 1 at Article 51(5)(c), which 
defines disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks as those in which the collateral damage is expected to be 
“excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  
11 Reid Griffith Fontaine, “Regarding Self-Defense: A Rejoinder to Professor Corrado” (2010) 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
97 at 102 [hereinafter Regarding Self-Defense]; Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009) at 
162-6 [hereinafter Killing in War] (innocent threats, who are subjectively justified in posing a threat of harm), and 
167-173 (nonresponsible threats, who are not morally responsible for posing a threat of harm); see also: Jeff 
McMahan, “Self-Defence and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker” (1994) 104 Ethics 252.  
12 Ibid. at 101.  
13 Some of the responses to the ICRC that will be discussed in this dissertation include: Michael N. Schmitt, “The 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis” (May 2010) 1 Harv. 
Nat’l Sec. J. 5; Michael Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements” 
(2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697; William Hays Parks, “Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect” (2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769; 
William C. Banks, ed., New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011); William C. Banks, “Towards an Adaptive Humanitarian Law: New Norms for New 
Battlefields” in New Battlefields/Old Laws 1; Eric T. Jensen, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” in New 
Battlefields/Old Laws 85; Daphne Richemond-Barak, “Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Distinction and 
Reciprocity” in New Battlefields/Old Laws 105. See: Chapter Three at s. 3.2 for discussion.  
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pitted against the interests of “preserving discretion or freedom of action for military planners 
and personnel making targeting decisions on the battlefield” and the “pragmatic and tactical 
realities of military operations,” on the other.14  The academic literature concerning rules of 
engagement, and specifically their treatment of rules concerning self-defense is small but 
growing, and much of this literature, too, characterizes the problem of targeting as one of 
balancing the rights of security forces with humanitarian concerns. Todd Huntley of the U.S. 
Judge Advocate General Corps, for example, states that the U.S. military has had difficulty in 
balancing the exercise of self-defense with the protection of civilians, stating that “[w]hile the use 
of force in self-defense must be proportionate, the range of response permitted under the law of 
armed conflict is quite wide, with many military leaders favoring the use of overwhelming force 
when confronted with a hostile act or hostile intent.”15 However, this balance most often falls on 
the side of protecting security forces over and above civilians. This dissertation rejects the 
“balancing approach” advocated by the above authors. While it may appear neutral on its face, 
the balancing approach incorporates numerous biases and prejudices, both about the efficacy and 
utility of using force and coercion against a target population, as well as the risks assumed to be 
posed by that population. Instead, this dissertation proposes that the matter be resolved not by 
balancing competing rights, but by incorporating objective criteria for determining when the use 
of defensive force is in fact legally justified. I argue that this is the best approach to minimize 
bias, avoid mistaken killings, and do justice to all parties involved.  
The problem of mistaken killings presents a serious challenge to the regulation of 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgent warfare in particular, as soldiers may mistakenly perceive 
threats from members of the civilian population, or wrongly assume them to be members of 
militant or insurgent groups, and so mistakenly take their lives. In this introductory chapter, I 
briefly describe the approach to self-defense and civilian immunity that have been taken by 
modern Rules of Engagement, as well as recent interpretations of civilian direct participation by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, topics that will discussed in greater length in 
                                                
14 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum” (2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 637 at 640. 
15 Todd C. Huntley, “Balancing Self-Defense and Mission Accomplishment in International Intervention: Challenges 
in Drafting and Implementing Rules of Engagement” (2014) 29 Md. J. Int’l L. 83 at 111.  
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Chapter Three. Next, I describe some of the reasons why mistaken killings present a serious 
problem for the protection of civilians in modern counterinsurgent warfare. Security forces are 
claiming a privilege to intentionally kill innocent civilians – a privilege not traditionally granted 
by the laws of war - and this denies civilians both their right to life, as well as justice for harms 
they suffer. Moreover, mistaken killings are often strategically counterproductive, as there is 
research that demonstrates that the killing of civilians can escalate the violence of armed 
conflicts, and place security forces at greater risk of reprisal attacks from insurgent forces.  
Next, I sketch out some of the basic principles that ought to inform a resolution of the 
problem of distinction in armed conflict, proposing that rules for distinguishing civilian direct 
participants be based upon rules governing the use of defensive force, but not those currently in 
place. First, I review the current legal standards in place, rejecting both the standard of 
reasonableness generally used in the criminal law - that would excuse the mistaken use of 
defensive force in cases in which the defender subjectively, but wrongly, believed the use of 
force to be necessary - as well as the more objective standard of liability used in tort law, that 
would hold defenders accountable for mistaken killings even when the mistake was reasonable 
under the circumstances. The first standard is over broad, and would permit the use of force 
against civilians who are not participating in hostilities, whereas the second standard is not well 
adapted to making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, in which many of the relevant facts 
cannot be known. Instead, I adopt a standard based upon available evidence, one that requires 
clear and convincing evidence of civilian direct participation before force may be used. This 
shifts the inquiry away from the subjective perceptions of the soldier, and on to the conduct of the 
civilian. As the international humanitarian law requires a presumption of civilian immunity,16 a 
clear and convincing standard that goes beyond a mere probability is necessary in order to 
comply with this requirement. The final section will address the elements of permissible 
defensive force, adapting them to the problem of determining whether a civilian is participating 
in hostilities, and defining this concept in terms of the threat of harm that the civilian poses. 
                                                
16 Protocol I, supra note 1 at Article 50(1), which applies to international armed conflicts. Such a rule does not 
appear in Protocol II, but it has been considered that this rule is part of the customary international law, and 
accordingly ought to be respected in all armed conflicts. See: Interpretive Guidance, supra note 3 at 1039; Yves 
Sandoz et al., eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 1987) at § 4789 [hereinafter ICRC Commentary]. 
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Under this definition, a civilian forfeits his or her immunity from attack only when there is clear 
and convincing evidence that he or she is engaged in an act of aggression that wrongfully, i.e. 
without lawful authority, justification or excuse, poses an imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily harm to civilians or members of armed forces, and the use of force is necessary and 
proportionate to prevent that harm. Force will be necessary and proportionate only after 
escalation of force procedures have been diligently applied, and the consequences of the use of 
force on the surrounding population would not be indiscriminate or disproportionate, or be such 
as to spread terror. The right to use defensive force in war, as well as the criteria for the justified 
use of defensive force, are themselves a subset of human rights law. Accordingly, the rules for 
defensive force also have close connections with international human rights laws, particularly 
those regulating the conduct of security forces. However, in this dissertation I will focus on the 
use of defensive force in the context of the international humanitarian law, and particularly its 
rules governing the distinction between military and civilian targets. It is hoped that this will 
highlight the centrality of these issues to the international humanitarian law, and provide a 
vehicle for bringing these two fields of law closer together.  
Chapter Two will discuss the development of the modern laws of armed conflict 
concerning belligerent privilege and civilian immunity, focusing on developments that took place 
from the late eighteenth century to the adoption of the Protocols Additional in 1977. This is an 
area of the international law which is not only highly contentious and politicized, but which goes 
to the heart of the prerogatives and privileges of state power and its use of violence against the 
individual. It is therefore instructive to examine the basic principles and values that underlie this 
area of the law, and to demonstrate how wholly novel are current approaches to the principle of 
distinction, and how out of step they are with the international treaty and customary laws of 
armed conflict. Defining the loss of civilian immunity in defensive terms that focus on the 
potential of the civilian actor to wrongfully harm others is more in keeping with the laws of war 
and the “principles of humanity”17 that they embody than are current approaches.  
Chapter Three will examine in greater depth the development of current Rules of 
Engagement and the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, as well as the ICRC’s critics and their own 
                                                
17 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 at para. 79 [hereinafter 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion], in which the Court states that warfare is regulated by the “fundamental 
principles of humanity”.  
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proposals for distinguishing civilians who are participating directly in hostilities. These 
approaches to distinguishing civilian participants are over-inclusive in that they justify the use of 
lethal force against civilians who are not participating in hostilities, and even against those who 
do not pose any threat of harm. Chapter Four will review four case studies that illustrate the 
problem of mistaken self-defense in armed conflict, and will discuss how a revised definition of 
the loss of civilian immunity based upon defensive criteria might assist in preventing these 
killings, and in promoting accountability on the part of the security forces involved. 
The case studies demonstrate the application of Rules of Engagement to the problem of 
distinguishing civilian participants, and are drawn mainly from the recent military conflicts in 
Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-present). The first case study describes an emblematic 
case of mistaken killings by examining escalation of force incidents at traffic checkpoints. Most 
of these killings took place when a vehicle approached a security checkpoint and would not stop 
according to instructions from Coalition forces. Standard Rules of Engagement authorize the use 
of lethal force in these circumstances, despite the fact that the civilians they killed were clearly 
not participating directly in hostilities. In these cases, it can be seen that the self-defensive criteria 
for the use of force found in Rules of Engagement are clearly incompatible with the rule of 
civilian direct participation as found in Protocol I. The second case study will examine the use of 
pre-emptive killings during the U.S.-led Coalition’s 2004 siege of the Iraqi city of Fallujah. 
Again, standard Rules of Engagement authorized the killing of civilians who were not clearly 
participating in hostilities and who were not known to have been members of militant groups.  
The remaining two case studies will examine the targeting of declared hostile forces as 
permitted by standard Rules of Engagement, i.e. the practice of distinguishing militants from 
ordinary civilians based upon their status as members of organized non-state armed groups. The 
first of these case studies will examine the detentions that took place at the U.S. internment 
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the judicial decisions concerning the meaning of the term 
‘unlawful enemy combatant’ that the U.S. government developed to justify these detentions.  
This case study will also examine the desuetude of the long-standing principle of customary law, 
declared in the 1899 Hague Regulations18 and adopted into the Third Geneva Convention,19 of 
                                                
18 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, Annex to the 
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levée en masse. A levée en masse is a concept that permits ordinary civilians to take up arms to 
repel an invasion,20 and it is notable for being the only rule in international law that would permit 
ordinary civilians a right of self-defense against an invading army. Coalition forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan expanded the circumstances under which their own security forces would be 
permitted to use defensive force, while simultaneously limiting those same rights for civilians. 
The fourth and final case study will review the U.S. government’s targeted killing program and 
the legal justifications for this program that the U.S. government has put forth under the 
international laws of armed conflict, many of which were drawn from the legal doctrines it earlier 
developed to deal with the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Standard Rules of Engagement are 
essential to the operation of the U.S.’s targeted killing program, and the manner in which its 
personnel choose their targets and justify these strikes. At present, there are few guarantees that 
civilians will not be killed by mistake, particularly in the course of ‘signature strikes’,21 and there 
are studies that purport to show that many civilians have in fact been killed in this manner.22 The 
use of signature criteria in order to justify lethal force also demonstrates that security forces are 
indeed using conduct-based criteria in order to distinguish targets, but the criteria being used do 
not meet the standard of civilian direct participation in hostilities as found in the ICRCs 
Interpretive Guidance, or the rules for the use of defensive force proposed herein. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land at Article 1; International Conferences 
(The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Annex to the Convention: Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land at Article 1 [hereinafter the Hague Regulations]; see full text of 
Article 1 at Appendix A at 10 and 11, p. 301. 
19 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, at Article 4 available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html (accessed 6 November 2014) [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention]; see Appendix A at 12, p. 302. 
20 Ibid. at Article 4(6), which states that lawful prisoners of war include “Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who 
on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading force, without having had time to 
form themselves into regular armed units, provided that they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of 
war;” see Appendix B, p. 305, for a list of definitions. 
21 Kevin J. Heller, “One Hell of a Killing Machine: Signature Strikes and International Law” (2013) 11:1 J. Int’l 
Crim. Just. 89 [hereinafter Signature Strikes]. 
22 Chantal Grut, “Counting Drone Strikes” (October 2012) Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic Report 
[hereinafter Columbia Drone Study], available at: http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-
rights-institute/files/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinal.pdf (accessed 17 April 2013); International Human Rights 
and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, Living 
Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan (September 2012) 
[hereinafter Stanford/NYU Drone Study], available at: http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf (accessed 17 April 2013). 
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These case studies focus primarily on recent military activities by U.S. forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Substantial evidence has been made available to the public concerning these 
incidents, and this assists the study of government activities that are frequently classified.  In 
addition, standard Rules of Engagement were developed by the U.S. military, and they have since 
spread to other nations, largely through U.S. influence. However, this emphasis here on U.S. 
forces is not meant to imply that standard Rules of Engagement are employed only by U.S. 
forces, or that this problem is limited to that country alone; it will be shown that many nations, as 
well as NATO, are increasingly adopting similar Rules of Engagement and counterinsurgent 
doctrine.23 American forces fought alongside soldiers from many countries as part of multi-
national coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there was a drive for standardization and 
harmonization among the different forces.24 These multi-national coalitions were therefore 
vehicles for disseminating knowledge and training regarding U.S. Rules of Engagement among 
Coalition forces. U.S. forces have also trained local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to use 
standard U.S. Rules of Engagement and counterinsurgency doctrine.25 Chapter Three will also 
discuss the International Institute of Humanitarian Law at Sanremo, and the Rules of Engagement 
Handbook that they have developed and disseminated.26 This is also an important vehicle for 
disseminating knowledge of standard Rules of Engagement, and the Institute has trained high-
                                                
23 See: Chapter Three at ss. 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.2.1.  
24 Ibid.  The NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) is composed of troops from 40 
NATO-member states, only about 52% of which are U.S. troops (as of May 2015), available at: NATO ISAF 
Operation Resolute Support: Troop Numbers and Contributors, http://www.rs.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-
contributions/index.php (accessed 6 July 2015); the Multi-National Force in Iraq contained troops or advisors from 
34 nations besides the United States, as part of the Coalition Forces, the NATO training mission, and the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, including: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and later Fiji, Japan, Portugal, Singapore, 
and the Ukraine; Hungary, Iceland, Slovenia, and Turkey contributed NATO training personnel, available at: U.S. 
State Department, “August 23, 2006 Iraq Weekly Status Report” (23 August 2006), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm (accessed 6 July 2015). There was therefore 
significant numbers of non-U.S. military personnel involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a great 
variety of national militaries were exposed to the policies and practices put in place there.  
25 Afghan National Army, Counterinsurgency, ANA 3-24 (June 2007), available at: 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/ANA-3-24.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013); infra Chapter Three, note 68 and 
accompanying text.  
26 Dennis Mandsager et al., Rules of Engagement Handbook (Sanremo: International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 
2009) [hereinafter ROE Handbook], available at: http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b0d0f70-bb07-48f2-af0a-
7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook (accessed 16 January 2013).  
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ranking military officials from many nations in these practices.27 The problems posed by Rules of 
Engagement can be expected to grow if these rules were to be adopted by further countries in 
future conflicts. The present time therefore affords an opportunity to reformulate the definition of 
civilian direct participation in hostilities so as to better protect human rights, and to mitigate some 
of the most damaging effects of standard Rules of Engagement, before these practices become 
more widely adopted. 
 
1.0.1 The Protection of Civilians in the Laws of Armed Conflict 
In the laws of armed conflict, the rules protecting civilians from the effects of hostilities 
are laid out in Protocols I28 and II29 Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Protocol I deals 
with international armed conflicts, and Article 51(1) sets out the general rule which states that the 
“civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising 
from military operations.” Article 51(2) states specifically that the “civilian population as such, 
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” 
Article 51(4) further prohibits indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are defined in Article 
51(4)(a) as those which are “not directed at a specific military objective,” or, in Article 51(4)(b) 
as “those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective,” or, in Article 51(4)(c) as “those which employ a method or means of combat 
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each 
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.” Article 51(3) states the general rule that civilians “shall enjoy the protection of this 
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” The regime of 
international criminal law and the Rome Statute depend upon the definition of civilian direct 
participation found in Article 51(3) of Protocol I; in particular, the war crime of intentionally 
killing civilians is defined in s. 8(2)(b)(i) as “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian 
                                                
27 Infra Chapter Three, note 180 and accompanying text.  
28 Protocol I, supra note 1.  
29 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 609, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html (accessed 15 March 2015) 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. 
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population as such or against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities.”30 Neither 
the Rome Statute nor Protocol I, however, further define what it means for a civilian to take a 
direct part in hostilities. 
Non-international armed conflicts, defined as all those conflicts not covered by Protocol 
I,31 are governed by Protocol II, which lays out similar rules governing civilian immunity in 
Article 13. Article 13(1) states that “The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy 
general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.” Article 13(2) states more 
specifically that “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
objects of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are prohibited.” Article 13(3) reiterates the principle found in 
Article 51(3) of Protocol I, stating that “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” The key difference between the 
two Protocols Additional is that Protocol II does not include a prohibition against indiscriminate 
methods and means of warfare, although the protection of basic human rights, including a general 
prohibition against violence and murder, are stipulated in Article 4, which protects all those who 
do not participate, and those who have ceased to participate, in hostilities. Although it may not 
always be clear whether a particular conflict is an international or a non-international armed 
conflict, the basic rules that require civilian immunity, or the laws governing civilian direct 
participation in hostilities are essentially the same in all types of armed conflict.32  
                                                
30 United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html (accessed 15 March 
2015) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
31 Protocol II, supra note 29 at Article 1.  
32 The Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19, defines an international armed conflict in Article 2 as “all cases of 
declared war or of any other conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” Article 
2 further states that the Convention “shall apply also to cases of partial or total occupation of a High Contracting 
Party, even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance.” This would seem to apply to cases in which a foreign 
power supplies troops to assist a host government in fighting a civil war or insurgency, as was the case for the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the main focus of this dissertation. The 1960 ICRC Commentary on the Geneva 
Conventions states that this provision was included to prevent pretexts that states might put forward for evading the 
Convention, including by claiming that they were acting in self-defense, by denying that a state of armed conflict 
exists or - what is most relevant for counterinsurgent actions - that they were merely undertaking a police action. 
See: Jean Pictet, ed., Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva: 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960) at 22-23 [hereinafter 1960 Commentary].  This provision of the 
Third Geneva Convention was adopted unchanged from the draft text that was prepared by the ICRC at its 1948 
Conference in Stockholm, where the preparatory work was completed on the draft Conventions for the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva; see: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Final Record of the 
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1.0.2 Rules of Engagement 
Rules of Engagement are a recent and particularly modern means of regulating the use of 
force in armed conflict.33 Although their antecedents date back to the end of the Second World 
War, they largely grew up in the post-Cold War era of the 1990s and the asymmetrical operations 
that then took on increasing importance.34 The 1992 U.S. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 
was a watershed event in generating the standard Rules of Engagement in place today.35 The 
Rules of Engagement that emerged around this time adopted an unprecedented focus on the 
individual self-defense of the ordinary soldier. The standard Rules of Engagement that grew out 
of this came to allow for the use of force on three grounds, all of which are broadly self-defense 
related, and all of which give final discretion to apply force to individual soldiers themselves. 
Rules of Engagement allow for lethal force in self-defense first, if a soldier perceives a hostile act 
on the part of a civilian, and second, if the soldier perceives a hostile intent on the part of a 
civilian.36 These criteria are clearly self-defensive in nature. Rules of Engagement also allow for 
the use of lethal force against any individual deemed to be a member of a ‘declared hostile force’, 
such as a militant or terrorist group.37 The targeting of declared hostile forces is often justified in 
terms of self-defense and as shall be seen, this is clearly in evidence in the debate concerning 
targeted killings.38 However, when security forces are given too much discretion, then ordinary 
civilians may be killed who bear no arms and pose no threat. Their killing violates the immunity 
                                                                                                                                                        
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. 1 (Berne: Federal Political Department, 1949) at 73. Protocol I 
applies in all circumstances in which the Third Geneva Convention applies, at Article 1(3), and specifically applies to 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against alien occupation, at Article 1(4). There is therefore good reason to 
conclude that both the Third Geneva Convention and Protocol I applied to the entirety of the counterinsurgent 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
33 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-
02 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 8 November 2010, As Amended Through 15 August 2014) at 256 
[hereinafter the Joint Chiefs Dictionary]. The Joint Chiefs Dictionary defines Rules of Engagement as “[d]irectives 
issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States 
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with forces encountered.” 
34 Infra Chapter Three at s. 3.1.2. 
35 Infra Chapter Three note 103 and accompanying text.  
36 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. 
Forces, Instructions 3121.01B Washington, D.C., Department of Defense (13 June 2005) at para. 6(b)(1). 
37 See e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, Instruction 
3121.01, Washington, DC.: Department of Defense (1 October 1994) at Appendix A Enclosure A para. 6.  
38 See e.g.: Phillip Montague, “Defending Defensive Targeted Killings” in Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & 
Andrew Altman, eds., Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 285 [hereinafter Targeted Killings]; Leo Katz, “Targeted Killings and the Strategic Use of Self-
Defense” in Targeted Killings 467. 
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granted to them by the laws of armed conflict, as well as their right to life. In particular, Rules of 
Engagement, at least in their current form, are a “method or means of combat” that are inherently 
likely to “strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction,”39 and 
this can be seen in the case studies of escalation of force incidents, the indiscriminate use of force 
at Fallujah, and within the present targeted killing program.   
 
1.0.3 The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Civilian Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Part of this problem lies in the lack of a clear definition in the international law of civilian 
direct participation in hostilities. Protocol I left civilian direct participation largely undefined, 
and there has been little case law on the subject.40 Many of the relevant cases have been 
conducted under domestic codes of military justice, such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
in the United States,41 and military authorities have shown a great deal of deference to the 
discretion of soldiers operating under their Rules of Engagement, irrespective of whether the 
killings were reasonable, or complied with international humanitarian law.42 Defining civilian 
direct participation in hostilities has been the subject of much discussion and debate, particularly 
following the controversies surrounding the U.S.-led counterinsurgent actions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In 2003, the ICRC led an expert process to better define the concept of civilian 
direct participation in hostilities. Their findings were expressed in the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance,43 which has been much criticized, including by many of the experts who participated 
in that process.44 The Interpretive Guidance takes a novel approach of separating civilian direct 
participants from those persons who are members of organized armed groups, thus creating a 
novel category of non-civilian: the non-state combatant.45 The non-state combatant is a status-
based concept, and as such it does not look to the conduct of the civilians and ask whether they 
                                                
39 Protocol I, supra note 1. 
40 Jens David Ohlin, “Targeting Co-belligerents” in Targeted Killings, supra note 38, 60 at 66. 
41 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 [hereinafter UCMJ]. 
42 See e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 458 27 1616 (I Marine Expeditionary Force, 16 March 1993) (Report of 
Article 32(b) Investigating Officer); United States v. Mowris, GCM No. 68 (Fort Carson 4th Infantry Division 
(Mech) 1 July 1993).  
43 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 3. 
44 William Hays Parks, “Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, 
and Legally Incorrect” (2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769 at 784 [hereinafter No Mandate]; see also: Michael 
Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements” (2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l 
L. & Pol. 697 at 699 [hereinafter Constitutive Elements]. 
45 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 3 at 1036. 
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are participating directly in hostilities, but whether they exhibit some characteristics of 
membership in a prohibited armed group. In this way, the ICRC’s definition is similar to the 
concepts embodied in the terms ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ and ‘declared hostile force’, in that 
these are all terms that attempt to encompass membership in a militant or insurgent group, and to 
define this in terms of the status of the group itself, rather than the conduct of its members; in 
particular, it does not address whether they are taking a direct part in hostilities at the time they 
are subject to attack.46 The Interpretive Guidance permits states a much freer hand in targeting 
members of such groups while providing few workable criteria for how such fighters can be 
distinguished, and the ICRC itself has recognized the practical unworkability of these criteria.47 
Criticisms of the Interpretive Guidance primarily center on arguments that the ICRC’s criteria 
lack a principled definition of civilian direct participation, as well as the fact that their criteria are 
under-inclusive.48 Military experts, in particular, argued that the ICRC’s standards were not as 
permissive as those they currently employed in their Rules of Engagement, and this would place 
soldiers at greater risk; accordingly, it was argued that the ICRC standards would not be accepted 
by military authorities.49  
On the other hand, there are reasons why the criteria found in the Interpretive Guidance 
are in fact over-inclusive. The Interpretive Guidance would permit attacks against civilians who 
engage in activities that would tend to harm or otherwise thwart a military objective.50 States 
could, and in some cases have interpreted this to permit attacks against civilians engaged in 
unarmed protest, or civilians who commit disciplinary infractions, such as disobeying orders 
from occupying forces, or even humanitarian and aid workers on the ground that these actions 
constitute direct participation in hostilities.51 In this way, states are moving the definition of 
civilian direct participation away from a concept that prohibits civilians from threatening or 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. at 1014. 
48 Constitutive Elements, supra note 44 at 714.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 3 at 1016. The ICRC has divided this aspect of civilian direct participation into 
two categories. The first defines direct participation in terms of the necessity for defensive force, as when the civilian 
commits an act likely to “inflict death, injury or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack,” at 
995. This would permit the use of lethal force to protect property. The second defines direct participation as an act 
likely to “adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict,” ibid.  In this 
dissertation, it is argued that the use of lethal defensive force is only permissible to protect against death or serious 
injury.  
51 Ibid. at 1017. See Chapter Three at sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 for a fuller discussion.   
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committing actual harms, to one of prohibiting actions that merely violate national interests. As 
Jean Pictet reminds us in the ICRC’s Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, “It must not 
be forgotten that the Conventions have been drawn up first and foremost to protect individuals, 
and not to serve State interests.”52 At the same time, the Interpretive Guidance recognizes 
soldiers’ right to attack civilians on grounds of self-defense, but does not provide criteria for what 
would constitute a permissible defensive killing of a civilian.53 It would appear, then, that the 
Interpretive Guidance would not prohibit some of the abuses being carried out under standard 
Rules of Engagement, including many mistaken killings. In this, the Interpretive Guidance failed 
to address the fact that the U.S. in its standard Rules of Engagement is moving away from an 
international humanitarian law standard of assessing direct participation in hostilities, and 
replacing it with a broader standard based upon the use of defensive force.  
Under the laws of armed conflict, armed forces have an obligation to distinguish civilians 
from qualified belligerents. This is a status-based determination: an individual’s liability to attack 
depends upon their membership in one of these two categories. In contrast, the concept of civilian 
direct participation in hostilities depends upon the actions performed by a civilian in an armed 
conflict. As will be discussed further in Chapter Three, status-based definitions of civilian 
participation are problematic precisely because they are liable to capture within their scope 
civilians who are not participating directly in hostilities, and have therefore not lost their 
immunity from attack. Civilian direct participation is a concept that is based upon civilians’ 
demonstrated actions, and so ought not to be defined in terms of status or group membership. 
What soldiers are being asked to do in assessing whether a civilian is participating directly in 
hostilities is to examine the conduct of the civilian, and to determine whether the civilian has 
forfeited his or her immunity from attack by virtue of engaging in that conduct.  
On the other hand, Rules of Engagement ask that soldiers examine the conduct of the 
civilian, and assess whether the civilian poses some risk of harm based upon three criteria: either 
because they (1) are engaged in a hostile act, (2) are harboring a hostile intent, or (3) are 
members of a declared hostile force. The criteria of hostile act is closely related to, but much 
broader than, the traditional concept of civilian direct participation, whereas the other two criteria 
                                                
52 1960 Commentary, supra note 32 at 23.  
53 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 3 at 1035. 
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are wholly novel. Targeting members of a declared hostile force is a status-based definition of 
civilian direct participation, as is the ICRC’s closely related concept of membership in an 
organized armed group; the defining criterion is the person’s perceived affiliation with a 
prohibited group, and not on their conduct. This is particularly true when membership is not 
readily apparent but must be inferred, for example by familial or other close relationships, or by 
gatherings of large numbers of military-aged males. Targeting those from whom a soldier 
perceives a hostile intent is only loosely related to civilian direct participation, and it seems to 
rely on the wholly subjective determinations of the soldier as to what is in the mind of the 
civilian. Rules of Engagement serve to privilege the subjective determinations of front-line 
soldiers, and shift the focus away from civilians’ demonstrated conduct and onto the soldiers’ 
subjective beliefs. The novel criteria found in Rules of Engagement and the ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance are therefore an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of distinction in that they 
include impermissible targets, i.e. they would permit the killing of civilians who have not 
engaged in conduct that would forfeit his or her immunity from attack. In addition, they lend 
undue weight to the subjective determinations of front-line security forces, while privileging their 
right to life over and above that of ordinary civilians.  
Determining civilian direct participation in hostilities based upon ordinary rules that 
justify defensive force has the potential to overcome many of these problems. First, it provides a 
principled definition of civilian immunity and its loss, and it does so in terms that have been well 
considered by the law and by legal scholars. Second, it avoids the main criticisms against some of 
the ICRC’s standards, that they are under-inclusive and would place soldiers at greater risk. 
Third, and most important for the topic addressed in this dissertation, it seeks to avoid the 
unjustified use of force against innocent civilians, and is thus better able to avoid the problems 
posed by mistaken killings, which form the subject of the following section.  
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1.1 The Problem of Mistaken Killings in War 
The problem of distinction, therefore, is one of determining when a civilian has forfeited 
his or her immunity from attack, and therefore may permissibly be killed by security forces.54 
Both Rules of Engagement as well as the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance resolve this problem by 
privileging the prerogatives of states and their military objectives. There are several reasons why 
this is an inadequate resolution to the problem of distinction. The magnitude of the power here 
claimed by the state – namely, the power to kill individuals who have done nothing to forfeit their 
lives – should not be underestimated. Such killings are unjustified according to ordinary 
standards of self-defense as found in the law, and are morally wrongful.55  They also violate 
fundamental legal principles guaranteeing equality56 and neutrality57 in the operation of the law 
during an armed conflict. Soldiers, of course, have a belligerent privilege to kill, but not to kill 
                                                
54 This dissertation will deal mainly with the use of defensive force by soldiers, i.e. members of the armed forces of a 
country. However, private security forces and military contractors are playing an increasing role in war, and they 
have adopted similar Rules of Engagement as those in place for soldiers. See: ASIS International. Management 
System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations – Requirements with Guidance. 2012. ANSI/ASIS 
PSC.1-2012 at 24 [hereinafter ANSI Standards for Private Military Companies], which defines the standard for the 
defensive use of force on the part of private military and security contractors. Better defining the criteria for the use 
of defensive force in war will therefore assist in governing these private forces, as well.  
55 Regarding Self-Defense, supra note 11 at 101.  
56 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. The Preamble of the Universal Declaration states, “member States have 
pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Article 1 states, “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reasons and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.” Article 2 states, “no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.” This would include civilians in occupied territories, and 
civilians in territories in which a foreign security force has been invited to conduct counterinsurgent operations. See 
also: Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 17 at para. 25. See also: Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 at para. 106, in 
which the ICJ affirmed that human rights laws apply in times of armed conflict. 
57 The laws of armed conflict do not set out (although they may recognize) universal rights in the same manner as do 
human rights conventions, but they are neutral as between belligerent parties. The ICRC has long been a proponent 
of the idea of neutrality as between belligerent parties and nations, an idea which the ICRC resurrected at the Geneva 
Conference of 1864, and which was embodied in Article 6 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Geneva, 22 August 1864. Article 6 requires that all parties shall collect and care 
for the wounded and sick “to whatever nation they may belong,” and that nations were not to show any preference 
for collecting and caring for their own wounded and sick. This was then a novel idea, for armies generally only cared 
for wounded persons belonging to their own nationality. But since that provision was enacted, the jus in bello has 
come to require more generally that no legal distinctions should be drawn based on the nationality of the individual, 
and irrespective of which side of the conflict their nation is waging war. See: Pierre Boissier, From Solferino to 
Tsushima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1985) at 72, 97 
[hereinafter From Solferino].  
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civilians. Shifting the risks onto civilians and away from soldiers in this way gives soldiers a 
privilege to kill that is not granted by the laws of armed conflict, and that is contrary to the rules 
laid out in the Protocols Additional. The consequences of this are significant. Not only do 
mistaken killings contribute to an overall sense of injustice among the civilian population in the 
conflict zone, but they can have very negative strategic consequences as well. There is a growing 
body of research, some of which is discussed below, that supports the thesis that the mistaken 
killing of civilians escalates violence and prolongs an insurgency. The killing of civilians can 
increase attacks against counterinsurgent forces, therefore making soldiers less safe, while 
impeding mission goals of establishing an overall environment of security. In this sense, the 
debate over the criteria used to distinguish civilians deserving of immunity from attack is really a 
debate over how to distribute the harms of war, and mistaken killings can increase the harms 
suffered by soldiers and civilians alike.  
There is much evidence, discussed below, that civilians as compared with soldiers are 
suffering disproportionately from the violence of war, and this was certainly true of the recent 
U.S.-led Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We normally ask that those who are 
responsible for creating the risks of harm – in this case those who would wage war – to bear 
those risks,58 as opposed to ordinary civilians in a conflict zone, who have few choices and little 
responsibility for geopolitical crises. In addition, it is national militaries waging wars who have 
the power to set the Rules of Engagement, and it is their soldiers who possess the training, 
equipment and protocols that can minimize their risks of harm. There will nearly always be an 
imbalance, therefore, between the opportunities that soldiers have to avoid harm as compared 
with civilians. As can be seen in Chapter Four where escalation of force incidents are discussed, 
soldiers staffing checkpoints are failing to take even minimal safety precautions before using 
lethal force against civilians, such as placing proper signage, or warning civilians of the 
upcoming checkpoint.59 Michelle Hansen of the U.S. Judge Advocate General’s Office sums up 
the debate concerning the Rules of Engagement when she advocates for fewer protections for 
civilians, stating that “Warfighters will bear the costs of these increased protections as additional 
                                                
58 Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) at 169 [hereinafter The Ends of Harm].  
59 Infra Chapter Four, note 46 and accompanying text.  
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constraints on how they accomplish the mission and as increased risks to their lives.”60 Although 
such beliefs may be common, they are not justified by the evidence, and shifting the balance 
towards soldiers in this way may not be the best way to protect the interests of individual 
soldiers, as well as the civilians they encounter.   
Several studies support the proposition that attacks against civilians are positively 
correlated with an increase in insurgent violence. Shifting the risks from civilians back onto 
security forces, and then encouraging them to take steps to minimize those risks, would be a 
better means of reducing overall insurgent violence. This assists in creating not only a climate of 
security but also of legitimacy, as it would reassure civilians that security forces are there to 
protect them. States may be brought to see the benefits of this approach, if it can be shown that 
unjust and indiscriminate violence against civilians plays an important role in escalating and 
sustaining violent insurgencies.  
The National Bureau of Economic Research conducted a study of civilian killings in 
Afghanistan and found that when Coalition forces killed civilians by mistake, the likelihood of 
insurgent attacks against Coalition Forces was increased.61 Condra and Shapiro then performed a 
similar study of civilian deaths in Iraq, using data from the Iraq Body Count data set from 2004 
to 2009, and again found that “Coalition killings of civilians predict higher subsequent levels of 
insurgent attack directed against Coalition forces.”62 The authors put forth a theory that local 
civilians are key to both insurgent and counterinsurgent efforts; when Coalition forces killed 
civilians, the local population was more likely to withhold important information and intelligence 
from Coalition forces, and more likely to assist insurgent groups.63 Condra and Shapiro tested for 
causality, and they concluded that the relationship between Coalition-caused civilian casualties 
and subsequent insurgent attacks against Coalition troops was probably causal.64 Condra and 
Shapiro conclude that not only are policies that protect civilians and follow the laws of war a 
                                                
60 Michelle Hansen, “Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of Human Rights Law into 
Armed Conflict” (2007) 194 Mil. L. Rev. 1 at 7 [hereinafter Emasculation of Warfare]. 
61 Luke N. Condra et al. “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq” (2010) National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Paper w16152 [hereinafter Civilian Casualties]. 
62 Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Who Takes the Blame: The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage” 
(2012) 56:1 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 167 at 168 [hereinafter Who Takes the Blame]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. at 176.  
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moral imperative for modern democracies, but they are strategically advantageous as well.65 
Harming civilians can increase risks for security forces while reducing the likelihood that local 
civilians will cooperate in counterinsurgent efforts. The Taliban in Afghanistan also appear to 
have adopted such a policy; therefore, it seems that encouraging state and non-state armed groups 
alike to adhere to the laws of war may be possible, particularly if adherence to the principle of 
civilian immunity is recognized as being strategically advantageous for belligerent parties.66  
This study was followed-up using data from the Iraq War Logs to perform a spatio-
temporal analysis of Coalition-caused casualties and subsequent insurgent attacks against 
Coalition forces in Iraq, and came to the same result.67 The results showed that “Coalition violent 
events strongly predicted subsequent insurgent activity,” particularly in poor Sunni areas.68 
Similar results have been demonstrated by Benmelech et al., who found that preventive house 
demolitions in the Palestinian occupied territories were positively correlated both temporally and 
spatially with subsequent suicide attacks.69 All of these studies lend support to the proposition 
that security forces may be placed at greater risk of insurgent violence when they wrongfully 
attack civilians. On the other hand, Downes and Lyall have found that high levels of violence 
directed against civilians reduced insurgent activities in the Boer War and Chechnya respectively, 
at least in the short term; however, it appears from their studies that in order to have this effect 
the violence needs to be widespread, random and indiscriminate, and therefore would almost 
certainly violate the laws of war.70  Lyall does not argue that this is therefore an effective 
                                                
65 Ibid. at 185.  
66 Ibid. at 185.  
67 John O’Laughlin et al., “Space-Time Granger Analysis of the War in Iraq: A Study of Coalition and Insurgent 
Action” (2012) 38:4 Int’l Interactions 402.  
68 Ibid. at 424.  
69 Efraim Benmelech et al., “Counter-Suicide Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions” (October 2010) 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 16493. Benmelech et al. showed that targeted/punitive 
house demolitions led to a significant decrease in suicide attacks, while preventive house demolitions did not. They 
conclude that targeting known terrorists is an effective means of reducing future attacks, but that indiscriminate 
violence backfires, and leads to an increase in suicide attacks.  
70 Alexander B. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate 
Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy” (2007) 9:4 Civil Wars 420; Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence 
Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya” (2009) 53:3 J. Conflict Resol. 331. Downes found that ethnic 
cleansing could be quite effective, and that when a population is small, homogeneous, and has good incentives to 
cooperate with the counterinsurgent forces, then indiscriminate violence may also be effective. Lyall found that the 
standard Russian counterinsurgent tactic of using random and indiscriminate violence against villages where 
insurgents were present was positively correlated with a decrease in insurgent violence in the 90-day window he 
used. The severity and lethality of the attacks was also positively correlated with a reduction in insurgent attacks, 
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strategy; he notes that the insurgency in Chechnya increased overall during the time period of the 
study, and that such tactics clearly constitute war crimes.71 He does argue that this explains why 
states so often resort to indiscriminate violence in putting down insurgencies: it is sometimes, 
even if rarely, effective, and so states and military authorities will often turn to the tactic of 
indiscriminate violence, always thinking that their case is one of the exceptions.72 This is an 
important lesson for those who wish to change this pattern of resort to indiscriminate violence. 
Two recent studies of civilian casualties in Afghanistan also lend support to the thesis that 
causing civilian casualties is harmful for a counterinsurgent operation. Hultman studied civilian 
casualties in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009, and found that civilian casualties were 
strongly predicted by losses on the part of Coalition forces.73 She states that the findings “support 
the idea that collaterals are mainly the result of poor counterinsurgency performance. The results 
show that, when pro-government forces suffer large losses, they are more likely to engage in 
fighting that leads to higher levels of collateral deaths, implying that they are provoked into a 
response that will be detrimental for the operation in the long run.”74 A further study that 
examined Canadian counterinsurgent strategy in Afghanistan found that when an enemy-centric 
approach, one dedicated towards destroying the insurgency, was replaced in 2009 by a 
population-centric approach, in which the main goal was to provide security to the local 
population, that this resulted in a more controlled and secure environment with fewer attacks 
against Canadian soldiers.75 Osama Ali, a 24-year old Iraqi youth, demonstrates the connection 
between insurgent violence and the problem of mistaken killings when he states, “When the 
Americans fire back they don’t hit the people who are attacking them, only the civilians. This is 
why the Iraqis hate the Americans so much. This is why we love the mujahedeen.”76 Certainly, 
relaxing Rules of Engagement may make it easier for soldiers to wage war by imposing fewer 
                                                                                                                                                        
perhaps because it disrupted movement and supply lines, at 344. Overall, however, the insurgency escalated during 
this time, and Lyall notes that these findings may not be generalizable, at 355.  
71 Ibid. at 355, 358. 
72 Ibid. at 358. 
73 Lisa Hultman, “COIN and Civilian Collaterals: Patterns of Violence in Afghanistan, 2004-2009” (2012) 23:2 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 245 [hereinafter COIN and Civilian Collaterals].  
74 Ibid. at 246. 
75 Eric Jardine and Simon Palamar, “From the Medusa Past Kantolo: Testing the Effectiveness of Canada’s Enemy-
Centric and Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Operational Strategies” (2013) 36:7 Stud. Conflict & Terrorism 
588.  
76 Who Takes the Blame, supra note 62 at 167.  
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restrictions and demands on how they distinguish between militants and civilians, but this may 
not be the best manner in which to protect security forces, or to accomplish the long-term goals 
of reducing insurgent violence.  
Similarly, when we look at the application of actuarial methods of risk assessment to 
more targeted counterterrorism operations, such as ethnic and behavioral profiling at airports and 
security checkpoints, they are also shown to be ineffective and counterproductive. The general 
thinking is that such methods are non-random, that they are targeted, and therefore more 
effective.77 However, actuarial methods of risk assessment are almost wholly preventive, as the 
characteristics used to assess risk are aggregate characteristics, not associated with any individual 
or evidence of any actual wrongdoing on the part of the individual thus targeted.78 Using actuarial 
methods based upon certain signature criteria to catch rare malfeasors, such as terrorists or 
insurgents, is no more mathematically justified than random sampling; rather, such an approach 
is often harmful, as it wastes precious resources on policing innocent individuals.79 This is the 
case even if the data on which the counterterrorism operations are based is unreasonably 
perfect.80 However, in most counterterrorism and counterinsurgent operations, the signature 
criteria used by ordinary soldiers in the field is often far from perfect, and is almost always far 
from being quantitative or reliable. When soldiers must decide if a group of armed men are 
members of a declared hostile force, or if a car approaching a checkpoint at high speed is part of 
an insurgent attack, their decisions are almost always immediate, subjective, and based upon an 
inherent lack of empirical data. Indeed, foreseeability and probability are subjective concepts, 
depending largely on the subjective state of mind of the assessor.81 Civilian casualties that are the 
                                                
77 This is the thinking, for example, behind the Amtrack Police Department’s new “See Something, Say Something” 
campaign, which seeks to target suspicious behaviors, including appearing unusually calm, unusually nervous, 
looking around, and taking photographs. The criteria are overbroad, intended to capture any unusual or suspicious 
behavior, and are therefore not targeted. See: http://police.amtrak.com (accessed 7 November 2014).  
78 William H. Press, “Strong Profiling is Not Mathematically Optimal For Discovering Rare Malfeasors” (2009) 
106:6 P.N.A.S. 1716 at 1716.   
79 Ibid.  
80 William H. Press, “To Catch a Terrorist: Can Ethnic Profiling Work?” (December 2010) 7:4 Significance: 
Statistics Making Sense 164 at 164. See also Willem Schinkel, “Prepression: The Actuarial Archive and the New 
Technologies of Security” (2011) 15:4 Theoretical Criminology 365. The use of signature strikes and targeted killing 
with unmanned aerial vehicles are some of the most developed uses of these actuarial and surveillance technologies, 
and these publications use statistical analyses to present a useful and critical view of their limitations.  
81 Kimberley Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing” (2012) 9 Ohio St. J. 
Crim. Law 669 [hereinafter Culpable Aggression].  
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result of poor performance, reprisal killings, and behavioral profiling or signature criteria are also 
contrary to Article 51 of Protocol I, as they target civilians who are immune from attack, and are 
often indiscriminate by their nature.  
There are therefore good strategic reasons to shift risks away from civilians in 
counterinsurgent and counterterrorism operations, as well as good reasons to question the use of 
behavioral profiling as a method of targeting insurgents. In addition, it can be seen that civilians 
suffered a disproportionate amount of harm in Iraq and Afghanistan as compared with Coalition 
soldiers. Data is available concerning the numbers of American soldiers killed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. A report by Veterans for Common Sense, a U.S. veteran advocacy group, states 
that, as of 2012, 2,333,972 individual Americans had been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.82 
As of 2013, a total of 6,211 U.S. soldiers were killed while on active duty there.83 This gives an 
aggregate death rate of 266 per 100,000 U.S. military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan 
between 2001 and 2013. Some of these deaths were not directly related to hostile activity, such as 
deaths due to accident or illness. In Afghanistan, between 2001 and 2013, 1758 U.S. military 
personnel were killed in non-friendly hostile fire incidents, primarily due to improvised explosive 
devices and small arms fire.84 In Iraq, between 2003 and 2013, 3537 U.S. military personnel were 
killed in non-friendly hostile fire incidents, again, primarily due to improvised explosive devices 
and small arms fire.85 This gives a total of 5295 deaths directly due to hostile acts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and a death rate of 227 per 100,000 soldiers due to non-friendly hostile fire 
incidents.  
                                                
82 Veterans for Common Sense, “Iraq and Afghanistan Impact Report” (January 2012), available at: 
http://veteransforcommonsense.org/2012/01/20/new-veterans-for-common-sense-impact-report-is-now-available/ 
(accessed 18 February 2014). Veterans for Common Sense compiles this information through Freedom of 
Information Act requests from the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. They are the 
only organization to publish figures on the total discrete number of individual Americans deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, an update including the years 2012 and 2013 is not yet available at the time of writing. 
If the total number of Americans deployed were to be higher, then this would lower the overall death rate, as the total 
casualty rate includes all violent deaths that occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 to 2013.  
83 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “Coalition Military fatalities Per Year” (2013), available at: 
http://icasualties.org/Iraq/index.aspx (accessed 8 December 2013) [hereinafter Iraq Casualty Count]. This figure of 
total deaths was compiled by a manual count of the Coalition Military Fatalities data sets, excluding deaths due to 
non-hostile incidents, including friendly-fire, accidents, illness, and suicide. 
84 iCasualties.org, “Database for Operation Enduring Freedom” (2013) [hereinafter Enduring Freedom Casualty 
Count], available at: http://icasualties.org/OEF/Fatalities.aspx (accessed 8 December 2013). The above total was 
arrived at through a manual count of the database, excluding deaths due to non-hostile incidents. 
85 Iraq Casualty Count, supra note 83. 
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Data regarding the number of civilian casualties during the recent conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been difficult to come by, and Coalition forces did not collect data regarding 
civilian casualties. One meta-study reviewed a number of published studies regarding civilian 
casualties caused by the conflict in Iraq up until the year 2008, and found that a 2006 household 
survey undertaken by Burnham et al. was the most methodologically rigorous.86 Burnham et al. 
found that, between the invasion of 10 March 2003 and 15 July 2006, there had been 654,965 
excess deaths among Iraqis due to the war and of these, 601,027 were attributable to violent 
causes.87 Adjusted for the size of the population, this would give a rate of death due to violence 
of 2244 Iraqi civilians per 100,000 for those three years alone.88 Iraqi civilians were therefore 
almost 10 times more likely to die from violence in just the first three years of the war than were 
U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan from all of 2001 to 2013.  
The number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan is even more difficult to establish, as no 
comparable household surveys have been performed there. One survey of 600 communities in 
Afghanistan covering the first nine months after the U.S. invasion of October 200189 found that 
there were 10,770 deaths due to landmines and unexploded ordnance, and 7,773 deaths due to 
aerial bombardment, shooting, and other forms of conflict violence, out of a studied population of 
2 million persons.90 If only the latter figure is taken - landmines and unexploded ordnance may 
have been left from previous conflicts and so cannot be definitively attributed to the U.S. 
invasion - then this gives a death rate of 389 persons per 100,000 Afghan civilians in those 
communities during this time frame. This means that the death rate for Afghan civilians in only 
the first nine months following the U.S. invasion was again significantly higher than the death 
rate for all U.S. soldiers who fought in both conflicts combined. The authors also note that such 
figures do not capture the indirect effects of conflict, which is also a cause of significant loss of 
life and morbidity.91 The World Health Organization has collected data concerning the poor state 
of health of Afghan civilians, who have suffered from many decades of war. For example, 
                                                
86 Christine Tapp, et al., “Iraq War Mortality Estimates: A Systematic Review” (2008) 2:1 Conflict & Health 1.  
87 G. Burnham, et al., “Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey” (2006) 
368 Lancet 1421. 
88 Based upon a UN estimated Iraqi population of 26,783,383 persons as of July 2006.  
89 Aldo A. Benini, and Lawrence H. Moulton, “Civilian Victims in an Asymmetrical Conflict: Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Afghanistan” (July 2004) 41:4 J. Peace Res. 403 at 409 [hereinafter Civilian Victims in Afghanistan].  
90 Ibid. at 411.  
91 Ibid. at 421.  
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maternal mortality in Afghanistan during the years 2009-2013 was 460 per 100,000 live births.92 
This alone is higher than the death rate of U.S. soldiers due to hostile fire for both conflicts 
combined.  
The risks to civilians in conflict zones are therefore significant and multifaceted. Jennifer 
Turpin has found that civilian casualties increased from 50% of all casualties to 90% of all 
casualties in the years between World War II and 1998, and the majority of these victims were 
women and children.93 Moreover, the data indicate that civilians in the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were significantly more likely to die in conflict-related violence than were U.S. 
soldiers, by almost a factor of 10 in the case of Iraq. This should give pause to those who would 
argue that the risks of waging war should be further shifted away from soldiers and onto 
civilians, who are already bearing the brunt of war’s violence.  
 
1.2 Towards a Defensive Reformulation of the Principle of Distinction 
Both the traditional definition of civilian direct participation as found in Article 51(3) of 
Protocol I and that found in modern Rules of Engagement are closely bound up with the problem 
of mistaken self-defense, in that they both ask how we are to know whether a particular 
individual in an armed conflict poses a threat such that they forfeit their immunity from attack. 
Certainly, domestic legal systems have developed rules for governing the use of defensive force 
in criminal and tort law, but there is a great variation in standards between and even within 
jurisdictions, and the rules for defensive force are the subject of much debate and contention. 
Legal standards governing self-defense may also differ significantly in tort cases as compared 
with criminal cases. Also, many legal systems, particularly in the United States, have developed 
rules and biases that are highly deferential to police and soldiers who raise the defense of self-
defense when they kill in the course of their duties.94  Holding security forces to account for the 
                                                
92 World Health Organization, “Maternal Mortality Ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)” (2013), 
available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT (accessed 9 December 2013).  
93 Jennifer Turpin, “Many Faces: Women Confronting War” in Lois A. Lorentzen, and Jennifer Turpin, eds., The 
Women and War Reader (New York: New York University Press, 1998) 1 at 3.   
94 This is particularly the case in the United States. See: Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386 (1989) at 396-7, in which the court found that the reasonableness of the use of force was to be 
determined “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) at 559; 
and Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994) at 1148, in which the court held that police are not 
required to use “all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiable be used.” The 
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excessive use of force is difficult, even in Western democracies with advanced legal systems, and 
there are certainly dangers in transplanting into an armed conflict laws that are already 
inadequate, without addressing matters of fundamental justice surrounding the use of defensive 
force. There are several tasks, therefore, that must be accomplished before defensive rules can be 
adapted for use during armed conflict to distinguish civilians who have forfeited their lives 
through their conduct. First, the rules adopted must be those that protect civilian lives, prevent 
mistaken killings, and promote best practices and accountability among security forces. Second, 
the rules must be adapted to be consistent with the rules and values of the international laws of 
armed conflict, particularly rules governing civilian direct participation, as well as the rights to 
life and equality under the law. The third, and likely most difficult, task is to change the way the 
armed forces frame their decisions to use lethal force, restricting the use of prejudices and 
replacing subjective discretion with the constraints of institutionalized decision-making 
procedures.  
This section will describe the basic elements of the laws regulating the use of lethal force 
in self-defense, and will seek to define defensive force in a way that is compatible with the laws 
of armed conflict and the protection of civilians, beginning with a short review of the laws of the 
United States military, the United Kingdom and Canada, those nations most prevalent in the 
Coalition forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. The next section will discuss the evidentiary 
standard to be met in determining when civilians forfeit their immunity from attack by 
participating directly in hostilities. The ordinary standard that is used in cases of self-defense is 
one of reasonableness, but the reasonableness of a defender’s actions is often determined by 
                                                                                                                                                        
Washington Post recently reported, after a Grand Jury in St. Louis failed to return an indictment against Officer 
Darren Wilson, who is accused of fatally shooting Michael Brown, that fewer than eight percent of complaints of 
excessive force are upheld against police by their departments. Despite the excessive controversy caused by these 
cases, the latest year for which data have been analyzed is 2002. See: C.D. Leonnig, “Current Law Gives Police 
Wide Latitude to Use Deadly Force” The Washington Post (28 August 2014), available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/current-law-gives-police-wide-latitude-to-use-deadly-
force/2014/08/28/768090c4-2d64-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html (accessed 26 November 2014). See also: 
Wesley Lowery, “How Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows” The Washington Post (8 September 2014), 
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-shootings-a-year-
no-one-knows/ (accessed 26 November 2014), in which he reports that the U.S. Department of Justice does not keep 
data on how many persons are shot by police officers each year, and does not require local police departments to 
report this data. See also: Geoffrey P. Alpert and William C. Smith, “How Reasonable is the Reasonable Man?: 
Police and Excessive Force” (1994) 85:2 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 481 at 482, in which the authors state that police 
use of force reporting in the United States is not mandatory, and statistics are often neither kept nor reviewed.  
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reference to a number of subjective factors, many of which can interfere with reliable decision-
making. Decisions to use lethal force in war can come to seem intuitively reasonable based upon 
subjective biases and prejudices, and for this reason subjective factors ought to be minimized 
when making these decisions. Instead, an objective evidence-based standard is proposed, 
meaning that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the civilian is engaged in conduct 
that would forfeit their immunity from attack. The following section will define civilian direct 
participation in hostilities in terms of posing a wrongful threat of harm, rather than merely 
interfering with military objectives. In Chapter Two, I discuss the development of the concept of 
civilian direct participation, and argue that conceiving of civilian direct participation in terms of 
wrongful harm is consistent with the meaning and spirit of the international humanitarian law.  
 
1.2.1 Soldiers and the Law of Self-Defense 
The self-defensive rules in military law governing soldiers’ conduct generally import the 
civilian laws concerning self-defense. Both the UCMJ,95 and the United Kingdom Armed Forces 
Act96 are silent as to defenses. The Canadian Code of Service Discipline states specifically that 
ordinary civil defenses apply to any justification or excuse in any proceedings.97 The U.S. 
Manual for Military Courts Martial states that in cases of homicide or the use of deadly force, 
self-defense would apply when the accused apprehended on reasonable grounds that death or 
grievous bodily harm was about to be inflicted wrongfully, and that the accused believed that the 
amount of force used was necessary for protection against that harm.98 The Manual explains that 
the first criterion, which goes to the existence of the threat, is based upon a standard of objective 
reasonableness, whereas the second criterion, which goes to the proportionality of the force used 
to repel the threat, is a subjective standard, based upon what the individual believed was 
necessary under their unique circumstances.99 The defense is not available to one who was an 
                                                
95 UCMJ, supra note 41.  
96 United Kingdom Armed Forces Act (U.K.), 2006, c. 52.  
97 National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, at s. 151. 
98 United States Department of the Army, Manual for Military Courts Martial, 2012 Edition (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2012) at s. 916(e), at p. II-111 [hereinafter Manual for Military Courts Martial].  
99 Ibid. Caroline Farrell states that the law used by the military is generally in line with the basic requirements of 
self-defense law in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. See: Caroline Farrell, “What’s Reasonable? Self-Defense and 
Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law” (2010) 14:4 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1401 at 1403.  
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aggressor, or who provoked an attack.100 In Canadian law, the rules regarding self-defense are set 
out in section 34 of the Criminal Code, which states that under ordinary Canadian law, self-
defense would excuse an offence if (a) the offender believes on reasonable grounds that force is 
being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or 
another person; and (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of 
defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the 
act committed is reasonable in the circumstances.101 Section 34(2) describes a number of factors 
to be considered in determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, 
stating that “the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties 
and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors,” including the nature of the force 
or threat,102 the person’s role in the incident,103 i.e. whether they were the aggressor or provoked 
the threat, as well as a number of subjective factors, such as the nature of the relationship 
between the parties,104 and the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the defendant.105  
The law of the United Kingdom is broadly similar, requiring a standard of reasonableness 
in determining the existence of a threat, but permitting this reasonableness to be determined in 
light of the subjective views of the defendant. However, the UK law validates the subjective 
beliefs of the defender in cases of mistaken self-defense. The UK Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act states that whether the degree of force used was reasonable depends upon “the 
circumstances as D [the defendant] believed them to be.”106 However, the Act further states that 
“If D claims to have held a particular belief as regards the existence of any circumstances”107 and 
“if it is determined that D did genuinely hold it, then D is entitled to rely on it for the purposes of 
subsection (3), whether or not – (i) it was mistaken, or (ii) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a 
reasonable one to have made.108 Therefore, according to the ordinary laws concerning self-
defense in the U.S., Canada and the United Kingdom, even an unreasonable but sincerely held 
                                                
100 Ibid.  
101 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. 46, s. 34(1), as amended 16 December 2014.  
102 Ibid. at s. 34(2)(a).  
103 Ibid. at s. 34(2)(c). 
104 Ibid. at s. 34(2)(f). 
105 Ibid. at s. 34(2)(e). 
106 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (U.K.), 2008, c. 4, Part 5, s. 76(3).  
107 Ibid. at s. 76(4).  
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belief may excuse a killing that has been performed in mistake. However, there a number of 
reasons why a standard of reasonableness is not an appropriate standard to use in setting rules of 
engagement for armed conflict, a topic that is addressed in the following section.  
 
1.2.2 Forfeiting Civilian Immunity: Objective versus Subjective Standards 
When approaching cases of mistaken self-defense, there are three broad epistemological 
positions that can be used to determine whether the use of force was justified. This might be 
determined based upon the facts as they objectively are; if, in fact, the victim is innocent, then the 
use of force is unjustified.109 At the other end of the spectrum is the determination of liability 
based upon the subjective beliefs of the defender; as long as a belief is genuinely held, then the 
use of force will be justified, even if the belief is unreasonable in the circumstances.110 Between 
these, there exists a middle position, which seeks to adjudge the use of force based upon the 
evidence available to the defender at the time.111  
The problem of distinction might be approached by requiring that civilians forfeit their 
immunity only when it is objectively true on the facts that the civilian has indeed participated 
directly in hostilities. To do so would be to reject a reasonableness standard entirely, and instead 
adopt one of objective facts. This would be consistent with the wording of Protocol I. However, 
an objective standard would always find mistaken killings to be wrongful, even in cases in which 
the true facts are not and could not be known by the defender. A standard based only on facts as 
they are therefore sets a very high bar, as defenders will rarely have all of the relevant facts 
before them; they must necessarily respond to a risk, rather than a certainty. This makes a wholly 
objective standard unfeasible in practice, and provides little practical guidance on how to make 
such decisions under conditions of uncertainty. On the other hand, adopting a standard based on 
the subjective beliefs of the defender errs too far in validating even those defensive killings that 
are unreasonable in the circumstances. To use such a standard when apportioning punishment in 
criminal cases may well be justified, but to use a subjective standard to make decisions at the 
outset would facilitate mistaken killings, and create a climate of impunity for security forces. In 
the extreme, this can amount to giving state agents a virtual carte blanche to kill; when the target 
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population is largely made up of a foreign or marginalized population, this can create an 
untenable, yet subtle, situation of systematic oppression that is difficult to diagnose and 
counteract. In many ways, this describes the situation created by Coalition forces operating in 
Iraq and Afghanistan in the case studies discussed in Chapter Four. Decisions to use force are 
best made by rejecting both the omniscient and subjective positions, and instead taking the 
middle position that these decisions are best guided by the evidence available to the soldier at the 
time. This shifts the inquiry away from the soldier’s beliefs and perceptions, and instead seeks 
evidence concerning what it is the civilian has done, and whether these actions would forfeit their 
immunity.  
When the matter is not being litigated under the criminal law, courts choose very different 
standards to adjudge cases of mistaken self-defense; here, the issue is not one of justifying 
punishment, but in identifying wrongs that are deserving of a remedy. One case that addresses 
these issues is the UK case of Ashley, which concerned a police officer who shot and killed the 
victim during a raid to execute a warrant on him at his home; at the time of the shooting, the 
victim was just getting out of bed, and was unclothed and unarmed.112 The officer involved had 
been acquitted of criminal charges on grounds that he honestly but mistakenly believed his use of 
force was necessary. However, the present case was brought by the victim’s heirs to request 
compensation for his wrongful killing, which they were granted. The Court of Appeal held that, 
while we do not generally punish people for honest mistakes, this is quite different than 
determining whether the defendant’s actions were objectively justified.113 Tort law upholds the 
rights that every person possesses not to be wrongfully harmed, and others are required to respect 
these rights.114 The Court found that three different standards might be applied to the mistaken 
use of defensive force: a subjective standard, which is appropriate for criminal cases, a purely 
objective standard of liability that would not excuse even reasonable mistakes, and a standard in 
between these two that would excuse a mistake, but only when the false beliefs were at least 
                                                
112 Ashley v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police, [2008] 1 A.C. 962 at para. 6. See also: Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 
509, 514 (La. Ct. App. 1995), a case involving a tort claim for wrongful death brought by the parents of a Japanese 
exchange student who had been shot by Mr. Peairs, whose home he approached on a Halloween night. Peairs had 
been acquitted of a criminal charge of homicide, but was held responsible in this civil suit, with the court stating that 
“There was absolutely no need to resort to the use of a dangerous weapon to repel an attack[.].”  
113 Ibid. at para. 17.  
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reasonably held – “and it may be,” the Court stated, “that even that would not suffice to establish 
the defence”115 in a civil suit. In fact, the Court found that a standard of liability based upon 
objective facts - one that would hold a defendant responsible for even reasonable mistakes - “has 
a good deal to be said for it,” and that “I would, for my part, regard the point as remaining 
open.”116 
Therefore, in apportioning punishment, the law might utilize a more subjective standard, 
as the issue is the moral culpability and thus the punishment to be assigned to the offender. In 
determining whether the victim has been wronged, then an objective standard of liability, based 
on actual facts, may be the most appropriate means to apportion compensation for harms 
suffered. There seems to be no reason why these standards ought not to apply to soldiers and 
security forces in counterinsurgent operations abroad, as they apply to domestic police; indeed, 
U.S. forces instituted several compensation programs for civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan who 
had been harmed as a result of the actions of U.S. personnel, and this seems an appropriate 
response in cases where mistakes cannot be avoided.117 However, when determining the use of 
force at the outset, an evidence-based standard should be preferred over a standard based upon 
either subjective beliefs or objective facts, as it will best minimize subjective factors and ensure 
accurate decision-making at the outset.  
 
1.2.3 The Standard of Reasonableness 
A defensive killing will normally be permissible under the law if the person’s actions 
were reasonable under the circumstances.118 Within this, there can be a greater or a lesser reliance 
on subjective beliefs versus objective standards. The criteria for reasonableness are by no means 
clear, and can vary widely among jurisdictions. In U.S. law, ‘reasonableness’ simply means a 
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117 United States Government Accountability Office, The Department of Defense’s Use of Solatia and Condolence 
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“reasonable belief that he or she is in imminent or immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm and 
the use of force is necessary to avoid this danger.”119 A perpetrator who kills a victim who was 
not, in fact, about to cause them unlawful bodily harm, would be acquitted under normal self-
defense rules if those beliefs were honest and reasonable, even if mistaken.120 Within this, there 
also exists a continuum of objective versus subjective methods of assessing the reasonableness of 
the perpetrator’s beliefs. More objective means of characterizing the behavior examine what an 
objectively reasonable person would have believed and done in the circumstances, whereas more 
subjective methods of determining reasonableness focus on the perpetrator’s subjective state of 
mind at the time of the killing. Objective standards of reasonableness tend to use the law 
instrumentally, to enforce certain standards of community behavior, whereas a subjective 
approach focuses on an actor’s state of mind in order to determine his or her level of moral 
culpability.121 For these reasons, the usual legal standard of reasonableness is not the same as a 
standard based upon evidence that the victim has forfeited his or her right to life; even the more 
objective standards of reasonableness focus on what the defender ought to have perceived and 
done, and not on whether the victim’s actions justified the killing.  
One case that has addressed the reasonableness of the use of lethal force by soldiers in 
self-defense is that of Clegg.122 This case employed a subjectively reasonable standard, and it 
demonstrates the difficulties that such a standard poses when prosecuting soldiers for killing 
civilians. This holds true even when soldiers are held to the same standard as other individuals, 
and the public prosecution service expends considerable time and resources to prosecute the 
soldiers involved. Clegg concerned the killing of several teenagers at a checkpoint staffed by 
British soldiers in Northern Ireland. On the evening of 30 September 1990, British soldiers set up 
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120 Ibid. at 389. 
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a checkpoint for the purpose of monitoring youths joyriding in stolen vehicles.123 The purpose of 
the mission was therefore to enforce public order and discipline amidst ongoing sectarian 
tensions, and was not directed against terrorism suspects.124 A vehicle approached the checkpoint 
at a high speed and did not stop when requested to do so. Private Clegg fired his weapon four 
times at the vehicle as it passed through the checkpoint. The fourth shot killed a teenaged girl 
sitting in the back seat of the vehicle.125 This situation is thus very similar to those facing soldiers 
who are staffing checkpoints in counterinsurgent and stability operations abroad. In this case, the 
defense introduced evidence to show that the fatal bullet may have been fired before the vehicle 
went through the checkpoint, and not after; this was an important point, as Clegg had testified at 
trial that he subjectively believed that after the car had passed the checkpoint there was no longer 
any danger to himself or his fellow soldiers, and he therefore believed that such a shot could not 
be justified on grounds of self-defense.126 Two other British soldiers in the case were convicted 
of perjury and obstruction of justice for fabricating exonerating evidence: one soldier had falsely 
claimed to have been struck by the vehicle, while another soldier had in fact stamped on his 
leg.127 
The House of Lords of the United Kingdom and the Appeals Court of Northern Ireland 
both found that ordinary laws and legal standards could and should apply to govern defensive 
actions by soldiers.128 The House of Lords found that the standard to be used was one of 
reasonableness, and no exceptions were to be made for security forces acting in the course of 
their duties.129 The House of Lords in Clegg was not specific about the precise scope of the 
reasonableness standard to be used, most likely because the Court found this to be a clear case of 
the excessive use of force.130 However, Clegg was eventually acquitted at his retrial because 
forensic evidence cast a reasonable doubt as to whether he fired his weapon after the vehicle went 
through the checkpoint. This outcome was the cause of riots and further sectarian tensions, and 
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fed perceptions among the Catholic population that British soldiers would not be held 
accountable for killing civilians.131  
Clegg demonstrates that allowing soldiers to define their own subjective standards of 
reasonableness can lead to mistaken killings, and that this can create a climate of impunity that 
has significant negative political consequences in conflict situations. A further reason to adopt 
objective standards of reasonableness is the danger that subjective beliefs may be influenced by 
stress,132 as well as dehumanizing and racist stereotypes; both of these are very real dangers in 
conflict zones when security forces are tasked with policing foreign populations. Employing 
objective criteria to determine the use of lethal force can minimize the use of prejudicial and 
dehumanizing stereotypes as a motivation to engage in the overuse of force against a civilian 
population. Recall that Hultman has stated that stresses of combat and recent attacks can 
influence soldiers to overuse force against a target population.133 Lee states that “[u]nder a 
subjective standard of reasonableness, if a defendant honestly but erroneously believes persons of 
a particular racial group are peculiarly susceptible to aggressive conduct, and acts on this belief 
by using deadly force against members of this racial group whenever he encounters them, the 
defendant may be acquitted.”134 There is a danger that gauging the reasonableness of soldiers’ 
actions by a subjective standard simply comes to refer to those norms and beliefs that are typical 
or commonly held by soldiers, and may not describe conduct that is objectively justified or 
normatively desirable.135 Soldiers may view the local population as being dangerous and hostile, 
and so come to believe that any suspicious behavior ought to be met with a swift and decisive use 
of lethal force. As seen above, this response may be out of proportion to the actual risks posed by 
the typical civilian in a conflict zone.  
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Using objective criteria to govern the use of lethal force by security forces may help to 
reduce tensions by limiting the mistaken killing of civilians, and send a message to the local 
population that security forces will be held to account for killings that are objectively 
unreasonable. In fact, when the U.S. Marine Corps introduced a revolutionary new 
counterinsurgent doctrine in 2006, they stated that a measured use of force is crucial to the 
success of such missions. The 2006 U.S. COIN Manual states that the “cornerstone of any COIN 
effort is establishing security for the civilian populace.”136 Excessive force undermines the goals 
of counterinsurgency, which are to build effective and legitimate governance,137 and the rule of 
law.138 The U.S. COIN Manual itself states that using excessive force, arbitrary detentions, and 
torture is self-defeating, “even against insurgents who conceal themselves amid noncombatants 
and flout the law.”139 The U.S. COIN Manual states that public perceptions of justice are 
important to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, for “[a]ny human rights abuses or legal violations 
committed by U.S. forces quickly become known throughout the local populace and eventually 
around the world.”140 Respecting human rights is therefore presented as a key component of 
counterinsurgent and stability operations, and Rules of Engagement that authorize force ought to 
be interpreted in ways that demonstrate a deep respect for human rights and that minimize the use 
of excessive force. Not only is this consistent with international law, but also with U.S.’s own 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  
However, this is not how U.S. Rules of Engagement operated on the ground. There is 
evidence that U.S. soldiers deployed in Iraq held negative perceptions about the local population 
that may have contributed to abuses of civilians. A 2006 survey of soldiers and Marines deployed 
to Iraq undertaken by the U.S. Army Surgeon General’s Mental Health Advisory Team found 
that 10% of soldiers and Marines reported having mistreated Iraqi civilians.141 This included 
damaging or destroying Iraqi civilians’ property when not necessary, or hitting or kicking a non-
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combatant when not necessary.142 The majority of military personnel sampled knew someone 
who had been a casualty, or had a member of their unit become a casualty,143 and almost 50% 
expressed frustration over Rules of Engagement that they felt were too restrictive and placed 
them at greater risk.144 Many soldiers expressed concern and fear over improvised explosive 
devices and sniper fire, risks that they could not predict or control, and which caused them severe 
stress.145 Soldiers expressed a particular concern that they could not engage with force when 
Iraqis threw chunks of concrete at their vehicles, until the Rules of Engagement were altered to 
permit this.146 However, a manual review of all deaths among Coalition soldiers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan indicates that no military personnel were killed in this manner.147 Soldiers may 
therefore be systematically overestimating the risks posed by the local population, and their 
propensity to use force against civilians may be exacerbated by the stresses of combat.148  
 
1.3 Defining Civilian Direct Participation in Hostilities  
The definition proposed herein is that a civilian participates directly in hostilities, and so 
forfeits immunity from attack, only when there is clear and convincing evidence that he or she is 
engaged in an act of aggression that wrongfully, i.e. without lawful authority, justification or 
excuse, poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to civilians or member of armed 
forces, and the use of force is necessary and proportionate to prevent that harm. Force will be 
necessary and proportionate only after de-escalation of force procedures have been diligently 
applied, and the consequences of the use of force on the surrounding population would not be 
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indiscriminate or disproportionate, or be such as to spread terror. Each of these elements will be 
discussed below in turn.  
 
1.3.1 Clear and Convincing Evidence of Forfeiture of Immunity 
As can be seen from the above discussion, even an objective standard of reasonableness is 
not by itself sufficient to adjudge that a civilian has forfeited their immunity from attack. Such a 
standard may simply amount to asking what a reasonable soldier, holding views that are common 
among those same soldiers, would generally think and feel under the circumstances. If soldiers 
typically or commonly hold biases about the dangerousness of a civilian population, then this 
standard would validate those prejudices, rather than minimize them. This is the paradox of 
‘reasonableness’: the more common and approved of are dehumanizing beliefs, the more they 
come to seem reasonable; at the same time, violence can become more widespread and egregious 
as a result of these beliefs, while making them easier for individuals to justify subjectively. Such 
positive feedback loops can increase the violence of war and ethnic conflict, and they contribute 
to the commission of atrocities and genocide.149  
Amos Guiora, a former legal advisor to the Israeli Defense Forces who was involved in 
decisions that authorized targeted killings, reminds us that the only permissible goal is the correct 
identification of a legitimate target, “otherwise, the state’s action is illegal, immoral and 
ultimately ineffective.”150 An objective, criteria-based, decision-making process is required to 
isolate and identify the key pieces of information, and to minimize mistakes.151 Subjective and 
contextual factors are always present, but an objective criteria-based decision-making process can 
constrain these subjective factors within permissible bounds.152 An objective standard is desirable 
precisely because it asks not what a reasonable soldier would do, but what he or she ought to do 
in order to comply with the laws of armed combat, and the requirement to protect civilians in 
Protocol I. As stated above, one way of resolving this is to abandon both the omniscient and the 
subjective points of view, and instead inquire into the evidence available at the time, asking 
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whether the evidence indicates that the civilian is engaged in conduct that would forfeit their 
immunity from attack.  
The weight of the evidence required in order to establish that civilians’ conduct has 
forfeited their immunity has not been made clear in the international law. Because the laws of 
armed conflict require a presumption of civilian immunity,153 the available evidence must 
therefore be sufficient to rebut this presumption.154 There is no general rule as to the weight of 
the evidence required to meet a presumption; this might range from a scintilla of evidence, to a 
preponderance of the evidence, to a standard beyond a reasonable doubt.155 No such rule appears 
in the laws of armed conflict to provide guidance, but it is clear that the rule is intended to protect 
civilians, and that is a cornerstone of the laws of war. Therefore, the presumption is a strong one. 
The right at stake, the right not to be arbitrarily or wrongfully killed, is also a weighty one, with 
grave consequences for its breach. A lower standard of evidence would not be sufficient to 
prevent mistaken killings and do justice. A higher standard of evidence, such as certainty, or 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, suffers from the same flaws as a standard of objective fact, 
and security forces would be unlikely to adopt such a rule.  
Recall that Protocol I prohibits methods and means of warfare that are unable to 
distinguish between civilians and military targets.156 This would certainly rule out any standard, 
such as a scintilla of evidence, or a mere probability, that the civilian poses a threat. Even the 
usual civil standard of requiring that the civilian pose a threat of harm on a balance of 
probabilities would be insufficient. If the tactics soldiers use were to kill civilians 49% of the 
time, for example, and strike military targets 51% of the time, then it is difficult to argue that 
such tactics are able to distinguish civilian from military targets, and are not indiscriminate. We 
ought to require a standard of evidence that is able to accurately distinguish between civilians and 
civilian participants at least a clear majority of the time. In order to strike a balance, while 
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providing clarity to ordinary soldiers, I argue that a ‘clear and convincing’ standard would do 
justice.157 This standard is not so stringent as to require that soldiers assume an omniscient 
position, while prohibiting the use of force against threats that are not probable. It also excludes 
evidence that is itself unreliable. Guiora notes that we should be wary of basing these decisions 
upon intelligence that may be unreliable, or that comes from a dubious source.158 In this way, a 
civilian would retain their immunity from attack only if there is clear and convincing evidence 
that they are engaged in conduct that would forfeit their immunity. The next section will address 
the individual elements of self-defense, and describe the conduct that would forfeit a civilian’s 
immunity, and so permit the use of defensive force against them.  
 
1.3.2 A Wrongful Act of Aggression 
The first element of a permissible claim to use defensive force is that the civilian must 
commit an act of aggression, which means a wrongful act that threatens to cause death or serious 
bodily harm to another. There are two components to this definition. First, the act must be 
wrongful; second, the act must meet the threshold of harm such that it is capable of causing death 
or serious bodily harm. In the chapters that follow, and in the case studies explored in Chapter 
Four, it can be seen that both the Interpretive Guidance and standard Rules of Engagement 
permit the use of lethal force against civilians where even a wrongful act of aggression is not 
present.  
As discussed above, the Interpretive Guidance defines civilian direct participation in 
terms of activities related to an armed conflict, i.e. in terms of activities that would tend to 
adversely affect one party or side in the conflict, and not whether the act poses a risk of harm.159 
Both the Interpretive Guidance and standard Rules of Engagement also allow for the use of force 
against members of militant groups, even when they are not participating directly in hostilities; 
there are few criteria on how membership is to be adjudged but, as I will demonstrate, this may 
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be based upon activities that also do not pose a risk of harm: interfering with military 
equipment,160 or logistics and communications,161 clearing landmines and unexploded 
ordnance,162 participating in demonstrations,163 attending at certain private homes or public 
gatherings,164 being a military-aged male in the vicinity of a strike zone,165 the wearing of certain 
brands of apparel,166 or even being associated with suspect persons through familial and social 
relationships,167 have all been considered as acts that forfeit one’s immunity to attack, as have 
financing, training, and supplying food to rebel groups,168 as well as advertising or publishing 
materials.169 Many of these activities not only do not pose an imminent threat of harm, but may 
well be lawful according to the civilians’ own domestic laws, and even protected by international 
human rights laws. Where such activities are not lawful, domestic laws already provide a remedy. 
Where this is not the case, then the claim being made is that armed forces ought to be permitted 
to kill civilians who are engaged in lawful activities because a belligerent party considers that 
such acts might adversely affect their military operations. Not only is it undesirable to govern war 
by such rules, but there is nothing in the law concerning civilian immunity as outlined in the 
Protocols Additional that would support this interpretation. Therefore, this dissertation proposes 
that civilian direct participation be defined in terms of the threat of harm that the civilian 
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wrongfully poses to other persons. The forfeiture of civilian immunity would then be determined 
according to the rules that permit the use of defensive force.  
One classic definition of self-defense is provided by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her 1991 
article on self-defense, in which she argues that one is liable to defensive killing because they 
violate a right that you have not to be killed, and in so doing have forfeited their own right, 
stating “it is not because they will otherwise kill you that you may proceed; it is because of the 
entirely impersonal fact that they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you that you 
may proceed.”170 Two elements of this definition are important for resolving the problem of 
distinction in war. First, Thomson’s definition espouses a rights based view, in which the target’s 
right to life is recognized, and both the target and the defender’s rights to life are placed on an 
equal footing; an act of aggression will forfeit one’s right to life not because the defender’s life is 
merely to be preferred to that of the target, but because the threat posed by the target wrongfully 
threatens the rights of the defender. Second, Thomson’s definition shifts the emphasis away from 
the defender’s beliefs and perceptions, and places it on the target’s actions by asking what it is 
the target needs to do in order to forfeit her right to life. The forfeiture of civilian immunity 
should not be dependent upon soldiers’ - often fallible - perceptions, but upon what conduct a 
civilian intentionally engages in, and for which she would bear responsibility. Conduct-based 
criteria guarantee to the civilian “a basic level of protection – not to be directly targeted if she 
does not participate in hostilities.”171 It ought to be clear to any civilian what she needs to do in 
order to maintain her immunity from attack, and refraining from participating directly in 
hostilities is a choice that any civilian can make. The criteria set out in the Interpretive Guidance 
and standard Rules of Engagement break this bargain, as they permit individual civilians to be 
attacked intentionally even when they do refrain from engaging in hostile acts. It is unclear what 
a civilian could do to avoid being deemed to be harboring a hostile intent, or deemed to be posing 
some level of risk to military operations, or deemed to be associating with a prohibited group, 
and thus to maintain her immunity. 
                                                
170 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self-Defense” (1991) 20:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 283 at 308 [emphasis in 
original].  
171 Naz Modirzadeh, “The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict” (2010) 86 U.S. Naval War College Int’l L. Stud. (Blue Book) Series 349 at 
363.  
  42"
Jeff McMahan would modify Thomson’s definition of permissible defensive killing, 
arguing that simply posing a threat is too wide a criterion to use in justifying force. To illustrate 
his point, he gives the example of a murderer who is about to kill innocent people, and asserts 
that “the police officer who takes aim to shoot him does not thereby make herself morally liable 
to defensive action, and if the murderer kills her in self-defense, he adds one more murder to his 
list of offences.”172 McMahan likens this situation to that of just and unjust combatants in an 
armed conflict; unjust combatants, like the murderer, have no right of self-defense against just 
combatants, who stand in the same position as the police officer. Any killing committed by unjust 
combatants is therefore a crime, whereas it is never legitimate to kill just combatants, even in 
self-defense.173 McMahan claims that it is only permissible to attack in war if the target is 
morally responsible for posing an objectively unjustified threat of harm.174 Civilians who acquire 
arms and begin to fight “are now doing harm, and have made themselves into dangerous men, 
and thus have become legitimate targets,”175 provided that their use of force is not itself justified; 
forming part of a levée en masse would be one such justification that is permitted by the laws of 
war. In justifying self-defensive killings in war in this way, McMahan proposes one advance over 
Thomson’s definition, which is that the civilian must be “morally responsible” for posing the 
threat of harm. Here, the wrongfulness of the harm is defined in terms of the moral responsibility 
on the part of the civilian for engaging in the act of aggression, without justification or excuse.  
In order to ensure that defensive force is being accurately used against a perceived 
threat,176 Ferzan proposes that “the question should be what the offender must do that creates 
such an appearance such that he is liable to defensive force.”177 In this formulation, defensive 
force may only be used against those who are morally responsible for posing a threat, but the gap 
between the target’s responsibility and the defender’s perceptions is bridged by only permitting 
defensive force when the target is responsible for engaging in acts of aggression that give rise to 
that perception of risk. Therefore, a defender would have permission to use force if the target is 
engaged in what Ferzan terms an act of aggression, which means to purposefully, knowingly, or 
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recklessly and without justification engage in conduct that would lead a defender to believe that 
lethal force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm.178 Therefore, the question is 
whether there was clear and convincing evidence that the civilian engaged, purposefully, 
knowingly, or recklessly, and without justification in a wrongful act of aggression.  
One United States military court martial that illustrates the principle of wrongful 
aggression is that of Behenna. First Lt. Michael Behenna was court martialled for killing an Iraqi 
detainee, Ali Mansour, during an interrogation.179 Behenna had argued that the killing was 
performed in self-defense, after Mansour had thrown a chunk of concrete at him. The Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Behenna was the aggressor in this case. He had taken the 
prisoner to a remote location, stripped him naked and interrogated him at gunpoint. The court 
found that his force was unauthorized and excessive, and therefore he could not claim self-
defense when the prisoner fought back.180 Here, the court found both that the use of force by the 
detainee was not wrongful, as the soldier had provoked it by his own wrongful act of aggression, 
and furthermore that the act of throwing a piece of concrete did not pose a risk of death or serious 
bodily harm to the soldier. This decision is in line with the proposed definition of civilian direct 
participation, as well as the usual law concerning defensive force as applied by the U.S. military.  
As in Behenna, a threat must meet the threshold of harm in that the aggressor’s behavior 
must pose a risk of death or serious bodily harm before the use of lethal force will be permissible. 
In the example above, U.S. soldiers in Iraq were concerned about local civilians throwing 
concrete projectiles at their vehicles and convoys as they passed by, and they believed that their 
Rules of Engagement ought to permit them to use force in these cases. States do not normally 
make the claim that throwing rocks or other projectiles constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities; rather, states generally argue that the use of force is justified on grounds of self-
defense as found in standard Rules of Engagement, despite the fact that the aggressors do not 
pose a risk of death or serious harm to the soldiers.181 In one incident that took place during the 
initial invasion of Iraq on 24 March 2003, soldiers from the United Kingdom shot and killed an 
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Iraqi civilian who had thrown rocks at them.182 The Attorney General of the United Kingdom 
declined to prosecute the soldiers, on the grounds that they had acted in self-defense, and in 
accordance with their Rules of Engagement.183 Note that the Attorney General did not excuse the 
soldiers on the grounds that the Iraqi civilian was participating directly in hostilities by throwing 
the rocks. On the other hand, a recent review of the use of deadly force by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection agents found serious problems with the use of deadly force against civilians 
throwing rocks against Customs and Border Patrol Officers, and recommended that the policy be 
changed to state clearly that “Officers/agents are prohibited from using deadly force against 
subjects throwing objects not capable of causing serious physical injury or death to them.”184 
These are best practices that should apply equally to soldiers as to border patrol officers.  
 
1.3.3 Imminent Harm 
The proposed definition of civilian direct participation requires that the threatened harm 
be imminent. Imminence is often a requirement of laws governing self-defense; recall that the 
U.S. Manual for Military Courts Martial requires that “death or grievous bodily harm was about 
to be inflicted wrongfully.”185 There is widespread disagreement as to whether imminence is a 
separate requirement, or whether it is simply one component of determining whether the use of 
force is necessary, and it is not necessary to resolve this debate here. However, when addressing 
the question of when armed force have permission to kill civilians during armed conflict, 
imminence serves a valuable function in excluding cases where there is merely an inchoate or 
speculative threat of future harm, and requiring imminent harm therefore serves to prevent 
killings that are merely pre-emptive.  
Russell Christopher has argued that imminence is not a necessary component of a 
justified claim of self-defense, that the use of force may be valid even in cases in which the harm 
is not “about to be” inflicted. His argument centres on the fact that requiring imminence can lead 
                                                
182 Charles Garroway, The “War on Terror”: Do the Rules Need Changing? (London: Chatham House, 2006) at 8, 
note 126. 
183 Ibid. 
184 The Police Executive Research Forum, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Use of Force Review: Cases and 
Policies (Washington, D.C.: The Police Executive Research Forum, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Customs Use of Force 
Review] at 7.  
185 Manual for Military Courts Martial, supra note 98 at s. 916(e), p. II-111 [emphasis added]. 
  45"
to situations in which it is impossible to distinguish who is the defender and who the aggressor.186 
He states that it is paradoxical that if the ‘defender’ uses force at a time when the ‘aggressor’ 
seems to pose an imminent threat, then the ‘defender’ will become the first party to “physically 
manifest aggression and the first to pose a fully imminent threat.”187 Similarly, if two parties 
threaten one another, and the threats escalate to the point where they each pose an imminent 
threat of death at the exact same time, then imminence can again tell us nothing about who is the 
aggressor and who the defender; this can only be determined by examining whose actions are 
wrongful.188 This is precisely the problem often raised in war: aggressive actions that fall short of 
posing an imminent threat can provoke like actions in the adversary, thus escalating the conflict 
by creating the very conditions that make the use of defensive force seem necessary.  The 
requirement that minimal force be used, such as that found in de-escalation of force rules 
discussed below, can also serve to de-escalate violence and, when applied properly, make the 
need to use defensive force less likely overall. This is preferable to abandoning the imminence 
requirement.  
There are other good reasons to preserve imminence as a requirement for justified 
defensive force during armed conflict. Petter Asp has argued against the dangers of what he terms 
‘preventionism’, which he defines as a growing social tendency that values the prevention of 
harm, and which is characterized by an exaggeration of the dangers we face, combined with an 
overly optimistic view of our abilities to “steer and control the world.”189 A drive towards 
preventionism of this kind can certainly be seen in arguments in favor of preventive 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgent measures, including targeted killings.190 Arguments in 
favor of the use of coercive preventive measures also place little weight on the very real and 
present harms that do result therefrom. Kimberly Ferzan has argued in favor of keeping the 
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imminence requirement as an integral part of legitimate self-defense because it “separates those 
threats that we may properly defend against from mere inchoate and potential threats.”191 She 
argues that a “threat” is not “merely a risk, or even an evil intention, but an act of aggression.”192 
Ferzan claims that the right of self-defense is not the right to act to preserve one’s life or safety, 
which is a mere self-preference rather than self-defense, but a right to respond to wrongful 
aggression.193 For Ferzan, “the correct question is not when does the defender need to act, but at 
what point is it fair to construe the putative aggressor as posing a threat?”194 This argument in 
fact seems very close to that of Christopher. While he argues that there can be sufficient evidence 
of wrongful aggression even in cases in which the harm is not imminent,195 the real question is 
not whose aggression is first in time, but whose acts are wrongful.196 Imminence, in his view, 
merely serves as evidence of aggression, but it is often very good evidence.197 Imminence, in 
Ferzan’s view, also serves to limit the kinds of threats that constitute aggression, so that we can 
be more certain that we know that the use of force is necessary.198 Determining whether 
aggressive acts are wrongful is best captured by clear and convincing evidence of aggression, 
while the requirement for imminence serves as a further limiting factor on the kinds of threats 
that can be responded to by lethal force. Keeping the requirement that the potential harm be 
imminent therefore serves a valuable function in regulating defensive force during armed 
conflict. It can eliminate the unnecessary use of force against putative and inchoate risks that may 
not materialize, while keeping the evidentiary standard high. Therefore, requiring imminence of 
harm better serves to prevent mistaken killings.  
Article 51(3) of Protocol I permits civilian participants to be targeted “unless and for such 
time as” they do take a direct part in hostilities. This temporal limitation on targeting civilian 
participants is not the same as requiring that the threatened harm be imminent, although the two 
will often be closely linked. In order to comply with both the international humanitarian law, as 
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well as rules regarding defensive force found in domestic laws, then both temporal limitations 
must be respected. Therefore, civilian participants may only be targeted for such time as they do 
engage in a wrongful act of aggression, and only if the threatened harm is imminent.  
 
1.3.4 Necessity, Proportionality and De-Escalation of Force Procedures 
The requirements that the use of force be necessary, that only proportional force be used, 
and the requirement for de-escalation of force procedures are all closely related. Even in the face 
of a wrongful act of aggression, the use of lethal force may not be necessary in order to repel the 
threat, and no more force is justifiable than that which is necessary to repel the threat.199 If lesser 
means can be used to repel the threat, then the use of lethal force will not be necessary; if the use 
of force is more than what is required to meet the threat, then it will be excessive and 
disproportionate.200 In addition, the force that is necessary and proportionate must be determined 
after de-escalation of force procedures have diligently been employed. There is some dispute 
over the extent to which the use of minimal force or escalation of force procedures is a 
requirement of international humanitarian law, and there is much evidence to support the 
proposition that this is at least an important principle, if not a customary rule.201 However, when 
armed forces justify their use of force on grounds of self-defense, as they do under standard 
Rules of Engagement, then they must also establish that the use of force is necessary and 
proportionate, i.e. that means other than lethal force will not suffice to repel the threat or to 
protect life. When civilian direct participation is conceived of in defensive terms, then necessity 
and proportionality also become key components of the permissibility of force. Under current 
practices, the proper application of de-escalation of force procedures is a readily available means 
to ensure that the use of force is both necessary and proportional, and that the least amount of 
force necessary is routinely used.  
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 As Christopher has noted above,202 we may be faced with interpersonal situations in 
which the level of conflict is very high. Each party may be contributing to threats and acts of 
aggression, and in these situations the potential for violence to escalate is also very high. This 
may be the case, for example, in a gang war in an urban area, or in a blood feud. It is also very 
often the case in situations of armed conflict, not only as between soldiers and insurgent forces 
on the ground, but as between belligerent parties and states acting in the international arena. It is 
not difficult to create situations, through direct or indirect provocation, in which the use of 
defensive force seems justified.203 Without policies and procedures to de-escalate the use of 
force, it is easy to see that there may be no end to the need for ‘defensive’ force. In the same way 
that direct provocation renders one’s use of force unjustified, so too does a failure to take steps to 
minimize one’s use of force within the prescribed boundaries.  
Like standard Rules of Engagement, the escalation of force continuum is a recent means 
of regulating the use of force, and one that began to be developed for use by domestic police 
forces in the 1980s.204 Escalation of force rules generally call for a graduated use of force when 
an officer is presented with resistance, first using the officer’s presence to induce compliance, 
and then moving towards verbal commands, the use of physical coercion to restrain the subject, 
followed by the use of less-than-lethal physical force and, only when the above is ineffective, is 
the use of lethal force permissible.205 The use of force continuum was put in place to attempt to 
clarify what may be considered as objectively reasonable force, and to guide decision-making on 
when to use force in police-citizen encounters.206 Terrill and Paoline note that this ‘step-ladder’ 
arrangement is the most common force continuum model currently in use, in which the use of 
force is escalated in a step-wise fashion if the civilian or detainee is not subdued.207 This is the 
model used by the U.S. armed forces. Escalation of force incidents were one of the most common 
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types of incident in which U.S. soldiers used force in Iraq208 and Afghanistan;209 therefore, better 
regulating escalation of force procedures can minimize the unjustified use of force, and could 
have a significant impact on relations between counterinsurgent forces and the local population.  
While there have been no studies concerning soldiers’ use of escalation of force 
procedures during counterinsurgent operations, studies of police escalation of force procedures 
have found that having effective administrative policies in place and ensuring their correct 
enforcement, assists in limiting police misconduct in the use of force. White, who studied the 
police use of force in Philadelphia, found that police shootings were not correlated with levels of 
crime, the number of homicides, felony arrests, or changes in demographics,210 and were only 
weakly correlated with laws and court decisions restricting the use of police force.211 Instead, he 
found that the most significant factors at work in limiting police shootings were administrative 
policies and procedures being in place, their proper enforcement, and the informal norms and 
attitudes of peers and supervisors.212 He concluded that “the internal police working environment, 
particularly administrative policy, is an effective control of police shooting behavior if properly 
enforced.”213 He found that internal control was much more effective than external control, and 
that departments already had access to the kinds of measures that would limit police misuse of 
lethal force.214 Other studies support this view. Lee and Vaughan found that mismanagement and 
a breakdown in administrative procedure were the key factors in increasing liability for police 
misuse of deadly force.215 Eitle et al. also found that organizational and administrative factors 
were the most important elements: clear written policies, training, and effective enforcement 
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were the key factors in limiting police misconduct.216  
No studies have been done to date to examine how administrative failures in drafting, 
training, and then enforcing soldiers’ Rules of Engagement and their escalation of force 
procedures have contributed to the unjustified use of force. However, the case studies discussed 
in Chapter Four tend to show that Rules of Engagement were often unclear, that administrative 
procedures gave great discretion to soldiers, that training was almost non-existent, and that 
accountability for mistakes was very poor. Poor understanding of Rules of Engagement played a 
role, for example, in the massacre at the Al-Muthanna chemical weapons complex in Iraq in May 
2009, also known as Objective Murray. Several soldiers stated that their Rules of Engagement 
were unclear and confusing, particularly on the issue of whether the entire complex, including the 
village, and all military-aged males found therein had been declared hostile and were therefore 
permissible targets.217 Five civilians were killed, and three detainees were executed, resulting in 
the convictions of two U.S. soldiers for murder.218 Colonel Steele, the commanding officer, is 
reported to have stated in a memo, “While I never specifically stated that every military-age male 
should be killed on Objective Murray, the unit’s understanding fell within my intent.”219 On the 
other hand, this indicates one ray of hope: the misuse of force by Coalition troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan was not inevitable; it was largely the result of poor administrative procedures and a 
lack of accountability, and these are problems for which there are obvious and available 
remedies.  
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1.3.5 Justifications, Explanations and Excuses 
In order for a civilian’s act of aggression to be sufficient to forfeit their immunity, the 
aggressive actions must neither be justified nor excused. A full discussion of justifications and 
excuses lies outside the scope of this dissertation,220 but it is certainly the case that aggressors in a 
conflict zone may have a justification or excuse for their actions. Civilians may be responding to 
violence that is itself unlawful, such as war crimes or unlawful acts of aggression. This leaves 
open the possibility that security forces engaged in unlawful acts of aggression or provocation 
may thereby lose permission to use force in self-defense, and that civilians may be justified in 
repelling unlawful acts of aggression, as in Behenna.221 In addition, the laws of war permit the 
use of force against an invading army, in the circumstances that comprise a levée en masse.222  
In addition, there may be reasonable explanations for a civilian’s conduct, perhaps more 
probable than the assumption that the civilian is engaged in a wrongful act of aggression. Such 
explanations are also relevant to determining whether the evidence of aggression is clear and 
convincing, for this will be lacking where there is a more likely explanation for the civilian’s 
conduct. Therefore, it is important for security forces to turn their minds to possible explanations. 
Is the person engaged in lawful, or ordinary activities? This is especially the case when civilians 
are engaged in usual daily activities, such as digging in fields, or driving motor vehicles. Soldiers 
giving verbal instructions should ensure that civilians are capable of hearing them, and that there 
are no language barriers. Soldiers should be aware that civilians might easily be panicked by 
warning shots at a mobile checkpoint. This may at first seem like much to ask of soldiers, and 
they have not often been asked to engage in such considerations, but it encourages a fuller 
appreciation of the humanity of the local population, and serves as a reminder of the ordinariness 
of many of the civilian activities that have led to lethal force.  
 
  
                                                
220 See generally: Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) [hereinafter Excusing 
Crime]. See also: Regarding Self Defense, supra note 11 at 101, in which Fontaine draws a distinction between 
justifications and excuses, arguing that mistaken killings are not justified, but may be excused under certain 
conditions.  
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1.3.6 The Consequences of the Use of Force 
The ways in which risks and actual harms are distributed by the rules governing defensive 
force can have an impact that goes far beyond the parties involved.223 As Jeremy Horder states, 
the rules that are devised ought to maintain common goods, which include a morally sound legal 
order.224 In counterinsurgent and counterterrorism operations, this means establishing trust with 
and security for the surrounding civilian population. There are always good reasons for soldiers 
to hold their fire. The use of lethal force is always a dangerous act, capable of harming innocent 
bystanders, or having unforeseen adverse consequences. Killings that are wrongful, or that are 
perceived to be wrongful, may weaken the authority of security forces and their ability to gain the 
assistance and cooperation of the local population. Killings that might seem permissible in the 
moment, can therefore threaten the success of the overall mission.  
The definition proposed here also includes a requirement that the use of force not be such 
as to spread terror among the civilian population. This has been included in order to comply with 
the rules set out in sections 51(2) and 13(2) of Protocols I and II respectively, and is therefore 
necessary in order to comply with the international laws of armed conflict. This requirement also 
recognizes that the consequences of the use of lethal force have impacts that go beyond the 
immediate soldier-civilian encounter. In the case studies examined in Chapter Four, it can be seen 
that the overall effects of the overuse of force in escalation of force incidents or in targeted 
killings can have a widespread and negative effect on the civilian population that amounts to the 
indiscriminate use of force, and that is such as to spread terror. Focusing solely on the use of 
lethal force in micro encounters is therefore not sufficient, and the rules in place for the use of 
defensive force must take into account the overall effects and consequences of the use of force on 
the local population.  
There are those who might argue that the above criteria are too onerous to be adopted by 
security forces in life-threatening situations that require split-second judgment. However, a recent 
incident involving the Secret Service shows that such criteria can be, and in fact are, effectively 
employed in such situations; moreover, they are of great assistance in reaching a desirable 
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security outcome.225 Omar J. Gonzalez, aged 42 years, scaled the security fence at the White 
House, and reached the columned entrance of the residence before he was stopped by Secret 
Service personnel. The reasons given by Secret Service officers for holding their fire are in line 
with the above criteria. One Secret Service officer noted that, “This wasn’t a military-style 
assault. He had no bag, backpack, no visible weapons.”226 There was therefore an absence of 
evidence that the individual was engaged in an overt act of aggression. The officers also turned 
their minds to possible explanations and excuses, with one noting that, “he seemed to be mentally 
disturbed.”227 Officers also turned their minds to the risks and consequences of acting against the 
threat, noting that a stray bullet might have hit a bystander. “You’re accountable for every 
round,” the officer noted, “You need to think about not just the target but what’s behind the 
target.”228 One officer thought that it was important that members of the public have access to the 
grounds near the White House, and that the public’s civil liberties ought to be respected. The 
officer noted that, in the end, “We have to show restraint. You have to have the proper 
restraint.”229 The use of such criteria is therefore not difficult to employ in the rapid decision-
making processes that security forces must engage in. This includes a proper appreciation of the 
consequences of using force, as well as the cultivation of framing-values that seek to protect the 
rights of the local population. In this case, such a decision-making process correctly prevented an 
unnecessary tragedy.  
 
1.4 Conclusion  
As Victor Tadros point out, while it is one thing to suffer harm and be killed, it may well 
be worse to be wrongfully killed.230 It may even be worse, particularly for the surviving 
community, when there is impunity for wrongful killings. However, the problem posed by 
mistaken killings goes beyond even impunity: here, the wrongfulness of the killing is not 
officially recognized, and is even approved of and validated by the values, regulations, and 
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procedures put in place by the relevant authorities. Indeed, self-defense is commonly thought to 
be a “morally forceful” excuse for killing,231 and one that often plays well with the public in 
troop-providing countries. As long as this remains the case, armed forces will continue to resort 
to this explanation for their conduct.  
Jeremy Horder also cautions us against accepting what he terms a “due diligence” excuse 
for wrongful killings.232 Standard Rules of Engagement and escalation of force criteria suffer 
from the pitfalls of a due diligence excuse, as it is easy for military authorities to claim that 
precautions have been taken to avoid mistakes, and that Rules of Engagement have been 
followed. However, when the rules in place are over-inclusive in terms of who may be targeted, 
systems are not adequate to the task of avoiding mistaken killings, and training and oversight is 
poor, then claims to due diligence become a mere whitewash. This dissertation seeks to propose a 
novel way of conceiving of the forfeiture of civilian immunity in terms of the ordinary rules 
permitting defensive force, which can serve as a starting point for developing procedures and 
mechanisms of oversight that reduce mistakes in distinguishing innocent civilians from those 
who have forfeited their immunity. While this is a beginning, there is no guarantee that it will be 
sufficient, and that improved procedures will not themselves simply lead to an improved due 
diligence excuse for mistaken killings. Even if accurate procedures were to be meticulously 
followed in lawful counterinsurgent operations, there will always remain a gap between killings 
that are objectively wrongful, yet permissible; in these cases mistakes must be recognized, harms 
acknowledged, and restitution made. The framing values within which decisions are made are 
also important, and these include values that respect the lives and humanity of all persons in a 
conflict zone, values that place the responsibility for minimizing risks onto armed forces, as well 
as values that seek to minimize the use of unnecessary force. Many of these values are deeply 
rooted in the international humanitarian law as it has developed over the past few centuries, and 
they can inform our resolution to the problem of distinction in our own time.  
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Chapter Two: The Development of the Laws of Civilian  
Immunity & Belligerent Qualification  
 
Let every individual do his best to keep the claims of his own country within just limits… 
Let every individual State do its best to prevent injustice between its neighbours, either 
in entering on a war or in the terms of peace by which a war may be concluded, by not 
shrinking from expressing an opinion or from supporting that opinion by the needful 
pressure. If citizens have not the courage, and States have not the unselfishness for this, 
no machinery will help the case. If they have, machinery will not be wanted, or will be 
arranged easily so far as wanted. 
 ~ John Westlake, Whewell Professor at Cambridge, on the First Hague Peace 
Conference, 1899.1 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 This chapter will examine the development of the modern laws of belligerent qualification 
and civilian immunity. These principles form the core of the modern treaty laws, as well as the 
customary laws of armed conflict, and as such they are applicable to all nations, and in all types 
of armed conflict. They specify the fundamental principles regarding who may lawfully use force 
during war and who may lawfully be attacked in war. This Chapter will discuss how the law 
developed from the end of the Middle Ages through the modern period, and up to the adoption of 
the Protocols Additional of 1977. Chapter Three will discuss the more recent developments that 
have arisen from the creation of modern Rules of Engagement, and the drive to better define 
civilian immunity by the ICRC.  
 Belligerent qualification entitles a combatant to belligerent privileges, and this includes, in 
modern times, the privilege to use force, to kill, to be afforded prisoner of war status upon 
capture, to take prisoners, to institute military tribunals and to convene courts martial. Belligerent 
liabilities include primarily the liability to be attacked by enemy forces at all times during the 
conflict. Belligerent duties include the responsibility to distinguish oneself from non-combatants, 
to present oneself as a lawful target for the enemy by wearing distinctive uniforms and/or 
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insignia and by carrying arms openly, and to obey the laws and customs of war. The law of 
belligerent qualification is necessary for the operation of the principle of distinction. Its purpose 
is to define who is a lawful combatant in a conflict and therefore may lawfully be attacked; 
civilians are defined as all those persons who are not qualified belligerents, and they retain their 
immunity to attack so long as they do not take a direct part in hostilities. Before these principles 
developed in the modern era, there were few restrictions on who could participate in armed 
conflict. Throughout the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the 
great powers were developing more professional and better equipped armies, they began to limit 
the granting of full belligerent qualifications only to certain classes of combatants. The problem 
thus created was which combatants would be eligible for qualification, and this in turn created the 
corresponding problem of how to treat those irregular combatants who did not meet these 
criteria.2 This phenomenon can be understood as an outgrowth of changes in military 
administration instituted by the great powers of Europe in the post-Westphalian era, and the 
means by which they built their professional armed forces and consolidated their monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force.  
 To date, many scholars who have examined the history of civilians in war focus on the 
principle of distinction between combatants versus civilians.3 However, categories of actors now 
commonly termed ‘civilians’ and ‘combatants’ are themselves of relatively recent historic origin; 
they are normative categories that are the product of how belligerent privileges, duties and 
liabilities to attack came to be distributed in the course of nineteenth century warfare by the great 
European powers. In this modern view, a ‘civilian’ is by definition someone who takes no part in 
                                                
2 Here, the term ‘irregular’ is used to refer to any combatant that is not part of the regularly constituted and 
uniformed armed forces of a nation state. Irregular combatants may be unqualified, or they may qualify themselves 
by organizing in accordance with the requirements imposed by the international law, as discussed below. Many 
irregular fighters would include non-state actors, often termed ‘guerrilla’, ‘militant’ or ‘insurgent’ fighters. Irregular 
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military) forces, non-military governments agents, such as police or members of intelligence agencies, and members 
of special-forces who engage in covert operations without wearing uniforms or carrying arms openly. Irregular 
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a vast array of irregular forces. 
3 See for example, Richard Shelly Hartigan, The Forgotten Victim: The History of the Civilian (Chicago: Precedent 
Publishing, 1982); Igor Primoratz, “Civilian Immunity in War” (2005) 36:1 Philosophical Forum 41; Hugo Slim, 
“Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War” (2003) 79:3 Int’l Affairs 481; and Anicee van 
Engeland, Civilian or Combatant?: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
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hostilities, is possessed of no belligerent qualifications, and is not liable to be attacked. A ‘lawful 
combatant’ is possessed of belligerent privileges, and is liable to be attacked at all times provided 
that a state of armed conflict exists. In between these categories exists one of the most 
strategically utilized and legally controversial actors in war – those irregular fighters who do not 
clearly fall into either category. Therefore, the analysis that follows will focus not on civilians 
and combatants, but on belligerent privileges, duties, and liabilities, asking instead which actors 
are possessed of belligerent privileges to use force and which are not, which actors may be liable 
to attack and under what circumstances, and what treatment should be afforded to those who are 
captured.  
  
2.1 Civilians and Combatants in the Medieval Era      
 One might think that in the Middle Ages the set-piece battle, the small size of the army, and 
the expense of outfitting a soldier for combat left little doubt as to who was a soldier and who 
was not. Richemond-Barak, for example, characterizes this period of warfare as one in which 
civilians played little part; the set-piece battles clearly separating civilians from combatants.4 In 
fact, in the Middle Ages, there was very little distinction between violence that was ‘war’, and 
that which was not, nor was there a strong distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ violence as 
those notions have taken shape in the modern period. As Keegan reminds us, “through its 
references to ‘putting in fear’, ‘making an affray’, and ‘keeping the Queen’s peace’, the medieval 
world was one in which the distinction between private, civil and foreign war, though recognized 
could only be irregularly enforced.”5 War was only one extreme end of this spectrum of violence. 
The distinction between civilians and combatants was neither recognized in practice, nor did the 
normative categories of ‘civilian’ and ‘combatant’ receive any recognition under the norms and 
customs then in force. As Green states, “[i]n ancient times, as evidenced by the Laws of Manu, 
the Old Testament, or the writings of Kautilya or San Szu, there was no attempt to identify those 
who were entitled to be treated as combatants... During feudal times, when the law of arms was 
                                                
4 Daphne Richemond-Barak, “Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity,” in 
William C. Banks, ed., New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001) 106 at 107.  
5 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1976) at 16 [hereinafter Face of Battle]. 
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developing there was equally no attempt at definition.”6 The distinction between civilians and 
combatants was not yet recognized in the Middle Ages; violence was fluid, and non-combatants 
often played a significant role in the war effort. The facts as they existed on the ground would 
have meant that in practice it was difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants; this situation, however, did not give rise to the distinction between ‘combatants’ and 
‘civilians’ as distinct normative categories.   
 Just as there was a fluid relationship between ‘war’ and ‘private’ violence, there was a fluid 
relationship between those who were taking part in such violence, and those who were not. 
Civilians who aided in the war effort, such as by harboring fighters, providing supplies, or 
resisting a siege, were all liable to attack. The governing principle was not the distinction 
between combatants and civilians, but the distinction between those who were ‘innocent’, and so 
‘not harming’, and those who were nocentes, and therefore posed some harm,7 but this was often 
interpreted very expansively. It was this view of ‘innocent’ as ‘non-harming’ that underlay the 
Truce of God and the Peace of God movements of the late tenth to the fourteenth centuries. 
Private persons, including the clergy, were much subjected to the depredations that arose out of 
the private violence of feudal warfare. This resulted in several peace movements beginning in the 
late tenth century that culminated in what historians call the Peace of God and the Truce of God 
movements. Such peace movements centered around Aquitaine, likely because of the high level 
of political instability suffered by that region after the collapse of the Carolingian Empire.8 At the 
early Synod of Poitiers in 1000 AD, the Bishops prohibited three very specific acts of war: taking 
ecclesiastical property by force, attacking unarmed clerics, and plundering agricultural resources 
from peasants.9 Such acts were punishable by anathema.10 Many of the attacks that motivated the 
early Peace of God movement were directed towards the plunder of private property to fund the 
expensive feuds of the secular magnates. Without any administrative structure, particularly 
regarding supply and logistics, individual fighters were often left to fend for themselves. This 
                                                
6 Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Juris Publishing, Manchester 
University Press, 2008) at 125 [hereinafter Law of Armed Conflict].  
7 Igor Primoratz, “Civilian Immunity in War: Its Grounds, Scope and Weight” in Igor Primoratz, ed., Civilian 
Immunity in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 21 at 30.  
8 Thomas Head, “The Development of the Peace of God in Aquitaine (970-1005)” (1999) 74:3 Speculum 656 at 656 
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9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
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often meant that individual fighters got their food and supplies by forced contribution from the 
surrounding population, including from peasants and ecclesiastical estates.11 It is thus not 
surprising that the early prohibitions of the Peace of God focused on outlawing such 
depredations, which would have posed significant hardships for the peasantry. It is notable, 
however, that the Church was focused particularly on the protection of its own property and 
persons, and Held argues that “the Bishops acting at the early Peace Councils in that region were 
responding to attacks upon their properties and their selves caused by conflicts among secular 
magnates in the region.”12 The protection of the property of peasants may have been a response to 
popular pressure, and a way of keeping the population under the protection of the Church. Such 
Peace Synods were very public and popular affairs, according to contemporary narratives,13 and 
such an addition may have been a response to popular demands. While it later came to prohibit 
attacks on women and children as well, the Peace of God movement, which continued to hold 
some influence until the fourteenth century, did not prohibit attacks on civilians as such, nor did 
it prohibit collective punishment or reprisals against civilians who assisted in the war effort.  
 It appears that there was little quarrel that civilians who aided in the war effort could 
lawfully be attacked, and this principle was in evidence as late as the Thirty Year's War (1618-
1648) that resulted in the Treaty of Westphalia.14 Lesaffer states that all authors writing in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries acknowledged, for example, the right to pillage a town taken 
by storm because the inhabitants refused to surrender.15 He writes that scholars “emphasized that 
the victor could always grant conditions and stated that natural law, justice or honour, or even the 
‘usage of civilized peoples’ dictated the lenient treatment of the vanquished.”16  
 Hugo Grotius, in his 1625 De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, recognizes an almost unrestricted right 
for a just party to use force against an enemy population. He stated that the “Rights of War” 
                                                
11 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 27 [hereinafter Command 
in War].  
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13 Thomas Head, and Richard Landes, The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France Around 
the Year 1000 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1992) at 4.  
14 Randall Lesaffer, “Siege Warfare in the Early Modern Age: A Study on the Customary Laws of War,” in James B. 
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flowed solely from the sovereign authority by which such “crimes were authorized.”17 Grotius 
states that the “Slaughter of Infants and Women is allowed, and included by the Right of War,” 
as is the wasting of villages with fire and sword.18 These actions were licit, in the sense that they 
were permitted, but this did not mean that they ought to be done. The scholars of the late Middle 
Ages recognized these usages, even as they tried to advocate for more humane treatment.  
 
2.2 The Sovereign Authorization Rule of the Early Modern Period    
 By the time of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), the late-feudal system of “military-
entrepreneurship”19 was well established, by which most fighting units were self-constituted and 
self-financed. In land warfare, this meant that fighters were expected to recoup their costs from 
the surrounding population, or from pillage or tribute from conquered territories. Nobles often 
raised and maintained their own armed forces on behalf of the Crown, which they partly funded 
from their own estates, and this was an important aspect of their privileges and power within late 
feudal society.20 In naval warfare, the same result was accomplished by way of the sovereign 
issuance of letters of marque to private vessels, authorizing them to undertake specific hostile 
acts in foreign territory. The vessels self-financed by being able to claim prize money under 
international maritime law for any vessels they were able to capture.21 Letters of marque and 
reprisal were drafted to authorize very specific hostile acts, and it was this authorization only that 
distinguished the practice of piracy - unlawful erga omnes under international customary law - 
from what came to be known as ‘privateering’. Privateering was well established in the medieval 
period, with one of the earliest letters of marque being issued by King John of England in 1205 
AD to Thomas of Galway.22 Privateering became more widespread throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, as European powers sought to establish trade routes and colonies abroad. 
This system of military entrepreneurship enabled the sovereign powers of Europe to project their 
                                                
17 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (1625), A.C. Campbell, trans. (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001) at Book III, 
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power globally while keeping the cost to the Crown at a minimum, and served as a bridge 
between the feudal armies of the Middle Ages and the professional armies that began to develop 
in Europe from the mid-eighteenth century onwards.23 
The first attempt by states to abolish the private wars of the military entrepreneurs was 
made by European states when they concluded the Treaty of Westphalia at the close of the Thirty 
Year’s War. Article 118 states: 
[T]he Troops and Armys of all those who are making War in the Empire, shall be 
disbanded and discharg’d; only each Party shall send to and keep up as many Men in his 
own Dominion, as he shall judge necessary for his Security.24 
The Peace of Westphalia, however, was only the beginning of states’ consolidation over the use 
of military force. In the century following Westphalia, “the customs of war were still determined 
by the same professional elite that had dominated them for ages and whose incorporation into the 
state was as yet incomplete... While today's international lawyers take it for granted that state 
authorities dictate the behaviour of their military agents and lay down the law, during the century 
after 1648 it was often the other way around.”25 Yet the military's incorporation into the nation 
state long remained contested and incomplete, and this has frequently been a site of the “struggle 
for law”26 between the military authorities, civilian authorities, the courts, and the public. One of 
the major sites of this struggle was the incorporation of various kinds of irregular combatants into 
the emerging governing paradigm.  
Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the great military and 
industrial powers of Europe began to professionalize their armies and to demarcate the lawful 
scope of the conflict by excluding those fighters who were not organized along these lines. Even 
many of those who fought as volunteers were given a rank, a uniform, and extensive drilling in 
the regimental military techniques of the day. Irregular militia such as these were employed by 
many of the great powers. Prior to the post-World War II era, irregular militias often went by the 
name of ‘volunteers’ or ‘partisans’, and they were generally attached to a regular professional 
army.  
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Vattel, writing in 1758, describes the growth of professional armies during this period: 
In former times, and especially in small states, immediately on a declaration of war, every 
man became a soldier; the whole community took up arms, and engaged in the war. Soon 
after, a choice was made, and armies were formed of picked men, - the remainder of the 
people pursuing their usual occupations. At present the use of regular troops is almost every-
where adopted, especially in powerful states. The public authority raises soldiers, distributes 
them into different bodies under the command of generals and other officers, and keeps them 
on foot as long as it thinks necessary.27 
This period thus saw the rise of a new type of professional soldier, one for whom the military was 
his occupation, and whose duties, moral, contractual, and patriotic, lay with the public authority 
who so employed him.  
 A bureaucratic administration to govern the military now became necessary, and it was 
introduced throughout Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This 
represented an exercise on the part of civilian authorities to centralize and consolidate their power 
over a still largely feudal military. Vattel was one of the earliest scholars at this time to describe 
the situation of a soldier28 as a professional,29 and an agent of a public authority,30 one who is 
subsumed under the command of a higher officer, suggesting a certain degree of consolidation of 
central state authority over the military by the time of the mid-eighteenth century.31 Vattel states 
that subordinates may never use their own discretion, for it would be dangerous “to leave the 
decision to the judgment of men in subordinate stations, who are not acquainted with all the 
views of their general, and who do not possess an equal degree of knowledge and experience.”32 
Vattel makes no distinction between those who can and those who cannot be authorized by the 
sovereign to conduct war, i.e. he espouses no rule that would qualify belligerents. Moreover, 
Vattel denies that all soldiers, no matter on which side of the conflict they wage war, are 
                                                
27 B. Kapossy & R. Whatmore, eds., Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of 
Natural Law and on Luxury (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), at Book III, Chapter II, s. 9, available at: 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2246&Itemid=27 [accessed 
6 January 2013] [hereinafter Vattel’s Law of Nations]; see Appendix A at 2, p. 297. 
28 Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 6 at 126.  
29 Vattel’s Law of Nations, supra note 27, at Book III, Chapter II, s. 9. 
30 Vattel describes the public authority requirement by stating that the “power of levying troops, or raising an army, 
is of too great a consequence in a state, to be entrusted to any other than the sovereign,” ibid., at Book III, Chapter II, 
s. 7.  
31 Ibid. at Book III, Chapter II, ss. 19-21 on subordinate powers in war. The commander-in-chief should have a 
nearly unlimited discretion to conduct war, ibid., s. 19, and military discipline is described as being of the utmost 
importance, ibid., s. 18. 
32 Ibid. at Book III, Chapter XV, s. 231. 
  63 
possessed of the same privileges, liabilities and duties. On the contrary, the natural law principles 
of humanity and just war earlier espoused by Grotius still predominantly underlie his analysis of 
the laws of war. He opens ‘Book III On War’, by restating the just war principle earlier espoused 
by Grotius, that “he who is engaged in war derives all his right from the justice of his cause.”33   
 Nor does Vattel distinguish between qualified and unqualified belligerents. Instead, he 
devoted Book III Chapter XV to “The Rights of Private Persons in War”. Here, he states, “If we 
confine our view to the law of nations, considered in itself, - when once two nations are engaged 
in war, all the subjects of the one may commit hostilities against those of the other, and do them 
all the mischief authorised by the state of war. But should two nations thus encounter each other 
with the collective weight of their whole force, the war would become much more bloody and 
destructive, and could hardly be terminated otherwise than by the utter extinction of one of the 
parties.”34 Thus, “it is therefore with good reason that the contrary practice has grown into a 
custom with the nations of Europe, - at least those that keep up regular standing armies or bodies 
of militia. The troops carry on the war while the rest of the nation remain in peace.”35 Even this 
custom was not universal among European nations - only among those who could maintain 
standing armies or militia - and Vattel proceeds to enumerate exceptions to the general custom. 
He states that, “although the operations of war are by custom generally confined to the troops” 
the inhabitants of a place taken by storm may take up arms to recover the liberty of the territory 
on behalf of the sovereign, “And where is the man that shall dare to censure it?”36 Here, Vattel is 
articulating the concept known today as a levée en masse, and which remains protected by the 
Third Geneva Convention.37  
 Vattel also expresses what later scholars would term the ‘sovereign authorization rule’, the 
earliest formulation of the public authority requirement that stated that only those combatants 
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authorized by the sovereign are qualified belligerents.38 At the same time, as Vattel has indicated, 
there were few restrictions on who could be so authorized by the sovereign. There is evidence, 
for example, of the widespread authorization of irregular forces during the French and Indian 
War (1754-1763) in North America. Both the French and British troops fought alongside a 
mixture of irregular forces, including colonial ‘rangers’, poorly trained local volunteers, and 
Aboriginal fighters.39 The British, for example, organized a group of Aboriginals and 
frontiersman into what became known as ‘Roger’s Rangers’. The Aboriginal chiefs, as well as 
Robert Rogers, were formally commissioned into the British colonial forces and were paid by the 
British Crown, but were given no uniforms.40 The frontiersmen and the Aboriginal fighters were 
sometimes administered an oath of service and read the Articles of War to induct them into the 
British forces and to signify that they were now subject to its laws and discipline.41 The 
sovereign’s authorization is made explicit through these acts. Instead of being self-financed, as 
with the military entrepreneurs of the late Middle Ages, these irregulars were paid directly by the 
Crown and made the subjects of its system of military law and discipline. Irregular forces 
authorized in this manner would thereby be considered as fully qualified belligerents, and 
irregular militia on both sides of the conflict were treated as such by the British and French 
authorities.42  
 At other times, the relationship between Indigenous fighters and the European forces was 
less formal. In such cases, Aboriginal allies were to be remunerated as were the European 
military entrepreneurs of the previous century - through plunder and the ransom of prisoners. 
This was the case, for example, at the infamous siege of Fort William Henry in August of 1757. 
The French had negotiated very favorable terms of surrender with the British, permitting the 
British forces and their families to evacuate to Fort Edward while retaining their baggage and 
arms.43 General Montcalm held a council of the chiefs of the Iroquois League before acceding to 
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these terms, thus tacitly admitting, as Steele states, that “the Indians were allies and not 
completely under his command.”44 The Iroquois fighters failed to respect the terms negotiated by 
the French as it left them without compensation; they plundered the fort, attacked and killed 
several of the evacuees and took several more prisoner. Each of the parties felt that it had been 
betrayed and dishonored by the others.45 Steele states that this incident reinforced European 
views that natives were to be excluded from the protection of European laws and customs of war, 
as they had little regard for them.46  
 This attitude continued to be evident in the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), 
during which both the British and American forces allied with Aboriginals, while attempting to 
disrupt the alliances made by their adversaries. Particularly influential was the British-educated 
Mohawk leader Joseph Brant, who led fighters from the Iroquois Six Nations in the service of the 
loyalist cause. In his biography of Joseph Brant, William Stone states that the British government 
was very eager to enlist the service of the Six Nations to the cause of the British crown, despite 
their public denials that they would not ally with Aboriginals.47 At the same time, the American 
forces considered it of the utmost importance to disrupt this alliance and prevent the Six Nations 
from fighting on the side of the British.48 In July of 1778, Fort Wyoming in Connecticut was 
taken by British and Iroquois forces, and was plundered and burned upon its capture in much the 
same way as Fort William Henry had been pillaged when the British capitulated to the French.49 
Stone states that the tales of the massacre at Fort Wyoming were very likely overblown, and they 
unfairly cast the Aboriginals as the guilty parties.50 In particular, he states that popular tales of 
Brant’s role in the affair were almost certainly fictitious.51 Later that year, in October of 1778, the 
American Lieutenant Colonel William Butler similarly raided and destroyed Brant’s settlement 
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along with several Iroquois villages in what is now upstate New York.52 Yet, European atrocities 
were excused as permissible incidents of war, whereas similar actions on the part of the Iroquois 
were treated as acts of savagery - the tales of which were often embellished, in order to justify 
treating Aboriginal fighters and civilians alike outside of the European rules of ‘civilized’ 
warfare. These incidents demonstrate the political expediency, secrecy, and hypocrisy that 
characterized the Europeans’ use of irregular forces when they felt that matters of national 
security were at stake. 
 
2.2.1 The Bureaucratic Modernization of the Military: The Example of France 
  Keegan states that the “replacement of crowd armies by nuclear professional armies was 
one of the most important, if complex, processes in European history.”53 State-building by the 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries required a more sophisticated bureaucracy to execute 
public policies and meet the demands of industrialization and colonization in an increasingly 
complex social environment. The rationalized and professionalized bureaucracy that arose 
throughout Europe in this period was most influentially characterized by Max Weber, who 
described its main features as a reliance on mechanization and technological progress, 
centralization and disciplined control, quantifiability and predictability - particularly through the 
collection of social knowledge through the science of statistics - the separation of workers from 
the means of production, and the legal doctrines of positivism and formalism.54 The 
rationalization and systematization “was necessary because modernity meant change, that is, the 
steady introduction of new technologies, new modes of organisation etc., which individuals and 
organizations somehow needed to systematize in order to be able to act purposefully.”55 For 
Foucault, army inspections were part of the broader movement to delineate sovereign power 
through a continuous process of examination, extracting “from bodies the maximum time and 
force” through the use of “timetables, collective training, exercise, total and detailed 
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surveillance.”56 Within the military, “discipline was used to harness new weapons technologies 
because the effective use of the musket demanded well-drilled infantry and elaborate logistical 
arrangements.”57 The great powers wanted to raise standing armies and professional officers, as 
well as the massive resources to mobilize them and to construct defenses against the professional 
forces of the enemy.58 At the same time, improvements in breech-loading weapons and lighter 
and more mobile heavy artillery gave rise to the tight tactical formations that characterized the 
set-piece battles of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The development, use, and 
deployment of new technologies, and the desire for larger forces, required states to centralize 
control over the armed forces, to increase discipline and training, and for the first time to assume 
the full costs of the enterprise.  
  This rationalized system of bureaucratic administration would replace the older system of 
organizing the army by way of military commissions in the hands of the nobility; this system 
subsisted throughout much of the eighteenth century, and formed a bridge between the feudal era 
and the modern era in which states assumed centralized control over the armed forces. Blaufarb 
discusses how this process took place in France, which adopted substantial military reforms after 
its disastrous performance against the Prussians in the Seven Year's War (1756-1763).59 The 
French began a comprehensive and revolutionary program of military modernization that 
centralized control over the armed forces at the War Ministry, increased systematization, 
documentation, inspection and discipline of troops, and that sought out commanders based upon 
personal merit, rather than family lineage. The French experience therefore exemplifies the kind 
of military reforms taking place among the great European powers in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Britain and Prussia were instituting similar reforms, and many large non-
European powers would follow suit, often asking for European assistance in training and 
organizing modern military forces along the same lines.60 
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As a consequence of France’s defeat by Prussia, the duc de Choiseul undertook a series of 
comprehensive military reforms to increase the centralization and systematization of the French 
armed forces. As Blaufarb states, “[t]housands of officers were demobilised, regulations were 
rewritten, a permanent regimental structure (France's first) was established, and a centralised 
system of personal records was instituted.”61 To accomplish this, the functions of the military 
officers were largely taken over by the central government and its War Ministry.62 Prior to these 
reforms, the system of commissioned offices meant that members of the nobility, and not the 
Crown, undertook most functions of administration, discipline, logistics, as well as the financing 
of the military. As Blaufarb describes, “Under the traditional system of administration, captains 
received a royal stipend from which they had to keep their companies at full strength, provide 
lodging, replace worn-out horses, repair broken equipment, procure necessary supplies, and carry 
out training exercises.”63 In times of war, this meant that captains very often had to rely on family 
resources to supply any shortfall in funds, and this provides a key reason as to why officers were 
sought from the wealthier families, and not chosen based on personal merit.64 However, this 
system of what Blaufarb calls “private administration” meant that commanders sought to keep 
costs down, and limited training exercises. Captains could be reluctant to discipline soldiers or to 
employ the drill, as they sought to retain personnel to avoid paying recruitment fees to new 
soldiers.65 This system of private administration was crucial, however, to the social position and 
privileges of the Second Estate, and it primarily served their interests, rather than those of the 
Crown. It was the position of the nobility that “if nobles were prevented from serving or if their 
service was stripped of its voluntary, generous character, the very foundation of noble privilege 
would collapse and the entire social edifice totter.”66 Rationalization and bureaucratization were 
seen as inherently threatening to noble privilege. By “making military service a remunerative 
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profession, establishing minutely detailed administrative routines, and enforcing them with the 
threat of punishment, Choiseul's reform violated the ideal of freely given service.”67 The central 
authorities of France felt, however, that they needed to abolish the system of private 
administration in favor of centralized administration at the War Ministry in order to rebuild an 
effective military.68 It was a necessary component of these reforms that the central authorities 
would also assume the full financing of the military, as well as administering spending and 
bookkeeping; as a result, the reforms resulted in a seventy percent increase in costs to the 
monarchy.69 
Britain also made reforms to its military at the end of the eighteenth century, but they 
were less comprehensive at this time than those undertaken by France and Prussia. Following the 
Prussian example, Britain introduced new regulations for military drills in 1764, although Hayter 
states, “most officers seem to have taken little interest in new ideas.”70 Gates states that it was 
only after the British Army was defeated and demoralized in its struggle for the American 
colonies in 1783, that Britain would develop the impetus to conduct more comprehensive military 
reforms.71 In 1792, a more regimented system of drills was instituted, again inspired by the 
Prussian example.72 The Duke of York was instrumental in introducing a comprehensive system 
of reforms that transformed the British Army in the years following 1793.73 He reformed the 
purchase system to introduce some qualifications based upon merit and service, and improved 
rations and barrack accommodations; he ameliorated the brutality of the penal codes then in 
force, while standardizing tactical drills and maneuvers, and he introduced the first permanent 
regiments of light infantry.74 Unlike France and Prussia, Britain would not abolish the purchase 
of military commissions until 1871, and possessing the financial resources to purchase a 
commission remained the primary prerequisite for introduction into the officer corps until that 
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time.75 However, the outbreak of war with France in 1793, and the massive mobilization that 
followed, served to open up the officer corps to classes outside of the landed gentry, as “men 
from other sectors of society, foremost among them the prosperous middle classes who had 
emerged in the aftermath of the agricultural and industrial revolutions, accounted for a growing 
proportion of the officer corps.”76 As with France and Prussia, rigid hierarchy and strong 
discipline were the key principles of military governance at this time.77  
Gates describes this system as an extension of the social values and organization of the 
feudal period, stating that Wellington “placed his faith in uncompromising disciplinary codes and 
the army’s reflection of Britain’s social hierarchy; the rank and file were the tenants of a 
feudalistic community; the officers its squires. The latter group were, by upbringing and 
temperament, destined and duty bound to furnish the former with leadership”78 This often meant 
discipline tempered by considerations of humanity and a respect for the welfare of the soldiers, 
primarily because these were important means of maintaining discipline and control. Richard 
Kane, Brigadier-General and Governor of Minorca, wrote an influential treatise concerning 
discipline, drills, and formations in 1745. He enjoins commanding officers not to treat their men 
with cruelty, stating that many officers had been killed by their men for this reason, whereas 
“those officers who, on the other hand, treat their men with justice and humanity, will be sure, on 
all occasions, to have them stand fast by them, and even interpose between them and death.”79 
Nor was discretion on the part of junior commanders seen as desirable at this time. Kane states 
that senior officers “should not depend on the care and judgment of others,” both because senior 
commanders had greater knowledge and experience, and also because “whatever misfortune 
happens, the blame will be laid at their door.”80 The edifice of military organization that grew up 
at the end of the eighteenth century, and that would lay the foundations for the large, professional 
standing armies of the nineteenth, was inimical to the idea of individual soldiers’ agency and 
rights of personal self-defense.  
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 The European push to modernize the military, and the ideologies of governance that 
underlay such modernization efforts – central control, systematization, regimentation, and 
discipline - would have an effect on how scholars conceived of the customary international law 
concerning belligerent qualification. Perhaps the two most important scholars of war at this time, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Georg Friederich von Martens (1756-1821), both 
accepted this growing consolidation of force on the part of the state, while attempting to restrain 
it within just bounds. Rousseau’s Social Contract of 1762 was perhaps the most influential work 
at this time to reject the views of Grotius, and sought instead to re-conceive of international 
relations as the interactions between equal sovereign states; at the same time, the power that 
states possessed over individuals was to be limited in accordance with the rights of those 
individuals. Rousseau’s famous maxim, that war is not the law of the strongest, “a relation not 
between man and man but between state and state,”81 sought to impose new limits on the 
sovereign authority. Rousseau’s thoughts on war are contained within that section of the Social 
Contract that deals with slavery, and sets out a justification for the natural rights of man against 
the state. Rousseau’s views of war therefore privilege the natural rights of the individual, and he 
argues that this necessarily limits what states can do, in the conduct of war: 
[T]he purpose of war is to destroy the enemy state, so we have a right to kill its defenders 
while they are bearing arms; but as soon as they lay down their weapons and surrender, they 
stop being enemies or instruments of the enemy and resume their status as simply men, and 
no one has any right to take their lives.82  
Rousseau is clear that he is breaking with the Grotian view of war that generally prevailed, when 
he states that, “These principles are not those of Grotius: they are not based upon the authority of 
poets, but are derived from the nature of things and are based upon reason.”83 Taking up arms on 
behalf of the enemy and posing a threat is the guiding principle – civilians, who have never taken 
up arms, are also simply men and no one has the right to take their lives for this reason. It also 
follows that anyone who does take up arms has now made themselves an instrument of the 
enemy, and may be targeted. Rousseau’s comments are therefore one of the earliest expressions 
of norms governing civilians and civilian participants in war, and he based his determinations not 
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on the status of the defenders, but on their conduct.  
 Rousseau’s’ ideas would exert a good deal of influence on the international laws of war, 
which were developing rapidly in the late eighteenth century. Georg Friedrich von Martens, 
writing A Compendium of the Law of Nations in the late eighteenth century, was closely 
associated with the introduction of legal positivism and doctrinal systematization into the 
international law, and he developed upon Rousseau’s ideas concerning belligerency.84 Treatise 
writers like von Martens were concerned with the practical aspects of managing international law 
as part of a wider system of European public law in an age with an increasingly complex and 
sophisticated bureaucracy; the point of this, states Koskenniemi, was to “imagine and present the 
interaction of European princes and states, and in particular the practices of European diplomacy, 
as aspects of an actually operating legal system.”85 This legal system, through the doctrinal 
writers, was to take on the character of “an academic science, neutral in method, religious in 
spirit, but committed – at least in some of its vocabulary – to the Enlightenment ideal of a rule of 
law to replace philosophical speculation and reason of state.”86 The ideas of Rousseau would fit 
very well into this new legal system, and von Martens introduces into his treatise two ideas that 
depart dramatically from the Grotian view of war: the idea that only a state’s authorized soldiers 
are lawful combatants, and that it is now unlawful for unauthorized combatants to take up arms. 
Von Martens states: 
Soldiers, by the order of their commanders, and such other subjects as may obtain express 
permission for the purpose from their sovereign, may lawfully exercise hostilities, and are 
looked upon by the enemy as lawful enemies; but those, on the contrary who, not being so 
authorised, take upon them to attack the enemy, are treated by him as banditti; and even the 
state to which they belong ought to punish them as such.87  
Von Martens distances himself from the natural law view of war espoused by earlier scholars 
such as Vattel. Von Martens states that all sides in a war generally claim that they are in the 
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right,88 and that theirs is the defensive position.89 He therefore rejects the notion that we can hold 
a war to be legal or illegal based upon the justice of its cause. Instead, we should defer to each 
sovereign’s judgment, “if it be not manifestly unjust.”90 For this reason, von Martens is often 
considered to be the first international law scholar to reject the natural law view of war, and to 
characterize it instead in terms of positivism and raison d’État,91 while still maintaining the 
principle that wars that are clearly unjust are not to be permitted.   
 Von Martens thus shifted the law’s emphasis onto the jus in bello, and he also introduces 
several key principles of the jus in bello now familiar to the modern laws of war. Among these 
are the principles that those who do not carry arms “are safe under the protection of the law of 
nations, unless they have exercised violence against the enemy,” and that soldiers who have laid 
down their arms, or who have not the will nor the power to resist, may not be harmed.92 The 
principle that those who do not bear arms, or are otherwise hors de combat, are not liable to be 
attacked, harkens back to the Medieval idea of ‘nocentes’; only those who pose a risk of harm are 
liable to be attacked.93 Von Martens therefore followed Rousseau in defining civilians and 
civilian participants in armed conflict based upon their conduct – i.e. that they take up arms and 
pose a threat – while separating out from this all those combatants who were authorized by the 
sovereign, and whose privileges in war to be determined according to their status as such. This 
approach sought to balance the competing values of consolidating the lawful right to wage war 
within the state, while protecting the rights of individuals who took no part.  
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2.2.2 The Battle of Waterloo and the Beginnings of Strategic Command Control 
 The modern laws of belligerent qualification and civilian immunity developed within the 
system of military discipline and regimentation as it was developed in Europe in the course of the 
nineteenth century. By the time of the Battle of Waterloo (1815), the reforms of Choiseul had 
progressed further; regimentation and discipline were now important means of governing soldiers 
in combat, particularly as more systematic methods of command control over soldiers in battle 
had yet to develop. The very drills and regimentation used to fight the Napoleonic Wars were 
themselves means of coercion, of military discipline. The artillery square - a hollow square 
formation of one or more infantry battalions designed to repel a cavalry advance - had been in use 
since at least the end of the seventeenth century,94 but it had been improved upon by drills and 
regimentation. At this time, orders were primarily transmitted from officers to rank and file by 
means of the drill and the drum. As Kane states, commanding officers may be killed in battle, 
resulting in confusion in the ranks, “whereas the drum is always the same, and much easier heard 
and understood.”95  Not only was an artillery square formation easy to govern aurally via the 
drum, but was itself a form of discipline, for “no soldier can possible misbehave, but there will be 
an eye presently upon him.”96 Keegan describes the use of the artillery square formation at the 
Battle of Waterloo (1815) in the following terms: 
Indeed, the very formation of the square, merely tactical as it may seem, concealed a strong 
coercive purpose. Infantry in line, particularly if formed four deep, offered just as much fire 
to cavalry as when in square.  In line, however, the ratio of officers to ‘attacked length’ was 
altogether lower than in square, for there all the officers were grouped in the centre and could 
turn in an instant to consolidate whichever face of the square was attacked; moreover the 
weapons they and their sergeants carried, swords and halberds, though of little offensive 
value, were exactly what was needed to keep individual soldiers, or groups of them, from 
running away.97 
The artillery square could not for long fend off the growing chaos of the battlefield, the 
enveloping dark, and the panicked retreat of the French Guard, nor was it intended to. Discipline 
only held the formation in check long enough to weather the decisive part of the battle. One 
commander surveyed the field at Waterloo in the early hours of the evening of 18 June 1815, 
where perhaps as many as 40,000 men had died that day, and described the surviving soldiers as 
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stumbling upon one another and over the dead in the mud and the dark, while “beastly drunk...  
and not at all particular as to which way they fired.”98 
 Choiseul's reforms may have increased the tensions between the estates, and the resulting 
financial pressures may have hastened the fall of the monarchy,99 but these administrative 
reforms were important building blocks upon which Napoleon would be able to institute much 
more comprehensive administrative reforms, particularly in the area of strategic command 
control. Van Creveld defines military command control in the following terms: 
First, command must arrange and coordinate everything an army needs to exist - its food 
supply, its sanitary service, its system of military justice, and so on. Second, command 
enables the army to carry out its proper mission, which is to inflict the maximum amount of 
death and destruction on the enemy within the shortest possible period of time and minimum 
loss to itself; to this part of command belong, for example, the gathering of intelligence and 
the planning and monitoring of operations.100 
Military command in this broad sense has always existed, and it has always been integral to the 
structure and organization of armed forces. However, within this expansive notion of command 
control there exists the ‘chain of command’, the system for delegating orders through the 
hierarchical structure of military offices.  Napoleon was the first military commander to put 
together a general staff and to use delegation to engage in strategic planning.101 A specialized 
planning staff did not exist before the nineteenth century,102 from which van Creveld concludes 
that “the years around 1800 may be regarded as among the last in which the traditional union 
between ruler and commander was still possible.”103  
 Napoleon’s contributions to the professionalization of modern armies lay primarily in the 
revolution in administration that he engendered.104 This involved decentralizing the armed forces, 
while instituting a system of regular reporting so as to coordinate the different units, while still 
maintaining sufficient control over their activities. In decentralizing strategic command in battle, 
Napoleon established several institutions which would come to dominate military organization in 
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the following centuries.105 Napoleon proceeded: 
 (a) to organise the army into self-contained, mission-oriented strategic units, each with its 
own proper commander, staff, and balance of all arms; (b) to institute a system of regular 
reports from the corps to General Headquarters, and of orders from the latter to the corps; (c) 
to organise a headquarters staff capable of dealing with all the traffic thus tenanted; and (d) to 
prevent the commander in chief from becoming a prisoner of that staff.106 
Although Napoleon was the first to decentralize and delegate command control, his reforms did 
not aim at creating subordinates who would gather information and make their own decisions.107 
His marshals were not organized into a hierarchy, and would not have been permitted to defer to 
one another.108 The bureaucratic administration of the General Staff was still in its infancy at 
Waterloo; there was no systematization, and orders were given by Napoleon on an ad hoc basis. 
As van Creveld states, “Napoleon on campaign sent out his orders with no kind of system 
whatsoever, writing to whomever he thought necessary at the moment, putting into his messages 
whatever part of his plan he thought fit, and informing those others whose names happened to 
occur to him.”109 In this, Napoleon “stood on the threshold between the age-old tradition of oral 
operational command and the new system of written staff work.”110 
 The new military science of delegated command came to revolutionize command control 
systems throughout the nineteenth century. Inspection, examination, and documentation were all 
increased, so as to bring order to the increasing specialization and decentralization occurring in 
the large standing armies: 
For example, it was the procedure of submitting daily detailed strength reports, established 
toward the end of the eighteenth century, that created the requirement for specialised 
personnel and thus gave both to the first general staff. Once staffs existed, pen and paper, not 
to mention desks and filing cabinets, became much more important than they had previously 
been. The switch from oral to written operational command, largely accomplished within the 
century from 1750 to 1850, meant that far more attention could be paid to systemic 
analysis.111 
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For the first time, command control began to address basic questions, such as “who ordered 
whom to do what, when, by what means, on the basis of what information, what for, and to what 
effect.”112 While systematic command control gained in terms of strategic planning and in 
increasing the size of military formations, the larger numbers of soldiers and the decentralization 
of command away from the general also meant there was less control over what subordinates did 
during battle. As states increased the size and complexity of the armed forces among the large 
military powers of Europe - a key component of nation-building in the nineteenth century - there 
was a corresponding need to decentralize command control and place more control in the hands 
of subordinates. This meant that less information would be available to those higher up in the 
chain of command, necessitating further decentralization. This increased the problem of keeping 
command control over the troops in battle, and the growth of the hierarchical chain of command 
was an attempt to remedy this.  
 
2.2.3 The Prussian Reforms of von Moltke: Rationalized Command Control 
 The development of rationalized military administration was brought to its apogee in the 
mid-nineteenth century in the command control systems of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the 
German Field Marshal of the Prussian Army, who further developed the methods of Napoleon 
and increased the complexity and decentralization of the Prussian military forces. The 
modernization of the Prussian military began in 1806, at which time it introduced modernization 
reforms based upon the French model after the Prussians’ disastrous defeat at the hands of 
Napoleon's forces at the Battle of Jena (1806). Yet it was not until the time of Moltke that 
strategic command in battle would assume its full form. Moltke’s 1866 campaign against Austria 
provides the first example of a modern general staff in action in battle.113 Moltke’s reforms 
included the inception of a permanent General Staff, whose peace time activities included such 
now-common military activities as the “painstaking gathering of information on possible 
opponents and theatres of war”, “drafting and redrafting plans for mobilization” and deployment, 
and conducting war games.114 The activities of the General Staff also included preparing 
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regulations and standing orders for training purposes,115 presaging the modern system of military 
doctrine and standing Rules of Engagement. The Austrian and Prussian forces at the Battle of 
Koniggratz (1866) together mustered about 440-460,000 troops, the largest up until that time.116 
Armies of this size could not be mobilized permanently, but had to be kept as reserves and called 
up at short notice.117 The increasing complexity and size of military forces meant that a regular 
and rigid chain of command needed to be developed to assist the army in its continued growth, to 
manage its activities and to maintain discipline. As van Creveld states, by the time of Koniggratz, 
“No longer was there much of a chance that a commander would address his subordinate as ‘my 
cousin’ and receive an undated message in reply.”118 
 The Prussian command control system instituted in the mid-nineteenth century was 
rationalized and methodical:  
The Prussian command system was as different from the Napoleonic one as it is possible to 
imagine. Whereas the one operated as a private institution (the emperor's Cabinet) addressing 
private individuals (“my cousin”) about private matters (“my affairs”), the other was fully 
and completely militarised for the first time. What one worked through a large span of control 
and a central reserve, the other would have nothing of either. Where one was all about 
brilliant improvisation and ad hoc measures without previous training to speak of, the other 
operated methodically on the basis of the most painstaking preparation in peacetime.119 
Moltke decentralized command control and, unlike Napoleon, delegated responsibility for the 
first time to the company commanders.120 Now, commanders were brought more fully into 
strategic planning, and asked to take initiative in carrying out their orders.  
 Moltke also introduced a systematic, detailed, and methodical form of transmitting orders 
in combat, called the ‘five paragraph field order’. Prior to this, field orders varied in detail, 
content, and length, and were issued in an ad hoc manner.121 The purpose of systematizing the 
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transmission of field orders in this way was to ensure that instructions were “clear, short, precise 
and complete.”122 As Armor states, “[t]hey avoided every form of expression that could have 
been misunderstood because experience showed that such orders had invariably been 
misunderstood.”123 He also noted that orders “used positive terms so that responsibility could be 
placed with ease.”124 Moltke’s five paragraph field order was first adopted by the U.S. in 1897, 
and most Western militaries had adopted such a format by the time of World War I.125 While this 
format delegated some new powers of discretion to company commanders, the system was also 
designed to maintain strict control over local commanders and ordinary soldiers in the field. As 
Armor states, “[s]ubordinates were not left to exercise their own judgment, for it would result in 
too great a variation in execution which meant incoherence and weakness… small unit trench 
warfare in WWI demanded the most detailed and exact form of orders, a long order filled with 
minute instructions on every point was vital to a well-knit coordinated effort.”126 Between the 
Franco-Prussian War and the massive mobilizations of World War I, European nation states 
aspired to mimic the structure and successes of the Prussian General Staff.127 As van Creveld 
states, “[t]he belief in the scientific nature of war led to the establishment of war colleges in every 
leading country; to the proliferation of military journals; and to the vast numbers of officially 
published military histories.”128 The administrative structure laid down by the Prussian army 
became the standard for Western and Westernizing militaries for the next century.  
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2.3 The Modern Requirements for Belligerent Qualification 
 The administrative system of military governance and its hierarchical chain of command 
thus came to full fruition during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the first time that 
Moltke’s full reforms were deployed in battle. The modern definition of belligerent qualification 
would also arise shortly after this juncture. Indeed, the definition of belligerent qualification - 
defined in terms of military organization and the chain of command - could not have arisen until 
such methods of military administration as regimentation and systematized command control had 
already become established. It was also during the Franco-Prussian War that serious conflict 
would arise among the European powers over the legality of arming and authorizing irregular 
belligerents to fight on their behalf. This would erupt in the debate concerning the irregular 
militia that fought in that war, known as the francs-tireurs. The first attempt on the part of the 
international community to clearly define belligerent qualification was undertaken just after the 
Franco-Prussian War, at the Brussels Conference of 1874, as part of the Project of an 
International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War.129 The solution that was 
proposed at Brussels was that irregular fighters would be recognized only if they possessed a 
minimum of the qualities possessed by a regular army,130 and by this it was meant the 
professional armies of the great military powers of Europe.  
 The Brussels Conference of 1874 was a project devoted to codifying the international laws 
of war for use by the militaries of the leading European powers. The Conference was called by 
the Tsar of Russia at the behest of the twenty-eight year old Chair of International Law at St. 
Petersburg University and advisor to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the young Fyodor 
de Martens.131 Martens drafted the code of land warfare that would form the Brussels 
Declaration,132 and that would, although not ratified at that time, be adopted at The Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and form the basis of the Hague Regulations.133 Although very 
different in substance from the Code drafted by Francis Lieber for use during the American Civil 
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War (1861-1865),134 the Lieber Code was an important transitional document in the laws of war 
upon which Martens drew.135 Perhaps the most important advance engendered by the Lieber 
Code was simply that the laws of war could be codified, and issued as instructions to armies in 
the field, and Martens adopted this idea and sought to draft a code that would be ratified and 
implemented by the international community as a whole.  
 
2.3.1 Francis Lieber and the American Civil War 
 Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states’ treatment of irregulars was 
inconsistent; they very often refused to recognize the irregular militia raised by opposing states, 
while at the same time mustering their own. For example, when Napoleon invaded Prussia in 
1813, the Prussians raised a militia, known as the Landsturm.136 Napoleon announced that the 
French considered the Landsturm as brigands, a common term for unqualified belligerents. 
Landsturm were authorized by the sovereign, but had little organization.137 They used little in the 
way of distinctive symbols, “[t]heir only uniform was a cap and belt, which they were instructed 
to hide when hard pressed.”138 Yet when Napoleon’s forces were themselves hard pressed, he too 
called up non-uniformed French peasants.139 Throughout the nineteenth century, European 
powers used irregular militia as they saw fit to assist their regular forces in the conduct of 
hostilities, yet the sovereign authorization rule was gradually ceasing to function as the sole 
criteria for belligerent qualification. This can be seen, for example by the additional criteria 
imposed upon irregulars fighting in the American Civil War (1861-1865). Irregulars were much 
used in the course of the Civil War; some strongly resembled regular troops in their organization 
and were considered as fully qualified belligerents, whereas less organized troops were 
considered mere ‘brigands’.  
 In order to clarify the applicable laws and customs of war, the Lincoln Administration 
commissioned Francis Lieber, a German-American who had been trained in the Prussian Army, 
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to draft the Lieber Code to govern the conduct of troops during the Civil War. Lieber was 
primarily concerned with codifying the current customs and practices that prevailed at the time. 
For example, Lieber affirms the sovereign authorization rule in Article 57 of the Lieber Code, 
which states, “So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath 
of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual 
crimes or offences.” Volunteer, or militia corps, often referred to as ‘partisans’ in the Civil War, 
were in use by both sides of the conflict, during which they supplemented the regular army. 
Article 81 of the Lieber Code defines partisan soldiers by stating, “Partisans are soldiers armed 
and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to a corps which acts detached from the 
main body for the purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If 
captured, they are entitled to all of the privileges of the prisoner of war.” Article 82 distinguishes 
partisans from unqualified belligerents as follows: 
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for 
destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and 
portion of the organized hostile army [and who occasionally return to their civilian 
avocations] are public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of 
prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates. 
Often, individual irregulars would be arrested and courts martialed on charges solely of being a 
‘brigand’. Charges would be laid for such crimes as ‘Free Booting’, ‘Jayhawking’, and 
‘Bushwacking’ - “all terms which were said to be so well understood as to of themselves state a 
punishable offence without elaboration.”140 There is thus a distinction being drawn between more 
and less irregular troops. Sovereign authorization remains a necessary condition of belligerent 
qualification, but the Lieber Code further requires that troops be wearing uniforms, be paid by 
and be “part and portion of the organized army.”141 Thus, the Lieber Code reflects a transition 
between the earlier period in which sovereign authorization was sufficient for belligerent 
qualification, and the international agreements of the late nineteenth century, which also imposed 
the four organizational criteria.142  
 While drafting the Lieber Code, Francis Lieber was called upon to specifically address the 
issue of partisans in greater depth, and he produced a treatise entitled Guerilla Parties 
                                                
140 Ibid. at 37.  
141 Lieber Code, supra note 134 at Article 82; see Appendix A at 5, p. 298.  
142 JAG Treatise, supra note 38 at 45.  
  83 
Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War.143 Lieber calls this a “new topic” in 
the laws of war, and his purpose in writing the treatise is to sum up the applicable practices and 
usages of states, rather than to propose new rules.144 Lieber sums up the problem posed by 
guerilla warfare during the Civil War, by stating that the “rebel authorities claim the right to send 
men, in the garb of peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and houses, 
and to destroy property and persons within our lines.”145 Several Confederate leaders were openly 
claiming the right to use such nonuniformed partisan rangers to engage in guerilla attacks against 
Union soldiers.146 Governor John Lechter of Virginia had declared that all men who had a 
commission from the state were entitled to all the protections of soldiers and prisoners of war, 
thus claiming the right to authorize such irregular guerilla fighters.147 Confederate General 
Thomas Hindman further asserted that the Confederacy would be bound by military necessity, 
rather than laws of war imposed by foreign powers, declaring that “We cannot be expected to 
allow our enemies to decide for us.”148 Another Confederate commander claimed the right to 
decide “whether we shall fight them in masses or individually, in uniform, without uniform, 
openly or from ambush.”149 
 In his treatise on Guerilla Parties, Lieber defines guerilla troops as being “self-constituted 
or constituted by the call of a single individual, not according to the general law of levy, 
conscription, or volunteering.”150 Lieber distinguishes these fighters from partisans, for whom he 
proposes the definition of partisan troops that he would later adopt as Article 82 of the Lieber 
Code.151 Here, Lieber is attempting to define the difference between guerilla and partisan troops 
on the basis of the sovereign authorization rule: partisan troops are called up according to the 
general law of levy and are part and portion of the regular army, whereas guerilla troops are self-
constituted or called up at the behest of one or more individuals. However, Lieber also 
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recognized that guerilla fighters were in fact called up by the Confederate authorities, who were 
indeed claiming the right to authorize and to use such troops.152 The sovereign authorization rule 
then in use would have permitted this; if the use of such irregulars were to be prohibited, then 
some other rule would be required. Lieber did not propose a new rule, but he did attempt to 
restrain the worst abuses being committed against such troops in the interests of humanity, 
recognizing that “it is difficult for the captor of guerilla-men to decide at once whether they are 
regular partisans, distinctly authorized by their own government,” and so there should be a 
presumption that they are to be treated as regular partisans, and according to the law.153  
 Even as he urges leniency and humanity against irregular troops, Lieber leaves the actual 
formulation and implementation of policies concerning guerilla fighters up to the legislative and 
executive powers, without seeking to circumscribe their discretion through general rules of 
law.154 Witt argues that Lieber did more than just declare the law, however, and that his chief 
innovation was to focus on the characteristics that made men soldiers.155 These characteristics 
included open and visible manifestations of the legitimacy and permanency of the fighting group, 
such as uniforms, insignia, and the permanence of the regiment.156 This moved the law, for the 
first time, away from the sovereign authorization rule, finding that something more was required 
for lawful belligerency, although that something had not yet been articulated with precision.  
 Lieber’s approach to the problem would be influential in Europe. Johann Bluntschli, a 
noted scholar of international law at the University of Heidelberg would translate the Lieber 
Code into German, and it would become the Prussian Code of Land Warfare.157 The failures of 
the sovereign authorization rule to prohibit the use of guerilla troops, to prevent the slaughter of 
guerillas and suspected guerrillas, and to quell international disagreements concerning the 
behavior of armies towards such actors would come to a head during the debate over the francs-
tireurs called up by the French government during the Franco-Prussian War. At the time, the 
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Prussians were using the code drafted by Lieber, and translated by Bluntschli.158 Martens, who 
had access to Lieber’s text, as well as his work on Guerilla Parties,159 would go farther than 
Lieber in proposing that the problem of the francs-tireurs be solved by imposing the four 
organizational criteria on all fighters; this advance would give rise to the modern laws concerning 
belligerent qualification and civilian immunity.  
 
2.3.2 The Franco-Prussian War and the Francs-Tireurs 
 The debate over guerilla troops was even more contentious in Europe during the Franco-
Prussian War (1870-1871). After the conventional French forces were routed by the Prussians, 
the French government called up groups of irregular militia, including the uniformed Garde 
Mobile, as well as individuals belonging to shooting clubs, known as the francs-tireurs.160 Some 
francs-tireurs wore uniforms, while others wore only blue blouses with a red armband or 
shoulder strap.161 The francs-tireurs were authorized, but were not uniformed, trained or 
equipped by the French government. Francs-tireurs were not recognized by the Prussian army, 
who “treated all these forces, without distinction, as unlawful belligerents, although all were 
authorized by the French government.”162 The Prussians required not only uniforms, but also 
clear evidence of sovereign authorization, requiring that “each individual irregular combatant was 
required to have on his person a certificate of his character as a soldier, issued by a legal 
authority, and addressed to him personally, to the effect that he was called to colours, and was 
borne on the rolls of a corps organized on a military footing by the French government.”163 These 
requirements were nearly impossible to meet164 – the French government was experiencing 
significant difficulties outfitting even their regular troops165 - and large numbers of francs-tireurs 
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were shot and executed upon capture.166 At this time France, as well as many smaller European 
nations who were similarly unable to raise and equip professional military forces of their own, 
sought legal recognition for such irregular combatants.167 The old authorization rule was failing 
to perform the functions of distinguishing combatants and protecting captives, and was leading to 
large numbers of casualties. The authorization rule was also causing contention between the 
European powers, who disagreed over the terms of the emerging customary law regarding 
belligerent qualification. This was the dispute that Martens hoped to resolve at the Brussels 
Conference of 1874.  
 The dispute over the francs-tireurs gave rise to the central issue in the laws of war in the 
1870s, this being whether an insurgent population in an occupied territory were to be considered 
as lawful combatants,168 and it is the resolution of this dispute which gave rise to the modern laws 
of belligerent qualification and levée en masse. At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia 
had declared that such fighters were not lawful combatants, but many other European powers 
disagreed. In Britain, for example, the francs-tireurs were considered to be lawful combatants, 
their status being similar to that of privateers. The Earl of Denbigh stated as much in a House of 
Commons debate on the war in 1871,169 and this view would be echoed by Cavendish Bentick, 
who stated that “belligerent powers had to the full as much right to employ privateers as Francs-
Tireurs, torpedoes, or Gardes Mobiles.”170 The sovereign authorization rule was as yet in force.  
 
2.3.3 The Brussels Conference of 1874 and the Martens Code  
 It was with the goal of clarifying the emerging customs of war that Tsar Alexander II of 
Russia called the Brussels Conference in 1874 as part of the Project of an International 
Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War. The Conference took place in Brussels 
from 27 July to 27 August 1874.171 Fifteen European states were in attendance, as well as an 
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Ottoman delegation.172 France, Britain, and the secondary powers were cognizant of the danger 
that the Prussian victory might enshrine the right of conquest in the international law. Russia 
supported the secondary powers of Spain, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland in recognizing the 
legitimacy of calling up a levée en masse to fight an occupying power.173 Germany, on the other 
hand, strenuously argued against this practice, and instead demanded that irregular forces be 
outlawed, as their use would only result in military escalation, and cruel reprisals.174  
 Martens “argued that the German claim that military necessity took precedence over all else 
in fact amounted to a denial of international law as a principle,”175 a view that was favored 
among Russian scholars of international law in the late nineteenth century.176 The German 
position was thus similar to the claim earlier made by Confederate leaders that their guiding 
principle was military necessity, rather than foreign laws imposed by one’s enemies.177 Instead, 
Martens wished to found an international code of land warfare based upon principles of 
humanitarianism, one that would “mitigate the horrors of war, in accordance with the legal 
awareness and humanism that were growing among the general public.”178 In fact, there were 
then several groups operating in Europe that had as their aim the drafting of a more complete 
international code for the conduct of warfare. These included the International League for Peace 
and Freedom, and the Association for Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, which 
shared the goal of wanting the conduct of war to be subject to international law.179 The Society 
for the Improvement of the Condition of Prisoners of War, led by the Comte de Houdetot and 
Henri Dunant, had originally proposed a conference be called in Paris to discuss the adoption of a 
Convention relating to prisoners of war, but this plan was preempted by the Russian Project. The 
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Society called off the Paris Conference in deference to the Russian Project, but when they arrived 
in Brussels with their delegation, they were denied entry by the state delegates, who determined 
that only “European Powers such as those invited, could be allowed to attend or take part in the 
in the proceedings of the Conference.”180 None of these parties sought to adopt the Prussian Code 
of Land Warfare translated from Lieber, likely because it tipped the balance in favor of military 
discretion rather than the rule of law. The debate over the law of belligerent qualification, both in 
the 1870s and today, stems not so much from what Witt terms the struggle between 
humanitarianism versus justice as competing visions of war,181 but the struggle between the rule 
of law versus military discretion. Will security forces be guided by legal rules, or will they be 
permitted to act according to their own determinations as to what actions constitute military 
necessity?  
 Indeed, Baron Jomini, the principal Russian delegate and chairman of the Brussels 
Conference, made it clear in his opening statement to the Conference that what was at stake was 
the very idea of war itself in the modern age. He stated that, at the present time: 
[V]ery contradictory ideas prevail concerning war. There are those that would like it made 
more terrible so as to make it less frequent, while others would turn it into a tournament 
between regular armies with civilians simply as onlookers. People must know where they 
stand… It is easier to do one’s duty than to define it. We must, therefore, tell everyone what 
his duty is.182 
While the delegates at the Brussels Conference generally agreed with the above view of war, the 
fault lines developed along pragmatic, rather than ideological, lines. The secondary powers were 
simply unable to organize and equip the kind of regular military that the ‘tournament’ of war 
demanded, and which Germany already possessed; instead, they maintained that they needed to 
rely on the ‘patriotism’ expressed in the levée en masse in order to secure their defense against 
foreign invasion.  
 Prior to the Conference, the Germans declared their position as follows: 
With regard to the question of volunteer forces - “Francs-tireurs” and “levées en masse” - 
Major-General Walker learns that, as the Germans have no such auxiliary forces, and as the 
Landsturm is to be put under legal and Parliamentary control, the policy will be to endeavour 
to force the French into a like course, by discouraging all immunities to volunteers and free 
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corps.183 
The Germans reiterated this position at the Conference, stating that it was expedient, “in the 
interests of humanity that no encouragement be given to the inhabitants of an occupied district to 
rise against the invader,” as the French had done in the late conflict, “as such a course would lead 
to repressive measures, which, instead of diminishing the horrors of war, would tend to increase 
them.”184 None of the other delegates present at the Conference took this view. The Belgian 
delegate, Baron Lambermont, pointed out the practical difficulties of organizing and funding a 
regular army of the kind deployed by Germany. He pointed out that, despite the time and 
sacrifices they had put into the defense of their countries, the armed forces of the secondary 
nations would always be inferior to those of the Great Powers; therefore, it was necessary for 
such countries to preserve those ‘patriotic’ and ‘heroic’ sentiments that had so often led their 
subjects to rise and defend their nations.185 Concerning the proposed punishment of irregular 
forces who resisted an occupying power, he stated that “if citizens were to be sacrificed for 
having attempted to defend their country at the peril of their lives, they need not find inscribed on 
the post at the foot of which they are about to be shot, the Article of a Treaty signed by their own 
Government, which had in advance condemned them to death.”186 Privately, the Belgian Under-
Secretary communicated to the British delegate, Sir Alfred Horsford, in plainer terminology that: 
[A]ny inhabitants who might rise in rear of the invaders, would be liable to be treated by the 
enemy with the utmost rigour, whereas (to make use of the words employed by the Under-
Secretary himself) the inhabitants would most probably be shot by the Belgians themselves if 
they did not rise in defence of their own standard; and, he continued, neither the Government 
nor even the King would dare to propose to them any other course.187 
The delegate from The Netherlands also remarked that, in practical terms, the effect of outlawing 
levées en masse would mean either that they would have to limit their powers of defense, or 
institute compulsory conscription as Germany had done - a course which they were not prepared 
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to accept.188 The new rules of belligerent qualification proposed at Brussels favored the 
disciplined and well-equipped regular forces of the Great Powers. The secondary powers were 
forced either to develop inferior armies along the same lines, or be subjected to harsh reprisals for 
failing to do so.  
 One of the great advances of the Brussels Conference, and which engendered somewhat 
less controversy than the definition of levée en masse, was the formulation of the modern rules 
for belligerent qualification. An early formulation of the laws of belligerent qualification as they 
appear in the Brussels Declaration was delivered in a paper read by Henry Richmond Droop, a 
barrister of Lincoln’s Inn Fields, to the Juridical Society of London on 30 November 1870.189 
Droop’s paper addressed the most pressing topic in international law of the day – that of the 
francs-tireurs – and he articulates many of the key concepts of the modern international 
humanitarian law. Like Martens, Droop was motivated by overriding concerns of humanity, and 
sought to limit military discretion. In particular, Droop espouses the four core organizational 
criteria, and links the law of belligerent qualification with the emerging principle of civilian 
immunity. He states that troops must be required to distinguish themselves from civilians in order 
that civilians might be protected from the ravages of war190 – the idea that now forms the basis of 
the humanitarian law and the modern principles of distinction and civilian immunity.  
 Droop begins by asserting that sovereign authorization remains the generally accepted rule 
for belligerent qualification.191 However, he argues that this rule is no longer desirable for 
regulating present-day conflicts, and he proposes instead a rule for belligerent qualification based 
upon objective and readily observable criteria.192 Droop rejects the sovereign authorization rule 
that had been asserted by Vattel - “that every inhabitant of an invaded country has a natural right 
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to defend his home, and therefore ought, if he takes up arms, to have the status of a soldier”193 - 
on the grounds that sovereign authorization alone would make it impossible to distinguish 
between troops and civilians, or to enforce respect for the laws of war on the part of 
belligerents.194 Civilians ought not to be attacked in war, and preventing this is the responsibility 
of the armed forces who would fight the war.195 At the same time, he argued that the rules 
regarding belligerent qualification would also be beneficial for armies. Regular troops must have 
some security for reciprocity from enemy troops, and “[t]his security they can hardly have, unless 
the combatants they are fighting against are so connected with the national army that any part of 
this army can be held responsible for their conduct… Therefore to entitle them to the privileges 
of regular troops they ought to be under the actual control of officers who are in communication 
with and responsible to the commanders of the national army.”196 This could only be 
accomplished by clear standards for belligerent qualification, which Droop outlined as follows: 
1. They must have an authorization from an established Government or from some de facto 
substitute for such a Government. 
2. They must be under the actual control of officers who are recognized by and responsible to 
the chief military authorities of the state. 
3. They must themselves observe the rules of war. 
4. All combatants intended to act singly or in small parties must have a permanent distinctive 
uniform, but this is not indispensable for troops acting together in large bodies. 
5. Levies en masse of the whole population are legitimate combatants provided they comply 
with the above conditions, but not otherwise.197 
Droop’s formulation of belligerent qualification would set out the basic outlines and rationale for 
the Brussels Declaration, including the importance of discipline maintained through a clear chain 
of command, yet it differs from the Brussels Declaration in three key respects. First, Droop 
would have eliminated the traditional concept of levée en masse, instead requiring that such 
combatants follow the same organizational criteria as regular troops to distinguish themselves 
from civilians; otherwise, it would be too difficult to identify and protect the non-combatant 
population. Second, Droop significantly relaxed the uniform requirements for regular troops. 
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Providing uniforms to a large number of troops takes considerable time and expense, and 
therefore uniforms are not always available, provided they have other means of distinguishing 
themselves.198 Third, Droop recognized that a de facto authority could authorize the use of force, 
provided that it is able to discipline its troops. These last two ideas would be rejected at the 
Brussels Conference, but similar ideas would appear a hundred years later in Protocol I.199  
 The modern definition of a ‘lawful combatant’ first appears in its essential form in Article 9 
of the Brussels Declaration, and it is based primarily upon Droop’s organizational criteria, 
including wearing a distinctive insignia, carrying arms openly, and being subsumed under a 
nation state’s military chain of command so that the laws and customs of war can be enforced by 
a qualified public authority. Article 9 of the Original Project that was placed before the 
Conference for discussion read as follows: 
The rights of belligerents shall not only be enjoyed by the army, but also by the militia and 
volunteers in the following cases: 
 
1. If, having at their head a person responsible for his subordinates, they are at the same time 
subject to orders from headquarters; 
2. If they wear some distinctive badge, recognizable at a distance; 
3. If they carry arms openly; and 
4. If, in their operations they conform to the laws, customs, and procedure of war.  
 
Armed bands not complying with the above-mentioned conditions shall not possess the rights 
of belligerents; they shall not be considered as regular enemies, and in the case of capture 
shall be proceeded against judicially.200 
This final sentence was intended to prevent the reprisal killings that were undertaken against the 
francs-tireurs by the Prussians. However, many of the delegates thought that it remained too 
harsh, and proposed that it be struck altogether.201 The final Brussels Declaration states in Article 
9: 
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The laws, rights and duties of war, apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer 
corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
 
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance [so that they may be 
distinguished from the civilian population]; 
3. That they carry arms openly; and 
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.202 
The Brussels Declaration thus formalized the position that sovereign authorization was 
insufficient; only those troops that met the four core organizational criteria could be authorized to 
fight.  
 There is a similarity between Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration and the criteria outlined 
by Droop at Lincoln’s Inn.203 While there is no evidence that Martens had Droop’s speech before 
him, as he certainly did the Lieber Code and Lieber’s treatise on Guerilla Parties,204 Martens had 
studied the topic closely before drafting the Brussels Declaration. He states, “During the war of 
1870-1871, being close to the theatre of war, I collected from the newspapers of all countries and 
through personal contacts all the facts which established a violation of the laws and customs of 
war. Already I had come to the conclusion that the establishment by the governments themselves 
of these laws and customs was entirely necessary in order to prevent endless occupations and 
merciless reprisals.”205 Martens may have been cognizant of Droop’s speech when drafting the 
Brussels Declaration, and the Judge Advocate General, in his 1956 treatise on the laws of 
belligerent qualification, states that Droop’s speech was the origin of the Brussels rules regarding 
belligerent qualification, although this is difficult to confirm.206  
 The rules of belligerent qualification as they appeared in the Brussels Declaration were 
largely based upon European concerns concerning the use of the francs-tireurs in the Franco-
Prussian War. American jurists were less enthusiastic about these rules, preferring instead the 
flexibility of their own Lieber Code. At the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, U.S. delegates took 
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no position concerning the debate over the proposed definition of levée en masse, or the text of 
Article 1 of the Hague Regulations that set out the rules for belligerent qualification.207 Major 
General George Davis, an American military scholar and the Judge Advocate General at the time 
the U.S. ratified the Hague Regulations, preferred the Lieber Code over the Brussels Declaration, 
which he finds errs too far on the side of protecting humanitarian interests at the expense of 
military commanders and their discretion. He states that, unlike the Lieber Code, the Brussels 
Declaration has the “disadvantage of being adopted in times of peace, when the minds of men in 
dealing with military affairs turn rather to the ideal than the practical.”208 It is worth noting that 
the Americans had been asked by the Russian government if they would take part in the Brussels 
Conference, but they declined to do so.209 Davis saw the Brussels Declaration, and the Hague 
Regulations that followed upon it, as espousing quite different rules and principles than those 
found in the Lieber Code, and he was in no way eager to claim it for America’s own. 
 Significant also is Article 10 of the Brussels Declaration, which recognizes levées en masse 
as qualified belligerents: 
Article 10. The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach 
of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had 
time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 9, shall be regarded as belligerents if 
they respect the laws and customs of war.210   
This was essentially the same concept earlier articulated by Vattel. Yet now, the population of a 
territory that was already under occupation lost the right to resist through force of arms, and 
lawful belligerents were not to include “groups of the inhabitants of an occupied territory who 
take up arms subsequent to the occupation to harass or engage the occupant,”211 as the francs-
tireurs had done. Even the German delegate at the Brussels Conference admitted that, “amongst 
those unfortunate peasants who were shot in virtue of the laws of war, many were guilty of 
nothing more than having obeyed an instinctive and almost irresistible sentiment of local 
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patriotism.”212 However, it was also the German position that countries must develop a strong 
military organization, so as to enforce the laws and usages of war, and ensure that military force 
would be effective.213 Article 10 was therefore a compromise solution: the Brussels Declaration 
declined to require that levées en masse follow the organizational requirements for belligerent 
qualification laid down in Article 9, but also declined to abolish the concept, instead restricting it 
temporally to the time of invasion.  
 The Brussels Declaration is therefore the first formal articulation of the modern rules of 
belligerent qualification and the principle of distinction: belligerent qualification belongs equally 
to all those who fight on behalf of a public authority, who follow the laws of war, who are subject 
to the discipline of a military chain of command, and who clearly distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population by wearing distinctive emblems and carrying their arms openly. At the same 
time, the Brussels Declaration formally recognized that the only exceptions to this rule are the 
specific circumstances that give rise to a levée en masse. All other combatants are unqualified, 
and their taking up arms can be treated as a criminal offence in and of itself. Although the 
Brussels Declaration was not ratified, the definition of a combatant laid down at the Brussels 
Conference was essentially adopted at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference,214 and again 
unchanged at the second Hague Peace Conference of 1907.215 As Green states, “what appears in 
the Hague Regulations is the wording of Brussels, with but minor verbal changes,”216 and these 
criteria were subsequently adopted into Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which 
adopts the Hague law of belligerent qualification to determine which combatants are entitled to 
the privileges of prisoner of war treatment.  
                                                
212 War Rights on Land, supra note 161 at 49. 
213 Supra note 184.  
214 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, Annex to the 
Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, states at Article 1, “The laws, rights, 
and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps, fulfilling the following conditions: 
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance; To carry arms openly; and To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In 
countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the 
denomination ‘army’” [hereinafter Hague Regulations of 1899]; see also: Appendix A at 10, p. 301. 
215 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Annex to the 
Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land at Article 1 [hereinafter Hague 
Regulations of 1907]; see also Appendix A at 11, p. 301. 
216 Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 6 at 131.  
  96 
 Although it was not formally ratified, the Brussels Declaration had a significant impact at 
the time upon the conception of what were customarily accepted usages of war. Britain, for 
example, which had earlier supported the francs-tireurs, would largely adopt the Brussels 
Declaration principles after the Brussels Conference.  Sir Henry Drummond Wolf would approve 
of the findings of the Conference, telling the House of Commons that “the articles submitted 
restricted the laws, rights, and duties of war to troops of any kind commanded by officers 
responsible for their subordinates conforming to the laws and customs of war, and forbade the 
Constitution of an Army unless it was governed by men having knowledge of those laws and 
customs.”217 Sir William Harcourt would state in the House of Commons in 1875 that francs-
tireurs were not volunteers, and that “volunteers did not go out for gain as they did.”218 Even the 
Earl of Denbigh, who stated that the United Kingdom would not undertake any new obligations 
as a result of the Brussels Conference,219 expressed his approval for the inclusion of levées en 
masse. The Earl of Denbigh is clear that this concept was intended to protect state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity from outside aggression – the position of Great Britain and the secondary 
powers at the Brussels Conference - when he states that without the law authorizing levées en 
masse, “if a foreign force landed in Kent, that county would cease to belong to the Queen. 
Hitherto the safeguard of a country had been thought to be the breast and arm of every citizen.”220 
Any proposals to remove levées en masse from the list of qualified belligerents would “deprive 
the country attacked of that advantage.”221   
 These instruments did not end the controversy over the position of irregular combatants. At 
the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, there was again significant disagreement between the great 
military powers and the weaker states over the issue of arming militia and their status as 
belligerents. This was resolved by the introduction of the Martens Clause as the preamble to the 
1899 Hague Convention II, again drafted by Martens, who was now the Russian delegate to the 
Conference. As Ticehurst explains, “Martens introduced the declaration after delegates at the 
Peace Conference failed to agree on the issue of the status of civilians who took up arms against 
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an occupying force. Large military powers argued that they should be treated as francs-tireurs 
and subject to execution, while smaller states contended that they should be treated as lawful 
combatants.”222 The positions of various delegates were so opposed on the issue of irregular 
combatants, that it threatened the entire conference.223 The Martens Clause reads: 
 Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it 
right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations 
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, 
as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of 
humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.224 
Despite this, the Martens Clause failed to resolve the issue of arming militia, which only gained 
momentum as a consequence of the controversial treatment of irregular forces during World War 
II.  
 
2.3.4 Warfare in the Nineteenth Century and Civilian Immunity 
 The principle of civilian immunity grew up alongside of the modern law of belligerent 
qualification. Indeed, the concepts are two sides of the same coin: qualified belligerents must 
fight according to the criteria laid out in the Hague Regulations, so that they might be 
distinguished from civilians, who are all those persons who possess no belligerent privileges and 
who are immune from attack.  
 The Peace of God movement of the Middle Ages neither defined nor protected civilians in 
terms that we would recognize today. By the time Grotius wrote his treatise on international law 
in the seventeenth century, the ‘enemy’ was still considered to include the entire population of 
the hostile power, and there were no restrictions on who was liable to be attacked in the course of 
a lawful war. In his 1625 De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Grotius states that killing in war “is no murder,” 
if it be a lawful war, and that this right to kill or injure included “not only those who actually bear 
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arms, or who are immediately subjects of the belligerent power, but even all who are within the 
hostile territories.”225 Grotius states that the “Slaughter of Infants and Women is allowed, and 
included by the Right of War,” as is the wasting of villages with fire and sword.226 Von Martens, 
writing in the late eighteenth century, forbid the use of violence against those who were hors de 
combat, stating that those, including children, old men, and women, who do not or cannot carry 
arms “are safe under the protection of the law of nations, unless they have exercised violence 
against the enemy,” and that soldiers who have laid down their arms, or who have not the will nor 
the power to resist, may not be harmed.227 This is one of the earliest expressions of the modern 
principles of civilian immunity and civilian participation.  
 The Lieber Code of 1863, while an important transitional document in the modern laws of 
war, does not espouse what we now call the principle of civilian immunity. Lieber does recognize 
a growing usage that distinguishes combatants from non-combatants, when he states in Article 
22: 
 Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily 
advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging 
to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been 
more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, 
and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit. 
Lieber finds this to be a growing custom among those peoples he terms ‘civilized’.228 Yet he also 
finds there to be a number of exceptions to this rule, including the subjection of noncombatants to 
sieges and bombardments,229 and the use of starvation of civilians to promote their 
capitulation.230 He also demonstrates a pragmatic approach that gives deference to the discretion 
of military authorities, allowing that civilians should be protected “as much as the exigencies of 
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war will admit.” Nor does he include the rule prohibiting violence against those fighters who are 
hors de combat, as Rousseau and von Martens did. Instead, he states that the enemy population is 
divided into combatants and unarmed citizens.231 Unarmed civilians themselves are divided into 
those who are loyal and those who are disloyal. Disloyal citizens include those who “sympathize 
with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give 
positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy.”232 The “Commander will throw the burden of 
war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens.”233  
 Rousseau’s principle - that no government had the right to take the life of a man who had 
laid down arms and was no longer defending against it – was in a state of flux at this time, with 
some treatise writers asserting the principle, and some circumscribing it almost entirely by 
military discretion. Several treatise writers directly adopted the principle that those who were 
hors de combat were not liable to be attacked. For example, the 1863 edition of Wheaton’s 
Elements of International Law, which was prepared contemporaneously with the Lieber Code 
and so addresses many legal issues arising out of the U.S. Civil War, largely adopts this principle. 
This follows very closely upon the reasoning of Rousseau. Wheaton states, “[t]hose who are 
actually in arms, and continue to resist, may be lawfully killed; but the inhabitants of the enemy’s 
country who are not in arms, or who, being in arms, submit and surrender themselves, may not be 
slain, because their destruction is not necessary for obtaining the just ends of war.”234 That this 
formulation gave ample discretion to military authorities to determine when civilians could be 
attacked as a matter of military necessity is confirmed in the 1878 edition of Wheaton’s Elements, 
in which the author states that “the ravaging of Georgia and Carolina by General Sherman during 
the American Civil War was perhaps a necessary military operation.”235 This was echoed in the 
Third English Edition of Wheaton’s Elements in 1889.236 Notably, none of these treatises mention 
the Brussels Conference of 1874, or its Declaration. 
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 Indeed, the deliberate targeting of civilian populations was often carried out in the 
nineteenth century, and was justified on the grounds of military necessary. This was true not only 
for large-scale military conflicts such as the American Civil War or the Franco-Prussian War, but 
also for smaller wars and counterinsurgent operations. During the nineteenth century, most of the 
activities undertaken by soldiers were what we would now term ‘unconventional’ or 
counterinsurgent operations. Counterinsurgent warfare during this time primarily involved the 
suppression of insurgent, resistance, and revolutionary movements.237 Often known as 
‘pacification’, or ‘constabulary’ (policing) actions, these operations often took place in the 
colonies, or in areas that were undergoing conquest.238 The regular army would have spent most 
of their time engaged in operations of this kind, rather than in inter-state warfare. As Birtle states, 
“much of the Army’s combat experience prior to World War II was gained not in conventional 
battles against regular opponents, but in unconventional conflicts against a bewildering array of 
irregulars, from American Indians to Bolshevik partisans.”239 Nineteenth-century 
counterinsurgent warfare was thus closely linked with realpolitik, colonialism and territorial 
expansion.  
 Techniques of occupation and colonization in the nineteenth century – what we would now 
call ‘counterinsurgency’ – permitted the targeting of civilians who were thought to be lending 
support to an insurrection or rebellion.  As Birtle states, “[w]hen a civilian population spurned the 
hand of reconciliation and supported illegal combatants, an army was free to employ more severe 
measures.”240 This was how the U.S. Army dealt, for example, with the Aboriginal populations 
within its expanding borders. Birtle states that the U.S. army’s experience in the antebellum 
period, “was in many ways the child of the frontier,”241 as the settled boundary was pushed ever 
westward.242 In 1835, Dennis Hart Mahan began to teach the techniques of frontier campaigning 
                                                
237 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine 1942-1976 (Washington, D.C.: Center 
of Military History United States Army, 2006) at 4 [hereinafter COIN Doctrine 1942-1976]. 
238 Ibid. By the time of World War II, these actions were generally termed ‘Small Wars’. By the latter part of the 
Cold War, they fell under the heading of ‘military operations other than war’, and were often referred to in military 
doctrine as ‘foreign internal defense’, or ‘stabilization’ operations. Since then, the terms ‘counterinsurgency’ and 
‘peacekeeping’ have come into more general usage.  
239 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine 1860-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center 
of Military History United States Army, 2006) at 3 [hereinafter COIN Doctrine 1860-1941]. 
240 COIN Warfare 1942-1976, supra note 237 at 8. 
241 COIN Warfare 1860-1941, supra note 239 at 7. 
242 Ibid. at 11. The U.S. based many of their techniques of frontier warfare from the earlier experiences of the British.  
  101 
at West Point.243 Key tactics include the use of “science and strategy to force the Indian to fight 
on the white man’s terms.”244 Since Aboriginals were better marksmen,245 the preferred strategy 
was to “send a column deep into enemy territory to destroy the Indians’ villages and food 
supplies. Only by striking at the foundations of Indian society could the Army compel its elusive 
opponents either to capitulate or to stand and fight on terms favorable to the Army.”246 This often 
included the use of sieges, starvation, and the burning of entire villages, as the U.S. had done, for 
example, to the Seminole tribes in Florida.247  
 Similarly, in his pacification of Mexico during the Mexican War (1846-1848), Major 
General Winfield Scott adopted a policy that, on the one hand, sought to win the favour of the 
local population, but that was accompanied by a heavy-handed strategy of collective punishment 
against those who resisted. General Scott distributed rations to the poor, maintained basic 
facilities, such as courts, schools, and hospitals, and declined to requisition supplies from the 
population.248 Nevertheless, he took a harsh stand against any irregular forces who fought back, 
as well as the civilians who supported them. Scott denied quarter to irregular fighters, confiscated 
civilian property as punishment, and even burned entire villages suspected of harboring 
irregulars.249 As Birtle states, “Scott used the torch with such liberality that the road between 
Vera Cruz and Mexico City was marked by a black swath of devastation several miles wide.”250 
Not only were irregulars to be dealt with as criminals, but collective punishment was imposed 
upon entire communities to discourage support for resistance movements.251  
 Such techniques were accepted under the international customary law of the time. Henry 
W. Halleck, for example, published a treatise on international law in 1861 that affirms the 
permissibility of such acts. While Halleck found that the law generally protected the lives of all 
those who refrained from acts of hostility, he also found that “If the peasantry or common people 
of a country use force, or commit acts in violation of the milder rules of modern warfare, they 
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subject themselves to the common fate of military men, and sometimes to a still harsher 
treatment… even if a portion of the non-combatant inhabitants of a particular place become 
active participants in the hostile operations, the entire community are sometimes subjected to the 
more rigid rules of war.”252 Halleck would certainly have been familiar with General Scott’s 
actions in Mexico, as he was then serving under Scott as Secretary of State of California, and was 
a chief legal advisor on the conduct of the war.253 He also taught these principles at West Point, 
which Birtle claims “represented views that were widely held.”254 
 Martens would take a very different view of the principle of civilian immunity when 
drafting the Brussels Declaration, and one that would, if adopted, have given full effect to the 
legal obligations arising out of Rousseau’s ideas of war, and the inherent limitations that 
individual rights place on the privileges of the state. When the laws of belligerent qualification 
were proposed at the Brussels Conference of 1874, Martens would draft several articles that 
espoused the idea of civilian immunity. Article II of the Original Project laid before the 
Conference states, “Operations of war must be directed exclusively against the force and means 
of making war of the hostile State, and not against its subjects, so long as the later do not 
themselves take any active part in the war.”255 This article appeared at the beginning of the 
Original Project in a preambular section entitled “General Principles.” Horsford states that these 
general principles were not brought forward for discussion at the Conference, and so were not 
included in the final text of the Brussels Declaration; however, they were considered in the 
course of the Conference, and they “form the groundwork of several Articles of the Project.”256 
These include Article 13(c), which prohibits the killing of an enemy who is hors de combat, and 
Article 15, which departs substantially from the Lieber Code to state that “Open towns, 
agglomerations of dwellings, or villages which are not defended can neither be attacked nor 
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bombarded.”  
 Martens then issued his draft Brussels Declaration as instructions to the Russian armed 
forces in a Code of Land Warfare that Martens himself drafted, and that would quickly be put to 
the test with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).257 The humanitarianism of 
Marten’s code had a counterpart in the growing Red Cross movement, and both would be tested 
in a bitter war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires that was characterized by ethnic and 
religious animosities.258 During Russia’s final march to Constantinople in January of 1878, the 
ensuing panic among the local population caused a vast flow of refugees, depopulating entire 
regions, and leading to widespread starvation and disease among the civilian population in what 
the head of the Red Crescent Society in Turkey would term “the spectacle of a calamity perhaps 
without precedent in the annals of modern warfare.”259 For the first time, the Red Cross was 
called upon to provide humanitarian relief to civilians and, while they thought this was outside 
the scope of their mandate, they felt they could not refuse in the face of the growing humanitarian 
catastrophe.260 Although the law as it then stood was not able to protect the civilian population as 
such from the violence of the war, the idea of civilian immunity was “in the air,”261 as Pustogarov 
states, and both the protection of civilians and the organization of humanitarian relief were 
growing in importance.  
 Lieber himself saw the necessity of drafting an international code of land warfare, 
recognizing the need to settle the law and generate more humane rules; this ought to be 
accomplished through consensus among the leading powers. Shortly before his death in 
September 1871, he wrote to communicate this wish to Gustav Rolin-Jaequemyn, who was then 
president of the Institut de Droit International which he had founded along with Gustav Moynier, 
then President of the ICRC in Geneva.262 This project came to fruition in 1880, when the Institut 
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de Droit International published the Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare.263 Article 1 
forbids the use of violence by civilians, authorizing force only as between the armed forces of 
belligerent states. Articles 2 and 3 set out the four organizational criteria for qualified armed 
forces. The Oxford Manual did not include Article II of the Original Project of the Brussels 
Declaration protecting the civilian population generally, stating only in Article 7 that “It is 
forbidden to maltreat inoffensive populations,” and in Article 4 that armed forces must refrain 
from acts of “undue severity”. The Oxford Manual also protects public and private property, in 
Article 32(b), as well as religious and cultural sites, in Article 34.  
 Although the Hague Regulations of 1899 did not address civilian immunity directly by 
adopting an article similar to Article II of the Original Project of the Brussels Declaration, they 
do contain provisions that prohibit the killing of non-combatants. Article 23(c) adopts Article 
13(c) of the Brussels Declaration almost word for word, stating that it is especially prohibited to 
“kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down arms, or having no longer means of defence, has 
surrendered at discretion,”264 thus affirming the long-standing unwritten prohibition against 
killing those who were hors de combat.  Article 50 prohibits the collective punishment of enemy 
populations. Article 46 most directly protects the lives of civilians, for it states that “the lives of 
persons” must be respected by occupying powers, as must other basic rights, including family 
honor, and religious convictions and practices. Although the principles of civilian immunity and 
civilian direct participation were not directly expressed as such in the Hague Regulations, it 
received some recognition as a generally accepted principle, albeit one whose scope was 
uncertain, and for which enforcement was weak. George Davis, who approved of the more 
pragmatic approach found in the Lieber Code, nonetheless recognizes the principle of civilian 
immunity in his post-Hague treatise on international law, published in 1900. He recognizes the 
principle that unarmed persons are immune from attack, and states, “this exemption from the 
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operations of war they enjoy so long as they take no active part in hostile operations.”265 This is 
very close to Marten’s formulation of the principle as it appeared in Article II of the Original 
Project of the Brussels Declaration, and also very close to the final phrasing that would 
eventually be adopted in Article 51(3) of Protocol I.  
 World War I, and Allied concerns over German atrocities, would give a further impetus to 
the growing adoption of more humane methods of warfare. The 1916 edition of Wheaton’s 
Elements was written to update the law following the adoption of the Hague Regulations, and to 
respond to the crises posed by the war.266 For the first time, a section on “Lawful Belligerents” 
appears.267 The 1916 edition is also notable for its assertion of the principle of minimal harm. The 
author states, “[t]he instruments of warfare should be such as do not inflict unnecessary or 
superfluous injury or damage. The object of a belligerent is obviously attained if he puts hors de 
combat the adversary; the infliction of unnecessary suffering is not indispensable to achieve this 
object.”268 This is also one of the few English-language treatises to mention the Brussels 
Conference of 1874,269 in which it is invoked to demonstrate that “[t]hese rules were in practice 
recognized long before the Hague Conferences. But in the France-German war, the Germans paid 
little heed to them.”270 The purpose of introducing the Brussels Declaration at this late date was 
to show that Germany was violating principles of the international laws of war that were by then 
“long standing.”271 
   
2.3.5 The Hague Law of Belligerent Qualification and World War II 
 Following the Hague Peace Conferences, the law of belligerent qualification came to be 
generally recognized among the international community. Whereas the First Geneva Convention 
in 1864 had been signed by only a handful of European powers, the 1899 Hague Regulations 
were signed by twenty-three nations, including such major non-European powers as the U.S., 
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Turkey, Iran, Siam, Japan, and Mexico.272 The 1907 Hague Peace Conference would be attended 
by most of the nations of Latin America as well, and the Hague Regulations would then be 
extended to most of Central and South America.273 China would attend the 1907 Peace 
Conference, and would ratify the Hague Regulations in 1917.274 Other non-European powers 
would ratify the Hague Regulations after World War II, these being India and Pakistan in 1950, 
and Laos in 1955.275 Whereas the laws of belligerent qualification were a European invention, 
stemming largely from European concerns, they were adopted by most major non-European 
powers after the 1907 Peace Conference, and by most countries in the world following World 
War II. The basic rules of belligerent qualification were also adopted into Article 4 of the Third 
Geneva Convention of 1949, which has now been ratified by virtually every nation state.276  
 By the time of World War II, the law of belligerent qualification and the importance of 
humanitarian treatment of captured combatants had advanced with the assistance of such treaties 
as the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929.277 However, these instruments were inadequate to the 
task of securing humanitarian treatment for irregular belligerents and the civilians who supported 
them. World War II, more so than World War I, was fought using a wide variety of irregular and 
partisan forces. Such forces were often ill treated, and even slaughtered upon capture,278 and this 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the laws of belligerent qualification enacted in the Hague 
Regulations to govern the use of such troops. Many partisan forces that fought in World War II 
had high levels of organization yet, by and large, they failed to achieve the status of belligerent 
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qualification under the Hague Regulations. For example, Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia wore 
“captured uniforms, or parts of uniforms, with a small Red star on the cap.”279 They closely 
approximated a de facto civilian authority for, “[a]t times, they operated what amounted to a 
functioning government, with postal systems, an armory… and a rough judicial system.”280 The 
JAG Treatise states that “the Partisans had many of the characteristics of a regular army, even to 
a staff organized upon conventional lines.”281 Tito’s Partisans were supplied by the Allied powers 
and, “during most of the war Tito obeyed radioed orders from the Presidium of the USSR without 
a question.”282 The Soviets used similarly organized partisans, under the direction of an executive 
agency separate from the Red Army, at the Partisan Headquarters in Moscow.283 Yet even this 
close approximation of the organizational criteria laid out in the Hague Regulations did not assist 
the allied partisans to secure prisoner of war treatment from Germany. Hitler issued a number of 
decrees ordering that even suspected partisans be liquidated, “which, in effect allowed any officer 
to execute on the spot, without a trial, any person opposing the German army, whom it was felt 
expedient to liquidate.”284  
 In America, the Supreme Court of the United States found in 1942 that a group of Germans, 
duly authorized by the German government and sent to America to commit acts of sabotage on 
American soil, were unqualified belligerents and could be sentenced to death by a military court 
martial. In Ex parte Quirin, the Court distinguished between lawful and unlawful combatants, 
finding that “[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition 
they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful.”285 The fact that the saboteurs did not meet the four organizational 
requirements, despite being trained and authorized by the German government, closely follows 
the Hague law of belligerent qualification.  
 While Ex parte Quirin affirmed that a state may court martial, and thereupon execute, an 
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unqualified belligerent that it had captured, the subsequent Nuremburg Tribunals found that a 
state could target and kill unqualified belligerents, even after capture when they were hors de 
combat, and without a court martial. This was affirmed in the Hostages Trial, in which Wilhelm 
List and others were tried at Nuremberg for the execution of suspected partisans. The Tribunal 
found that only a small number of partisans met the Hague requirements for belligerent 
qualification. Without belligerent qualification, the irregulars could lawfully be executed 
pursuant to Hitler’s liquidation orders, and the Tribunal acquitted the defendants on these counts. 
The Tribunal found: 
The evidence shows that the bands were sometimes designated as units common to military 
organization. They, however, had no common uniform. They generally wore civilian clothes 
although parts of German, Italian and Serbian uniforms were used to the extent they could be 
obtained. The Soviet Star was generally worn as insignia. The evidence will not sustain a 
finding that it was such that it could be seen at a distance. Neither did they carry their arms 
openly except when it was to their advantage to do so. There is some evidence that various 
groups of the resistance forces were commanded by a centralized command, such as the 
Partisans of Marshal Tito, the Chetniks of Draja Mihailovitch, and the Edes of General 
Zervas… The captured members of these unlawful groups were not entitled to be treated as 
prisoners of war. No crime can be properly charged against the defendants for the killing of 
such captured members of the resistance forces, they being francs-tireurs.286 
The Tribunal thus exonerated those defendants who had killed captured prisoners, despite the fact 
that they sometimes had parts of uniforms and had “units common to military organization”. 
Thus, neither the Hague Regulations, nor the practice of states themselves, were sufficient to 
recognize irregular forces or to bring them under the protection of the laws of war. This extended 
even to those who had been rendered hors de combat, and the Tribunal seems not to have applied 
von Martens’ long-standing principle against killing those who were hors de combat. If even very 
high levels of organization could not meet the Hague requirements, then there seemed to be little 
incentive for any irregular troops to organize more fully. Nor were there any protections for those 
civilians who were merely suspected of having participated in hostilities. 
 Therefore, the judgment in the Hostages Trial did not apply even the limited protections 
contained within the Hague Regulations for protecting the lives of hostile irregulars and non-
combatants, or outlawing reprisal killings. Instead, the tribunal emphasized the importance to an 
occupying power of maintaining law and order by putting down an insurgency.287 The tribunal 
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recognized that it could be difficult to discern whether a captured guerilla were a lawful 
belligerent or not, and that “[w]here room exists for an honest error in judgment, such army 
commander is entitled to the benefit thereof by virtue of the presumption of his innocence.”288 
This interpretation shifts the balance in favor of the discretion of military authorities, and away 
from the rights of civilians and detainees. The decision would also seem to leave very little scope 
for a more general customary rule prohibiting the killing of non-combatants. In fact, the judgment 
in the Hostages Trial was criticized precisely on these grounds. Lord Wright of Durley, the 
Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, took what he termed the “unusual” 
step of criticizing the judgment when it was published in the Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals.289 He found that the judgment in the Hostages Trial had not “correctly stated the 
general law of war crimes on this very important issue.”290 He notes that both Articles 50 and 46 
of the Hague Regulations, prohibiting collective punishments and mandating that the lives of 
enemy populations be respected, if applied, should have led to a finding that these killings 
amounted to war crimes.291 More than that, he found expressed in these provisions a more 
general rule prohibiting the killing of civilians, whose “essential feature is that innocent non-
combatants are slaughtered”.292  The Hostages Trial has generally not been followed, even by 
other Tribunals at Nuremberg,293 and Lord Durley’s opinion served as a strong precedent in favor 
of the general prohibition on the killing of non-combatants, and one that was more in keeping 
with the more widespread recognition of this principle following the war.294 
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2.3.6 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Common Article 3 
 At the close of World War II, the laws of war were updated and further codified into the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which adopted the Hague law of belligerent qualification 
essentially unchanged. The Fourth Geneva Convention contains a number of additional 
provisions protecting civilian non-combatants. Article 27, for example, contains essentially the 
same prohibitions as found in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, and ensures respect for the 
lives of protected persons, who “shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or 
threats thereof.”295  The true advance, however, of the Fourth Geneva Convention is to be found 
within the Common Article 3 that it shares with the Third Geneva Convention. Common Article 
3 applies to all armed conflicts, even those not of an international character, and it specifically 
protects all non-combatants, as well as those who are placed hors de combat, from violence to 
their life and person. Common Article 3 states: 
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, 
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria.  
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture[.] 
The expansive language of Common Article 3, its application to non-international conflicts as 
well as international ones, and its prohibitions on violence to life or person “at any time and in 
any place whatsoever”, combined with the near-universal ratification of this Article, argue in 
favor of the proposition that killing non-combatants then gained the status of a jus cogens norm 
of international law.296  
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 Emily Camins has stated, in her history of civilian immunity, that Common Article 3 is 
not a precursor to Article 51(3) of Protocol I, and that it was likely not intended to reflect a 
general customary legal obligation upon states to refrain from killing non-combatants.297 She 
argues that the obligations contained in the Geneva Conventions are limited only to those who 
find themselves in the hands of an enemy power,298 and that more general obligations to protect 
non-combatants in civil and colonial wars were removed by states at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference at Geneva.299 However, evidence from the 1949 Diplomatic Conference itself 
indicates that the provision was intended to protect all civilians, and that it was thought to 
embody norms that were uncontroversial, as they were already binding on all states at all times. 
The debate over Common Article 3 centered around the application of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to armed conflict generally, including cases of non-international armed conflict not 
covered by the Geneva Conventions. Many states did not wish to extend these protections to all 
manner of irregulars in all manner of conflicts on the grounds that “Any such proposals giving 
insurgents a legal status, and consequently increased authority, would hamper and handicap the 
Government.”300 Those nations whose delegates most forcefully put forward these arguments 
included the United States and Burma. The U.S. delegate, Leland Harrison, advocated for a more 
expansive role for states in putting down insurrection within their own borders than appears in 
Common Article 3.301 The delegate from Burma made similar arguments, stating that putting 
down an insurrection in one’s own territory should not place a nation outside the laws of 
humanity; yet he nevertheless felt the need to assure the Committee that “we have not shot one 
rebel for being a rebel[.]”302 The Australian delegate put forward the idea that ‘suspected’ or 
‘hostile’ civilians ought to lose the protection of Common Article 3; although this motion was 
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adopted by several nations - including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Switzerland - it was eventually rejected from the final text as being arbitrary and prone to 
abuse.303 In times of war, the ICRC recognized that “the lawful government, or that which so 
styles itself, tends to regard its adversaries as common criminals,” and that this attitude ought to 
be prohibited.304 This attitude extended not only to those members of the civilian population who 
were thought, as Lieber did, to be “disloyal,”305 but also to the Red Cross itself, as when 
governmental authorities looked upon “relief given by the Red Cross to war victims on the other 
side as indirect aid to guilty parties.”306 There was much discussion and intense debate over this 
matter, and the deadlock was finally broken by a proposal from the French delegation, who 
proposed that the entire Convention need not apply to cases of non-international conflict, but 
only its most important and fundamental obligations, such as prohibitions on torture and unlawful 
killings.307 A working committee was then assigned the task of identifying these principles, and 
drafting the article.308 The result was Common Article 3. The prohibitions contained within 
Common Article 3 were considered so fundamental that they would apply at all times and places 
– even in times of peace - as they set a minimum standard of required behavior.309 This included 
acts of internal strife that did not amount to a full-scale armed conflict.310 As Pictet states, how 
could any government refuse to observe “a few essential rules which it in fact observes daily, 
under its own laws, even when dealing with common criminals.”311 It was certainly the intention 
of the ICRC and the working committee that Common Article 3 would have a very wide, even 
universal, scope of application, and these matters were thoroughly debated by states and their 
representatives, who all had ample opportunity to have their say.312 The result is that: 
Article 3 has an extremely wide field of application and covers members of the armed forces 
as well as persons who do not take part in hostilities. In this instance, however, the Article 
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naturally applies first and foremost to civilians – that is to persons who do not bear arms.313 
Common Article 3 was intended to express universal and customary laws of jus cogens, that were 
already thought to be binding upon all states at all times. Finally, the ICRC states that the 
prohibitions are intentionally left quite broad, as it would never be possible to “catch up with the 
imagination of future torturers.”314  
The Third Geneva Convention also includes Common Article 3, and belligerent 
qualification is addressed in Article 4(2), which defines lawful combatants, i.e. those combatants 
who possess belligerent qualification, in terms of the Hague Regulations, as follows: 
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or 
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or 
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following 
conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
 
Thus, the Brussels Declaration definition of belligerent qualification in terms of the four 
organizational criteria was largely kept in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.315 Now, 
‘militia’ and ‘volunteer corps’ were also to include resistance movements operating in or outside 
of occupied territory, which the Committee referred to as “an important innovation which has 
become necessary as a result of the experience of the Second World War.”316 It was also intended 
by the Plenary Committee of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference that Article 4 not be exhaustive, 
and that prisoners of war were not limited only to those enumerated categories.317 Article 4 also 
kept the long-standing definition of levée en masse, as described in subsection 4(6). The Plenary 
Committee also stated that nothing in the Convention limited the right of a civilian population, 
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either individually or collectively, to defend itself against an act of aggression, or against war 
crimes committed by armed forces.318 Yet this affirmation of the rights of self-defense of 
civilians and organized resistance movements fighting occupation, would not last long in the 
post-war era, as memories of past occupations faded in comparison to states’ desire to put down 
resistance movements in their own territories and in the colonies. The international community 
began to recognize the undesirability of this situation, particularly as regards the atrocities 
committed by and against many anti-colonial liberation movements, which led to the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1971-1976.  
  
2.3.7 The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 
In order to address the contentious issue of irregular belligerents, particularly those 
waging anti-colonial wars of liberation, and the further protection of civilians during armed 
conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross convened the Diplomatic Conference of 
1971-1976, which produced the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.319 The 
Diplomatic Conference was open to all State parties to the Geneva Conventions,320 and was 
attended by 155 nations, 51 inter- and non-governmental organizations, and 11 national liberation 
movements.321 The Conference followed published Rules of Procedure modeled upon those 
generally in use for diplomatic conferences held pursuant to international law.322 The topic of 
guerilla fighters was again the subject of much controversy among representatives.323 The ICRC 
itself remained firm in its position of granting belligerent privileges to guerilla fighters in a 
limited number of circumstances, in the interests of humanitarian considerations and so that 
“many contemporary conflicts will be governed by law.”324 
The most contentious provision of the Protocols Additional has been Article 1(4) of 
Protocol I, which grants belligerent qualification to non-state, and therefore unauthorized, 
belligerents who are fighting against foreign, colonial or racist domination. Article 1(4) states 
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that the scope of application of Protocol I shall “include armed conflicts in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination.” This article comes very close to echoing the 
position of Droop, who asserted in 1870 that de facto public authorities could authorize qualified 
belligerents to wage war.325 In the post-World War II era, anti-colonial struggles were 
increasingly recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as being legitimate.326 Prisoner 
of war status for ‘freedom fighters’ was recognized by UN General Assembly in 1970,327 and 
again in their resolution concerning the “Basic principles of the legal status of the combatants 
struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes” of 1973.328 It was the 
position of the nations of the General Assembly that prisoner of war protections be extended to 
such unauthorized irregular belligerents.329 
Protocol I also facilitates the qualification of irregular troops, such as paramilitary troops 
and non-state fighters. Under Protocol I, certain militia, police, and volunteer corps can be added 
as qualified belligerents by way of a formal declaration. Article 43(3) stipulates that “whenever a 
Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed 
forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.” Therefore, states may incorporate these 
security forces, provided they meet the organizational criteria, including being subsumed under 
the military chain of command, and a formal declaration is made. Non-state actors, such as 
liberation movements who wish to become recognized parties to an armed conflict, and receive 
belligerent qualification under Protocol I, can make a similar declaration under Article 96(3) of 
the Protocol. 
 Protocol I does not recognize all non-state belligerents who have taken up arms in the 
course of waging a war of national liberation. In addition to meeting the requirements of Article 1 
and the procedural requirement of making a formal declaration under Article 96(3), such irregular 
belligerents must still meet certain organizational criteria. The political authority that authorizes 
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such irregular belligerents “must have certain characteristics of a government, at least in relation 
to its armed forces.”330 Moreover, such irregular forces must be organized armed groups that 
have a collective character.331 The ICRC Commentary states: 
All armed forces, groups and units are necessarily structured and have a hierarchy, as they are 
subordinate to a command which is responsible to one of the Parties to the conflict for their 
operations. In other words, all of them are subordinate to a command and to a Party to the 
conflict, without exception, for it is not permissible for any group to wage a private war.332 
The Commentary thus highlighted the fact that fighters must be subsumed under a chain of 
command and subject to military discipline, which the Commentary interpreted to mean that the 
armed group enforces the laws of war through a system of military penal law.333   
 Article 1 has been controversial, and was particularly criticized by America,334 Britain,335 
and Israel,336 which rejected Article 1 on the grounds that it might lend legitimacy to insurgents 
and terrorist organizations. In supporting the rejection of Protocol I, then U.S. President Ronald 
Regan advised the Senate that Article 1 “would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if 
they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among 
whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.”337 He stated, “we must not, 
and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in 
humanitarian law.”338  
In fact, Protocol I greatly circumscribed an older customary rule that granted wide 
discretion to states to recognize unqualified belligerents waging wars of national liberation. One 
early example is the military support provided by Britain, France and Russia to those seeking 
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secession from the Ottoman Empire during the Greek War of Independence at the naval Battle of 
Navarino (1827).339 George Canning, then British Foreign Secretary, had stated of the 
secessionist movement that “when a whole nation revolts against its conqueror, the nation cannot 
be considered as piratical but as a nation in a state of war.”340 Supporting secession movements 
was considered by Britain to be one solution to the ‘Eastern Question’ of how to deal with the 
declining power of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore an indispensable tool of foreign policy.341 
George Davis would state the rule in similar terms to George Canning in his 1900 treatise on 
international law. Rebel fighters in internal wars could receive a recognition of qualified 
belligerency provided that the conflict rose to the level of a public war, that there was broad 
public participation in the insurrection “by a considerable portion of the population”, that the 
rebels maintained a well-defined territory, and that that they established such governmental 
institutions as would enable them to enter into diplomatic intercourse with those states whose 
recognition was sought.342 Within these bounds, states had a broad discretion to recognize rebel 
groups, for it might harm a state’s foreign policy interests if they did not recognize an insurgency 
that was eventually successful.343 Similar rules were proposed at the Diplomatic Conference of 
1949, but at that time the participants decided in favor of the more expansive provisions 
contained in Common Article 3, which it was thought would both bind and protect insurgents and 
resistance movements.344 It therefore appears that insurgents, under customary law and practice, 
could become a de facto public authority, and gain other states’ recognition of the belligerent 
qualification of its fighters, on grounds that were decidedly more expansive than the conditions 
imposed by Article 1.  
 The Diplomatic Conference also addressed the contentious questions concerning the 
status of non-belligerent members of the regular armed forces, and of non-combatants who 
sometimes assist guerilla forces and other armed insurgent groups. During the preparatory work 
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undertaken in 1971, it was again remarked that guerilla warfare was often the only method open 
of self-defense for whole populations of civilians who had been denied their collective and 
individual rights, and therefore the principles of humanity ought to govern their treatment.345 The 
delegates at the Diplomatic Conference of 1971 introduced the word ‘directly’ in Article 51(3), 
and wanted also to make the temporal connection with armed combat clear.346 Therefore, Article 
51(3) of Protocol I lends general protection to all civilians “unless and for such time as they take 
a direct part in hostilities.” The ICRC Commentary states, “a civilian who takes part in armed 
combat, either individually or as part of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target.”347 It was 
determined that the Protocols Additional would draw a sharp distinction between qualified 
belligerents and everyone else, declining to recognize a middle-status between that of 
‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’. The Commentary explains that, “[a]ll members of the armed forces 
are combatants and only members of the armed forces are combatants. This should therefore 
dispense with the concept of ‘quasi-combatants’, which has sometimes been used on the basis of 
activities related more or less directly in the war effort.”348 Thus, civilians that aid guerrilla forces 
– by providing food shelter, planning, surveillance, etc. - continue to be treated as civilians. 
Civilians who are not qualified belligerents and who participate in hostilities may only be 
attacked for the duration of their participation. At times when such fighters are not directly 
participating in hostilities, “there is nothing to prevent the authorities, capturing him in the act, or 
arresting him at a later stage, from taking repressive or punitive security measures with regard to 
him in accordance with the provisions of Article 45.”349 Protocol I, and the Commentary, would 
therefore close the door to status-based interpretations of the belligerency of non-state armed 
groups, instead treating them as civilians participating in hostilities. This rejects the notion that 
unqualified belligerents fighting as part of armed groups can receive a ‘quasi’ status – one that 
imposes upon them no responsibilities or privileges, but that renders them liable to be attacked at 
all times. The same principle also holds for non-belligerent members of regular armed forces, 
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such as cooks or logistical personnel; they do not thereby lose their belligerent status, and they 
retain the privilege of receiving prisoner of war treatment.350 In Chapter Three, the discussion 
will turn to new proposals for status-based unqualified belligerency, including the ICRC’s 
‘continuous combat function’, ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ as used at Guantanamo Bay, and 
‘declared hostile forces’ as found in modern Rules of Engagement, which are all designed to 
consign precisely such a quasi-status on guerrilla fighters – a contentious topic that was 
purportedly settled at the Diplomatic Conference, but that has been resurrected once again.  
 With the exception of Article 1 of Protocol I, the status of the Protocols Additional as 
customary law is generally accepted. The U.S. considers many of the provisions of Protocol I, 
and all of Protocol II, to be binding customary international law.351 This includes provisions 
relating to the principle of distinction and the targeting of civilians who take a direct part in 
hostilities. Article 4 of Protocol II similarly guarantees humane treatment to those who take no 
part in a non-international armed conflict, or who cease to take part, including the prohibitions on 
violence to life352 and collective punishments that were first codified in the Hague Regulations.353 
The Judge Advocate General of the United States confirms that the U.S. has no objections to 
these provisions.354 After the Protocols Additional, therefore, most states have agreed that the law 
of belligerent qualification and the principle of distinction are binding customary law in all armed 
conflicts, and that formerly common techniques of war – including deliberate attacks on civilians 
and members of rebel movements not participating directly in hostilities, the killing of suspected 
rebels, reprisals against civilians who support rebel movements, and collective punishments 
against civilians – are prohibited, even in civil wars, counterinsurgent operations, and domestic 
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uprisings.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The present laws of belligerent qualification emerged in the late nineteenth century as 
modern nations states, led by the great military powers of Europe consolidated their power over 
the use of armed force. As war was conceived of as a contest between states and their 
professional armies in the international arena, civilians were no longer permitted to participate in 
hostilities, but armed forces would be required to refrain from subjecting them to attack, so long 
as they refrained from participating. While formally acknowledging these rules, state authorities 
have also been reluctant in practice to give up the discretion they formerly held to deal summarily 
with suspected irregular fighters, and civilians who “spurn the hand”, and support guerilla or 
insurgent movements. As a result, rules restricting the discretion of states and their military 
authorities to determine when civilian are directly participating in hostilities have long been 
controversial. Despite several attempts to finally resolve the matter in favor of protecting civilian 
populations – at Brussels in 1874, at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, at 
Nuremberg in the war crimes tribunals at the close of World War II, and at the Diplomatic 
Conferences in Geneva in 1949 and 1971-6 - military powers have found ways to push back the 
rules in favor of greater discretion in putting down rebel movements and insurgencies.  
This last lesson is important to keep in mind when more recent law-making endeavors are 
discussed in the remaining two chapters, including the ICRC’s expert process, the legal 
interpretations of international law from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, 
and the formulation of Rules of Engagement by military authorities, for they represent the latest 
chapter in this long struggle for law for irregular combatants. The ICRC’s expert process 
abandoned the transparency and inclusivity that the ICRC had fostered at the 1949 and 1977 
Diplomatic Conferences, and the rules produced by the Interpretive Guidance’s expert process 
not only rolled back many protections that had been established there, but re-opened the 
contentious issue of status-based interpretations of organized armed groups that was supposed to 
have been resolved during the negotiations leading up to Protocol I. Rules of Engagement take a 
novel approach to the problem, by defining the use of force not in terms of the traditional 
belligerent privileges possessed by qualified belligerents, but according to a much broader, yet 
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“morally forceful”355 standard based upon defensive force.  
Interpreting civilian direct participation in terms of the need for defensive force against 
civilians who pose a threat of harm is perhaps a novel response to this most recent challenge to 
the legal protection of civilians; however, it is consistent with the principle of civilian immunity 
as it has developed since the publication of Rousseau’s Social Contract, and von Marten’s early 
formulation of civilian immunity as belonging to all those who do not pose a threat of harm that 
would engage one’s right to self-defense. Since that time, the principle of civilian immunity has 
focused upon the conduct of individual civilians, and in particular whether they have taken up 
arms and posed a threat of harm to others, just as it has limited the discretion of military 
authorities in favor of protecting individuals and populations that are particularly at risk of being 
characterized by them as ‘suspicious’, ‘disloyal’, ‘hostile’, or ‘criminal’.  
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Chapter Three: Unprivileged Belligerency and Civilian  
Immunity in the Post-Protocol Era 
 
We must transform not only our armed forces but also the Defense Department that 
serves them -- by encouraging a culture of creativity and intelligent risk-taking. We 
must promote a more entrepreneurial approach: one that encourages people to be 
proactive, not reactive, and to behave less like bureaucrats and more like venture 
capitalists; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be validated, but rather 
anticipates them before they appear and develops new capabilities to dissuade and 
deter them. 
         ~ Donald Rumsfeld, in Foreign Affairs, 20021 
 
 
3.0 Belligerent Qualification and Civilian Immunity in the Post-Protocol Era 
 This Chapter examines developments in the laws of belligerent qualification that have taken 
place since the Protocols Additional. As in the nineteenth century, changes in military 
governance, doctrine, and command control have rendered some of the established rules obsolete 
as mechanisms of governing and bringing accountability to the use of force. This Chapter will 
discuss how new command control doctrines of intent-based orders and standard Rules of 
Engagement have changed the ways in which civilians suspected of participating in hostilities are 
identified and attacked during the course of hostilities. Now the power in the international arena, 
and the centre of gravity for the development of these new practices, has shifted to the U.S. and 
its NATO allies. While these practices have been developed primarily by the U.S., this Chapter 
seeks to show that some of these new approaches to the distinction and treatment of civilians 
participating in hostilities are also becoming internationalized. These new practices give great 
deference to military discretion in making targeting choices, and push decision-making authority 
down the chain of command much more than had formerly been the practice in the modern era of 
professional and bureaucratized armies. The ICRC has not been successful in restraining even the 
worst of the resulting abuses, and even after it adopted a novel status-based definition of civilian 
                                                
1 Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military” (2002) 81:3 Foreign Affairs 20 at 29.  
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participation by permitting states to engage in unrestricted targeting against fighters who perform 
a ‘continuous combat function’,2 it has failed to find a compromise with participating states that 
they are willing to accept, or that adequately protects civilians. In this debate, the need for 
discretion by military forces is pitted against the rule of law, just as it was in the time of Fyodor 
de Martens.3 Allowing military authorities greater discretion to use force in asymmetric and 
counterinsurgent operations may make it easier for armies to make these decisions, but at the 
same time it may increase the violence of the war, and make it more difficult to resolve the 
underlying conflict and restore legitimate governance.4 Defining civilian immunity and the 
circumstances under which it can be lost in terms of the justified use of defensive force may be a 
more effective means of regulating and bringing justice to armed conflict, as humanitarian 
reformers once did in drafting codes of land warfare embodying humanitarian principles in 
response to the military atrocities of the late nineteenth century.  
 Recent attempts to define civilian direct participation give rise to rules that permit 
unjustified killings, both because they target actions that pose no threat of harm but that merely 
violate national interests, and because they attempt to define the belligerency of non-state actors 
in terms of their status as members of militant groups. Previously, non-state combatants were 
treated as civilian participants in hostilities, and therefore possessed no belligerent privileges, as 
affirmed by Protocol I and its 1987 Commentary.5 Status-based concepts of civilian direct 
participation have changed the ways in which armed forces distinguish and treat civilians who are 
suspected of participating in hostilities. One important consequence of this shift is a move away 
from distinguishing belligerents based upon observed and objective behavior exhibited by the 
fighters themselves – a key precept of Lieber, Droop and de Martens as they formulated the rules 
we now have in place. Instead, suspected militants are identified and targeted based upon criteria 
                                                
2 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law” (2008) 90:872 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 991 at 1007 [hereinafter 
Interpretive Guidance].  
3 Peter Holquist, The Russian Empire as a Civilized State: International Law as Principle and Practice in Imperial 
Russia, 1874-1878 (Washington, D.C.: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2004) at 5. 
4 Supra Chapter One at s. 1.1. 
5 Yves Sandoz et al., eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) at 515 [hereinafter ICRC Commentary]; see also: supra 
Chapter Two at note 348 and accompanying text The ICRC Commentary explains that, “[a]ll members of the armed 
forces are combatants and only members of the armed forces are combatants. This should therefore dispense with the 
concept of ‘quasi-combatants’, which has sometimes been used on the basis of activities related more or less directly 
in the war effort.” 
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that are relatively common, risks that are inchoate, and social and political associations that are 
subjectively judged by soldiers themselves. This is illustrated by the development of the concept 
of a ‘declared hostile force’ contained within standard Rules of Engagement. Chapter Four will 
discuss cases in which hostile forces have been defined and constructed – i.e. declared - by U.S. 
forces themselves, with little reference to the actual belligerent activities of those targeted. This 
departs significantly from the traditional concept of unqualified belligerency as it was articulated 
in the Hague Regulations, in which it referred to civilians whose belligerency was unlawful as it 
was not conducted pursuant to a public authority that enforced the four organizational criteria.6 
On numerous occasions, international legal fora have rejected states’ claims to be able to 
summarily execute such irregular combatants, particularly when the very fact of their 
belligerency is merely suspected, rather than established.7 The new rules overturn this basic 
approach, and return to a subjective and discretionary standard that is liable to abuse.  
 In the ICRC’s expert process, the debate again focused on the opposition between justice 
and humanitarianism in the conduct of warfare, continuing upon the old fault lines of whether 
and to what extent the discretion of military authorities can be fettered by humanitarian 
concerns.8 To a large extent, this is a misguided debate. The rule of law can facilitate justice in 
war - as well as perceptions among the population that justice will be done - and this is of greater 
assistance in bringing insurgencies to a resolution and reestablishing good governance. In the 
nineteenth century, new rules were adopted when a sufficient number of states saw that it was in 
their interests to govern armed forces through the chain of command. This gave them greater 
legitimacy in the international arena, as well as greater control over their own armed forces. It 
would also afford states some reciprocity that opposing belligerent powers would follow the 
                                                
6  International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, Annex to the 
Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land at Article 1; International Conferences 
(The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Annex to the Convention: Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land at Article 1 [hereinafter the Hague Regulations]. 
7 Case 72, Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others (German High Command Trial), Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, Vol. XII (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949) at 83 [hereinafter German High Command 
Trial]; Jean Pictet, ed., Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times 
of War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) [hereinafter 1958 Commentary] at 10.  
8 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum” (2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 637 at 640 [hereinafter An Introduction to the Forum]. 
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same laws, which in turn would ensure better treatment for their own troops.9 At present, U.S. 
Rules of Engagement and counterinsurgent doctrines are being adopted by numerous states with 
relatively little opposition or debate as to their consequences. The rules that are emerging may 
not be those that best serve the widest variety of interests - including those of host states, armed 
forces, and civilian populations - or those that will bring a speedy resolution to counterinsurgent 
operations.  
 
3.1 The Restructuring of Command Control 
 The devolution of decision-making authority in the military chain of command proceeded 
gradually in the decades preceding the 1980s. At this time, the new command control doctrines of 
‘intent-based orders’ and ‘standing Rules of Engagement’ were introduced into U.S. military 
operations. Standard Rules of Engagement grew up alongside the intent-based system of 
transmitting orders, and in many ways are a natural outgrowth of this system of command 
control, for standard Rules of Engagement are essentially standing intent-based orders that 
govern when force can be deployed during military operations. This first section will therefore 
discuss the development of intent-based orders in U.S. military doctrine, and examine its role 
within counterinsurgency doctrine more broadly, and the following section will discuss Rules of 
Engagement more specifically. Intent-based orders and Rules of Engagement only grew into 
standard operating procedures in about the late 1980s and 1990s, and have since been adopted by 
many U.S. allies. The third section will describe how many of the leading Western military 
powers, including NATO, have now adopted these methods of command control into their own 
military doctrine. This has been facilitated by the widespread assumption of new 
counterinsurgency field manuals, as well as the desire to harmonize joint doctrine for use in 
multi-national and peacekeeping operations.  
 Much of the discussion below will focus on changes and developments taking place within 
military doctrine. Military doctrine is itself a species of regulation, of governance, whose purpose 
is to set out “those concepts, principles, policies, tactics, techniques, practices, and procedures 
which are essential to efficiency in organizing, training, equipping, and employing its tactical and 
                                                
9 H.R. Droop, “The Relations Between an Invading Army and the Inhabitants, and the Conditions Under Which 
Irregular Combatants are Entitled to the Same Treatment as Regular Troops” (17 December 1880) 15 Solicitor’s J. & 
Rep. 121. 
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service units.”10 After World War II, modern militaries shifted towards setting out their doctrine 
systematically in field manuals, drafting specific regulations for different combat units, different 
types of combat, or different governance functions.11 As a species of regulation, military 
doctrine, indeed military governance in general, has been responsive to broader changes in the 
ideologies and mentalities concerning governance and management, and this has been reflected in 
the development of military doctrine. Military doctrine and Rules of Engagement are binding 
laws, and any person who violates or fails to obey a Rule of Engagement or a regulation found in 
military doctrine may be prosecuted under military codes of justice, such as the United States 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.12  
 
3.1.1 Intent-Based Orders & Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
 Between the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries, front-line soldiers were bound by 
the traditional command control structure, including a hierarchical chain of command with 
decision-making centralized in the uppermost levels of command, with the use of force being 
governed by precise written orders.13 This was equally true for soldiers fighting in 
counterinsurgent and unconventional operations, which formed the bulk of day-to-day 
soldiering.14 For example, the U.S. Marines Small Wars Manual of 1940,15 long the official 
doctrine governing U.S. counterinsurgent and unconventional operations until replaced by the 
                                                
10 Evaluation Division, Air University, “To Analyze the USAF Publications System for Producing Manuals” Staff 
Study (13 July 1948), cited in Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States 
Air Force, 1907-1960 (Air University Press, December 1989).  
11 Ibid. The British did not publish their first capstone doctrinal publication until 1988. See: Timothy Granville-
Chapman, British Military Doctrine (London: Department of National Defence, 1988).  
12 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109, 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47, at §892 at Article 92 [hereinafter UCMJ]. 
See also: Mark S. Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering” (Winter 
1994) 143 Mil. L. Rev. 1 at 61 [hereinafter Rules of Engagement], in which Martins describes some of the 
circumstances that could lead to prosecution under Article 92 for failure to obey an ROE. 
13 Matthew Armor, “The Five Paragraph Field Order: Can a Better Format be Found to Transmit Combat 
Information to Small Tactical Units?” (1988-9) Monograph prepared for School for Advanced Military Studies 
United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas [hereinafter Five Paragraph 
Field Order].  
14 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine 1942-1976 (Washington, D.C.: Center 
of Military History United States Army, 2006) at 4 [hereinafter U.S. COIN Doctrine 1942-1976].  
15 United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 
1940) [hereinafter Small Wars Manual]. The first such manual was the 1935 United States Marine Corp, Small Wars 
Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1935).  
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2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual,16 imposed a traditional centralized chain of command on 
these operations. In its chapter on ‘Command Control’, the Small Wars Manual states that the 
“Major General Commandant exercises only administrative control over the marine force; its 
operations are controlled by the Chief of Naval Operations directly, or through the senior naval 
officer present, if he be superior to the marine force commander. Consequently, no operation 
plans or instructions with regard to the tactical employment of the marine force originate in the 
office of the Major General Commandant.”17 Essentially, this means that all operational orders 
were to originate directly from the Chief of Naval Operations. This is in line with traditional 
centralized and hierarchical conceptions of command control, which require that there be unity of 
command, that a single, clearly defined commander is responsible for each operation, that the 
command structure be hierarchical, clear and unequivocal.18 Command was centralized, with 
orders being issued only by very senior commanders.  
 By the late 1980s, the centralized chain of command that governed the use of force using 
clear and detailed written field orders was becoming obsolete. Instead, the U.S. military had 
begun to institutionalize intent-based orders and standing Rules of Engagement that push 
decision-making down to the lowest levels in the organization. Intent-based orders, also called 
‘mission-type’ orders, are defined in the Joint Chiefs Dictionary as “an order to a unit to perform 
a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished,” and ‘mission command’ is defined as 
“the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type 
orders.”19 Individual soldiers are expected to use their initiative and personal judgment to 
determine how best to meet the overall mission goals assigned to them.  
 Intent-based orders were first used informally during the more mobile warfare of World 
War II.20 The use of intent-based orders was limited, and their growth in the U.S. can be traced 
                                                
16 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2006) [hereinafter COIN Manual].  
17 Small Wars Manual, supra note 15 at 36.  
18 National Defence Canada, Canadian Military Doctrine, CFJP 01, 1st ed. (Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch, Canadian 
Forces Experimentation Centre, Department of National Defence, 2009) at 5-3 [hereinafter Canadian Military 
Doctrine], available at: http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/cfwc-cgfc/Index/JD/CFJP%20-%20PDF/CFJP%2001/CFJP-
01_Cdn_Mil_Doctrine_EN_2011_09.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013).  
19 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-
02 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 8 November 2010, As Amended Through 15 August 2014) at 194 
[hereinafter Joint Chiefs Dictionary].  
20 Richard M. Perry, Striking the Balance: Airpower Rules of Engagement in Peace Operations (Maxwell Airforce 
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by examining their gradual introduction into military doctrine, particularly into the operations 
manuals, whose function is to set out the basic goals and principles of military governance. As 
late as 1976, the Operations Manual of that year,21 the U.S. military’s “keystone warfighting 
manual,”22 makes no reference to these concepts, and is primarily concerned with warfare 
involving the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe.23 Similarly, the 
U.S. Army’s 1976 reissue of its Law of Land Warfare Field Manual is silent on intent-based 
orders and Rules of Engagement.24 The Manual straightforwardly applies the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions, and describes how they are to be made operational by U.S. military 
personnel. The updated 1982 version of the Operations Manual makes no reference to mission-
type orders or to Rules of Engagement, but does state for the first time that flexibility and 
initiative are important components of winning war, and that “[l]arge unit commanders must 
encourage initiative in their subordinates.”25  
 The first establishment of intent-based orders in U.S. military doctrine occurred in the next 
reissue of the Operations Manual in 1986. The 1986 Operations Manual emphasizes “flexibility 
and speed, mission-type orders, initiative among commanders at all levels, and the spirit of the 
offence,”26 suggesting that the development of intent-based orders as a standard doctrine of 
command control began to take shape in the middle years of the 1980s. A mobile infantry field 
manual of 1988 gives an early version of an intent-based order, stating that intent-based orders 
“reflect the commander's intention and will. Indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language leads to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Base, Ala.: United States Air Force, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1999) at 17, available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDocLocation=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA391759 (accessed 20 
November 2011) [hereinafter Striking the Balance]. 
21 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1976) [hereinafter 
1976 Operations Manual], available at: 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll9/id/39/filename/40.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013). 
22 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986) at I 
[hereinafter 1986 Operations Manual], available at: 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll9/id/893/filename/894.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013). 
The 1986 version superseded FM 100-5 of 1982, infra note 25. 
23 1976 Operations Manual, supra note 21 at 102.  
24 Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of 
the Army, 1956, Updated 15 July 1976), available at: http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/files/fm27-10.pdf (accessed 12 
January 2013).  
25 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1982), at 2-1, 
available at: http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll9/id/44/filename/45.pdf, (accessed 9 
January 2013).  
26 1986 Operations Manual, supra note 22 at i, 4.  
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uncertainty. Subordinates are told in direct and unmistakable terms exactly what the commander 
wants them to do; they are not normally told how to accomplish it.”27 Here, the military has come 
to emphasize small-unit commanders’ information, initiative and responsibility, based upon their 
experience in the combat zone. By 1988, intent-based orders had become an important doctrine 
of command control,28 and were beginning to replace the century-old Prussian field orders; they 
have since become the standard format for delivering combat orders.29 
 Intent-based orders devolve decision-making responsibility down the traditional chain of 
command by empowering subordinates in the field to make decisions to employ force. Front-line 
soldiers are now tasked with using their own individual judgment and initiative, developed in the 
combat zone, to better adapt to asymmetrical threats. This has become embodied as the core 
command control doctrine in counterinsurgency operations governing unconventional and 
asymmetrical warfare. As stated by the 2006 US Counterinsurgency Field Manual: 
Thus, effective COIN [counter-insurgency] operations are decentralized, and higher 
commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to 
their level. Mission command encourages the initiative of subordinates and facilitates the 
learning that must occur at every level. It is a major characteristic of a COIN force that can 
adapt and react at least as quickly as the insurgents.30  
The military’s command control doctrine for counterinsurgent and asymmetrical warfare has thus 
shifted greatly since the Small Wars Manual of 1940,31 or even the Operations doctrine of 
1976.32 The subjective discretion embodied in intent-based orders have now become 
institutionalized, not only in asymmetrical warfare, but across all divisions of the U.S. military.33  
 The production of the U.S. Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2006 saw a 
significant shift in doctrine related to counterinsurgency, particularly in its institutionalization of 
new doctrines of command control. The U.S. COIN Manual is a significant re-conceptualization 
of military doctrine for waging complex irregular warfare, and likely one of the most significant 
                                                
27Department of the Army, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, U.S. Army Field Manual 71-2 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters US Department of the Army, 1988), at para. B-2(e), available at: 
http://www.militarynewbie.com/pubs/FM%2071-
2%20THE%20TANK%20AND%20MECHANIZED%20INFANTRY%20BATTALION%20TASK%20FORC.pdf 
(accessed 24 November 2011). 
28 Five Paragraph Field Order, supra note 13 at 15, 22.  
29 COIN Manual, supra note 16 at para. 1-146.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Small Wars Manual, supra note 15.  
32 1976 Operations Manual, supra note 21.  
33 COIN Manual, supra note 16, at para. 1-146.  
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shifts in military doctrine concerning irregular warfare since the nineteenth century. The U.S. 
COIN Manual was a direct response to the insurgency that developed in Iraq after the U.S.-led 
invasion of 2003. The drafting of the 2006 U.S. COIN Manual was largely led by then General 
David Petraeus and John Nagl. John Nagl states that the U.S. had no counterinsurgency doctrine 
to draw upon when it invaded Iraq, which impeded U.S. forces’ ability to wage that war.34 The 
COIN Manual was directed toward “making the Army and Marine Corps more effective learning 
organizations that are better able to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of modern 
counterinsurgency campaigns.”35 Accordingly, an interim field manual was drafted in response to 
the growing Iraqi insurgency, a large part of which was centred at that time on the Iraqi city of 
Fallujah.36 Then General David Petraeus took charge of the project in 2005, and the final COIN 
Manual was produced in December 2006.37 The COIN Manual focuses on leadership and values, 
such as developing local civil institutions and capacity for governance, and exercising leadership 
and integrity. Chief topics covered by the COIN Manual include, for example, chapters on 
integrating civilian and military activities,38 leadership and ethics,39 and social network 
analysis.40 
 In the military, the new ethic of experimentation, adaptability, and fallibility is seen as 
better facilitating the gathering of information and the management of risks, which are both key 
concerns of the new counterinsurgency doctrine. This is closely linked with an ethic of non-
coerciveness, as the military has relaxed its emphasis on discipline and punishment in favour of 
individual initiative. As stated in the Introduction to the COIN Manual, “In COIN, the side that 
learns faster and adapts more rapidly – the better learning organization – usually wins.”41 This 
involves fostering “open communication between senior officers and their subordinates,” 
“coordinating closely with governmental and nongovernmental partners at all command levels,” 
and establishing “rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned.”42 Discipline is not mentioned 
                                                
34 Ibid. at “Forward”. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Department of the Army, US Marines Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22 (1 October 2004).  
37 COIN Manual, supra note 16 at “Forward”. 
38 Ibid. at para. 2-1.  
39 Ibid. at para. 7-1.  
40 Ibid. at Appendix B, para. B-1.  
41 Ibid. at ix.  
42  Ibid. at x.  
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in the COIN Manual, although leaders are enjoined to “check routinely on what Soldiers and 
Marines are doing;”43 commanders are left not necessarily knowing what activities they are 
performing in the combat zone, “due to the decentralized nature of operations.”44 This has 
consequences for the targeting of combatants in a conflict zone in which the line between lawful 
combatants, unlawful combatants, and civilians is increasingly shifting and unclear. Here, the 
ethic of non-coercion refers to the ways in which security forces deserve to be treated, and not to 
the ways in which they are required to act towards a target population.  
 The COIN Manual’s emphasis on leadership and ethics renders it liable to the criticism that 
its counterinsurgent doctrine possesses an inherent moral asymmetry. The COIN Manual states 
that COIN warfare “includes the responsibility to serve as a moral compass that extends beyond 
the COIN force and into the community. It is that moral compass that distinguishes Soldiers and 
Marines from the insurgents.”45 This is a radical re-conception of the “characteristics that make 
men soldiers,”46 and one that moves us away from the objective and readily observable criteria 
that once identified the “legitimacy and permanency of the fighting group.”47 Accordingly, 
commanders must maintain the “moral high ground” at all times, for maintaining this is key to 
winning the conflict,48 and in practice this often means that there is great pressure on 
commanders to justify the actions of their soldiers even when such actions appear to violate rules 
imposed by the international humanitarian law. Here, morality and ethics is represented by 
individual “initiative and adaptability”, involving “[s]elf-development, life-long learning, and 
reflection on experience.”49 Here, moral engagement in combat is depicted as a matter of process 
– of learning and reflection – and not on outcomes. As shall be discussed in the case studies in 
Chapter Four, there are many ways in which COIN doctrine and Rules of Engagement 
incorporate strategies of martial law and pacification used by imperial powers prior to the 
widespread introduction of the principle of distinction in the international humanitarian law, 
including collective punishment, the dehumanization of the population, and facilitating a 
                                                
43  Ibid. at para. 7-3.  
44  Ibid. at para. 7-6.  
45  Ibid. at para. 7-9.  
46 John F. Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History (New York: Free Press, 2012) at 193.  
47 Ibid.; Francis Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War (New York: D. 
van Nostrand, 1862) at 18.  
48  COIN Manual, supra note 16 at para. 7-10.  
49  Ibid. at para. 7-47.  
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presumption of the hostility of the civilian population.  
 John Nagl, co-author of the 2006 COIN Manual, held the position of operations officer of 
Task Force 1/34 Armor of the First Infantry Division, stationed in Khaldiya, near Baghdad, 
during U.S. counterinsurgent operations there in 2003-2004. His doctoral thesis was published in 
2002 as Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya, Vietnam, 
and Iraq,50 and he became very influential in developing present-day U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine. Counterinsurgency, Nagl explains, is intelligence-driven in that “[y]ou have to have the 
local nationals tell you who the bad guys are, and then you act on that information.”51 This idea is 
similar to the ‘informational thesis’ of counterinsurgency put forth by Condra et al., in which 
they find that the local civilian population can affect an insurgency to the extent that they choose 
to share information with, or lend support to, either the insurgent or counterinsurgent forces.52 
Counterinsurgent forces who mistakenly kill civilians are more likely to lose this support.53 
However, under Nagl’s command in Iraq, forcing locals to turn over militants often involved the 
use of coercive and dehumanizing tactics.54 Even when information was forthcoming, it was 
difficult for U.S. forces to locate suspected individuals given their lack of local and cultural 
knowledge. Nagl states that “[t]here aren’t any addresses in this country. The streets don’t have 
names, there are no street signs, there aren’t numbers on the houses; all the houses look the 
same.”55 Nagl found that he was not able to make effective use of local assistance, even when 
locals came forward with information. “These clowns don’t know how to read maps,” Nagl 
explained to the New York Times, “so how exactly do I find out which house the bad guy lives 
in?”56 Nagl describes how his unit instead used mortar attacks on civilian neighborhoods as a 
means to encourage locals to turn in insurgents. Nagl stated, “if you live in a neighborhood and 
you know there are bad people and you don’t want Americans to return heavy fire into your 
                                                
50 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002). 
51 Peter Maas, “Professor Nagl’s War” The New York Times Magazine (11 January 2004) [hereinafter Professor 
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53 Ibid.  
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55 Ibid. 
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neighborhood, endangering your families, you need to turn in the bad guys.”57 An American-
appointed representative of the local governing counsel, Ghazi Ajil al-Yarwar, referred to the 
U.S. practice of jailing relatives of suspected insurgents as one of “collective punishment.”58   
 Orders that are ambiguous cause difficulties, as they can facilitate atrocities while avoiding 
the appearance of manifest illegality.59 As Osiel explains, “this approach easily permits the 
superior officer who desires atrocity to formulate his orders in ways that ensure that soldiers 
obeying them are excused from criminal liability. It takes no great measure of verbal artistry to 
do this[.]”60 An example of this took place in Iraq in 2006 during Objective Murray,61 where the 
orders were vague as to whether all military-aged males in the vicinity of the Al-Muthanna 
chemical weapons complex were declared as hostile, and this led to the killing of several non-
combatants. As Colonel Steele stated afterwards, “While I never specifically stated that every 
military-aged male should be killed on Objective Murray, the unit’s understanding certainly fell 
within my intent.”62 Intent-based orders can therefore facilitate the commission of acts that are 
clearly unlawful under international humanitarian law, while simultaneously excusing them. The 
reliance of modern COIN doctrine on managing information and perceptions to gain the moral 
high ground further compounds this problem, by encouraging mistakes to be vindicated, rather 
than acknowledged and remedied. Intent-based orders are therefore very different from the old 
form of the five-paragraph field order, which was designed to “place responsibility with ease”, 
and instead have the effect of diffusing and obscuring responsibility.  
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3.1.1.1 The Internationalization of U.S. COIN Doctrine 
Several nations, including many of the U.S.’s key Coalition partners in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, have adopted similar doctrines regarding intent-based orders and counterinsurgent 
doctrine. After the U.S. issued its 2006 COIN Manual, several U.S. allies followed suit, as many 
leading Western powers revised their own COIN doctrine along the same lines, instituting intent-
based orders, and promoting discretion and freedom of action down the chain of command onto 
front-line soldiers. Intent-based orders are now enshrined in Canadian military doctrine as the 
foundational principle of command control. The capstone Canadian doctrinal manual, Canadian 
Military Doctrine, states: 
To be effective, command should normally be decentralized to the greatest degree practicable 
in order to cope with the uncertainty, the disorder, the complexity, and the confusion that are 
usually present at the tactical level. Commanders must always make their intentions clear to 
subordinate commanders who, in turn, must make their decisions on their own initiative 
based upon their understanding of the senior commander’s intentions.63 
Canada also updated its counterinsurgency doctrine, issuing the Land Force Counter-Insurgency 
Operations Manual in 2008.64 The British COIN Manual places an emphasis on governing 
counterinsurgent warfare from below, on flexibility, initiative and adaptation: 
In many cases, the most effective response to new threats or to developing patterns of activity 
come from those who face them at the tactical level. Those involved in the operation can keep 
the initiative by maintaining the mindset to learn and adapt, in the same way that the enemy 
adapts. This is particularly important at the lowest tactical level, with those who understand 
the operational environment the best, who are in the optimal position to judge local 
conditions, and can tailor their response to a new threat or new enemy TTP [tactics, 
techniques and procedures] accordingly.65 
Similarly, the new German COIN Manual states that the “overarching training objective is to 
qualify the soldier to act self-reliantly and in line with the higher commander’s intent, and to 
quickly adapt to changes in the situation while keeping his focus on accomplishing the mission, 
                                                
63 Canadian Military Doctrine, supra note 18 at 5-1, para. 0502.  
64 Department of National Defence, Land Force Counter-Insurgency Manual (Ottawa: Department of National 
Defence, 2008) [hereinafter Canadian COIN Manual], available at: http://wlstorage.net/file/canadian-coin-
operations-manual.pdf (accessed 17 February 2013).  
65 Ministry of Defence, Countering Insurgency, British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10, Army Code 71876 
(London: Ministry of Defence, 2009) at 3-20, para. 3-43 [hereinafter British COIN Manual], available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013). See also: at 3-23, 
and Chapter 11 on “Learning and Adaptation”.  
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even in complex situations.”66 The German COIN Manual draws heavily upon British and U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine.67 The US has also simplified and adapted their COIN Manual for use 
by the Afghan National Army.68 In this way, U.S. command control doctrine can come to be 
imposed upon the host nation states in which counterinsurgent operations take place, and this is a 
further mechanism whereby these doctrines may gain more widespread acceptance among 
domestic security forces. 
 France has adopted many of these doctrines into a revised counterinsurgency manual 
following upon the US COIN Manual. The French COIN Manual states that COIN “operations 
demand a flexible implementation… based upon a strong decentralization of the tactical action 
down to the lowest unit echelon.”69 The new French COIN Manual was therefore in operation 
when France undertook its own recent counterinsurgency operation in Mali. Examining the 
Malian conflict is therefore an opportunity to observe how the new COIN doctrine may be 
affecting counterinsurgent operations by countries that have adopted U.S. COIN doctrine. In this, 
there is some evidence that French and Malian government forces were targeting civilians 
according to status-based markers, such as their ethnicity and suspected group and social 
affiliations. Amnesty International states that “civilians were at risk by all parties to the conflict, 
against whom there is evidence of grave human rights abuses.”70 Civilian deaths included a 
number of civilians killed by French forces in air strikes in Konna on 11 January 2013.71 
However, much of the ground campaign was waged by Malian troops, and there are several 
reports that they were targeting civilians on the grounds that they appeared to be members of the 
Tuareg ethnicity. Malian forces were targeting civilians as suspected members of hostile forces 
on the grounds that they were wearing clothing that soldiers believed marked them as Tuaregs.72 
                                                
66 German Army Office, Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency (Cologne: Federal 
Ministry of Defence, 2010) at 23 [hereinafter German COIN Manual], available at: 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/GermanyCOIN.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013).  
67 Ibid. at 52.  
68Afghan National Army, Counterinsurgency, ANA 3-24 (June 2007), available at: 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/ANA-3-24.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013).  
69 Philippe Coste, Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, Armée de Terre (Paris: Ministère de la 
Défence, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, 2010) at 28 [hereinafter French COIN Manual], available at: 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/FR-TacticalCOIN.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013).  
70 Amnesty International, Mali: First Assessment of the Human Rights Situation after Three-Week Conflict (London: 
Amnesty International Publications, 2013) at 5 [hereinafter Mali: First Assessment].   
71 Ibid. at 6.  
72 Ibid. at 9.  
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One detainee told Amnesty International that he was arrested by government forces at a 
checkpoint on the basis of his ethnically Tuareg name, stating “the soldier in charge of the 
checkpoint told me that my name indicates that I was ‘jihadist’.”73 Targeting suspected insurgents 
based on ethnic markers would be consistent with standard counterinsurgency doctrine and Rules 
of Engagement; when used in this way such command doctrines may constitute not only 
violations of international humanitarian law’s prohibitions on targeting civilians, but, to the 
extent that they are systematic, may constitute crimes against humanity as well.74 Amnesty 
International did not find that either French or Malian forces had undertaken any prosecutions or 
other disciplinary actions at that time for ethnically-based killings and detentions, indicating a 
high degree of official tolerance for these actions.75  
 In 2011, NATO issued its own Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency.76 NATO COIN 
doctrine has also been influenced by new command control doctrines, particularly those of the 
United Kingdom, the present custodian of Allied Joint Doctrine.77 The recent NATO COIN 
Manual reflects the consensus of NATO countries as to their common conduct of 
counterinsurgent warfare. The NATO COIN Manual adopts a number of U.S. reforms, such as its 
emphasis on information and intelligence exploitation, learning and adaptation,78 devolving tasks 
upon host security forces and civilians whenever possible,79 the use of coordination and 
partnerships,80 the idea that COIN is primarily a battle of perception, to be waged by 
                                                
73 Ibid. at 10.  
74 United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html (accessed 24 
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76 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), AJP-3.4.4 (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011) [hereinafter NATO COIN Manual], available at: 
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77 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(D) (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 
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79 Ibid. at 3-27.  
80 Ibid. at 4-8.  
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information,81 and the importance of a decentralized chain of command.82 The NATO COIN 
Manual states, “command and control must be decentralized to allow for tactical initiative. This 
facilitates agility at the tactical level, allowing junior commanders to work with their civilian 
counterparts and seize the initiative in rapidly developing situations.”83 All of these recent COIN 
Manuals place a strong emphasis on managing public opinion and available information to create 
a favourable political environment for counterinsurgency operations,84 as well as adapting and 
influencing local cultural knowledge.85 U.S. COIN doctrine as embodied in their 2006 COIN 
Manual was therefore adopted fairly rapidly into the military doctrine of the U.S.’s key allies, 
particularly its emphasis on learning, adaptation, perception management, and the command 
control doctrines of intent-based orders, decentralization, and the devolution of decision-making. 
 
3.1.2 Standard Rules of Engagement  
 In addition to intent-based orders, the military has made increasing use of standard Rules of 
Engagement to govern the use of force in specific theatres of operation. As with intent-based 
orders, standard Rules of Engagement are drafted broadly so as to leave the actual decision of 
whether or not to employ force with the individual soldier, and they emphasize the individual’s 
inherent right of self-defense. ‘Rules of Engagement’ are defined by the Joint Chiefs as 
“[d]irectives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and 
limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement 
with forces encountered.”86 Rules of Engagement clearly emphasize the individual soldier’s 
‘inherent right of self-defense’,87 and permit soldiers a broad discretion in preemptively killing 
civilians they deem to be hostile. Prior to the late 1990s, U.S. military doctrine makes little 
mention of Rules of Engagement; it was only in the 1990s that they began to become 
significantly institutionalized into U.S. doctrine, particularly in military manuals that governed 
                                                
81 Ibid. at 5-5.  
82 Ibid. at 5-6.  
83 Ibid.  
84 See for example, French COIN Manual, supra note 69 at 25 et seq.  
85 NATO COIN Manual, supra note 76 at 20. 
86 Joint Chiefs Dictionary, supra note 19 at 256.  
87 Rules of Engagement, supra note 12 at 33. 
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‘stability’ operations and operations other than war.88 McClung describes this as a move away 
from a Soviet-based enemy and towards a more complex battlefield populated with an increasing 
array of non-state actors.89 Hall also notes that Rules of Engagement are a “distinctly modern 
method of constraining the military’s use of force,” and that Rules of Engagement were 
originally intended to limit the use of force in unconventional and humanitarian operations, even 
more than what was required by the laws of war.90 
 Virtually unknown during World War II, limited use was first made of Rules of 
Engagement during the air campaign of the Korean War, so as to project an image of compliance 
with the UN mandate to restrict the conflict and to utilize restrained air power.91 Airborne Rules 
of Engagement were again used during the U.S. air bombing campaigns during the Vietnam War, 
largely as a response to its political fallout.92 The first seaborne Rules of Engagement, specifying 
the circumstances under which naval troops may open fire, were developed by the British Royal 
Navy in the mid-1960s for the purposes of limiting maritime hostilities with Indonesia during the 
Malay Emergency.93 These early Rules of Engagement for air and naval forces were intended to 
restrict the use of force, even more than what was permitted under the international humanitarian 
law, and therefore they were designed to prevent the escalation of a conflict.94 Rules of 
Engagement for land forces developed later, with the first recorded use of land force Rules of 
Engagement being made during the U.S.’s action in the Dominican Republic, known as 
Operation Power Pack (1965-1966), after leftist forces deposed the sitting government.95  
 As with naval and air forces, early land force Rules of Engagement were intended to restrict 
the use of force, often beyond that which was permitted by the laws of armed conflict. For 
example, the Operation Power Pack Rules of Engagement did not permit soldiers to fire even 
                                                
88 Kevin J. McClung, Law of Land Warfare and Rules of Engagement: A Review of Army Doctrine and Training 
Methodologies (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004) at 5, available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423617 (accessed 16 January 2013). 
89 Ibid.  
90 D.B. Hall, “Rules of Engagement and Non-Lethal Weapons: A Deadly Combination?” Global Security.org (1997), 
available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Hall.htm (accessed 16 January 2013). 
91 Striking the Balance, supra note 20 at 17.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Rules of Engagement, supra note 12 at 40.  
94 Ibid. at 45.  
95 Ibid. at 47.  
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upon the sighting of enemy units.96 Standing orders in Vietnam from the same time period did 
not permit firing in self-defense as such, as is common today, but they did permit the use of lethal 
force in the following circumstances:  
 (1) Enemy personnel observed with weapons who demonstrate hostile intent either by taking 
a friendly unit under fire, taking evasive action, or who occupy a firing position or bunker. (2) 
Targets which are observed and positively identified as enemy. (3) Point targets from which 
fire is being received. (This will not be construed as permission for indiscriminate firing into 
areas inhabited by non-combatants). (4) Suspected enemy locations when noncombatants will 
not be endangered.”97  
At the time, the focus of these standing orders is on the demonstrated actions of the enemy 
personnel themselves, and the kinds of activities which they are performing, many of which – 
“taking a friendly unit under fire”, “point targets from which fire is being received” – are 
evidence of wrongful aggression. On the other hand, these Rules of Engagement opened up new 
opportunities for soldiers to choose to use lethal force, particularly when confronted with 
“suspected enemy locations”. Martins states that there was a sense among the U.S. Army that the 
Rules of Engagement in Vietnam were deliberately bent by soldiers so as to kill ‘potential’ or 
suspected insurgents, who were actually ordinary civilians.98 At the same time, intent-based 
orders and Rules of Engagement that permit the targeting of forces declared hostile avoid the 
appearance of manifest illegality, which was raised by critics to denounce the free-fire orders as 
unlawful.99 Despite these abuses, the Rules of Engagement drafted for Vietnam contained 
restrictions that are absent today, as they required that the target be carrying and pointing a 
weapon - or at least clearly manifesting the intent to fire a weapon - and also required that the 
target be positively identified.   
 During the 1989 Operation Just Cause in Panama, an infantry company in Colon received 
standing orders to shoot all armed civilians, irrespective of whether or not they were participating 
in hostilities.100 Although Martins states that there is no evidence that this was ever done, it marks 
a watershed departure from the time when Rules of Engagement restricted the use of deadly force 
in order to de-escalate conflict, and instead began to facilitate it. The U.S. Judge Advocate 
                                                
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. at 50.  
98 Ibid. at 20.  
99 See for example, Richard A. Falk, “Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The Vietnam Experience” (1974) 4:1 
Instant Res. Peace & Violence 1.  
100 Rules of Engagement, supra note 12 at 54.  
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General’s Law of War Deskbook indicates that Rules of Engagement are permissive in nature, 
stating that “commanders are generally allowed to use any weapon or tactic available” without 
having to gain permission, unless this has been specifically prohibited.101  Rules of Engagement 
are intended to be quite fluid around these basic boundaries.102 The 1993 Operation Restore Hope 
Rules of Engagement for Somalia permitted soldiers to fire in the face of a hostile intent, stating, 
“you are authorized to use deadly force if: a. you are fired upon; b. armed elements, mobs, and/or 
rioters threaten human life; [or] c. there is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your 
presence.”103 ‘Hostile intent’ has since become a standard criterion for the use of lethal force 
against civilians.  
 In addition to the above requirements, self-defense has become a crucial and much-used 
component of regulating the use of force through Rules of Engagement. This has normalized 
what were previously considered to be abuses, such as the preemptive killing of ‘potential’ or 
‘possible’ insurgents, and the targeting of ‘suspected enemy locations’.104 The current boilerplate 
self-defense clause now prominently displayed in all Rules of Engagement was first enacted after 
the 1983 Barracks Bombing in Lebanon, as a response to that emergency situation, but later came 
to be institutionalized in all theatre Rules of Engagement as a standing order. 105 At first, this 
appears to be a surprising reaction to the barracks bombing; there were many ways of responding 
to the incident, including target hardening, better surveillance around bases, and better training 
for soldiers. Rules of Engagement also feature a “prominent notice regarding the right of self-
defense.”106 As Martins states, “[t]his cautionary rule typically appears at the very beginning of 
written ROE, often in capital letters. One common version states that ‘nothing in these rules 
limits the right of individual soldiers to defend themselves or the rights and responsibilities of 
                                                
101 The United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Law of War Deskbook 
(Charlottesville, VA: The United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Centre and School, 2011) at 78, s. 
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leaders to defend their units.’”107 Rules of Engagement routinely not only remind soldiers of their 
inherent right of self-defense, but the exercise of this right often overrides other laws and 
important policy goals. For example, a 2009 Tactical Directive for NATO’s International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, issued a tactical directive that expressed 
important ISAF policies, including the necessity to limit civilian casualties, to utilize restrained 
force, and to fully appreciate the consequences of the use of force.108 However, the Directive then 
states, “This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and 
women as a matter of self-defense.”109 The over-use of defensive force has the potential to 
compromise these other policy goals. 
 Present-day standard Rules of Engagement also permit the use of lethal force on three 
grounds: in the face of a hostile act, when soldiers’ perceive a hostile intent, and when a 
particular force or individual has been declared to be hostile.110  In 1994, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued their first set of draft Standing Rules of Engagement, 111 which were intended to set out 
definitions and best practices for Standing Rules of Engagement across all branches of the U.S. 
                                                
107 Ibid., citing Headquarters, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Shield 
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armed forces, and to facilitate standardization and training.112 The Joint Chiefs SROE’s were 
updated and reissued in 2000, and again in 2005.113 The U.S. military defines a hostile act as 
“simply the actual use of armed force – attacking,”114 whereas a hostile intent is the “threat of 
imminent use of force.”115 ‘Hostile act’ and ‘hostile intent’ are self-defense-based criteria that 
authorize the use of lethal force against civilians who are not necessarily participating in 
hostilities. Martins states that now, as in Vietnam, proper training is the key to properly executing 
Rules of Engagement, and that Rules of Engagement can be better enforced by relying on 
individual soldiers’ experience and judgment.116 Perry states that Rules of Engagement are 
“intended to be used throughout the spectrum of conflict in the absence of any superseding 
guidance from the National Command Authority.”117 Soldiers are thus being asked to make 
decisions to use lethal force in the absence of central command control. 
 The precise scope of the criteria for determining when a civilian is manifesting a ‘hostile 
intent’ is not further defined by the U.S. military. The 2004 Judge Advocate General’s Law of 
War Handbook states that there is a “loss of civilian status” – and therefore the loss of their 
immunity from attack - “for those intending to cause harm to the personnel and/or equipment of 
the enemy.”118 Perceiving an intention to ‘cause harm to personnel and/or equipment’ is not 
necessarily equivalent to direct participation in hostilities, and it focuses on the subjective 
perceptions of the soldier, rather than the demonstrated actions of the civilian. What criteria do 
soldiers use to determine when civilians intend to cause harm to them or to their equipment? In 
Vietnam, this often included stipulations that the belligerent be aiming or pointing a rifle or other 
weapon, and even these actions would not be sufficient to justify the use of lethal force in all 
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cases.  
 Martins states that since the Marine Barracks Bombing of 1983, the U.S. has been 
concerned with soldiers who are over-tentative in using force, 119 while dismissing the over-use of 
lethal force against persons who, in fact, pose no threat. Dave Grossman finds that since the 
1960s, there has been a growing movement in the U.S. military to train soldiers to overcome low 
firing rates; this tendency for soldiers not to fire has been counteracted by improvements in 
training exercises and live simulations to achieve higher rates of fire.120 Rules of Engagement 
accomplish the same goal, and are in line with this broader movement to avoid the over-tentative 
use of lethal force. 
 The 1993 court martial of U.S. Army Specialist James Mowris was also influential in 
institutionalizing this permissive attitude towards the use of lethal force. Mowris was convicted 
of firing a warning shot that killed an unarmed Somali who was running away from U.S. soldiers 
during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.121 However, Martins states that the “investigation and 
court-martial conviction of Army Specialist Mowris, for instance, had a restraining influence on 
soldier responses to fire. The convening authority decided to set aside Specialist Mowris’ 
conviction for negligent homicide only after many soldiers received a strong signal.”122 Martins 
cites one Army colonel who clarified that many soldiers had interpreted this conviction in such a 
way as to make them reluctant to fire their weapons “even when fired upon for fear of legal 
action.”123 There is no obvious reason why the conviction of Mowris would be interpreted in this 
way, but the Army was very responsive to these concerns. Despite Martins’ injunction that a 
soldier may not “base anticipatory force on a mere hunch that the person is hostile,”124 the U.S. 
military has encouraged a liberal use of lethal fire and, since Mowris, has generally declined to 
prosecute soldiers who kill unarmed civilians in response to a perceived hostile intent.125 The 
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Joint Chiefs Standing Rules of Engagement now codify the result obtained in Mowris into 
standard Rules of Engagement, stating that self-defense includes the authority to pursue or 
engage persons who are fleeing U.S. forces, “if they continue to demonstrate a hostile intent.”126 
Chapter Four, infra, will discuss several examples in which U.S. forces perceived a hostile intent 
from civilians who were fleeing, or who were disobeying orders, or failing to heed verbal 
warnings.  
 Standing Rules of Engagement also permit the use of lethal force when a particular group 
or individual has been declared hostile. The 1994 Joint Chiefs SROEs set out the present 
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and have informed him of their intent to use force if he does not submit to custody. This law is not universal, even 
within U.S. jurisdictions. See: R. v. Gosset [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76, in which the Supreme Court of Canada overturned an 
acquittal for a police officer who shot and killed a fleeing suspect. See also: Clegg, supra Chapter One note 122 and 
accompanying text. White refers to this as the ‘fleeing felon’ rule, which he states had been in use since the Middle 
Ages, but which but was thought to have become “barbaric” and “outdated” by the American Law Institute in 1931; 
the Pennsylvania state legislature, for example, outlawed this practice in 1973 (Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 
C.P.S.A. s. 508). See: Michael White, “Examining the Impact of External Influences on Police Use of Deadly Force 
Over Time” (2003) 27:1 Evaluation Rev. 50 at 54. American soldiers may therefore be applying a standard similar to 
that used in certain U.S. states that permits the killing of a fleeing suspect. On the other hand, these laws privilege 
security forces with rights to use lethal force that are not available to other persons, and have been abandoned in 
several jurisdictions on the grounds that they violate basic human rights. 
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definitions for ‘hostile act’127 and ‘hostile intent’,128 and also defined the concept of ‘declared 
hostile force’ as follows: 
Once a force is declared hostile by appropriate authority, U.S. units need not observe a hostile 
act or a demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force. The responsibility for 
exercising the right and obligation of national self-defense and declaring a force hostile is a 
matter of the utmost importance demanding considerable judgment of command. All 
available intelligence, the status of political decision, and the consequences for the United 
States must be carefully weighed. Exercising the right and obligation of national self-defense 
by competent authority is in addition to and does not supplant the right and obligation to 
exercise unit self-defense. The authority to declare a force hostile is limited as amplified in 
Appendix A to Enclosure A.129 
The Judge Advocate General’s Operations Law Handbook of 2011 states that paragraph 3 of 
Appendix A of Enclosure A of the 2005 Joint Chiefs SROEs now sets out the circumstances 
under which forces and individuals may be declared hostile,130 but the provisions themselves are 
classified. This means that ordinary soldiers would not know how or why a particular force has 
been declared hostile, but they are tasked with attempting to identify and target them once this 
declaration has been made.  
Declaring a force or individual to be hostile facilitates the use of anticipatory force, 
particularly force that is based upon status or group affiliation as opposed to demonstrated 
belligerent activities. As stated in the Joint Chiefs SROEs, persons declared hostile can be 
targeted irrespective of whether they are armed or engaged in hostile acts, or manifesting a 
hostile intent. The Judge Advocate General similarly states that, “[o]nce a force is declared to be 
‘hostile’, U.S. units may engage it without observing a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile 
intent, i.e., the basis for engagement shifts from conduct to status.”131 Martins also confirms that 
the rules for declared hostile forces are an exception to the general rule prohibiting anticipatory 
force. He states, “[d]o not base anticipatory force on a mere hunch that the person is hostile. On 
the other hand, if your commander informs you that a particular fighting force has been 
designated by higher head-quarters as ‘hostile’, or as ‘the enemy’, you may shoot that force or its 
                                                
127 1994 Joint Chiefs SROEs, supra note 110 at para. 5(e).  
128 Ibid. at para. 5(f). The 1994 Joint Chiefs SROE definitions of ‘hostile act’ and ‘hostile intent’ are now embodied 
in the Joint Chiefs Dictionary, supra note 19 at 117.  
129 Ibid. at para. 6. 
130 The United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook 
(Charlottesville, VA: The United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2011) at 75 
[hereinafter 2011 Operations Law].  
131 Ibid.  
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equipment – on sight without identifying indicators of hostile intent.”132 As Colonel Max 
Maxwell states, discussing the concept of declared hostile force in the 2000 Joint Chiefs’ SROEs, 
“[o]nce declared hostile by a superior authority, enemy forces can be engaged and the soldier 
does not need to observe a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that 
force.”133 Maxwell states that when targeting ‘declared hostile forces’ “the soldier is legally 
permitted to engage and kill the hostile force without regard to whether the lethality is reasonable 
from the perspective of the hostile party’s conduct.”134 Janin clarifies the status-based nature of 
targeting declared hostile forces, stating that when “the ROE designate a civilian force hostile, 
the on-scene American servicemember will not have to perform the ‘direct part in hostilities’ 
analysis. Positive identification as a member of the civilian-belligerent group becomes the 
issue.”135 Positive identification is difficult, he concedes, because “their status is not revealed 
until the point of attack.”136 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has found that in 
Afghanistan, intelligence regarding the identity of enemy combatants was often faulty, stating, 
“international forces were often too uninformed of local practices, or too credulous in interpreting 
information, to be able to arrive at a reliable understanding of a situation.”137 The criteria that 
soldiers use to identify and target hostile forces are therefore poorly defined and liable to 
misunderstanding and abuse. 
 There are several public laws in the U.S. that also define and set out the process for 
declaring forces as hostile, including the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), 138 
the 2009 Military Commissions Act,139 and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.140 The 
                                                
132 Rules of Engagement, supra note 12 at 119. 
133 Mark “Max” Maxwell, “Rebutting the Civilian Presumption: Playing Whack-A-Mole Without a Mallet?” in 
Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, eds., Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an 
Asymmetric World (London: Oxford University Press, 2012) [hereinafter Targeted Killings] 31 at 32 [hereinafter 
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134 Ibid.  
135 Albert S. Janin, “Engaging Civilian Belligerents Leads to Self-Defense/Protocol I Marriage” (2007) Army 
Lawyer 82 at 91 [hereinafter Civilian Belligerents].  
136 Ibid.  
137 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Addendum: Study on targeted killings, UNHRC, 14th Sess., A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (28 May 2010) at 25 
[hereinafter UN Special Rapporteur Report], available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf (accessed 21 April 2013). 
138 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 50 U.S.C. 1541 (14 September 2001) [hereinafter 2001 
AUMF]; see Appendix D at 18, p. 325. 
139 Title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, H.R. 2647, 123 Stat. 
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2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force is an exercise by Congress in declaring 
members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to be hostile forces, and it has been used as the primary 
basis for targeting hostile forces by U.S. personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The AUMF 
authorizes “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he 
[the President of the United States] determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons.”141 The 2012 NDAA further authorizes the detention by U.S. forces of any person “who 
was part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged 
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”142  This would authorize the 
killing of persons who had been members of such groups in the past, and who were not presently 
taking a direct part in hostilities.  
 The U.S. has come to use the AUMF to target persons affiliated with insurgent forces other 
than Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and who had no involvement with the September 11 attacks, 
indicating how amorphous and malleable such status-based concepts can be. The U.S. has used 
the AUMF, for example, to target and detain suspected members of the Somalian Al-Shabaab 
group on the grounds that Al-Shabaab is suspected of having ties to Al-Qaeda. The group was 
formed sometime around 2006-7 out of the Islamic Courts Union militia who sought to establish 
                                                                                                                                                        
2190 (28 October 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Military Commissions Act]; see Appendix D at 21, p. 326. 
140 Title X, Subtitle D of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, H.R. 1540, 
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the 2009 Military Commissions Act, ibid. at s. 1021 (b)(2), or may be transferred “for trial by an alternative court or 
competent tribunal having lawful jurisdiction,” at s. 1021 (b)(3). However, covered persons may be subjected to 
“Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force,” at s. 1021 (b)(1), as well as “Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s country of origin, 
any other foreign country, or any other foreign entity,” at s. 1021 (b)(4). These sections would authorize indefinite 
military detention, as well as rendition to third parties, respectively. Section 1022 (a)(1) stipulates that a person who 
is captured in the course of hostilities under the 2001 AUMF “shall” be held in military custody pending disposition 
under the law of war. This provision does not apply to United States citizens, at s. 1022 (b)(1), or lawful resident 
aliens, at s. 1022 (b)(2). 
141 2001 AUMF, supra note 138.  
142 2012 NDAA, supra note 140.  
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a strict Wahabbi court system in Somalia.143 This took place sometime after the Islamic Courts 
Union was defeated after the fall of Mogadishu on 28 December 2006, and Al-Shabaab is thought 
to have been formed out of loose-knits groups of nationalist Islamic militia that grew up in the 
slums of Mogadishu.144 It is thus difficult to make the claim that the group existed as such at the 
time of the September 11th attacks, or that its fighters “planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks.”145 Despite this, the U.S. has begun to detain suspected Al-Shabaab militants 
pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. In April of 2011, for example, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was 
captured on a vessel in international waters in the Persian Gulf and taken to a U.S. Naval vessel, 
where he was interrogated for several months before being turned over to the FBI.146 As U.S. 
Senator Carl Levin explains, “the approach taken by the administration in this case is consistent 
with the bipartisan detainee provisions included in the National Defense Authorization Act… 
These provisions would authorize military detention for enemy belligerents captured in the 
course of hostilities authorized by the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force. That 
authority appropriately encompasses the detention of individuals like Warsame, who is suspected 
of participation in such hostilities.”147 Since then, three more suspected members of Al-Shabaab 
have been reportedly detained under similar circumstances.148 Therefore, the AUMF is being used 
to detain individuals outside of war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan on the grounds that they are 
suspected of being associated with Al-Qaeda, even when this association was not in existence 
until after 11 September 2001. Officials in the Obama administration and senior Department of 
Justice lawyers have reportedly queried whether many of the groups that the U.S. is targeting are, 
in fact, covered by the 2001 AUMF. Many of these groups, like Al-Shabaab, are nascent, or have 
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only tenuous links to Al-Qaeda – “associates of associates,” as one U.S. official described.149 
More recently, President Obama has used the 2001 AUMF to justify current military actions 
against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria,150 on the grounds that the group is an offshoot 
of Al-Qaeda, being originally formed as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, despite the fact that the central 
leadership of Al-Qaeda has disavowed the group.151 Officials are discussing whether to “turn 
counterterrorism policies adopted as emergency measures after the 2001 attacks into more 
permanent procedures that can sustain the campaign against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as 
other current and future threats.”152 Although a new authorization for the use of military force is 
currently being debated, the present administration has continued to rely on the 2001 AUMF to 
justify new military operations in Iraq and Syria against new and emerging groups of militants.  
 The U.S. Military Commissions Act of 2009 also provides a definition of an ‘unprivileged 
enemy belligerent’,153 and in doing so it provides perhaps the most complete definition in U.S. 
law as to the nature and scope of declaring forces to be hostile. The Act’s definition of the term 
‘unprivileged enemy belligerent’ departs in a number of ways from the cognate concept of 
‘civilian direct participation in hostilities’ that is found in the international law. The Act states: 
The term ‘unprivileged enemy belligerent’ means an individual (other than a privileged 
belligerent) who – 
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; 
(B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners’ or 
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offence under this chapter.154   
This provision makes it clear that privileged belligerents are excluded from this definition, but it 
                                                
149 Greg Miller and Karen de Young, “Administration Debates Stretching 9/11 law to Go After New al-Qaeda 
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152 Stretching 911 Law, supra note 149.  
153 2009 Military Commissions Act, supra note 139. 
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seeks to define non-state fighters in terms of their status as militants, rather than as civilians 
taking a direct part in hostilities according to Article 51(3) of Protocol I. Section C very closely 
mirrors the declaration of Al-Qaeda as a declared hostile force in the AUMF. Section A states that 
unprivileged enemy belligerents may be targeted at any time, whereas civilian direct participants 
are defined as such “only as long as and for such time as” they engage in hostilities.155 Section A 
thus removes the temporal requirement found in the international law. Section B defines 
belligerency as encompassing activities that materially support hostilities, but that may not 
amount to direct participation in hostilities - such as civilians who provide information, or food 
and other supplies to militant groups, or civilians who have family and other social relationships 
with suspected members of militant groups.  
 The targeting of declared hostile forces as found in standard Rules of Engagement, the 2001 
AUMF, the 2009 Military Commissions Act and the 2012 NDAA move away from traditional 
conceptions of combatant as known in the law of belligerent qualification. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the international laws of war only permit two status-based determinations: that of a 
civilian or a qualified belligerent. Those fighters who do not meet the criteria for qualified 
belligerency may only be targeted only “unless and for such time as they participate directly in 
hostilities.”156 Instead, the definitions of a ‘declared hostile force’ and an ‘unprivileged enemy 
belligerent’ are status-based concepts, ones that do not fall either into the conduct-based concept 
of ‘civilian direct participation’, or the existing status-based concepts of ‘civilian’ or ‘qualified 
belligerent’. Targeting forces declared as hostile abandons the established approach of treating 
irregular belligerents as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, and instead emphasizes their 
membership and association with a target group, which can include criteria not relate to 
participation in belligerent activities, such as social and political affiliations, or family or tribal 
groups.157  Recall that in Mali, there is evidence that security forces have targeted persons on this 
                                                
155 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 
UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] at Article 51(3).  
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157 For example see: Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War Through 
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basis, including those who simply appeared, by name or dress, to be ethnically Tuareg.158 This 
method of targeting is authorized by the above Acts, and by standard Rules of Engagement.  
 The self-defensive criteria embodied in standard Rules of Engagement that permit targeting 
civilians who engage in a hostile act, or who manifest a hostile intent may also permit the killing 
of many civilians who are not participating directly in hostilities. Commander Janin notes that the 
U.S. “interprets ‘direct part’ more broadly than the Additional Protocol signatories,” and through 
the “prism of self defense.”159 In this way, standard Rules of Engagement are coming to replace 
the concept of ‘civilian direct participation’ with justifications for the use of lethal force that are 
based on the right of self-defense, while providing no criteria that would ensure that defensive 
force is used within the bounds prescribed by ordinary laws governing self-defense. The case 
studies in Chapter Four explore many instances in which lethal force was justified on defensive 
grounds, and it will be seen that these justifications are not in line with either Article 51(3) of 
Protocol I or the criteria governing defensive force as outlined in Chapter One.  
 
3.1.2.1 The Internationalization of Standard Rules of Engagement 
These command control doctrines have not remained confined to the U.S. military, but 
have been adopted by many leading Western powers, as practices that began in the U.S. have 
spread to its allies. Perry states that Rules of Engagement have become the primary means of 
regulating the use of force not only in counter-insurgency operations, but also in inter- and 
multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.160 This has been facilitated by the fact 
that counterinsurgent and humanitarian operations are often conducted jointly among Western 
nations, leading to a push to standardize command control doctrine and Rules of Engagement. A 
recent initiative by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law of Sanremo seeks to 
standardize Rules of Engagement across the international community.161 The Sanremo Institute, 
founded in 1970, provides courses and training, holds conferences, and conducts an annual 
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Round Table on contemporary issues in international humanitarian law. The Institute is funded 
through membership fees, course participant fees, and voluntary contributions from governments, 
organizations and individuals.162 The Sanremo ROE Handbook seeks to set ‘best practices’ with 
respect to Rules of Engagement in joint and multinational operations.163 Although the major 
contributors to the ROE Handbook were limited to military law experts from a handful of NATO-
member states - namely the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom164 - the ROE 
Handbook “has been designed so that it can be used by any nation or group of nations without 
reference to security caveats or restrictions.”165   
 Like standard U.S. Rules of Engagement, the ROE Handbook does not elaborate on the 
definition of a ‘hostile intent’, stating only that a demonstration of a hostile intent exists when 
“there is a reasonable belief that an attack or use of force is imminent, based on an assessment of 
all the facts and circumstances known at the time.”166 The ROE Handbook states that indications 
of a hostile intent can include aiming or directing weapons, adopting an attack profile, closing 
within weapons release range, illuminating with radar or laser designations, and laying or 
preparing to lay naval mines, but also passing along targeting information and failing to respond 
to proactive measures, such as verbal queries, warnings, visual and noise signals.167 Similar 
criteria are also found in the 2005 Joint Chiefs SROEs, which further state that self-defense can 
be used to justify the pursuit and engagement of individuals who are fleeing U.S. forces, if they 
“continue to demonstrate a hostile intent.”168 These criteria would have validated the actions of 
Mowris, for example, who killed an unarmed civilian because he fled and failed to heed verbal 
instructions from U.S. troops. They would also validate many of the checkpoint shootings in Iraq, 
discussed in Chapter Four, which have been justified by Coalition forces on the grounds that 
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those killed failed to respond immediately to verbal instructions and in doing so manifested a 
hostile intent. Note also that these criteria are significantly broader in scope than the use of force 
rules that the U.S. employed in Vietnam. The proposition that a hostile intent can be manifest by 
civilians who ‘pass on information’ is also a significant widening of the circumstances under 
which civilians lose their immunity to attack; it opens the door to the targeting of civilians who 
are perceived as supporting insurgencies and is particularly liable to be abused by warring 
parties.169  
 The Sanremo ROE Handbook also adopts the U.S. practice of declaring individuals and 
groups to be hostile. The ROE Handbook defines a declared hostile force as “any civilian, 
paramilitary, or military force or terrorist organization that has been declared hostile by the 
appropriate authority.”170 The ROE Handbook’s draft Rules of Engagement suggest that a 
declared hostile force includes “a. Combatants of the armed forces of (SPECIFY nation), b. 
Civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, and/or c. (SPECIFY others e.g. group/vessel).”171 The 
Sanremo draft Rules of Engagement are thus framed very broadly and can potentially incorporate 
a very wide variety of groups and individuals quite apart from civilians taking a direct part in 
hostilities. Note that section b. closely mirrors the 2009 Military Commissions Act in its removal 
of the temporal limitation on targeting civilian participants only for such time as they do take part 
in hostilities;172 here, section b. would also permit such civilian participants to be declared as 
hostile, and then targeted even when not participating directly in hostilities.  
 The ROE Handbook does recognize that self-defense is an important component of 
standard Rules of Engagement, and that the exercise of individual self-defense in the course of 
combat is not intuitive but is conceived differently in different nations.173 Exercising the inherent 
right of self-defense depends greatly on the rules that are chosen to govern it,174 and this can 
materially change the character of the conflict. The 2005 Joint Chiefs SROEs state that reasonable 
efforts will be made to develop common Rules of Engagement in multinational forces, although 
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171 Ibid. at 37-8. 
172 2009 Military Commissions Act, supra note 139 at s. 948(a).  
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U.S. forces will only be bound by their own Rules of Engagement.175 The 2005 Joint Chiefs 
SROEs also state that Status of Forces agreements negotiated with host governments may never 
be interpreted in such a way that limits U.S. forces’ inherent right of self-defense.176 This 
suggests that the harmonization of Rules of Engagement with multi-national forces and host 
governments is likely to reproduce U.S. practices that displace the ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’ analysis.177 It can also mean that killings undertaken according to the doctrine of 
inherent self-defense cannot be prosecuted under the domestic laws of a host nation as criminal 
offences, essentially giving foreign armed forces a blanket immunity for mistaken killings, as 
occurred with U.S. forces in Iraq.178  
 Because individual nations, as well as NATO, have generally classified their Rules of 
Engagement, it cannot be known which nations have adopted the Sanremo ROE Handbook for 
use by their domestic armed forces. At present, the Joint Chief’s SROEs and the Sanremo ROE 
Handbook are the two formulations of standard Rules of Engagement that have been made 
publicly available, and they are substantially similar to one another. The Sanremo ROE 
Handbook has also been translated into numerous languages, including Spanish, French, but also 
including the languages of many non-NATO member states, these being Bosnian, Arabic, Thai, 
Russian and Chinese.179 The Sanremo Institute also promotes annual training seminars in these 
Rules of Engagement for high-ranking military officials from around the world.180 An inquiry to 
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Dr. Mandsagar, the now-retired lead author of the Sanremo ROE Handbook and the organizer of 
these training seminars, regarding which nations had attended these seminars garnered the 
response that the countries who had attended included those for whom the above translations had 
been done.181 Dr. Mandsager stated that, while he did not keep records of the nations who had 
attended the training seminars, the number was “quite large”, and that many countries used the 
ROE Handbook for training purposes, military exercises, and war games, particularly nations in 
South America.182 Therefore, many NATO and non-NATO member states alike have attended 
these seminars, and have been given translations of the ROE Handbook for domestic use, 
including not only many NATO Allies, but also the major non-NATO military powers of Russia 
and China. This indicates that knowledge concerning U.S. norms and practices has received 
widespread dissemination, but perhaps not yet widespread agreement. This leaves open a space 
for debate and engagement concerning alternative norms.  
 
3.2 Civilians Who Take a Direct Part in Hostilities:  The ICRC Expert Process 
In 2003, the ICRC convened a panel of experts to address the growing uncertainty 
surrounding the circumstances under which states may lawfully target civilians during armed 
conflict. Out of a series of expert meetings held over the course of six years, the ICRC produced 
its Interpretive Guidance, one of the more significant interpretations of the law of belligerent 
qualification since the Diplomatic Conference that produced the Protocols Additional. The 
Interpretive Guidance addresses the question of when civilians can be said to be taking a direct 
part in hostilities and are therefore liable to be attacked, as well as the belligerent qualifications of 
private contractors and civilian government employees, who have been taking on greater roles 
during hostilities.183 The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance presents its findings to be authoritative 
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interpretations of the customary laws of armed conflict, and hopes that its findings will be 
adopted by states.184 It is therefore instructive to discuss the expert process by which the ICRC 
developed its Interpretive Guidance.  
By 2003, distinguishing those civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities – and are 
therefore liable to be attacked – had again become a significant and controversial issue in 
international humanitarian law, and this controversy became particularly acute with the post-911 
War on Terror and the U.S.-led Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Interpretive 
Guidance lists a number of factors that have, in recent decades, contributed to increased 
confusion in determining whether civilians are taking a direct part in hostilities. Such factors 
include a number of governance reforms that have been instituted by the leading military powers: 
[T]he increased outsourcing of traditionally military functions has inserted numerous private 
contractors, civilian intelligence personnel, and other civilian government employees into the 
reality of modern armed conflict. Moreover, military operations have often attained an 
unprecedented level of complexity, involving the coordination of a great variety of 
interdependent human and technical resources in different locations. All of these aspects of 
contemporary warfare have given rise to confusion and uncertainty as to the distinction 
between legitimate military targets and persons protected against direct attacks.185 
These new State practices had, in recent decades, sowed confusion as to the acceptable criteria 
for distinguishing belligerents from civilians.  
One of the key legal questions asked by the ICRC’s expert process was what conduct on 
the part of civilians amounts to direct participation in hostilities, such that the military may 
lawfully target those civilians.186 A panel of forty to fifty experts was convened for five meetings 
held over the course of five years to address this and related questions. The final Interpretive 
Guidance was published in 2009. “In order to encourage open discussion on politically sensitive 
issues,” the ICRC states, it had decided not to publish a list of the experts involved, or with what 
organizations they were affiliated.187 The ICRC states that the resulting Interpretive Guidance 
“does not necessarily reflect a unanimous view or a majority opinion of the experts. It endeavors 
to propose a balanced and practical solution that takes into account the wide variety of concerns 
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involved[.]”188 It is difficult, therefore, to know what interests and concerns were raised during 
the expert process, and how these were taken into account in the final Interpretive Guidance. This 
contrasts sharply with the public processes that the ICRC led at the Diplomatic Conferences of 
1949 and 1977.  
The ICRC published the agenda, including the names and affiliations of the presenters, in 
attendance at the first expert meeting and then declined to provide further information.189 In some 
cases, expert participants disagreed so strongly with the draft produced by the ICRC that they 
asked that their names be removed as participants “lest inclusion be misinterpreted as support for 
the Interpretive Guidance’s propositions.”190 Of the published presenters from the first expert 
meeting, there were two professors of international law,191 one representative each from the 
American and British military,192 three legal representatives from the ICRC,193 one counsel from 
the T.M.C. Asser Institute,194 and one representative from the International Commission of 
Jurists.195 There were no presenters from outside of northern Europe and the United States, nor 
any representatives of non-governmental organizations, nor non-state organized armed groups, 
nor civilians in conflict zones – some of whom had been represented at the Diplomatic 
Conference that produced the Protocols Additional in 1977 - nor did they follow standard 
diplomatic protocols and record keeping, as had been done at the earlier conferences.196 The 
ICRC notes that the Interpretive Guidance is not binding law, but hope it to be persuasive for 
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states and non-state actors;197 at the same time, the process by which it chose its participants and 
produced its interpretations can be seen to be closed and non-transparent, and the process itself 
was highly contentious and politicized.  
 Under the international humanitarian law, civilians who take a direct part in hostilities 
possess no belligerent privileges: they may be targeted only for such as time as they participate 
directly in hostilities; outside of this, they may be detained and prosecuted criminally for their 
participation, but they may not be summarily killed.198 Such acts had led to the contentious 
debate over the German armed forces’ treatment of the francs-tireurs.199 This had also been the 
finding at the German High Command Trial at Nuremberg,200 and the international community’s 
rejection of such acts had led to the adoption of the expansive protections contained in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.201 It should also be recalled that in the U.S. case of Ex parte 
Quirin, agents of the German navy were sentenced to execution after being prosecuted for 
preparing to commit acts of sabotage on U.S. territory; they were not subjected to extra-judicial 
or summary killing.202 After World War II, the Fourth Geneva Convention continued to treat the 
issue of civilian direct participation in acts of sabotage in international armed conflict as a 
criminal matter that may be prosecuted by an occupying power.203 For those civilians who do 
make an attempt on the life and limb of members of the occupying forces, there are strict limits 
on when the death penalty can be applied. The death penalty is only available “provided that such 
offences were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force before the 
occupation began,” and only for “espionage”, “serious acts of sabotage”, and “intentional 
offences which have caused the death of one or more persons.”204 Article 6 of Protocol II affords 
similar guarantees to those subjected to judicial processes during non-international armed 
conflict, including a requirement that “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall 
endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed 
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conflict.”205 The Interpretive Guidance thus represents a shift away from affording non-state 
fighters judicial processes and amnesty for acts constituting their belligerency, and towards 
validating the discretion of military authorities to target even suspected irregular belligerents with 
lethal force. This, in turn, evidences a shift away from the approach taken by the ICRC in the 
post-World War II era, during which the ICRC attempted to incorporate irregular belligerents 
into the laws of armed conflict - either by qualifying them as belligerents, or by seeking similar 
treatment for them as that afforded to qualified belligerents, so that, in the words of Jean Pictet, 
“many contemporary conflicts will be governed by law.”206  
 
3.2.1 Continuous Combat Function 
 The ICRC began its expert process by acknowledging the difficulties inherent in 
distinguishing between combatants and civilians, and the problems that erroneous killings 
generate in armed conflicts. The ICRC recognized that the expert process was in part an attempt 
to resolve the problem of mistaken killings, stating that, “civilians are more likely to fall victim to 
erroneous or arbitrary targeting, while armed forces – unable to properly identify their adversary 
– run an increased risk of being attacked by persons they cannot distinguish from the civilian 
population.”207 The ICRC notes that direct participation in hostilities is not defined in treaty form, 
and that a clear picture does not emerge from state practice or international jurisprudence.208 The 
ICRC thus tasked its experts with explaining the precise scope of the meaning of Article 51(3) of 
Protocol I, which formulates the principle of distinction by stating only that “Civilians shall 
enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.” The Interpretive Guidance divides direct participation in hostilities into two 
categories: the first consists of civilians who participate sporadically in hostilities, and who may 
only be targeted for such time as they do so;209 the second consists of those fighters who belong 
to organized armed groups, and who perform a ‘continuous combat function’ on behalf of those 
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groups. These fighters may be targeted at any time during the hostilities.210  
The ICRC begins its analysis by stating that there are three mutually exclusive groups in a 
non-international armed conflict: civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups. 
Performing a continuous combat function is synonymous with membership in an organized, but 
unqualified, armed group. The ICRC was clear that members of organized armed groups are not 
civilians participating directly in hostilities, and therefore do not enjoy the immunity from attack 
outlined in Article 51(3) of Protocol I. The ICRC states: 
[T]he restriction of loss of protection to the duration of specific hostile acts was designed to 
respond to spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized hostile acts by civilians and cannot be 
applied to organized armed groups.211 
The Interpretive Guidance has therefore separated organized armed groups and removed them 
from the definition of ‘civilian direct participants in hostilities’. This approach is in opposition to 
the meaning and purpose of Common Article 3 which the 1958 Commentary states was intended 
to apply to all actors in situations of armed conflict, and specifically to prevent states from 
treating insurgents as common criminals, and outside of the law.212  
 “The decisive criterion,” the ICRC states, “for individual membership in an organized 
armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her 
direct participation in hostilities.”213 Such fighters are liable to be attacked at any time during the 
conflict, so long as they continue to perform a continuous combat function on behalf of an 
organized armed group.214 Visible signs that an armed group is an organized one include such 
signifiers as wearing uniforms, carrying weapons, and repeated involvement in armed 
activities.215 However, the difficulty in identifying such irregular fighters lies precisely in the fact 
that they frequently do not manifest the visible markers of such organization.  Moreover, a fighter 
must exhibit repeated involvement in combat operations in order to fall into this category. It is 
difficult to see how a soldier would or could have evidence of what a particular non-state fighter 
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has done at other times and places. The ICRC is attempting to capture the essence of a ‘militant’ 
or an ‘insurgent’, but this definition is extremely difficult to apply in practice.  
There is a danger that states will instead choose to use impermissible criteria for defining 
and then determining membership in organized armed groups - criteria that are much easier to 
apply, but that are over-inclusive. The ICRC attempted to address this problem by excluding 
certain activities from their definition of ‘combat function’. The ICRC stated that the planning, 
preparation, and execution of hostile acts constitutes a continuous combat function, but political, 
administrative, and non-combat roles do not.216 Mere attendance at training camps does not, in 
and of itself, qualify one as performing a continuous combat function.217 The ICRC specifically 
stated that recruiters, trainers, financiers and propagandists, while contributing to the war effort, 
were civilians, and so may not lawfully be targeted,218 on the grounds that these were not combat 
functions. The Interpretive Guidance states that, “the concept of organized armed group refers to 
non-State armed forces in a strictly functional sense. For the practical purposes of the principle of 
distinction, therefore, membership in such groups cannot depend on abstract affiliation, family 
ties, or other criteria prone to error, arbitrariness, or abuse.”219  
The ICRC’s separation of those who perform a continuous combat function off from 
civilians who perform hostile acts sporadically and not as part of an organized armed group is a 
novel concept. Watkin, for example, has criticized the Interpretive Guidance on the grounds that 
its ‘continuous combat function’ introduces a novel category of combatant quite apart from 
civilians and qualified belligerents,220 while providing few workable criteria to distinguish this 
category of combatant.221 He states that in “effectively creating a third category of participant in 
armed conflict,” and one that is difficult to explain or justify, it represents a departure from the 
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international law, and from the ICRC’s previous position on the protection of irregular 
fighters.222  
The ICRC appreciates the difficulties inherent in applying these standards. The 
Interpretive Guidance states: 
In operational reality, it would be impossible to determine with a sufficient degree of 
reliability whether civilians not currently preparing or executing a hostile act have 
previously done so on a persistent recurrent basis and whether they have the continued 
intent to do so again.223 
Individuals’ past actions, and subjective intentions as to future behavior, are neither readily 
observable nor objectively-determined criteria, and it is for this reason that they ought not to form 
part of the criteria for when an individual has lost their immunity from attack. Moreover, the 
ICRC’s concept of ‘continuous combat function’ only applies in non-international armed 
conflicts, thus sowing further confusion; the treatment of irregular fighters has certainly caused 
significant controversy in international armed conflicts, and it is difficult to understand why 
states would not wish to apply these more permissive rules there as well, or how states could 
apply different rules in a mixed conflict.224  
The ICRC’s concept of ‘continuous combat function’ shares some similarities with 
standard Rules of Engagement that define the targeting of declared hostile forces. While both 
concepts are attempting to capture a definition of when an individual can be said to be part of an 
organized militant or insurgent group, recall that any individual or group can be declared a hostile 
force225 - and not merely organized armed groups - making this a much more permissive and 
flexible basis for targeting. For these reasons, two of the American representatives at the expert 
process preferred the U.S.’s own rules over the ICRC’s criteria.226 The ICRC’s expert process 
therefore represents a lost opportunity to clarify the law in this area, and achieve widespread 
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acceptance on norms that best protect civilians.227   
 
3.2.2 Interpretive Guidance Criteria for Civilian Direct Participation 
 For those civilians who do not perform a continuous combat function on behalf of an 
organized armed group but who nevertheless participate directly in hostilities, the ICRC has 
generated several criteria for when they have lost their immunity from attack. These standards, 
too, suffer from conceptual and operational flaws. Unlike those who perform a continuous 
combat function, the Interpretive Guidance states, “the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
does not refer to a person’s status, function, or affiliation, but to his or her engagement in specific 
hostile acts.”228 The ICRC has proposed certain limiting criteria to determining when civilian 
direct participation forfeits the immunity normally enjoyed by civilians. There must be a certain 
threshold of harm, there must be direct causation between the act and that harm, and there must 
be a belligerent nexus, each of which will be discussed in turn.  
 
3.2.2.1 Threshold of Harm 
 In order to constitute a hostile act, the act must reach a threshold of harm, which the ICRC 
defines as follows: 
In order to reach the required threshold of harm, a specific act must be likely to adversely 
affect the military operations of a party to an armed conflict, or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.229 
The first criteria, that an act would be sufficient to forfeit the individual’s life if it would 
adversely affect the military operations of a party to an armed conflict, renders the ICRC’s notion 
of civilian direct participation over-inclusive, as does the permission to target civilian participants 
who merely threaten objects and property. The ICRC recognizes that this would include a 
number of unarmed activities, such as those “restricting or disturbing deployments, logistics and 
communication.”230 This also includes any activities that would deny the military “the use of 
certain objects, equipment, and territory,” including disrupting computer networks and clearing 
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landmines and unexploded ordnance.231 Defining direct participation in terms of harm to military 
operations in this way captures many lawful and peaceful activities, including political 
expressions, protesting unlawful military activities, protesting detentions, expressing opinions 
through media, and protecting cultural and religious sites. Civilians might clear land and naval 
mines to protect their lives and secure their livelihood, and it would be wrongful and undesirable 
to use lethal force to prevent them from doing so.  
 The ICRC’s criteria could therefore lead to an untenable situation in which individuals 
could be held to be participating directly in hostilities for engaging in unarmed and lawful 
activities, as well as political expressions and acts of civil disobedience.  There are a number of 
organizations, for example, that are devoted to clearing land mines and destroying unexploded 
ordnance in conflict zones,232 and the ICRC has not provided any justification as to why such acts 
would not constitute direct participation as they have defined it. In one case in the United 
Kingdom, a group of anti-war activists attempted to sabotage - and therefore deny to the military 
the use of - certain equipment at a military base in Fairfield, Gloucestershire, that was to be used 
in the course of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.233 They raised the defense that their actions were 
necessary to prevent the commission of unlawful acts, i.e. murder and crimes of aggression by 
the British government.234 Although this defense failed, the activists were given only token 
sentences in the form of conditional discharges. The criteria as outlined in the Interpretive 
Guidance could be used by states to justify targeting activists engaged in similar political acts, 
and there is little in the Interpretive Guidance itself that would clearly prevent this.  
 While the participants at the expert process generally agreed that certain conduct has 
traditionally been excluded from the definition of civilian direct participation in hostilities - 
including “war-sustaining” activities such as civilians working in a munitions factory, civilians 
engaged in media or propaganda activities, political activities, as well as agricultural production 
and food preparation - there was disagreement concerning other, closely related activities.235 
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Michael Schmitt, who was present as one of the U.S.’s expert participants in the ICRC expert 
process, advocates for the inclusion of activities such as involvement in logistics, deployments, 
and communications; clearing mines; computer network attacks; collecting information; and 
activities that attempt to deny to a belligerent party the ability to target certain objects, equipment 
or territory – a category often termed ‘human shields’.236 In characterizing the above activities as 
civilian direct participation, Schmitt relies on the ICRC’s principle that it is not the nature or 
quantum of harm that determines participation, but the fact that the activity is intended to 
adversely affect the military operations of a party to the conflict.237 From this, Schmitt argues that 
human shields ought to constitute lawful targets of attack,238 and that the act of shielding is itself 
unlawful under international humanitarian law.239 Schmitt also takes issue with civilians who 
demand that troops be withdrawn, or that prisoners be released, stating that such activities have 
caused a great deal of difficulty for national militaries waging counterinsurgent campaigns in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel.240 Schmitt has also raised the issue of food production, using the 
example of an army cook who may lawfully be attacked at all times, whereas “his or her 
counterpart in an organized armed group may be attacked only if he or she directly participates 
and then only for such time as the participation occurs.”241 Schmitt therefore argues that to 
exclude these criteria would confer greater protection upon irregular fighters than that afforded to 
regular armed forces.242 Of course, qualified belligerents receive a number of privileges in return 
for their liability to be attacked, including immunity from prosecution for acts constituting their 
belligerency as well as prisoner of war treatment if captured; therefore, they are not placed on an 
equal legal footing with unqualified belligerents.  International humanitarian law, he states, 
involves a delicate balance between military necessity and humanity, and that the ICRC “must 
remain sensitive to the interests of states in conducting warfare efficiently.”243 Here, he states that 
the ICRC’s interpretations “skew the balance towards humanity”, and “exaggerate humanitarian 
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considerations at the expense of military necessity.”244 
 There is therefore much dispute over which activities constitute direct participation in 
hostilities, and the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance did not provide a principled approach as to why 
certain activities ought to be included or excluded. For example, the dangers of characterizing 
human shields as combatants in an armed conflict who are liable to be attacked is illustrated by 
one example from the initial U.S. invasion of Iraq. Not only are shielding activities often 
lawful,245 as well as non-violent, forms of political expression, but killing those who participate 
in these activities can have serious negative consequences for an army’s counterinsurgency 
efforts. Ahmed Abu Ali related to journalist Mark Kukis the story of a human shield he 
participated in in March 2003 during the U.S. forces’ invasion of Karbala. Rumors that U.S. 
forces might enter the shrine of Imam Hussein had caused a large sit-in to take place in front of 
the shrine, with protesters passing out food and water.246 Abu Ali and a local cleric spoke to a 
U.S. officer, asking him not to enter the shrine, as it was considered a holy place for them. The 
U.S. officer informed them that they suspected the shrine of being used as a base for militant 
groups, and they proceeded to advance a tank with a raised gun upon the shrine.247 This prompted 
a large human shield to form around the shrine, and U.S. forces eventually withdrew the tank.248 
Abu Ali asks, “What kind of people would force a standoff with unarmed civilians? How could 
they insult our dignity by threatening such a holy place right in front of us? We are human beings 
after all. Aren’t we?”249 In this case, the human shields were protecting a cultural and religious 
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site that would normally be protected from attack under international humanitarian law.250 
Activities such as forming human shields or calling for the release of prisoners or the withdrawal 
of troops are essentially political activities, and may very often be directed towards protesting 
military activities that are themselves unlawful. Not only would it be a significant blow to the 
international humanitarian law to subject persons engaged in non-violent or lawful activities to 
lethal force, but such actions are also likely to cause harm to a party’s war effort. In this case, 
Abu Ali, who was initially very supportive of the U.S. invasion, joined the Al-Mahdi militia and 
participated in the insurgency as a result of this incident.251  
 Gathering information or targeting computer networks also fall under the category of “war 
sustaining” activities that do not necessarily pose an imminent threat of wrongful death or serious 
bodily harm. In fact, many of the activities raised by Schmitt are amenable to be characterized as 
political in nature and, even when they stand in the way of military authorities achieving their 
objectives, they are often legitimate and worthy of protection under human rights laws 
guaranteeing freedom of expression. Clearing mines, engaging in non-violent forms of protest, 
and forming human shields might all fall under the category of protected acts of expression. 
Civilians engaged in agriculture and food production, although often crucial to a war effort, are 
also protected under existing international humanitarian laws.252 The cook for a militant fighter 
may well be the fighter’s female family members, who are performing the cooking inside of a 
civilian home as part of their daily activities. If the above views were to prevail, civilians and 
family members providing such supporting services would thereby render themselves liable to be 
attacked. Under the Geneva Conventions, activities that do violate the law may be prosecuted in 
                                                
250 Article 52 of Protocol I, supra note 155, protects civilian objects from attack, defines legitimate military 
objectives, and provides that, in case of doubt, objects are presumed to be civilian objects. Article 53(a) protects 
from attack “historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage 
of peoples.” Unlike Article 52, Article 53 provides no exception to this rule when such objects are used for a military 
purpose. Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute, supra Chapter One at note 30, criminalizes the act of “Intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military 
objectives.” The shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala would certainly be considered an historic monument, as well as 
a cultural and religious site. 
251 Voices from Iraq, supra note 246 at 11.  
252 Protocol I, supra note 155, at Article 54(2), states that it is “prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render 
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the 
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the 
specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, 
whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.”  
  168 
the ordinary manner under domestic laws in force, or under the laws of an occupying power, and 
do not justify the use of lethal force.253 On the other hand, one does not normally forfeit one’s life 
by performing lawful activities. This is consistent with ordinary domestic laws concerning the 
necessity to use defensive force, as well as the international laws of war. 
 The situation is even more serious for humanitarian and relief organizations, who have long 
required special protection under the international law from states who have tended to view their 
activities as providing support for insurgent and rebel groups. Jean Pictet noted that this was 
already a long-standing issue in the 1958 Commentary, when he states that governmental 
authorities had tended to “look upon relief given by the Red Cross to war victims on the other 
side as indirect aid to guilty parties.”254 This had certainly been the case during the Franco-
Prussian War, one of the first armed conflicts in which the Red Cross participated. Article 5 of 
the First Geneva Convention gave immunity to those entitled to wear the distinctive Red Cross 
armband, but also provided that all “the inhabitants of the country who bring help to the wounded 
shall remain free… any wounded combatant receiving shelter and care in a house shall ensure its 
protection.” Boissier states that villages facing capitulation to the advancing Prussian forces 
distributed the armbands “with boundless prodigality.”255 Many ordinary civilians, “who cared 
for, or who wanted to appear to care for the wounded decorated themselves with an armband of 
their own making… Those who wore it simply to avoid active service were so numerous that 
they were called ‘francs-fileurs’.”256 This demonstrates a strong desire on the part of civilians to 
do what they feel is necessary to preserve their immunity from being attacked by advancing 
forces. For their part, the Prussians accused many persons who claimed neutrality under the 
auspices of the Red Cross as being involved in espionage, combat, and looting.257 As a result, 
German forces afforded little deference to those sporting the white flag of truce or even the Red 
Cross, who often suffered “the most regrettable consequences” thereby.258 This attitude can also 
be seen in present-day conflicts. For example, al-Nusra Front rebels in Syria’s civil war attacked 
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a group of peacekeepers from the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force at a border 
checkpoint in the Golan Heights in August 2014 because they were thought to be colluding with 
the Syrian government.259 At about the same time, the neutrality of several facilities in Gaza run 
by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was violated when Hamas placed 
weapons in evacuated schools. This was followed by attacks by Israel on several UNRWA 
schools on the grounds that UNRWA was providing material support to insurgents, killing 
dozens of civilians and eleven UN employees, and deepening long-standing tensions between 
Israel and UNRWA.260 On 3 October 2015, U.S. forces bombed a hospital in Kunduz, 
Afghanistan being operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), killing 42 and injuring 37 staff 
and patients. The U.S. has been inconsistent in its explanations for the incident, initially stating 
that it had come under fire, and Representative Duncan Hunter of the House Armed Services 
Committee has stated that he received reports that the hospital was attacked because local Afghan 
forces accused it of having been overrun by Taliban militia.261 Later that month, air strikes in 
Yemen carried out by the Saudi-led coalition destroyed another MSF-run hospital in the Haydan 
District in the Saada Province, leaving an area of 200,000 people without access to medical 
care.262 Eva Wortel has documented a number of instances since the end of World War II when 
the Red Cross has been accused of aiding and abetting a belligerent party by providing shelter 
and relief to civilians, for example, by providing aid during the famine in Biafra during the 
Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970),263 providing aid to Rwandan refugees in Zaire after the 1994 
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genocide,264 as well as providing humanitarian relief to civilians in the recent conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.265 There is therefore a very real - and long-recognized - danger that individuals 
working for human rights and relief agencies will be considered as engaging in activities “likely 
to adversely affect the military operations of a party to an armed conflict,” and they may be and 
have been targeted on that basis. The criteria outlined by the ICRC in the Interpretive Guidance 
provide no workable criteria for preventing this, and they run counter to the earlier position of the 
Red Cross when they were negotiating the final text of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
 
3.2.2.2 Direct Causation 
 The ICRC has also proposed that the hostile act must be such as to directly cause the harm 
envisioned. The ICRC defines direct causation as follows: 
In order for the requirement of direct causation to be satisfied, there must be a direct causal 
link between a specific act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a 
coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.266 
For the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance, the directness of civilians’ participation in hostilities 
is an important dividing line, for it distinguishes civilians who are participating only indirectly, 
and therefore would not lose their immunity from attack.267 The ICRC also stated that ‘directness’ 
means that the envisioned harm should be brought about in a single causal step.268 Here, the 
ICRC is responding to risk, to actions that appear likely to cause harm, but instead of using the 
concepts proposed herein, of clear and convincing evidence, and imminence of harm, they have 
chosen instead to use the standard of a single causal step. The ICRC intended that this would 
exclude indirect war-supporting activities, such as the provision of supplies, funding, and 
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financial services.269 The ICRC found that recruiters and financiers of militant or terrorist groups 
could not be targeted, nor could those who were attending at training camps, on the grounds that 
these activities would not cause harm directly.270 The design, production and transport of 
weapons would also be excluded, unless “carried out as an integral part of a specific military 
operation designed to cause the required threshold of harm.”271 One of the more contentious 
examples raised was that of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The ICRC found that making 
and storing IEDs would not directly cause harm, unless part of a specific military operation, but 
that planning to use them would.272 It is difficult to imagine that armed forces fighting insurgent 
groups would not view the production and transport of weapons as part of a “specific military 
operation” against them, and/or as evidence of planning to use such devices, and would therefore 
claim the right to target such persons. Such criteria are therefore unlikely to be adopted in 
practice, and would not adequately protect civilians who are merely suspected of engaging in the 
above activities.  
 The ICRC also permits the targeting of civilians who are not participating in hostilities on 
the basis that such killings may constitute proportional, and therefore permissible, collateral 
damage. For example, the ICRC noted that voluntary human shields could be targeted, stating, 
“the presence of voluntary human shields often has no adverse impact on the capacity of the 
attacker to identify and destroy the shielded military objective.”273 Another example raised in the 
Interpretive Guidance is that of a civilian driver of an ammunition truck. The ICRC stated that, 
while the truck itself is a legitimate target of attack, the civilian driver is not.274 However, the 
ICRC further stated that, as with human shields, the loss of the civilian’s life could be factored 
into to an assessment of proportionality vis à vis the military advantage to be gained.275 The 
ICRC provided no guidance as to how the proportionality calculus ought to be carried out, as 
such decisions would be left to the discretion of military authorities. If civilians may not be killed 
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as direct participants, but may be killed on grounds of proportionality, then there seems little in 
this definition that would actually protect civilians when such circumstances arise during combat 
operations.  
 
3.2.2.3 Belligerent Nexus 
 Finally, the ICRC stated that there must be a belligerent nexus to the armed conflict, which 
the ICRC defines as follows: 
In order to meet the requirement of belligerent nexus, an act must be specifically designed to 
directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another.276 
This is similar to the requirement, above, that the act must be such as to cause harm to the 
military operations of a party to the conflict. It may have been introduced to protect activities that 
are neutral, or humanitarian in nature, and so are not intended to support one party to the 
detriment of the other. As discussed above, relying on parties’ subjective determinations as to the 
neutrality and intentions of civilians and humanitarian relief organizations is not sufficient to 
ensure that their activities will not be interpreted as aid to guilty parties, or that they will not be 
subject to attack. The ICRC further states that actual culpability is not required; even children and 
civilians forced to participate would lose their protection against direct attack if they engaged in 
such an activity.277 Moreover, the ICRC states that parties may always exercise their rights of 
self-defense, even against acts that lack a belligerent nexus. The ICRC states that the use of force 
in such circumstances “must comply with the standards of law enforcement or individual self-
defense,”278 but without specifying what those standards are. The permissibility of lethal force in 
self-defense overrides the above prohibitions the ICRC has imposed on targeting civilians. If 
states may use lethal force in self-defense against civilians, would they not use this as a 
justification in preference to the ICRC’s criteria for civilian direct participation? Indeed, standard 
Rules of Engagement appear to permit precisely this, and therefore any workable standard for 
civilian immunity should address the issue of self-defense in specifying when persons have lost 
their immunity from attack. 
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3.2.2.4 The Principle of Minimal Harm 
Section IX of the Interpretive Guidance lays out the ICRC’s standards with respect to the 
principle of minimal harm, which states that armies must avoid superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering,279 and that military necessity must be balanced by considerations of humanity.280 If the 
above criteria were to be interpreted faithfully in this light, then this would go a long way 
towards minimizing abuses of the targeting criteria by military authorities, both in terms of 
deciding who should be considered as a civilian participating directly in hostilities or a militant 
performing a continuous combat function, as well as in deciding when civilians who are not 
participating in hostilities can be killed as part of a proportionality assessment. On the other hand, 
without the principle of minimal harm to fetter military decision-making, the ICRC’s targeting 
criteria are capable of being applied in ways that facilitate abuses and mistaken killings of 
civilians who are not participating in hostilities.  
Section IX describes the principle of minimal harm in the following terms: 
The principle of military necessity is generally recognized to permit ‘only that degree and 
kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order 
to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission 
of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and 
resources.’281  
William Hays Parks, a long-time Judge Advocate and senior counsel with the U.S. Department of 
Defense, states that the requirement for the use of minimal force originated with Jean Pictet’s 
arguments at the 1978-1980 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects which produced the treaty of the same name.282 Parks argues that 
there is no precedent for such a rule in the international law, and that Pictet’s arguments did not 
receive serious consideration from government delegates at the Conference.283 Regarding their 
inclusion of Section IX, Parks states that the ICRC, lacking any combat experience, “gave little 
deference to the advice of its military experts,”284 who were “senior military lawyers from 
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Canada, Israel, United Kingdom, and the United States.”285  
In fact, there is greater precedent in international law for the general principle of minimal 
harm than Parks has acknowledged. As has been discussed in Chapter Two, the principle that 
those who are not harming ought not to be harmed was first espoused by von Martens as a 
customary rule of armed conflict in his Compendium on the Law of Nations; significantly, the 
reason given for this is that excess harm is not necessary to achieve the legitimate ends of the 
war.286 This principle is more clearly defined in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which 
states: 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the 
greatest possible number of men; That this object would be exceeded by the employment of 
arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity.287  
Moreover, this principle is affirmed in a number of legal treatises on the laws of armed conflict 
that appeared throughout the nineteenth century,288 including one written by a U.S Judge 
Advocate General.289 In establishing this principle, the ICRC cited its present inclusion in a 
number of national military manuals, including the United Kingdom,290 NATO,291 France,292 
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Germany,293 Switzerland,294 and the United States itself.295  
Although Section IX does not deal in depth with escalation of force criteria that are now 
commonly part of Rules of Engagement, Parks states that the use of force continuum is not 
required for law enforcement officers even in peacetime, and that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
imposed only a reasonableness standard that trusts “individual police officers to use their 
discretion in applying broad rules to particular circumstances.”296 As discussed in Chapter One, 
domestic courts are often deferential to the subjective discretion of police officers when they use 
lethal force;297 this does not serve to protect innocent persons from being killed mistakenly in 
self-defense, nor does it solve the political and security problems that result when innocent 
civilians are mistakenly killed.  
Instead of fettering military discretion by the principle of minimal harm, Parks argues in 
favour of affording a large measure of discretion to military personnel to make decisions 
concerning direct participation in hostilities. Parks states that the laws of war belong to 
governments, and that they are “entrusted in large measure to their respective battlefield 
commanders.”298 He also argues that nations have “declined to impose treaty restrictions on 
battlefield commanders or individual soldiers with respect to the application of force against 
enemy combatants or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.”299 He rejects a law enforcement 
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approach to insurgencies, and instead advocates for a military-centred approach to threats based 
upon standard Rules of Engagement, as when a “soldier in an armed conflict… will see what may 
be a threat, identify it as a threat, process that information, and respond according to his or her 
training and the rules of engagement.”300 He asserts an unrestricted right on the part of qualified 
belligerents to use force, stating that “the historic consequence of combat is that combatants 
lawfully may kill their enemies and are at risk of being killed by them.”301 This argument, 
however fails to address the issue which has long been the subject of contention, namely how 
does a soldier in an armed conflict accurately distinguish who is the enemy, and avoid the 
unnecessary killing of civilians who pose no threat. He closes with the point made by Grotius that 
“[a]ccording to the law of nations, anyone who is an enemy may be attacked anywhere.”302 These 
comments harken back to the pre-modern law of Grotius and Vattel that would permit an 
unrestricted use of force against an enemy population, but without their extensive stipulations 
regarding the justice of the jus ad bellum. 
 
3.2.3 Further Criticisms of the Interpretive Guidance 
There were a number of further criticisms raised of the targeting criteria devised by the 
ICRC in the Interpretive Guidance. Commentators have largely characterized the debate as one 
in which humanitarian principles are pitted against the discretion of military authorities, and in a 
special issue of the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics devoted to the Interpretive 
Guidance, the editors explicitly characterized the debate in these terms. Goodman and Jinks state 
that in the struggle to define civilian direct participation, humanitarian and human rights interests 
on the one hand must be balanced against the interests of “preserving discretion or freedom of 
action for military planners and personnel making targeting decisions on the battlefield” and the 
“pragmatic and tactical realities of military operations,” on the other.303  
 Michael Schmitt, a long-time judge advocate and now director of the Stockton Center for 
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the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College, was one of the U.S. 
representatives at the expert process, and one of the experts who disavowed his connection with 
the Interpretive Guidance. Schmitt, too, criticizes the ICRC for taking a case-by-case approach 
rather than a principled approach to direct participation, focusing on whether a series of specified 
acts would constitute direct participation.304 He states that, as there is no authoritative guidance in 
international law as to which activities would classify as direct participation in hostilities, the 
“analysis has tended to be case-by-case and based upon vague and somewhat insubstantial 
criteria.”305   
William Hays Parks stated that “[m]ost experts’ comments, and particularly those of the 
military experts, were strongly critical”306 of the ICRC’s restrictive targeting criteria, particularly 
the ICRC’s declaration in Section IX that the degree of force permitted be no more than what is 
required to meet legitimate military objectives.307 Parks was also one of the military experts who 
participated in the expert process and asked that his name be removed from the Interpretive 
Guidance.308 Some of Parks’ objections to the expert process centre on the heavy-handed manner 
in which the ICRC introduced Section IX near the end of the expert process without informing or 
consulting the experts participating in the process,309 a procedural failure that is a further 
consequence of the non-transparent way in which the ICRC and the T.M.C. Asser Institute 
conducted the expert process.   
 The Interpretive Guidance characterization of civilian direct participation also provoked 
much discussion in the wider academic community, resulting in the subsequent publication of an 
edited volume of essays entitled New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric 
Warfare.310 Banks et al. argue that the nature of warfare is changing to include more non-state 
participants, and therefore the laws of war ought to be modernized to facilitate the targeting of 
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(2006) H.C.J. 769/02, 46 I.L.M. 375 at 394 (2007) [hereinafter Public Committee Against Torture]. 
306 No Mandate, supra note 282 at 784.  
307 Ibid.  
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. at 783.  
310 William C. Banks, ed., New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011) [hereinafter New Battlefields/Old Laws]. 
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suspected civilian participants. As Jensen states, the “modernised view” of asymmetrical warfare 
“must allow for the targeting of members of organized groups engaged in hostilities with military 
forces, including those who may not actually be pulling the trigger or setting off the explosive but 
still play an intricate supporting role.”311 Jensen argues that the ICRC concept of ‘continuous 
combat function’ places onerous burdens on states and unduly limits their targeting decisions. He 
argues that requiring that persons be habitually performing a continuous combat function before 
they can be continuously targeted would protect civilians engaged in non-combatant supporting 
activities, including a number of activities the ICRC has excluded from civilian direct 
participation, including “recruiters, trainers, financiers, propagandists.”312 Jensen argues that 
civilians take a direct part in hostilities by engaging in these activities, including when they train, 
act as observers, supply information to fighters, store weapons, and act as recruiters and 
financiers.313 Civilian participants in his view would also include those persons providing supply 
and logistical services.314  
 Daphné Richemond-Barak, supporting Jensen’s views, also argues in favour of new laws 
for new battlefields. She states that “the modern battlefield is different from that contemplated by 
the Geneva Conventions,” as it “features an array of non-state participants playing central roles in 
hostilities.”315 However, as has been discussed in Chapter Two, non-state actors have played key 
roles in wars throughout the modern period, including in international as well as non-
international armed conflicts, and it is precisely this problem to which the modern laws of war 
were responding. William Banks, who advocates for a freer hand in permitting states and their 
military authorities to target non-state actors in war, asks “whether the laws of war should be 
made available in any respect, to protect an enemy that is not deserving of protection?”316 He 
queries whether there might be “legitimate and illegitimate nonstate entities for humanitarian law 
                                                
311 Eric T. Jensen, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” in New Battlefields/Old Laws, ibid., 85 at 86 [hereinafter 
Direct Participation].  
312 Ibid. at 98.  
313 Ibid. at 102.  
314 Ibid. at 103.  
315 Daphné Richemond-Barak, “Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity” in New 
Battlefields/Old Laws, supra note 310, 105 at 108.  
316 William C. Banks, “Towards an Adaptive Humanitarian Law: New Norms for New Battlefields” in New 
Battlefields/Old Laws, supra note 310, 1 at 9.  
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purposes?”317 Accomplishing this is in essence the effect of standard Rules of Engagement: 
undesirable activities can be identified and then punished on grounds of ‘self-defense’, while 
states can declare any prohibited group or organization as hostile and then target them 
unrestrictedly – these are tactics that states have often used in the past, and whose legality has 
often been rejected by international humanitarian law instruments.318  These are new laws for old 
battlefields, and ones whose effects are to enlarge the prerogatives of the state, freeing them from 
the constraints of existing laws, while permitting them to claim the moral high ground by 
reinterpreting the law to authorize these killings.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 The counterinsurgency doctrines and Rules of Engagement recently adopted by an 
increasing number of military authorities restructure the traditional chain of command, and 
devolve targeting decisions onto front-line combat soldiers. Loosening these criteria, while also 
empowering individual fighters to make these determinations on an ad hoc basis in a dangerous, 
complex, and uncertain environment has significantly impacted the ways in which civilians are 
distinguished from qualified belligerents. It has largely replaced the long-standing norm that 
civilians are immune from attack so long and for such time as they refrain from direct 
participation in hostilities with norms that permit the killing of civilians who are suspected of 
posing a threat to security forces, or who are suspected of belonging to, or even merely 
supporting, rebel or insurgent groups. In the main, the ICRC validated many of these practices in 
its Interpretive Guidance. As a consequence, many of the reforms that the ICRC did attempt to 
devise to protect civilians against some of the abuses resulting from these practices are likely to 
be overridden by the discretionary powers inherent in intent-based command control, and the 
targeting procedures contained in standard Rules of Engagement.   
 Many of the changes to the international humanitarian law that were accomplished from the 
1860’s until the adoption of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, had as 
their goal the protection of the civilian population from the violence of war and occupation, and 
the encouragement of restraint on the part of military forces. Many of the most egregious 
                                                
317 Ibid. at 13.  
318 Supra notes 5, 7.  
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practices that armies had used against civilian populations were outlawed over the course of the 
century, including reprisals, collective punishments, the targeting of ‘disloyal’ civilians and 
suspected sympathizers, and civilian property and infrastructure. All of these techniques had been 
used during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to maintain order among the civilian 
population by spreading terror. In many ways, the new doctrines found in standing Rules of 
Engagement, escalation of force procedures, and the targeted killing of ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’ accomplish many of the same goals as did these formerly outlawed practices. The 
ICRC in its expert process has failed to appreciate the negative consequences of this for civilian 
populations. At the same time, the manner in which the ICRC conducted its expert process 
demonstrates a shift away from the transparency and inclusivity that the ICRC had promoted 
during the diplomatic conferences of the twentieth century, and the rights of civilian populations 
and resistance movements that had been validated and protected as a result of those conferences.  
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Chapter Four: Case Studies 
 
[Guerilla] operations consist chiefly in the killing of picket guards and sentinels, in the 
assassination of isolated individuals or detachments. If captured, they are treated with great 
severity, the punishment in any case being proportioned to the offence committed…1 The task 
is not one of serious or particular difficulty.2 
~George B. Davis on guerrilla operations at checkpoints, 1900.  
 
4.0 Introduction  
This Chapter illustrates the U.S. military’s application of use of force criteria in intent-
based orders and standing Rules of Engagement, and compares them to the ICRC’s definition of 
civilian direct participation in hostilities, and finally to the definition of civilian participation 
based upon wrongful aggression provided in Chapter One. The examples have been drawn from 
recent U.S. practices, primarily involving the U.S. and Coalition forces’ counterinsurgency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several U.S. allies have adopted many of these practices and 
principles into their own military doctrine.3 This helps to internationalize the acceptance of the 
norms embodied in modern counterinsurgency doctrine and standard Rules of Engagement. In 
each of the cases studied below, the U.S. has justified its practices as being permissible incidents 
of war, on the grounds that they are in accordance with standard Rules of Engagement and the 
rules regarding self-defense reflected therein, despite the fact that soldiers deliberately killed 
civilians whom it is not clear were in fact participating directly in hostilities.  
The first case study will examine escalation of force incidents at traffic checkpoints. 
Escalation of force incidents were one of the most commonly-used tactics employed by Coalition 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,4 and their importance for counterinsurgent operations is likely to 
                                                
1 George B. Davis, The Elements of International Law with an Account of its Origin, Sources and Historical 
Development (New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1900) at 292.  
2 Ibid. at 293.  
3 See: supra Chapter Three at ss. 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.2.1. 
4 According to the incident reports in the Iraq War Logs there were 12,578 escalation of force incidents reported in 
Iraq from January 1st 2004 to December 31st 2009, at https://www.wikileaks.org/irq/ (accessed 26 May 2015). In 
Afghanistan, there were 2271 escalation of force incidents reported between 2004 and 2010, at 
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grow, making them an important case for further study. Soldiers at checkpoints are often 
confronted with vehicles that do not respond to warnings, and soldiers must make very rapid 
decisions as to whether or not to employ lethal force against a vehicle and its occupants. Soldiers 
make these decisions in a permissive climate that seeks to minimize risks to soldiers, even if 
civilians are deliberately targeted without an adequate assessment of their status as belligerents, 
or the actual risks they pose.  
The second case study examines the use of status-based criteria for civilian direct 
participation in hostilities during the 2004 Coalition operations against the city of Fallujah, Iraq. 
The 2004 Operations Vigilant Resolve and Phantom Fury comprised some of the most 
widespread hostilities during the Coalition campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan. This presents an 
opportunity to examine how these doctrines might function during a more conventional “hot” 
theatre of hostilities, as opposed to isolated escalation of force incidents, which consist of 
widespread but small-scale encounters with the local civilian population. During Operation 
Phantom Fury, Coalition forces cordoned virtually the entire adult male population within the 
city, and did not permit them to leave before launching the assault. They also engaged in other 
abusive practices, including enforcing curfews and other military orders through lethal force, and 
preemptively bulldozing homes suspected of containing insurgents. Operation Phantom Fury 
exemplifies the widespread dangers posed to civilian populations if inadequate concepts of 
civilian direct participation are used during large-scale conventional military operations.  
The third and fourth case studies examine the practice of declaring forces hostile, and the 
legal doctrine of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ that the U.S. has developed to justify the detention 
and targeting practices that follow from this. The third case study concerns the U.S. classification 
of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility as ‘unlawful enemy combatants.’ This 
status-based concept of civilian direct participation in hostilities was instrumental in the U.S. 
government’s successful bid to treat the detainees outside of the scope of the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions. The treatment of the Afghan detainees also evidences the desuetude of the 
concept of a levée en masse, which permits the inhabitants of an invaded territory to take up arms 
in self-defense, without having to meet the organizational requirements of belligerent 
qualification. In order to avoid addressing the issue of whether the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
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were entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention, or 
whether they were civilians deserving of protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the 
U.S. avoided their obligation to hold Article 5 Tribunal hearings to determine the belligerent 
status of the detainees.5 This disuse of the procedures set down in the international law for 
determining the belligerent status of detainees represents a move away from the established legal 
framework, and towards determining belligerent status in ways that are discretionary and 
arbitrary. A preoccupation with intelligence-gathering has also prompted the U.S. to shift away 
from applying the Geneva Conventions, which place restrictions on interrogations and mandates 
rights of communication for detainees. Many of the detainee abuses that took place in connection 
with the U.S. government treatment of detainees at this time, and the legal doctrines they 
developed concerning the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, have now become normalized by the 
U.S. in standard operating procedures, including such practices as indefinite detentions, 
renditions, and the use of secret detention facilities. If these new status-based determinations of 
belligerency, and the practices concerning detainee treatment which accompany them, are to gain 
widespread acceptance, then this poses a systemic threat to the Geneva system of laws laid down 
at the end of World War II.  
The fourth case study of the U.S.’s targeted killing program is an instructive example with 
which to conclude this dissertation, as the controversies over its legal interpretation may greatly 
impact the future development of the principle of distinction and the law of belligerent 
qualification. The targeted killing program uses a status-based concept of ‘civilian direct 
participation in hostilities’, in which status is determined by the use of behavioral or ‘signature 
criteria’, which are particularly liable to be abused. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
program also reverses the presumption of civilian immunity. Many of the legal justifications that 
the U.S. government has proffered for the program are based upon legal doctrines developed to 
govern the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  
                                                
5 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 at Article 5 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention states that, “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having 
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerate 
in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.” Such competent tribunals to determine belligerent status shall hereinafter be 
referred to as “Article 5 Tribunals.”  
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When U.S. forces are applying their standard Rules of Engagement in combat situations, 
they are essentially engaged in identifying targets for the use of force, either because the target is 
performing a hostile act, manifesting a hostile intent, or is a member of a force declared as 
hostile. This identification of possible targets is defined by NATO as the “process of attaining an 
accurate characterization of a detected entity by any act or means so that high-confidence real-
time decisions, including weapons engagement, can be made.”6 The following case studies will 
illustrate that U.S. and NATO forces did not make accurate characterizations, and this is a 
consequence of administrative failures in formulating and enforcing adequate defensive criteria in 
standard Rules of Engagement. Standard Rules of Engagement not only permit soldiers wide 
discretion to make these decisions – with perhaps a high degree of confidence, if not a high 
degree of accuracy – in a climate in which there is little oversight over the application of Rules of 
Engagement and escalation of force rules, and little accountability for mistaken killings. 
 
4.1 Case Study I: Escalation of Force Incidents & Preemptive Killings  
Checkpoint shootings are a class of escalation of force incidents in which U.S. soldiers 
staffing a checkpoint observe suspicious behavior, and must make a very rapid decision as to 
whether and how far to employ force to neutralize a potential threat. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, civilians who fail to respond to verbal warnings can be and are targeted under present-day 
Rules of Engagement, and this view has also been promoted by the International Humanitarian 
Law Institute of Sanremo in their ROE Handbook.7 The U.S. and the drafters of the ROE 
Handbook have interpreted this behavior as manifesting a hostile intent, and so have permitted 
lethal force against civilians on these grounds. This is exemplified by the nature of many 
checkpoint shootings in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which U.S. forces killed civilians who were 
later found to have been innocent of posing any hostile intent, but who had failed to heed verbal 
warnings and instructions. 
Prior to the early 1990s, when the U.S. first employed standard Rules of Engagement 
                                                
6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (2008) at p. 2-I-1.  
7 Dennis Mandsager, Alan Cole, Phillip Drew, and Rob McLaughlin, Rules of Engagement Handbook (San Remo: 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2009) [hereinafter ROE Handbook], available at: 
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b0d0f70-bb07-48f2-af0a-7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook 
(accessed 16 January 2013) at 22-3. See: supra Chapter Three at note 161 and accompanying text. 
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during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, there are very few examples of escalation of force 
incidents being adjudicated in the international arena. Most of these incidents involve escalation 
of force incidents at border crossings, and aerial intrusions into a nation’s airspace.  A review of 
these incidents demonstrates that the killing of civilians in escalation of force incidents was 
generally rejected. One arbitration case brought in 1926 by Mexico against the United States 
found that U.S. border guards had acted improperly in firing on a raft of Mexican civilians 
attempting to cross the Rio Grande from U.S. back into Mexican territory, and who had failed to 
heed warning shots; in this incident, U.S. border guards shot and killed a young girl.8 The 
General Claims Commission held that “Authoritative writers in the field of domestic law in 
different countries and authoritative awards have emphasized that human life may not be taken 
either for prevention or for repression, unless in case of extreme necessity.”9 The Commission 
found that the act of firing is always dangerous, and that “it should not be indulged in whenever 
other practicable ways of preventing or repressing the delinquency might be available.”10 The use 
of lethal force was rejected in this case, in circumstances remarkably similar to many of the 
checkpoint shootings that Coalition forces undertook in Iraq and Afghanistan. This decision is 
also consistent with the requirement for the use of minimal force,11 and this is what escalation of 
force rules can accomplish, if they are used and enforced properly.  
Other early escalation of force incidents in the international arena involved aerial intrusions 
by civilian aircraft. In these incidents, as well, the use of lethal force was generally rejected. For 
example, on 29 April 1952, a French airliner was shot down by Soviet fighter planes over East 
Berlin; the Allied High Commissioners in Germany stated that it was entirely unacceptable to fire 
upon a civilian aircraft, even by way of warning shots when the aircraft ignored verbal and 
physical commands to land.12 Again, on 27 July 1955, when an Israeli passenger aircraft was shot 
down over Bulgarian airspace, briefs before the International Court of Justice submitted by Israel, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom all claimed that force could not be used under any 
                                                
8 Garcia Case (Mexico v. United States), 4 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 119 (1926) at 119. 
9 Ibid. at 121.  
10 Ibid.  
11 The Police Executive Research Forum, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Use of Force Review: Cases and 
Policies (Washington, D.C.: The Police Executive Research Forum, 2013 at 7. See also: supra Chapter One at note 
184 and accompanying text. 
12 John T. Phelps II, “Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time of Peace” (1985) 107 Mil. L.R. 256 at 
277 [hereinafter Aerial Intrusions].  
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circumstances against a civilian aircraft that ignored warnings to land; a remedy through 
diplomatic channels was urged as the appropriate response to an aerial incursion.13  
The above examples concern peacetime incidents, but on 21 February 1973 during the Yom 
Kippur War (1973), Israeli forces shot down a Libyan airliner over the Sinai Peninsula after using 
escalation of force criteria.14 Israeli forces stated that they had signaled to the plane to land by 
dipping their wings, but had been ignored.15 Given the hostile situation, Phelps states that it was 
not unreasonable to suspect that the Libyan government would use a civilian airliner for a hostile 
act, yet the government of Israel’s claims that its use of force was justified on grounds of security 
was not accepted by the International Civil Aviation Organization,16 or the United States.17 
Phelps states that while overflown states have often sought to justify the use of lethal force after 
aircraft failed to heed instructions to land, this rationale has always been rejected by a majority of 
nations as unacceptable.18 Therefore, as of 1985, the standard for the use of lethal force against 
civilians who were suspected of posing a security threat, even after the use of escalation of force 
procedures, was set very high.  
However, the acquittals in Mowris19 and Johnson20 during the campaign in Somalia set a 
much lower bar in land-based counterinsurgency operations for the use of lethal force against 
civilians who were suspected of posing a hostile intent for failing to heed warnings, or for 
attempting to flee. Recall that Mowris’ conviction for shooting a fleeing and unarmed civilian 
was overturned by his superiors on the grounds that it would have a “restraining influence” on 
soldiers’ responses to fire.21 Johnson concerned an incident in which U.S. soldiers killed a 13-
year old boy in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope because they suspected him of placing 
                                                
13 Aerial Incident of 27 July 1956, Israel v. Bulgaria; U.S. v. Bulgaria; U.K. v. Bulgaria, I.C.J. Pleadings 168 at 210-
11 (U.S. pleadings), and 368 (U.K. pleadings), which state that there can be no grounds for self-defense against a 
civilian aircraft, clearly identified as such. The case was dismissed due to Bulgaria’s refusal to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and no decision was rendered.  
14 Aerial Intrusions, supra note 12 at 288.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., citing 28 IACO Bull. 13 (July 1973). 
17 Ibid., citing 8 Dep’t. St. Bull 369 (1973).  
18 Ibid. at 293.  
19 United States v. Mowris, GCM No. 68 (Fort Carson 4th Infantry Division (Mech) 1 July 1993) [hereinafter 
Mowris]. Mowris claimed that he did not intend to hit the victim, but to fire the shot on the ground as a warning. 
20 United States v. Johnson, No. 458 27 1616 (I Marine Expeditionary Force, 16 March 1993) (Report of Article 
32(b) Investigating Officer) [hereinafter Johnson]. 
21 Mark S. Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering,” (Winter 1994) 
143 Mil. L. Rev. 1 at 66.  
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an incendiary device in their convoy as it was moving through the streets of Mogadishu. U.S. 
forces routinely instructed civilians to keep away from their vehicles.22 As Martins describes, 
“[s]uddenly, a boy carrying what appeared to be a small box in one hand, ignored the warnings 
and ran up behind the vehicle… Only after the boy had continued to ignore warnings and then 
had placed his arm in the back of the truck – but out of Sergeant Johnson’s reach – did Sergeant 
Johnson fire his weapon at the boy.”23 Soldiers had recently received reports of Somalis throwing 
grenades at coalition patrols, or handing grenades to children to use against coalition forces.24 No 
object was recovered from the vehicle, but the boy was killed.25 A preliminary hearing was 
convened to determine whether Sergeant Johnson should stand trial. The investigating officer 
concluded that Sergeant Johnson had acted appropriately and the convening authority dismissed 
all charges.26 The U.S. Army exonerated Johnson, like Mowris, because he was found to have 
properly followed the Rules of Engagement in order to assess the hostile intent of a civilian, and 
to have responded appropriately with lethal force. In this case, the impugned behavior involved 
the boy running after the soldiers’ convoy, and touching the back of the vehicle. This does not 
constitute clear and convincing evidence of an act of aggression, yet the soldiers genuinely feared 
for their lives. They did not consider whether further investigation, such as questioning or 
searching the boy, or lesser means than lethal force, would have revealed the absence of a threat. 
Had they done so, they would have averted a tragedy, and one that may well have eroded U.S.’s 
forces claims to moral authority among the local population.  
The application of standard Rules of Engagement during the campaign in Somalia laid the 
groundwork for how U.S. soldiers would later assess hostile intent at checkpoints in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The U.S. Army Rules of Engagement for traffic control operations found in the 
Traffic Control Operations Smartcard permit soldiers to use lethal force in self-defense when a 
person is committing a hostile act or exhibiting a hostile intent, and requires a graduated 
escalation of force, according to the step-ladder model.27 Escalation of force rules ask that 
                                                
22 Ibid. at 65. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Johnson, supra note 20.  
27 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Traffic Control Operations Smartcard,” GTA 90-01-005 (September 2010), 
available at: http://info.publicintelligence.net/CALL-TrafficControlPoints.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013). Traffic 
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soldiers first shout verbal warnings to halt, then show their weapon and demonstrate the intent to 
use it, then block access or detain, and then to fire warning shots before lethal force is used; 
however, these escalation of force criteria are to be used only when “time and circumstances 
permit.”28 The individual soldiers staffing the checkpoints make these judgments, often very 
quickly and under conditions of stress; accordingly, escalation of force rules are either not used, 
or are applied in a very cursory manner.29 
This is demonstrated by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in their study of checkpoint 
shooting incidents detailed in the Iraq War Logs. The Iraq War Logs are a collection of almost 
400,000 U.S. Army field reports, detailing a variety of incidents that U.S. soldiers documented 
throughout the conflict, and covering the time period from 2004 to 2009. The documents were 
released by WikiLeaks to a number of media outlets on 22 October 2010.30 The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (BIJ) undertook a manual count of a total of 13,963 reported checkpoint 
incidents. They found that 832 people had been killed at checkpoints during the reporting period. 
Of these, 120 were described as insurgents, 681 were described as civilians, and 31 were Iraqi 
security forces.31 The Bureau also reported that U.S. forces fired on 50 families, and that at least 
30 children were killed.32 Given the ubiquitous presence of checkpoints, the data also indicates 
that the risk of U.S. and Iraqi forces being killed in checkpoint incidents during this time period 
was quite low, at 0.22% of the recorded checkpoint incidents. Commander Albert Janin of the 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps, has described similar numbers of checkpoint killings, 
estimating that from May 2003 until mid-summer 2006, U.S. forces killed about 1200 Iraqi 
civilians in escalation of force incidents at checkpoints and during convoy operations.33 
                                                                                                                                                        
Control Point Procedures are also addressed in Department of the Army, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Rifle 
Platoon and Squad FM-3-21.9 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2002) at 7-11. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 14.  
30 Der Spiegel, “The WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs: Greatest Data Leak in US Military History” Spiegel Online (22 
October 2010), available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-wikileaks-iraq-war-logs-greatest-data-
leak-in-us-military-history-a-724845.html (accessed 5 April 2013).  
31 Emma Slater and James Ball, “Hundreds of Civilians Gunned Down at Checkpoints” The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism (22 October 2010), available at: http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/2010/10/22/more-than-600-civilians-killed-
in-error-by-coalition-forces-in-iraq/ (accessed 5 April 2013). The BIJ study did not find that any U.S. forces were 
indicated in the incident reports as being killed in checkpoint incidents.  
32 Ibid.  
33Albert Janin, “Engaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to Self-Defence/Protocol I Marriage” (2007) Army Lawyer 82 
at 104 [hereinafter Civilian Belligerents]. Commander Janin uses the data collected by the organization Iraq Body 
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The Iraq War Logs incident reports indicate that vehicles were normally fired upon before 
they reached the checkpoints, often because they disregarded verbal and visual signals that were 
made by U.S. forces during the vehicle’s approach. In one incident, U.S. forces shot and killed 7 
persons out of a family of 11 persons when their vehicle approached the checkpoint at a speed of 
40-45 mph, and did not slow down when instructed to do so. U.S. soldiers reported making hand 
and arm signals, which failed to stop the vehicle. U.S. forces then fired warning shots, which 
caused the vehicle to accelerate. At that point, U.S. forces engaged the driver directly. The report 
states that the “large number of civilians KIA [killed in action] resulted from the family having 
placed their children on the floor boards of the vehicle. The disabling shots aimed at the grill are 
believed to have traveled through the vehicle low to the floorboards causing the large number of 
KIA.”34 The warning shots were first fired when the vehicle was 150 meters away from the 
checkpoint, suggesting that the vehicle must have been some distance away from the checkpoint 
when the driver disregarded the hand and arm signals. In this case, the family was not found to 
have been posing a hostile intent, and it may have been the case that the driver disregarded the 
signals because he did not see them, or that he accelerated in response to the small arms fire due 
to panic.  
Some of the incidents involved drivers who were elderly, and had difficulties seeing the 
hand signals or hearing the verbal warnings. One incident involved the shooting of an elderly 
male driver who had been unable to see the visual signals made by U.S. forces. His relatives also 
indicated that “the brakes on the old vehicle were not functional,”35 and so he could not slow 
down. As in the above incident, this vehicle was also approaching the checkpoint, and shots were 
fired at the vehicle shortly after the visual and verbal signals were not heeded. The time frame 
within which U.S. forces are using escalation of force procedures - and making a final decision to 
use lethal force – may be very short, perhaps only a matter of seconds. This may not give 
civilians sufficient time to respond. A similar incident involved a 50-year old female driver, 
whose vehicle was fired upon after she did not respond to escalation of force procedures. The 
vehicle was as far as 200 meters away from reaching the checkpoint when 9 rounds were fired 
                                                
34 United States Army, Redacted Report 10-2, Iraq War Logs (14 June 2005), available at: 
http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/PDF/10/2.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013).  
35 United States Army, Redacted Report 10-1, Iraq War Logs (6 September 2008), available at: 
http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/PDF/10/1.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013).  
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into the vehicle. A three year-old boy was killed in the incident.36 
In one incident, a mobile, i.e. temporary, U.S. checkpoint was set up at the corner of what 
American forces referred to as Routes Irish and Vernon near Baghdad’s Green Zone.37 The 
checkpoint had been set up ad hoc to ensure safe passage for Ambassador Negroponte, who was 
making an unscheduled trip to the airport.38 A vehicle approached the checkpoint, and escalation 
of force procedures were used; the vehicle failed to stop for flashing lights, hand and arm signals, 
and then warning shots.39 The vehicle was then engaged with small arms fire. The fire wounded 
journalist Giuliana Sgrena, who had just been freed after being held captive for a month by 
insurgents.40 The fire killed Italian intelligence officer, Nicola Calipari, who had negotiated her 
release, and who was killed while shielding Ms. Sgrena; another Italian security agent, the driver, 
was wounded.41 The incident was widely reported, and the U.S. military publicly defended the 
killing, claiming that the soldiers had acted appropriately.42 Ms. Sgrena has reported that the 
driver could not see the checkpoint because “the patrol was not on the street. The patrol was 
outside the street, behind a curb.”43 She also reported that 58 bullets were fired at the vehicle, all 
but one at the passengers, and was strongly critical of the U.S.’s actions and its justifications.44 
Because of the high-profile nature of this incident and the tensions it caused between the 
U.S. and Italian governments, the U.S. undertook an investigation.45 The U.S. Army investigation 
claimed that Route Irish was a dangerous road, one that had experienced many insurgent attacks 
                                                
36 United States Army, Redacted Report 10-3, Iraq War Logs (11 December 2005), available at: 
http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/PDF/10/3.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013). In this incident, the grandmother, who was 
bleeding from glass in her eyes, refused medical treatment so that she could bury the child before sundown, 
according to religious custom.  
37 United States Army, Incident Report, Reference ID IRQ20050304n1554, Iraq War Logs (4 March 2005), available 
at: http://wikileaks.org/irq/report/2005/03/IRQ20050304n1554.html (accessed 5 April 2013).  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Jeffrey Smith and Ann Scott Tyson, “Shootings by U.S. at Iraq Checkpoints Questioned” Washington Post (7 
March 2005), available at: http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12507-2005Mar6.html (accessed 17 
January 2013).  
43 Amy Goodman, “Italian Journalist Giuliana Sgrena on Washington’s Refusal to Take Responsibility for Fatal 
Shooting of Intel Agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq” Democracy Now (14 March 2007), available at: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/14/italian_journalist_giuliana_sgrena_on_washingtons (accessed 5 April 
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44 Ibid.  
45 When an investigation is commenced, it is usually noted in the incident report. None of the above-referenced 
checkpoint incidents included a statement to the effect that the U.S. had commenced an investigation, and the 
incidents were simply closed.  
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and IED explosions that had killed both U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians.46 The soldiers staffing 
the checkpoint had been trained in standard Rules of Engagement, operating procedures for 
traffic checkpoints, and the use of a graduated escalation of force, requiring soldiers to “shout, 
show, shove, then shoot.”47 Soldiers were first to use verbal warning shouts, and then to shine a 
spotlight on the vehicle, then to aim a green laser light at the driver, then to fire warning shots 
near the vehicle, then to fire disabling shots at the vehicle; only then could they use lethal force.48 
At the time of the incident, the Italian diplomatic vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed 
towards the checkpoint. U.S. personnel reported shining a light onto the vehicle, and then 
focusing a green laser pointer onto the windshield.49 Specialist Mario Lozano then fired warning 
shots near the vehicle, which the vehicle did not heed; shots were then fired directly at the 
vehicle.50 The Investigation found that the incident took approximately a mere 7 seconds from 
the time the vehicle crossed the Alert Line, at which time the U.S. forces began their escalation of 
force procedures, to the time the last shot was fired and the vehicle came to a halt; of these, the 
firing of the shots took four seconds, leaving only three seconds within which U.S. undertook the 
above escalation of force procedures.51 The driver of the vehicle, Italian intelligence expert and 
member of the Carabinieri, Mr. Carpani, told U.S. forces that when he heard the shots, he 
panicked and sped up the vehicle to exit the area quickly.52 He was uncertain as to where the 
shots were coming from, and why they were being fired.53  
The investigation into the Calipari checkpoint shooting incident found that the spotlight and 
laser pointer had been effective in stopping about 15-20 vehicles that had previously approached 
the checkpoint that evening.54 It also found that the Italian vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed 
                                                
46 United States Army, Investigation into the Calipari Checkpoint Shooting Incident (Unredacted Version), 
Macchianera.net (May 2005) [hereinafter Calipari Shooting Investigation] at 12-13, available at: 
http://www.macchianera.net/files/rapportousacalipari-noomissis.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013).  
47 Ibid. at 22.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. at 30. 
50 Ibid. at 31.  
51 Ibid. at 32.  
52 Ibid. at 34.  
53 Ibid. at 31.  
54 Ibid. at 36. The Investigation does not report, however, at what time these vehicles were stopped, or whether it was 
still light out at that time. At the time of the shooting incident, witnesses reported that it was dark, and raining 
heavily.  
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much higher than average vehicles in the area.55 The investigation also found that the driver was 
distracted, as he was talking on a cell phone, concerned with getting to the airport, listening for 
threats, and navigating bad weather and wet roads.56 The investigation concluded that Specialist 
Lozano complied with the Rules of Engagement in firing his weapon.57 The investigation 
exonerated the soldiers involved in the shooting, but did make a number of recommendations, 
including better signage indicating the presence of U.S. checkpoints, as well as the use of non-
lethal blocking methods, such as spike strips and concertina wire, so as to limit the use of force.58 
These procedures would not only be practical and cost-effective, but would comply with the 
principle that only the minimum amount of force necessary be used. Indeed, according to the 
definition proposed herein - that civilian direct participation be defined in terms of the justified 
use of defensive force against a clear and convincing threat - then necessity becomes a crucial 
component of the use of force. Therefore, states are obliged to use escalation of force procedures 
to identify possible threats, as well as less than lethal means to repel actual threats - for when 
states avoid using these safeguards by choice, they cannot claim that their use of lethal force is 
necessary.  
Checkpoint shootings take place in an environment in which civilians may be unfamiliar 
with the checkpoint procedures, the language used, or may not be aware that there is a checkpoint 
present in the road ahead. Civilians may not be given sufficient time to respond and civilians may 
be likely to panic when coming under fire. Checkpoints, particularly temporary checkpoints, are 
not always clearly marked. Annia Ciezadlo, a reporter familiar with U.S. checkpoint procedures 
in Iraq, states that many U.S. checkpoints follow close upon checkpoints staffed by Iraqi security 
forces.59 Many drivers are routinely waved through the Iraqi checkpoint, but do not realize that 
there is a U.S. checkpoint following close after. She states, “[y]our driver, who slowed down for 
the checkpoint, will accelerate to resume his normal speed. What he doesn’t realize is that there is 
another, American checkpoint several hundred yards past the Iraqi checkpoint, and he’s speeding 
towards it. Sometimes, he may even think that being waved through the first checkpoint means 
                                                
55 Ibid. at 36. The vehicle was reported as travelling at 50 mph, as compared with an average speed of 24 mph. 
56 Ibid. at 37.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. at 38.  
59 Annia Ciezadlo, “What Iraq’s Checkpoints are Like” The Christian Science Monitor (7 March 2005), available at: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0307/p01s04-woiq.html (accessed 5 April 2013).  
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he’s exempt from the second one (especially if he is not familiar with American checkpoint 
routines).”60 This may be especially true of civilians travelling in unfamiliar territory, or when a 
checkpoint is new or temporary, and its procedures are not understood by the local population.  
Private contractors operating in counterinsurgent environments, and who lack belligerent 
qualification to use force during hostilities, are employing escalation of force procedures similar 
to those used by military forces, and are also defending their use of force on grounds of self-
defense.61 In one incident, DynCorp private security contractors were returning to the U.S. Army 
base at Camp Al-Asad, Iraq, when “a black sedan (opel) approached at a high rate of speed on the 
center line of the road. At 500 m, the lead DynCorp vehicle began flashing lights, but the sedan 
did not respond. At 75 m, the lead DynCorp vehicle fired (3-4) warning shots into the shoulder of 
the road.”62 The sedan then attempted to pass the convoy, hit the second DynCorp vehicle, and all 
three occupants of the sedan were killed.63 This incident also indicates that private contractors are 
also using escalation of force procedures to keep civilians away from their convoys and 
equipment, even when they themselves are not participating directly in hostilities (and are not 
permitted to do so); the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance has stated that private contractors are 
not to be considered as performing a continuous combat function on behalf of an organized 
armed group, and did not deal with the question of whether their use of force in the course of 
force protection activities would be considered as direct participation in hostilities.64  
Checkpoint shootings are not unique to the conflict in Iraq, and similar incidents occurred 
in Afghanistan, as well. In one incident, a white vehicle traveling toward a U.S. checkpoint failed 
                                                
60 Ibid.  
61 USCENTCOM Message, “USCENTCOM Civilian and Contractor Arming Policy and Delegation of Authority for 
Iraq and Afghanistan” (24 August 2009), available at: https://publicintelligence.net/uscentcom-civilian-and-
contractor-arming-policy-and-delegation-of-authority-for-iraq-and-afghanistan/ (accessed 14 April 2015). See e.g.: 
para. 4A, which states that private contractors have the right to use force in self-defense against a hostile act or 
hostile intent, whereas para. 4D1 confirms that deadly force “is permitted only for individual self-defense when there 
is a reasonable belief in imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm”, and para. 4D, which imposes a requirement 
for the use of minimal force. The defensive rules proposed herein are therefore similar to those already in use by the 
Department of Defense, but contractors are being permitted to interpret “hostile act” and “hostile intent” very 
broadly, and with little oversight or enforcement of the rules in place.  
62 United States Army, Incident Report, Reference ID IRQ20050302n1519 (2 March 2005), available at: 
http://wikileaks.org/irq/report/2005/03/IRQ20050302n1519.html (accessed 5 April 2013).  
63 Ibid.  
64 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law” (2008) 90:872 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 991 at 995 [hereinafter 
Interpretive Guidance]. See also: UNCENTCOM Message, supra note 55 at para. 4B, which states that private 
contractors are forbidden to participate directly in hostilities. 
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to respond to a wave signal, and was fired upon with 24 rounds of ammunition. One civilian was 
killed.65 It appears that U.S. forces did not use graduated escalation of force procedures in this 
incident; no investigation was noted as being commenced.66 In another incident, an Afghan 
National Police [ANP] Officer shot at a vehicle that had approached an ANP checkpoint at a high 
rate of speed and knocked the officer down. The ANP officer shot and killed the driver. No 
weapons or explosives were found, and U.S. forces noted that the person killed in this incident 
was a “civilian”. The US incident report states, “ANP escalation of force was appropriate. Effects 
on the enemy demonstrate the ANP support of IO themes. Effects on populace clearly identify 
the importance of stopping at checkpoints.”67 This last comment clearly evidences the 
disciplinary nature of these killings, and the effects they are intended to have on the behavior of 
the local population generally – and not merely on those traveling through checkpoints or near 
convoys. U.S. forces are instructing local host nation security forces in these procedures, and 
encouraging them to adopt similar Rules of Engagement and escalation of force procedures. In 
the above incident, an innocent civilian was killed as a result of a minor traffic incident, but the 
killing was justified by U.S. forces because of the desirable effect it would have on the civilian 
population generally in encouraging their compliance with security forces.  
Nor were checkpoint shootings confined to U.S. forces. There are a number of documented 
incidents in which British forces stationed in Basra, Iraq, killed civilians at checkpoints under 
similar circumstances. In one incident that took place on 24 August 2003, UK forces stationed at 
a temporary checkpoint in Basra shot and killed 42-year old driver Walid Fayay Mazban on the 
grounds that they had seen his minivan swerve in a suspicious manner near the checkpoint, and 
he had failed to heed verbal commands to stop his vehicle.68 The Ministry of Defence paid his 
family $1405 in compensation, but without admitting wrongdoing.69 In a similar incident that 
took place on 4 September 2003, British forces shot and killed As’ad Kadhem Jasem at a 
                                                
65 United States Army, Incident Report, Reference ID AFG20070227n568 (27 February 2007), available at: 
http://wikileaks.org/afg/event/2007/02/AFG20070227n568.html (accessed 5 April 2013).  
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67 United States Army, Incident Report, Reference ID AFG20070305n602 (5 March 2007), available at: 
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checkpoint north of Basra.70 He had been traveling at high speed, and it was dark.71 The Ministry 
of Defence did not launch an investigation into this incident.72 The inconsistent manner in which 
checkpoint shootings are investigated, and victims compensated, may reflect the fact that the 
Ministry of Defence in unclear about the legality of these killings, and has not been able to decide 
on a uniform response.  
 
4.2 Case Study II: Preemptive Killing and Collective Punishment at Fallujah 
 U.S. operations in Fallujah in 2004 illustrate the dangers posed to the civilian population as 
a whole when inadequate criteria for determining direct participation in hostilities are employed 
during military operations. At Fallujah, U.S. forces treated the entire military-aged male 
population of the city as potential insurgents, and their actions in Fallujah can be characterized as 
the collective punishment of a civilian population seen to be hostile to U.S. forces and the new 
Iraqi government that U.S. forces were supporting.73 
 The security situation in Fallujah deteriorated quickly during the early days of the U.S. 
occupation in April 2003. On 23 April 2003, a group of 200 protestors defied a U.S.-imposed 
curfew to protest the U.S. occupation of a local school. U.S. troops of the 82nd Airborne Division 
opened fire on the crowd, reportedly killing thirteen persons and wounding seventy-five.74 There 
is some dispute as to whether the U.S. troops fired in response to gun shots from the crowd; 
locals claim that only rocks were thrown, whereas the troops claimed to have come under fire.75 
Since the casualty rate was about 44% of all those present, and is also reported to have included 
children and medical personnel who were treating the wounded,76 this suggests that U.S. forces 
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73 For example, the U.N. envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi accused U.S. military commanders of engaging in 
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may have been firing indiscriminately, which is unlawful.77 On 11 September 2003, a further 
incident occurred in which members of the local Fallujah Protection Force claimed to have 
witnessed Blackwater security contractors, driving a blue BMW SUV, opening fire on the 
Mayor’s home. They pursued the BMW. U.S. forces then fired upon the Fallujah Protection 
Force vehicle in pursuit of the BMW, killing a reported eight police officers and wounding two 
others.78 These incidents caused significant tensions between the residents of Fallujah, U.S. 
forces and their private contractors. Tensions escalated until 31 March 2004, when four 
Blackwater security guards transporting kitchen supplies were ambushed and killed in Fallujah. 
Their mutilated bodies were hung from a bridge over the River Euphrates, and the images were 
broadcast around the world.79 In response to the murder of the Blackwater contractors, Coalition 
forces launched Operation Vigilant Resolve against Fallujah on 4 April 2004.80 Due to political 
pressure, Ambassador Bremer was forced to halt the operation on 9 May, and talks resumed 
between U.S. and city officials.81 The talks produced few results, and the U.S. felt that the 
resistance was growing. On 7 November 2004, the U.S. launched Operation Phantom Fury, also 
termed Operation Al-Fajr (“The Dawn”) by the Iraqi forces fighting alongside the Americans.82 
The U.S. considered the attacks to be a success, and it ended the operation on 23 December 2004, 
stating that “Operation AL FAJR served as an example for cities in open defiance of the new 
Iraqi government.”83 
 The U.S.’s actions during Operations Vigilant Resolve and Phantom Fury demonstrate how 
status-based interpretations of belligerency were used to characterize virtually the entire military-
aged male population of Fallujah as potential insurgents. The use of these tactics is also 
indicative of an overall campaign of collective punishment directed against a city that was 
disobeying U.S. forces and withholding support for the new Iraqi government. Kendall G. Gott of 
the Combat Studies Institute states that, “the Coalition continuously warned city leaders and 
                                                
77 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
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80 Ibid. at 5.  
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residents that they were provoking a major assault on the city, but the warning went unheeded.”84 
This reverses the presumption of civilian immunity normally required of troops under the 
international laws of armed conflict, and sets a dangerous precedent for future conflicts, as well.  
 Colonel Michael Formica, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry 
Division - also known as the Black Jack Brigade - discusses the inception of Operation Phantom 
Fury around the 7th of November. He confirms that the “concept was that we would perform 
basically a cordon and prevent anybody from leaving or reinforcing the city of Fallujah.”85 
Colonel Formica and his unit were directly responsible for preventing insurgents from leaving 
Fallujah.86 In order to prevent targets from leaving the city before the bombardment, “the bottom 
line answer was that military-aged men, deemed as 16-55, would not be permitted to leave, but 
children and women certainly could.”87 On the 12th of November, the Army Times reported that 
“[h]undreds of men trying to flee the assault on Fallujah have been turned back by U.S. troops 
following orders to let only women, children and the elderly to leave.”88 Officials suggested that 
men stay in their homes, but admitted that the city was a risky and frightening place to live.89 The 
Army Times also reported that after the battle all military-aged males would be searched, tested 
for explosive residue, catalogued, and interrogated about ties with insurgent forces.90 
 In Fallujah, there were reports and rumors of ‘free-fire’ orders reminiscent of those used by 
U.S. forces in Vietnam.91 These tactics also recall those used during Objective Murray, in which 
it was part of the intention of the commanding officer that all military-aged males in the area be 
treated as hostile.92 As discussed above, there are a number of ways that present-day Rules of 
Engagement are able to accomplish preemptive and indiscriminate targeting by giving soldiers a 
wide discretion to determine whether a given civilian is exhibiting a hostile intent or is affiliated 
with a hostile group, even basing a perception of ‘hostility’ merely on the grounds that the 
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civilian is a military-aged male. The New York Times reported that the Third Battalion, Fourth 
Marine Regiment received orders to shoot at anyone in Fallujah with a gun, as well as orders to 
shoot any male of military age on the streets after dark, armed or not.93 If this is the case, then 
these orders permitted the killing of civilian non-belligerents in circumstances that would have 
been impermissible even in Vietnam, and suggests that the U.S. may have issued orders that 
declared as hostile all armed civilians and all civilians breaking U.S. curfew orders. Certainly, 
officials reported in the Army Times that the males who had been prohibited from leaving 
Fallujah were told that they should remain in their homes, away from the windows, and off of the 
rooftops,94 further suggesting that any visible military-aged male was at risk of being targeted by 
U.S. forces, without their having to distinguish whether such civilians were or were not 
participating in hostilities.  
 The U.S. reportedly engaged in the preemptive bulldozing of houses suspected of 
containing insurgents. Ross Caputi, former Private of the United States Marine Corps, 1st 
Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, of the Alpha Company Headquarters Platoon during Operation 
Phantom Fury in November 2004, testified to the Office of Special Procedures of the U.N. 
Human Rights Council. Private Caputi claimed that U.S. forces were using preemptive and 
indiscriminate means of killing, such as ‘reconnaissance by fire’, a tactic in which soldiers fire 
into an area or building to determine if there are persons located there, and the use of bulldozers 
to clear the houses of suspected insurgents.95 Private Caputi states, “[s]ometimes we were unsure 
whether or not there were resistance fighters in a house, then we would bulldoze it just in case… 
so that they would not have to send their men inside to clear those houses.”96 This is confirmed 
by U.S. military sources. The Combat Studies Institute reports that, with only “a few exceptions,” 
soldiers “did not hesitate to destroy buildings simply suspected of holding insurgents.”97 
 It appears that the entire civilian population present in Fallujah at the time of Operation 
Phantom Fury was at serious risk of being targeted, even in circumstances in which they were not 
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taking a direct part in the hostilities or engaging in a specific hostile act, and despite the fact that 
many of them had been forcibly detained in the combat zone by U.S. forces themselves. The 
preemptive and indiscriminate killings discussed above that took place in Fallujah appear to 
violate the principle of distinction contained in Article 51(3) of Protocol I on their face, yet they 
were all authorized under the standard Rules of Engagement the U.S. employed there. In 
addition, the U.S. military has been quite open about these practices, and there has been an 
absence of criticism from members of the international community. Such acquiescence may set a 
precedent for the use of status-based characterizations of belligerency in future conflicts.  
 
4.3 Case Study III: Unlawful Enemy Combatants & the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
 The Guantanamo Bay detention facility is an internment camp located at the U.S. Naval 
Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The internment camp was established in January of 2002 to hold 
prisoners detained by the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well as suspected members of Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban detained elsewhere in the global war on terror.98 Many of the detainees were not 
captured on a ‘battlefield’, but were turned in by local Afghans, often for cash bounty 
payments.99 The U.S. detained these suspected belligerents pursuant to the 2001 AUMF.100 The 
U.S. claimed that these persons were ‘unlawful enemy combatants’, and so were not entitled to 
the protections of the Third Geneva Convention, including its requirement that detainees be given 
a hearing under Article 5 to determine their status as belligerents. This was despite the fact that 
these procedures had long been a standard part of U.S. military doctrine.101 Many of the concepts 
and procedures instituted by the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay have now been written into U.S. 
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doctrine, and have become standard operating procedures.102 As will be seen in the following 
case study, U.S. concepts and practices developed at Guantanamo Bay were instrumental in 
developing policies and legal justifications for the targeted killing program.  
 
4.3.1 The Suspension of the Geneva Conventions and the Office of Legal Counsel 
 The U.S. began its invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, fighting together with the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, and a loose-knit collection of militia known as the 
Northern Alliance,103 to overthrow the Taliban-proclaimed Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The 
city of Kabul fell on the night of 12 November 2001, beginning the rout of the Taliban forces and 
the increasing consolidation of Coalition control over the territory. By December, a Conference 
was hosted in Bonn, Germany to establish the Afghan Interim Authority under the leadership of 
future President Hamid Karzai.104 On 22 December 2001, the Afghan Interim Authority assumed 
de jure control over Afghanistan, although many parts of the country remained outside of its de 
facto control, as armed fighters, warlords, and various militia continued to operate throughout the 
country.105 The U.S. captured and detained numerous persons in the course of their invasion, 
some of whom were brought to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.106  
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 At the outset of the war, the U.S. had attempted to suspend the Geneva Conventions on the 
grounds that Afghanistan was not a functioning state, and so had no juridical authority to 
continue as a party to international treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions. The position of the 
U.S. government was set out in a legal memorandum dated 30 November 2001 from the Office of 
Legal Counsel, stating that “the President has the constitutional authority to find that Afghanistan 
was a failed state during the period in which the Taliban exercised control over most of the 
country” and consequently “is not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions,”107 
despite the fact that Afghanistan was one of the original High Contracting parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, which it signed in 1949 and ratified in 1956.108 A similar Memorandum was issued 
on 9 January 2001, which stated, “for the period in question, Afghanistan was a ‘failed state’ 
whose territory had been largely overrun and held by violence by a militia or faction rather than 
by a government. Accordingly, Afghanistan was without the attributes of statehood necessary to 
continue as a party to the Geneva Conventions, and the Taliban militia, like al Qaeda, is therefore 
not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.”109 This was followed up on 22 
January 2002 by a third Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, which stated that “our 
treaty obligations under Geneva III toward Afghanistan were suspended during the period of the 
conflict” on the grounds that “Under Article II of the Constitution, the President has the unilateral 
power to suspend whole treaties or parts of them at his discretion.”110  
 This decision to suspend the Geneva Conventions was much criticized by the international 
community, and also within the U.S. administration and the Office of Legal Counsel itself. As a 
consequence, on 7 February 2002, U.S. President George Bush reversed this policy and issued a 
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November 2001]. 
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Geneva, 12 August 1949,” available at: 
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109 John Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty, “Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of 
Defense,” Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice (9 January 2002) at 14 [hereinafter Yoo 
Memorandum of 9 January 2002]. 
110 Office of the Assistant Attorney General, “Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and 
William Haynes II General Counsel of the Department of Defense,” Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of 
Justice (22 January 2002) at 11 [hereinafter OLC Memorandum of 22 January 2002]. 
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statement that Taliban detainees would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, 
whereas Al-Qaeda detainees would not. The press release stated that Taliban detainees were not 
entitled to prisoner of war status, as they did not meet the four organizational criteria set out in 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, whereas Al-Qaeda detainees were not a state party to 
the Geneva Conventions and so “are not covered by the Geneva Convention.”111 The Judge 
Advocate General’s office has stated that by the time the Geneva Conventions were ‘re-instituted’ 
on 7 February, they were no longer applicable in any event, as the conflict had ceased to be of an 
international character once Hamid Karzai had assumed power.112  
 For those Taliban detainees who had been apprehended before this time, the U.S. denied 
that they met the criteria for belligerent qualification, and could be treated outside the scope of 
the Third Geneva Convention. The White House’s press announcement of 7 February 2002 was 
issued concurrently with a new Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel concerning the 
status of Taliban detainees, written by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee.113 The Bybee 
Memorandum found that the Taliban militia failed to meet the organizational requirements 
imposed by Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention,114 even if they were to be considered as 
the official and authorized armed forces of the state of Afghanistan.115 The Bybee Memorandum 
concludes by clarifying the, now, position of the U.S. Administration that Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
detainees did not need to be afforded a status determination hearing under Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention, because there was ‘no doubt’ as to their status as belligerents.116 Article 5 
requires that there be a presumption that detainees are prisoners of war until a competent Article 
5 Tribunal determines otherwise, thus placing the onus on the detaining power to demonstrate 
that the person is not entitled to prisoner of war treatment.117 The Bybee Memorandum states that 
“the presumption and tribunal requirement are triggered, however, only if there is ‘any doubt’ as 
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to a prisoner’s Article 4 status,”118 which Bybee stated had been definitively resolved in the 
negative by the preceding arguments in the Memorandum.  
 This suppressed the most important questions concerning the status of the Afghan 
detainees. First, it failed to address the question of whether a particular detainee was, in fact, a 
member of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban militia – a complex factual matter that, in and of itself, 
should have merited Article 5 Tribunal hearings for each detainee. Second, the OLC Memoranda 
failed to address the question of whether the detainees, even if members of Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, had actually participated as combatants in hostilities during the initial invasion of 
Afghanistan – a conflict of an international character that certainly would have been governed by 
the Third Geneva Convention.119 If a detainee had not taken part in hostilities, then they would 
have been entitled to be treated as a protected person under the Fourth Geneva Convention.120 
Third, the OLC Memoranda do not address the question of whether any of the detainees, even if 
they had participated directly in hostilities, were lawful prisoners of war under Article 4(6) of the 
Third Geneva Convention. Neither the Bybee nor the Yoo Memoranda make any reference to 
Article 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention, those provisions granting belligerent qualification 
to those participating in a levée en masse. Those persons who had taken up arms to repel the U.S. 
invasion may have fallen under Article 4(6) – even members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda – and 
this in turn is a complex question of mixed law and fact that would have merited Article 5 
Tribunal hearings in each case. In the end, the legal effect of the U.S.’s refusal to hold Article 5 
Tribunal hearings ought normally to have been that the presumption of prisoner of war status 
contained within Article 5 remained non-rebutted, during which time the detainees remained 
entitled to the privileges of prisoner of war protections under the Geneva Conventions.121 
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However, the U.S. did not proceed on this basis.  
 The Office of Legal Counsel has played an important role in interpreting, and even 
reshaping, customary international law through their legal opinions concerning the Afghan 
detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay. The OLC’s position on the status and treatment of the 
Afghan detainees has been highly influential, and the OLC is now playing a similar role in legal 
justifications for the U.S.’s targeted killing program, discussed below. The OLC, created in 1933, 
plays a unique role as a source of law. Its function is “to provide controlling advice to Executive 
Branch officials on questions of law that are centrally important to the functioning of the Federal 
Government.”122 The OLC provides guiding legal advice to the federal administration; this 
advice is likely to affect the policies and decisions of the executive branch, even as it is 
frequently immune to review by the courts. As stated by the Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
David J. Barron, the OLC “is frequently asked to opine on issues of first impression that are 
unlikely to be resolved by the courts – a circumstance in which OLC’s advice may effectively be 
the final word on the controlling law.”123 Many of the opinions of the OLC are not published.124 
The Barron Best Practices Memorandum states that the “OLC will decline to publish an opinion 
when disclosure would reveal classified or other sensitive information relating to national 
security.”125 “Similarly,” he states, “the OLC will decline to publish an opinion if doing so would 
interfere with federal law enforcement efforts or is prohibited by law. The OLC will also decline 
to publish opinions when doing so is necessary to preserve internal Executive Branch deliberative 
processes or to protect the confidentiality of information covered by the attorney-client 
relationship between OLC and other executive offices.”126 Therefore, the OLC’s advice to their 
clients very often has the status of law, and certainly U.S. law. However, the OLC’s opinions also 
cover aspects of the international customary law. Thus, the OLC’s opinions can justify state 
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practice and give rise to persuasive opinio juris.127 This is counterintuitive, but as the next case 
study will discuss further, the U.S. has sought simultaneously to keep the actual memoranda 
secret, while very openly publishing their conclusions that U.S. actions are not only lawful, but 
specifically that they are lawful under the international laws of armed conflict. In this way, the 
U.S.’s adoption of certain practices sets a precedent for other states who might wish to adopt 
similar policies, and this has the potential to significantly affect the interpretation of international 
humanitarian law. At the same time, however, the legal interpretations of the OLC are subject to 
attorney-client privilege, are very often immune from review by the courts, and – certainly in 
matters of national security - are inaccessible to the public.128 This gives the OLC a unique 
position as a source of law, for the controlling nature of its opinions arises directly out of the fact 
that they are not known to the general public, and so remain unchallenged and unreviewable.  
 The OLC's response to the Yoo Memoranda has significant consequences for the law 
concerning Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, as it repudiated some of the assertions 
made in the Yoo Memoranda, but not those concerning Article 5. First, the OLC issued the 
Barron Best Practices Memorandum outlining the standard their attorneys should follow in 
providing controlling legal opinions. Barron states, “It is thus imperative that the Office’s advice 
be clear, accurate, thoroughly researched, and soundly reasoned… OLC must always give candid, 
independent, and principled advice – even when that advice is inconsistent with the aims of 
policymakers.”129 For further clarity, it instructed Department of Justice lawyers at the OLC that 
the “OLC’s analysis should be guided by the texts of the relevant documents, and should use 
traditional tools of construction in interpreting those texts.”130 Their attorneys were reminded of 
the importance of precedent.131 The Barron Best Practices Memorandum squarely addressed the 
issue that government policy had been dictating the legal opinions of the OLC, and not the other 
way around, when Barron reminds OLC attorneys that their legal analyses are “not designed 
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merely to advance the policy preferences of the President or other officials.”132 In fact, a five-year 
investigation by the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility into the 8/1/02 
Interrogation Opinion and the 3/14/03 Military Interrogation Opinion, also written by John Yoo 
and Jay Bybee, and which concerned the application of the law of torture to the enhanced 
interrogation techniques being used by the CIA in Iraq and Afghanistan, did find that Yoo and 
Bybee had committed professional misconduct in failing to exercise independent legal judgment, 
and render thorough, objective and candid, legal advice.133 Specifically, the Office of 
Professional Responsibility found that the memoranda were drafted with a view to providing the 
client, the U.S. executive, with a justification for using the enhanced interrogation techniques.134 
The investigators concluded that “there was never any doubt that waterboarding would be 
approved by Yoo.”135 Precedents were not used appropriately,136 and some of the arguments 
presented were found to be “illogical or convoluted.”137 The Office of Professional 
Responsibility, while they did not examine the Yoo Memoranda in total, did address their advice 
concerning the suspension of the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, the Office of Professional 
Responsibility found that Yoo’s assertions in the Yoo Memorandum of 9 January 2002 that the 
President has the authority to suspend the Geneva Conventions to be incorrect, as well as his 
conclusion that al-Qaeda suspects were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, and therefore 
no breaches of the Geneva Conventions or war crimes could be found with respect to their 
treatment.138  
 The Office of Legal Counsel rejected the Office of Professional Responsibility Report.139 
Deputy Attorney General David Margolis rejected the findings of the investigation, and declined 
to refer its finding with respect to the misconduct of Yoo and Bybee to state bar authorities for 
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determination.140 Specifically on the issue of the extent to which OLC attorneys should take into 
account the wishes of the executive branch in crafting their opinions, Margolis stated that OLC 
attorneys must take into consideration the goals of the administration, and assist in their 
accomplishment within the law.141 Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith had told the OPR 
investigators that there was a long tradition where “Attorney Generals [sic] gave advice which 
was, you know, more of, here’s an argument to cover what you’ve done, rather than my best 
independent view on the merits,” and he noted that the standard to be followed was not clear to 
OLC attorneys.142 The Department of Justice defended the OLC memoranda, and denied that they 
were intended to provide legal cover to the U.S. Administration for questionable human rights 
practices they engaged in against the detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This is the context in which David Barron also drafted the OLC’s Targeted Killing 
Memorandum, discussed below.  
 Despite Margolis’ defense of the legal reasoning contained within the OLC memoranda, the 
OLC did issue a further Memorandum explicitly repudiating portions of the Yoo Memoranda,143 
including its “broad assertion of the President’s Commander in Chief power that would deny 
Congress any role in regulating the detention, interrogation, prosecution, and transfer of enemy 
combatants captured in the global War on Terror.”144 The Bradbury Memorandum also retracted 
the much-criticized 8/1/02 Interrogation Opinion and the 3/14/03 Military Interrogation Opinion, 
that had justified enhanced interrogation techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bradbury 
Memorandum also repudiated the assertion made in the Yoo Memoranda that the President 
possesses unfettered discretion to suspend treaty obligations.145 Bradbury states, “we advised the 
Legal Advisor to the National Security Council and the Deputy Counsel to the President not to 
rely on the two opinions identified above to the extent they suggested that the President has 
unlimited authority to suspend a treaty beyond the circumstances traditionally recognized.”146 
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The wording indicates therefore, that the other portions of the Yoo Memoranda continue to 
represent the official view of the OLC, including the position that the U.S. declined to review the 
belligerent status of the detainees, or to hold competent tribunals under Article 5 of the Geneva 
Conventions. Therefore, the OLC did not challenge their previous assertion that Articles 4(6) and 
5 of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the U.S.’s treatment of the Afghan detainees, and 
the U.S. government continued to act in accordance with this position, despite the cloud cast over 
the OLC’s memoranda by the Office of Professional Responsibility.  
4.2.2 The Belligerent Status of the Guantanamo Detainees 
 The U.S. therefore asserted through the Office of Legal Counsel that the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay were unlawful combatants, and that since there was no doubt on this matter, 
Article 5 Tribunal hearings need not be held to determine the detainees’ status as belligerents. 
However, if any of the detainees had not participated directly in hostilities, then they were 
entitled to be treated as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention. For those who 
did participate directly in hostilities, then it was open for them to claim that they did so as 
qualified belligerents under Article 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention, as part of a levée en 
masse. Recall from the discussion in Chapter Two that the concept of a levée en masse is a 
holdover from the customs of the early-modern era that would have permitted any civilian to take 
up arms in their defense, and this custom was preserved in Article 10 of the 1874 Brussels 
Declaration, and then codified in Article 2 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations. The current 
definition of a levée en masse is found in Article 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention, which 
states that it applies to “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form 
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and 
customs of war.” The law only imposes two organizational requirements on members of levées 
en masse: they must carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war, but they need 
not wear a uniform or be subsumed under a chain of command.147 The ICRC clarified this 
concept in its 1987 ICRC Commentary, which states that “it allows the combatants to distinguish 
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themselves solely by carrying arms openly.”148 Belligerent qualification is limited temporally to 
those who take up arms “on the approach of the enemy”. This narrow definition “was a direct 
reflection of contemporary State concerns that to give too wide a definitional scope to levee en 
masse was to legitimize resistance fighters and rebellion.”149 Yet, levées en masse may subsist 
not only during the initial phase of the invasion, but any time that a State moves to take new 
territory in an area that it is not presently occupying, or to retake a territory over which it has lost 
control. The ICRC Commentary states that it “seems to be accepted nowadays that a levee en 
masse can take place in any part of the territory which is not yet occupied, even when the rest of 
the country is occupied, or in an area where the occupying power has lost control over the 
administration of the territory and is attempting to regain it.”150 The ICRC Commentary also 
affirms, “Levee en masse will subsist unless the occupying power can demonstrate that it has 
established control over the administration of the territory, and has not lost it.”151 The ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance of 2006 affirmed the existing concept of levées en masse but without 
further elaboration.152 
Was there a serious issue to be raised, then, as to whether some of those detained during the 
course of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan were either ordinary civilians, or qualified belligerents 
entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention? This latter 
category could have covered all those detained before the fall of Kabul, and most likely all those 
detained before the Afghan Interim Authority was instituted on 22 December 2001. However, it 
would also appear to cover situations in which Coalition Forces moved into new territories over 
which neither they nor the Afghan Interim Authority had established administrative control, as 
well as territory that they had lost to local militia.  
Indeed, several detainees specifically raised the claim that they were members of levées en 
masse. This claim was raised in the Petition for habeas corpus and other relief filed by Shafik 
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Rasul153 and Fawzi Al-Odah154 and heard by the D.C. District Court on 26 June 2002.155 Also 
joined in the suit were Australians David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib, and twelve Kuwaiti 
nationals. The Petitioners were being held by the United States military at the Guantanamo Bay 
detention facility in Cuba. In their Amended Petition, the Petitioners Rasul and Hicks explicitly 
claimed to be members of a levée en masse. They stated, in the language of Article 4(6), that if 
any of the Petitioners “ever took up arms in the Afghani struggle, it was only on the approach of 
the enemy, when they spontaneously took up arms to resist the invading forces, without having 
had time to form themselves into regular armed units, and carrying their arms openly and 
respecting the laws and customs of war.”156 This was clearly an assertion on the part of the 
Petitioners that any use of force they engaged in against U.S. and Coalition troops was lawful 
under Article 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention. Several of the Kuwaiti Petitioners claimed 
that they were civilians who had taken no part in hostilities.157 The District Court did not hear the 
merits of the detainees’ claims, as it dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.158  
In 2004, the case of Rasul was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, which permitted 
jurisdiction in the matter of the Petitioners’ writs of habeas corpus, and held that the legality of 
their detention had to be addressed by the U.S. government.159 As a result of the decision in 
Rasul, the Department of Defense formed the Combatant Status Review Tribunal by an order 
dated 7 July 2004.160 The Wolfowitz Order was limited to those persons detained at Guantanamo 
Bay, and not to the much larger number of detainees being held in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in third 
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party countries.161 Its jurisdiction was limited to the power to “determine in closed session by 
majority vote whether the detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant. Preponderance 
of evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this determination, but there shall be a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence.”162 Thus, the presumption of 
belligerent qualification contained within Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention was 
reversed, and the Combatant Status Review Tribunal was not empowered to make findings that a 
detainee was either a qualified belligerent under the Third Geneva Convention or a civilian 
deserving of protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention, but could only rule whether their 
continuing detention was justified on the grounds that the detainees were ‘enemy combatants’.163 
Justice O’Connor, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s related 2004 decision in Hamdi,164 recommended 
that the U.S. government employ a procedure similar to that already established in U.S. military 
doctrine for the determination of belligerent status. The Military Police Prisoner of War Manual 
in force at the time already provided for a well-established procedure to implement Article 5 
Tribunal hearings to determine the status of all detainees,165 including a presumption that “[a]ll 
persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the GPW 
[Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War] until some other legal 
status is determined by a competent authority.”166 The Prisoner of War Manual also notes that 
inhumane treatment “is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or with deeper 
provocation.”167 This had been U.S. practice since the U.S. had ratified the Geneva Conventions 
in 1956, at which time it redrafted the Law of Land Warfare Field Manual to include a 
presumption that all detainees were entitled to a presumption of prisoner of war status, as well as 
Article 5 Tribunal hearings.168  
A companion manual to the Prisoner of War Manual, drafted in 1996 and in force at the 
time of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, sets out policies and procedures for Military Police to 
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follow when detaining enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees.169 The EPW/CI Policy and 
Procedures Manual also recognizes traditional categories of detainees under the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions, and includes a subcategory called “detainees”, which includes all 
persons not recognized as prisoners of war or protected persons under the Geneva Conventions, 
such as innocent civilians, displaced persons, “suspect civilians, terrorists, espionage agents, and 
saboteurs.”170 Such individuals would be held by the U.S. “until a definitive legal status can be 
established by competent authority and are treated as EPW [enemy prisoners of war] until that 
time.”171 This accords with the Geneva Conventions, as it mandates that civilians and suspected 
terrorists or insurgents are to be treated as prisoners of war until a competent tribunal determines 
otherwise. The U.S. government’s treatment of the Afghan detainees thus stood apart not only 
from the international law, but from the U.S. military’s own practices, doctrine, and 
institutionalized procedures. It also disregarded the advice of the U.S. Supreme Court that it 
implement its own military doctrine with respect to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  
During the U.S.’s earlier experience with counterinsurgent warfare in Vietnam, the U.S. 
treated North Vietnamese as presumptive prisoners of war, and held Article 5 Tribunals to 
determine their status.172 Blocher argues that this should have set a precedent for Afghanistan, as 
Vietnam was also an unconventional and counterinsurgent war against irregular belligerents.173 
Corn, Watts and Jensen, a group of legal academics from the U.S. Judge Advocate General’s 
Office, disagreed with Blocher, stating that in Vietnam it was the central command, and not the 
Article 5 Tribunals, who decided that the North Vietnamese detainees should be treated as 
prisoners of war. 174 Corn argues that this decision was made primarily on political grounds, as 
                                                
169 United States Army Military Police School, “Military Police EPW/CI Policy and Procedures, Subcourse Number 
MP 2011 Edition D” (1996).  
170 Ibid.  
171 Ibid. The U.S. already had the legal authority necessary to detain, and to try for criminal acts, any prisoners that it 
detained in Iraq and Afghanistan. What the U.S. could not do under these rules was detain persons who were not 
prisoners of war, or persons against whom there was no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, nor could it interrogate 
prisoners of war, or hold prisoners of war indefinitely. 
172 United States Army, Army Regulation 190-8 1-6 (b). Note that, since the U.S. ratified the Geneva Conventions in 
1956, the Vietnam War was the first major conflict fought by United States forces in which the Geneva Conventions 
applied.  
173 Joseph Blocher, “Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong Questions” (2006) 116 
Yale L.J. 667 at 669 [hereinafter Combatant Status Review Tribunals].  
174 Geoffrey Corn, Eric Talbot Jensen and Sean Watts, “Understanding the Distinct Function of the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals: A Response to Blocher” (2007) 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 327 at 331 [hereinafter Response to 
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their Vietnamese allies lacked a functioning court system to try the detainees as traitors, and not 
out of deference to the international law.175 The authors claim this to be precedent that the status 
of belligerents in counterinsurgent environments can be made by central authorities as a political 
decision.176 Moreover, they argue that the Third Geneva Convention does not ask whether a 
particular detainee fulfills the criteria for being a prisoner of war under Article 4, but only 
whether the detainee is a member of a predicate group covered by Article 4.177 The authors 
determined that there was no predicate group to which the Afghan detainees belonged that could 
qualify them as prisoners of war under Article 4, using arguments similar to those contained in 
the Bybee Memorandum.178 The authors did not address the issue of whether any of the detainees 
may have been civilians taking no part in hostilities. The authors also assert that the purpose of 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals was not to determine the status of the detainees under the 
Geneva Conventions, “but rather to subject the detainee to continuing U.S. detention in order to 
prevent his return to the battlefield.”179 If this is indeed the case, then the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal would not qualify as a ‘competent tribunal’ as required by the Supreme Court in 
Rasul180 and Hamdi181 and Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. Moreover, the authors do 
not address whether some of the Afghan detainees could have belonged to a levée en masse, a 
predicate group that would have qualified them for prisoner of war status under Article 4. 
Admitting that some of the detainees might have reasonable claims to belligerent qualification, or 
protection as civilians, or even that there was any doubt on this matter, would have undermined 
the U.S. government’s rationale for dispensing with the presumption of prisoner of war status and 
the Article 5 Tribunals.  
                                                
175 Ibid. See also: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
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177 Ibid., emphasis in original.  
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179 Ibid. at 334.  
180 Rasul, supra note 159.  
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Boumediene found the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
contained inadequate procedural guarantees, but did not go so far as to stipulate that the detainees 
were entitled to Article 5 Tribunal hearings.182 As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Boumediene, the U.S. government permitted the Afghan detainees to file petitions for habeas 
corpus directly before the D.C. District Court, and it ended the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals. Yet the scope of the Boumediene hearings was essentially the same as that before the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, in that the government’s evidence was presumed to be 
accurate, much of it was redacted, and the issue to be addressed was whether the detainees’ 
continuing detention was justified; the Boumediene hearings did not address the detainees’ status 
as belligerents or their treatment under the Third Geneva Convention.  
 
4.3.3 The Boumediene Hearings and Status-Based Determinations of Belligerency 
In its determinations of the belligerent status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the 
U.S. government was therefore not working within the established framework of the laws of 
belligerent qualification, even that which was affirmed in the U.S.’s own military doctrine and 
regulations. Instead, it treated the detainees at Guantanamo Bay as members of ‘declared hostile 
forces’ under the 2001 AUMF. This permitted the U.S. government, and the U.S. courts, to avoid 
determining whether the detainees had actually been participating in hostilities, and replace this 
with an analysis of the detainees’ membership in, or affiliation with, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated groups. This is evidenced in the manner in which the D.C. District Court of Appeals 
has assessed the prisoners’ habeas corpus petitions at their Boumediene hearings. The D.C. 
District Court of Appeals ruled in Al-Adahi that, pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, the government 
must only demonstrate some evidence that a detainee was a member of the Taliban or Al-
Qaeda.183 In other words, the U.S. government does not need to show that the detainee 
                                                
182Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2209, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) at 2260 [hereinafter Boumediene]. This case also held 
unconstitutional, at 2276, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17 
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, H.R. 2647, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). 
183 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 3d. 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010) at 1105 [hereinafter Al-Adahi]. This judgment 
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participated directly in hostilities in the war in Afghanistan in order to justify his continuing 
detention, only that there is some evidence that he was at some time a member of or affiliated 
with a prohibited organization. Referencing the AUMF, the Court of Appeals in Al-Adahi 
overturned the finding by the D.C. District Court that it was “the nature of Al-Adahi’s own 
conduct, upon which this case must turn,”184 and focused instead on evidence that showed that 
Al-Adahi had been associated with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other related organizations.185 The 
Court found that, under the AUMF, the government must only show that the detainee has been 
associated with groups which planned or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and 
not that the detainee has been a belligerent in the armed conflict in Afghanistan.186 The 
government’s evidence against Al-Adahi included his wearing a Casio watch (known to be 
favored by Al-Qaeda operatives),187 two meetings with Osama bin Laden, who had attended at 
his sister’s wedding,188 his attendance at an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, and the fact 
that his brother-in-law’s house “was very close to the compound of Mullah Omar, the leader of 
the Taliban.”189 These activities were alleged to have taken place before the commencement of 
hostilities in October 2001.190 The only evidence that Al-Adahi had taken up arms in the 
hostilities following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, was the fact that he had been found on a 
                                                
184 Ibid. at 1107.  
185 Ibid. at 1106. The Court also states that his brother-in-law was “affiliated with Al-Qaeda” in order to demonstrate 
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married to one of bin Laden’s most trusted associates,” ibid. at 1108.   
189 Ibid. at 1106. The Court also noted that Al-Adahi’s brother-in-law was “from mujahidin” – those who fought 
against the Russians in the Afghan civil war, ibid. This is surprising evidence of membership in Al-Qaeda, since the 
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Gibbs, “Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect”  (June 2000) 37 Int’l Pol. 233.  
190 Ibid. at 1108. Al-Adahi was expelled from the training camp after seven to ten days for smoking tobacco, which is 
not permitted by Al-Qaeda. Despite his expulsion after such a short time, the court stated that “there was no evidence 
that Al-Adahi ever affirmatively disassociated himself from Al-Qaeda,” ibid. at 1109. Compare with the Interpretive 
Guidance, supra note 64 at 1008, in which the ICRC stated that mere attendance at training camps is not sufficient 
evidence of membership in an organized armed group.  
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bus with several wounded Arab and Pakistani nationals traveling to Pakistan, and who were 
thought by the U.S. government to have been Taliban militants.191 Even this evidence was used 
by the Court as tending to show that Al-Adahi was part of Al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban, rather 
than as evidence showing that he took a direct part in the hostilities.192 The Court thus appears to 
have taken a view similar to Corn,193 in finding that detention is justified on group membership 
or affiliations, including family and social relationships, geographical proximity, and perceived 
loyalties, which are in turn based upon such markers as family relationships, geographical 
location, cultural habits, and manners of attire. At no time did the court address the question of 
whether Al-Adahi himself took a direct part in the armed conflict in Afghanistan.  
In a related case involving a former detainee at Guantanamo Bay, the D.C. District Court of 
Appeals overturned Salim Hamdan’s conviction for material support for terrorism on the grounds 
that this is not a war crime recognized by the international laws of armed conflict.194 Hamdan had 
also attended at Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, and had worked as a driver for Osama 
bin Laden from 1996-2001. Like Al-Adahi, he had been accused of being affiliated with Al-
Qaeda through these activities, which took place prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the 
United States and Afghanistan. The court also distinguished unlawful belligerency, or taking up 
arms, from activities that constitute material support for terrorism.195 This decision supports the 
finding that activities which evidence support for or affiliation with prohibited groups do not 
constitute direct participation in hostilities, and demonstrates the extent to which the court’s 
analysis of the U.S. 2001 AUMF in Al-Adahi departs from generally-accepted interpretations of 
the international law. 
The D.C. District Court’s decision in Al-Adahi has had a significant and negative impact on 
the Guantanamo detainees’ petitions for habeas corpus. A study by Seton Hall Law School has 
found that, prior to Al-Adahi, the D.C. District Court granted 59% of habeas petitions from 
Guantanamo detainees, but after Al-Adahi, only one petition has been granted, and this decision 
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Qaeda either near or after this time, nor that he had any knowledge of or participation in the September 11th attacks, 
calling into question whether his detention was properly authorized under the 2001 AUMF. 
192 Ibid.  
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had since been reversed and the detainee’s habeas petition denied.196 Like the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal, the Boumediene hearings canvas whether there is some evidence that the 
detainee was affiliated with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban or associated forces, and is therefore subject 
to continuing detention. The Boumediene hearings do not review whether the detainees took a 
direct part in hostilities in the War in Afghanistan or whether they are prisoners of war under the 
Third Geneva Convention. The Afghan detainees thus have not yet had a competent hearing to 
determine their lawful status as belligerents under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention.  
 
4.3.4 The Future Treatment of ‘Detainees’ Under International Humanitarian Law 
The U.S.’s controversial treatment of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay may set a precedent 
for the future treatment of detainees in counterinsurgent and counterterrorism actions. The 
Department of Defense’s most recent doctrine concerning detainee treatment, the 2008 Detainee 
Operations Manual, departs quite dramatically from previous doctrine concerning prisoners of 
war.197 Instead, it has normalized many of the most objectionable practices that the U.S. engaged 
in the wake of the September 11 attacks, including the regular assignment of interrogators to all 
detainees,198 and the routine screening of all detainees “to determine those suspected of 
possessing information of immediate tactical value.”199 The Detainee Operations Manual makes 
few references to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and instead treats all captured 
persons – civilians and belligerents alike - under the category of ‘detainee’. Detention, in turn, is 
primarily justified not on an individual’s participation in hostilities, but on his or her potential 
intelligence value in ongoing security operations. The Detainee Operations Manual includes a 
requirement that a “JIDC [Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center] commander, with the advice 
of the assigned interrogators, should provide recommendations to the DFC for release/transfer of 
detainees, to ensure that detainees are not released while still being exploited for HUMINT 
                                                
196 Mark Denbeaux et al., “No Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful Review” Report, Seton Hall 
University School of Law, Center for Research and Policy (1 May 2012) at 4, available at: 
http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/upload/hearing-habeas.pdf (accessed 18 
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[human intelligence].”200 In other words, the length of the person’s detention is not related to the 
armed conflict, but to their ability to be exploited for information. The Third Geneva Convention 
in Article 13 prohibits any form of intimidation or coercion being applied to prisoners of war, and 
Article 17 prohibits their intimidation for the purposes of “securing from them information of any 
kind whatever.” Article 118 states that prisoners of war must be repatriated at the close of active 
hostilities “without delay”, and states may not detain prisoners longer than this to exploit them 
for intelligence. The U.S.’s categorization of the Guantanamo Bay detainees as ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’ represents an attempt to move away from these standards.  
The Detainee Operations Manual also writes into law some of the more controversial 
treatment of detainees in the war on terror, including their internment at black sites,201 as well as 
extraordinary renditions.202 The Detainee Operations Manual permits prisoners to be transferred 
to long-term “strategic internment facilities,”203 for the purposes of intelligence exploitation. It 
affirms the “permanent or temporary transfer of a detainee to a foreign nation,” and provides that 
such renditions “may be based on ad hoc arrangements.”204 Therefore, it no longer makes sense 
to speak of ‘extraordinary’ rendition, as measures that were implemented and justified as 
extraordinary responses to an emergency situation are now regulated as standard operating 
procedures. The Detainee Operations Manual also regularizes the controversial treatment known 
as ‘forced cell extractions’ that were employed by U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay, which are 
now available to govern any “unruly and/or uncooperative detainee”.205 All of these procedures 
are absent from the previous version of the Military Police Prisoner of War Manual206 discussed 
above, which straightforwardly applied the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva 
                                                
200 Ibid. at p. VII-2.  
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Conventions. These procedures have been derived, according to the bibliography in the Detainee 
Manual itself,207 from the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, and that had been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdi,208 Rasul,209 and 
Boumediene.210 They are also drawn from the Standard Operating Procedures at the Bagram 
detention facility in Afghanistan, and the Guantanamo Bay Standard Operating Procedures, as 
well as its Medical Standard Operating Procedures, and the GTMO Tiger Team Standard 
Operating Procedures.211 Therefore, exceptional procedures instituted by the U.S. in the wake of 
its invasion of Afghanistan, such as extraordinary renditions, and indefinite detentions for the 
purposes of intelligence gathering - have now been codified into U.S. military regulations, and 
institutionalized as standard operating procedures.212  
The degree of legitimation and institutionalization that the U.S. military has given to status-
based determinations of civilian direct participation, and the procedures which accompany them, 
may facilitate their adoption by other nation states who may also wish to interrogate suspected 
insurgents and terrorists and treat them outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions. This could 
have an impact on the other states’ practices concerning the treatment of detainees in armed 
conflicts. UK Allied Joint CPERS Doctrine, which integrates the doctrine of UK and NATO 
forces, was updated in 2011213 as a response to abuses that took place at prison facilities at Abu 
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Ghraib,214 and at Camp Breadbasket215 in Basra, Iraq. Allied Joint CPERS Doctrine does not 
overcome the above problems, but it does represent a better approach to detainee operations than 
U.S. doctrine. Allied Joint CPERS policy correctly recognizes that the abuse and mistreatment of 
detainees is not only unlawful, but harms military and counterinsurgent operations and the 
authority of national security forces.216 It also correctly confirms that Article 5 Tribunals must be 
held in all cases of doubt as to whether the captured person is a prisoner of war,217 and this 
includes members of non-state militia,218 although this policy is limited to cases of international 
armed conflict.219 Prisoner of war status is not to be granted in cases of non-international armed 
conflict, and this impedes the reforms attempted in the post-war period by the U.N. General 
Assembly and Protocol II that had attempted to bring more irregular fighters under the 
framework of the law, as discussed in Chapter Two.220 In addition, Allied Joint CPERS Doctrine 
permits individuals suspected of committing criminal acts, including those related to direct 
participation in hostilities, to be transferred to the host nation,221 as well as third party nations,222 
which, like the U.S. Detainee Operations Manual, essentially permits the rendition of detainees. 
Although Allied Joint CPERS Doctrine states that detainees will not be transferred if there is a 
real risk that the detainee will be tortured or mistreated,223 this is an area in which human rights 
abuses have been particularly widespread.224 However, one positive development is the 
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recognition by the Ministry of Defence that international human rights laws and treaties apply to 
detainees captured abroad, including the European Convention on Human Rights.225 This is a 
welcome reversal of the policy earlier expressed by the Ministry of Defence that human rights 
laws did not apply extraterritorially to the actions of UK forces.226 This promotes the trend of 
applying human rights laws to international, as well as non-international conflicts and 
counterinsurgent operations. This ought to set an important precedent regarding the treatment of 
detainees in future conflicts, as human rights laws and the laws of armed conflict become better 
integrated on the issue of detainee treatment.  
  
4.4 Case Study IV: Declared Hostile Forces & the Targeted Killing Program  
In November of 2002, the U.S. launched its targeted killing program by conducting its first 
drone strike in Yemen, killing Qaed Sinan Harithi, one of the suspected planners of the 2000 
terror attack on the USS Cole.227 Although much of the controversy surrounding the U.S.’s 
targeted killing program concerns the use of ‘drones’, which are unmanned aerial vehicles used to 
remotely target particular individuals from a high altitude, the targeted killing program is broader 
than drone strikes. A special-forces team, for example, was used to kill Osama bin Laden at his 
compound in Abbotabad, Pakistan on 2 May 2011.228 Nor is the use of drones in armed conflict 
new. Fully automated vehicles have been available since 1898, when Nicholas Tesla’s radio-
controlled watercraft was rejected by the U.S. military.229 While balloons have been used for 
surveillance purposes in armed conflicts since World War I, the weaponization and use of drones 
in targeting irregular belligerents was first employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan in October 
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2001.230 During his term in office, President Bush is thought to have launched between 45 and 52 
drone strikes.231 Since President Obama took over the program he has significantly expanded 
both the number of drone strikes, as well as the geographical areas covered, increasing the 
number of drone strikes in Yemen and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, and 
extending drone strikes into Somalia.232 Only four countries to date have openly used - and 
argued in favour of the legality of - targeted killings. The United Kingdom has made use of drone 
strikes in Afghanistan.233 The United States, Israel, and Russia have all used targeted killings as 
part of their counterinsurgency strategy.234 Russia has passed a law similar to the AUMF, 
authorizing targeted killings against suspected terrorists outside of Russian territory.235 The use 
of non-weaponized drones has expanded in many countries, where they are being used for 
security, reconnaissance, policing, and search-and-rescue operations.236  
The targeted killing of suspected militants raises a number of legal issues concerning the 
international laws of armed conflict. These include laws prohibiting aggression against an 
individual located in another state without that state’s consent, jurisdictional questions regarding 
when an armed conflict can be said to exist that would trigger the international laws of war, 
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whether domestic laws and ordinary criminal laws would apply, the role of international 
humanitarian law versus international human rights law, and whether the attack is a lawful 
exercise of self-defense under the U.N. Charter. 237 Although there are many legal issues raised 
by the targeted killing program, this section will focus on the laws of belligerent qualification, 
and the ways in which states are required to distinguish between ordinary civilians and irregular 
belligerents participating directly in hostilities. The U.S. has characterized its conflict with Al-
Qaeda as a transnational and non-international armed conflict, as well as a counterterrorism 
operation; however, it has justified the legality of its actions specifically under the international 
laws of war, and this will be the main focus of the discussion below. Recall that the present state 
of the international law is that targets may only be killed intentionally if they are qualified 
belligerents, or civilians participating directly in hostilities.  
For the present discussion, what is most significant about the targeted killing program is its 
use of signature criteria to choose individuals for targeting based upon their membership in a 
declared hostile force. Signature criteria are behaviors that U.S. forces use to determine whether 
an individual belongs to a declared hostile force for the purpose of targeting, based upon a 
“pattern of life analysis,” rather than targeting a named individual.238  Signature strikes result in 
the killings of many persons who are demonstrably not participating in hostilities. This practice 
has largely been justified by the 2001 AUMF,239 and the doctrine of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ 
as it grew up to govern the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
largely validates this concept as it authorizes the killing of those persons performing a continuous 
combat function on behalf of an organized armed group, even when they are not participating in 
hostilities, although it attempts to limit the signature criteria that can be used to make these 
decisions. The final section will argue that these criteria can be better identified by a definition 
based upon a definition of wrongful aggression, ensuring that those who are killed have 
justifiably forfeited their lives.  
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4.4.1 The White Paper & the Targeted Killing Memorandum 
 Although the use of targeted killings performed pursuant to the 2001 AUMF began in 
Afghanistan in October 2001, the U.S.’s targeted killing program came to widespread public 
attention on 2 May 2011, when U.S. officials announced that the CIA and special forces from the 
U.S. Navy’s Seal Team Six had killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden at his compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan.240 Although the U.S. government publically announced and defended the 
killing, questions surrounding the legality of targeted killings began to emerge.241 Following 
upon these criticisms, U.S. government officials made several public statements asserting the 
legality of the targeted killing program. First, Department of Justice General Counsel Jeh 
Johnson delivered the Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School on 22 February 2012, and stated that 
targeted killings were in compliance with the laws of armed conflict, including the customary law 
and its core principles of distinction and proportionality.242 On 5 March 2012, then Attorney 
General Eric Holder gave a speech to Northwestern University School of Law students. This was 
the first official public acknowledgment of the targeted killing program by the U.S. government, 
and one of the first public discussions of its legality under international law. Holder stated that 
targeted killings, including that of Osama Bin Laden and other “senior operational leaders” of Al-
Qaeda are not assassinations, “and the use of that loaded term is misplaced. Assassinations are 
unlawful killings.”243 He also stated that “the U.S. government’s use of lethal force in self-
defense against a leader of al Qaeda or an associated force who presents an imminent threat of 
violent attack would not be unlawful,”244 thus clearly justifying the targeted killings as a 
legitimate use of defensive force. The Attorney General also noted that the laws of armed conflict 
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only permit the U.S. to target “combatants, civilians participating directly in hostilities, and 
military objectives.”245 Holder did not clarify whether senior operational leaders of al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban were to be classified as combatants, civilians participating directly in hostilities, or as 
military objectives. As these fighters would not meet the criteria for belligerent qualification as 
found in Annex B of the Hague Regulations, they ought properly to be classified under the laws 
of armed conflict as civilians participating directly in hostilities.  
Shortly after Eric Holder’s speech at Northwestern University, John Brennan, then 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, addressed the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars. Brennan discussed the legality of drone strikes and 
targeted killings, including the high-profile killings of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and 
American citizen Anwar al-Aulaki in Yemen.246 Brennan briefly addressed the principle of 
distinction, stating, “[w]ith the unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely 
target a military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could argue that never before 
has there been a weapon that allows us to distinguish more effectively between an al-Qaeda 
terrorist and innocent civilians.”247 On the legality of targeted killings, he stated that the 2001 
AUMF authorizes the use of force against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.248 
Brennan also acknowledged the precedential value that U.S. practice has on the development of 
other nations’ targeted killing programs, stating,  “President Obama and those of us on his 
national security team are very mindful that as our nation uses this technology, we are 
establishing precedents that other nations may follow[.]”249 Brennan concluded by stating, “we’ll 
look to institutionalize our approach more formally so that the high standards we set for ourselves 
endure over time, including as an example for other nations that pursue these capabilities.”250 
U.S. officials therefore view the targeted killing program as offering a model for other nations to 
follow.  
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At the same time as these officials were making public statements regarding the legality of 
the drone strikes, they refused to disclose the precise legal justification for these strikes contained 
within a memorandum written by the Office of Legal Counsel. A case brought by the New York 
Times and the ACLU sought disclosure of the OLC memorandum, but was unsuccessful at 
trial.251 However, on 4 February 2013, about a month after the district court decision in the New 
York Times case, NBC News received a leaked copy of excerpts of an undated Department of 
Justice Memorandum, known as the “White Paper”. The White Paper is a “policy document that 
closely mirrors the arguments” of the OLC’s classified Targeted Killing Memorandum.252 The 
White Paper “sets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S. 
government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities 
against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force.”253 
Although the White Paper focuses on circumstances in which the target is a U.S. citizen, it also 
includes a discussion of targeted killings generally under the international laws of armed conflict. 
The White Paper states that the U.S. is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, and 
therefore al-Qaeda and ‘associated forces’ comprise an “enemy force.”254 To the extent that a 
conflict is not of an international character, it is nevertheless governed by Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions as well as the customary international law, which include the basic 
principles regarding belligerent qualification and civilian immunity.  
The White Paper asserts that members of enemy forces may be attacked at any time.255 The 
White Paper cites the 1987 ICRC Commentary, which states, “those belonging to armed forces or 
armed groups may be attacked at any time.”256 However, this section of the ICRC Commentary 
clarifies that armed forces and armed groups refer to qualified belligerents, and further states that 
other fighters may only be attacked for as long as they participate in hostilities, and that “in case 
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of doubt regarding the status of an individual, he is presumed to be a civilian.”257 The ICRC 
Commentary therefore does not provide authority for the proposition that non-state actors may be 
targeted “at any time” in the course of an armed conflict, and instead supports a strict 
interpretation of when a civilian can be said to be participating directly in hostilities.  
The White Paper does not recognize any geographical limitation on the scope of the U.S.’s 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces, stating that “[a]ny U.S. operation would be 
part of this non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces, even if targeted 
killings were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities.”258 The White Paper states 
that the Department of Justice “has not found any authority for the proposition that when one of 
the parties to an armed conflict plans and executes operations from a base in a new nation, an 
operation to engage the enemy in that location cannot be part of the original armed conflict, and 
thus subject to the laws of war governing that armed conflict, unless the hostilities become 
sufficiently intense and protracted in the new location.”259 The sole example of such a state 
practice cited in the White Paper is the U.S. Strategic Air Command’s bombing campaign against 
Cambodia during the Vietnam conflict, known as Operation Menu.260 However, the legality of 
this action was questionable even at the time, and was sharply criticized by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee after a lengthy investigation.261 The House Judiciary Committee considered 
including this issue in the articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon, but the 
motion was voted down.262 The U.S. bombing campaign in Cambodia is therefore doubtful 
precedent for the U.S.’s current practices in targeting persons outside of areas of active hostilities 
in neutral territory, and rather serves as a precedent against their legality.  
The geographical scope of an armed conflict is governed by the laws of neutrality, which 
regulate the conduct of belligerent states towards third party states. The law of neutrality has 
rarely been invoked since World War II, and this may be because many of its customary 
provisions have been superseded by the U.N. Charter; however, while the U.N. Charter may 
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have limited the free choice of states to declare their neutrality, it is less clear that it has affected 
the substantive rights and obligations of belligerents towards neutral states.263 These principles 
are expressed in the Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Case of War on Land, which prohibits attacks on the territory of a neutral state, which is held 
to be inviolable.264 The Hague Convention (V) contains a number of provisions covering 
situations in which belligerents seek shelter or supplies within the territory of a neutral state. 
Individuals do not violate neutrality by furnishing loans or supplies to belligerents.265 When 
troops from a belligerent party are found on the territory of a neutral state, that state shall intern 
them, and shall provide them with food, shelter, and relief required by humanity, at its own 
expense.266 Although the Hague Convention (V) only applies to those parties who have ratified it, 
including the United States,267 its provisions may have now become customary law.268 It certainly 
lends support to the proposition that financing and supplying belligerents have not traditionally 
been considered as direct participation in hostilities, and therefore not belligerent acts. It also 
contradicts the position outlined in the White Paper, which asserts that states may attack 
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belligerents on the territory of neutral states.  
The Hague Convention (V) governing neutrality does not permit the unrestricted targeting 
of suspected belligerents in neutral territory; however, there are scholars who have rejected the 
Hague law of neutrality in favour of a new concept of a ‘zone of hostilities’ that is not bound by 
the territoriality of states.269 Daskal argues that such operations would be permissible if they 
follow a framework of individualized threat assessment, a least-harmful means test, and 
meaningful procedural safeguards.270 Blank argues that status-based Rules of Engagement are 
preferable to the traditional framework of the law of neutrality because they permit a state to 
create a zone of conflict by declaring a force hostile.271 Blank also advocates for permitting states 
a wide degree of choice in declaring zones of conflict, as well as the framework chosen to 
address the targeting of forces declared as hostile.272 This line of thinking follows the same 
reasoning found in the White Paper that would sideline the Hague Convention (V) norms 
governing neutrality and instead permit states a wider latitude in targeting militants in neutral 
territories. However, there are no guarantees that targets will be chosen on the basis of their 
participation in hostilities. There is also a lack of appreciation for the effects on the sovereignty 
of neutral states if the law of neutrality were to be abandoned. On this point, the White Paper 
mainly references U.S. policies and practices, rather than established principles of the 
international laws of armed conflict, and therefore serves as doubtful authority for the legality of 
the targeted killing program. 
In 2014, the U.S. government was ordered by the New York District Court of Appeals to 
release a redacted version of the OLC Targeted Killing Memorandum. The release of the White 
Paper and the public statements made by senior U.S. officials were crucial to the Court’s holding 
that there had been voluntary disclosure, which waived the Freedom of Information Act 
exemption the U.S. government had claimed.273 The Court found that waiver of secrecy and 
privilege in the Targeted Killing Memorandum had occurred “[a]fter senior government officials 
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have assured the public that targeted killings are ‘lawful’ and that OLC advice ‘establishes the 
legal boundaries within which we can operate,’ and the Government makes a public and detailed 
analysis [redacted], waiver of secrecy and privilege as to the legal analysis in the Memorandum 
has occurred.”274  The Court released a redacted version of the Targeted Killing Memorandum on 
23 June 2014.275  
The Targeted Killing Memorandum argues that targeted killings of members of hostile 
forces are lawful under the international laws of armed conflict, including the principle of 
distinction between civilians and combatants. It includes many arguments that are substantially 
similar to those raised in the White Paper; for example, it raises the example of Operation Menu 
in Cambodia as precedent for targeted killings in neutral third countries.276 The basic argument of 
the Targeted Killing Memorandum is that targeted killings “undertaken in accord with the public 
authority justification were not ‘unlawful’ because they were justified.”277 The lawful conduct of 
war “is a well-established variant of the public authority justification,” and therefore it is not a 
crime to kill within the laws of war, but it is a crime to kill in violation of the laws of armed 
conflict.”278 It is certainly a violation of the laws of armed conflict to kill civilians who are not 
participating directly in hostilities. However, the Targeted Killing Memorandum does not argue 
that the targets of the killing program are participating directly in hostilities as defined by the 
international law; instead, it argues that U.S. law and practice would permit the killing of those 
persons declared to belong to a hostile force. As with the White Paper, the Targeted Killing 
Memorandum references primarily U.S., rather than international, laws and practices in order to 
justify the legality of targeted killings under the international laws of armed conflict.  
The Targeted Killing Memorandum asserts that the 2001 AUMF authorizes the Department 
of Defense to use force against those who planned and committed the September 11 attacks.279 
                                                
274 Ibid. at 37.  
275 David J. Barron, “Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the 
Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi” Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Justice (16 July 2010) [hereinafter Targeted Killing Memorandum].  
276 Ibid. at 25.  
277 Ibid. at 19.  
278 Ibid. at 20.  
279 Ibid. at 21. See: supra Chapter Three at p. 147, where it is noted that many of those groups targeted in Yemen and 
Somalia were not involved in the 11 September attacks, and that the Al-Shabaab militant group in Somalia in 
particular was not in existence at that time. It is therefore questionable whether the 2001 AUMF would in fact 
authorize many of the targeted killings taking place.  
  231 
However, it does not address whether declaring forces hostile in this manner would comply with 
the international laws of war. Instead, Barron uses as precedent the Boumediene hearings held 
before the D.C. district court,280 including specifically the decision in Al-Adahi, discussed 
above.281 Barron reasons that, since those detentions were justified under the laws of armed 
conflict as lawful incidents of war, than so would be the use of lethal force in similar 
circumstances.282 The classification of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’ is used to demonstrate that those who are associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
are properly targeted as part of the enemy forces.283 Therefore, the U.S. government’s treatment 
of the Afghan detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and its establishment of the legal doctrine of 
‘unlawful enemy combatant’ in U.S. courts have come to form the basis of the legal argument 
used to justify the targeted killing program.   
The Targeted Killing Memorandum also addresses the question of civilian direct 
participation in hostilities, setting standards for when forces declared as hostile can be said to be, 
or no longer to be, participating in hostilities. First, Barron claims that the use of lethal force 
against members of armed groups is a lawful incident of war, but does not address the 
circumstances under which members of irregular armed groups are lawful targets by virtue of 
their direct participation in hostilities, or how membership in such groups is to be adjudged.284 
Here, Barron cites the Lieber Code, Article 15, which states, “Military necessity admits of all 
direct destruction or armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally 
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unavoidable in the armed contests of the war.”285 Barron does not reference the Hague 
Regulations or the laws of belligerent qualification outlined there. Also, Barron reverses the 
presumption found in Article 50 of Protocol I that civilians are immune from attack, claiming 
that enemy armed forces are considered as taking no active part in hostilities “only once they 
have disengaged from their fighting function (‘have laid down their arms’) or are placed hors de 
combat; mere suspension of combat is insufficient.”286 This reverses the long-standing 
presumption in the international humanitarian law that civilians are presumed to be immune from 
attack, and instead shifts the burden onto civilians to prove that they are not participating in 
hostilities.287 This also violates the temporal limitations on targeting found in Article 51(3) of 
Protocol I, which states that those taking a direct part in hostilities may be targeted “unless and 
for such time as” they do so. Using status-based criteria to assess targets serves the function of 
removing both the presumption of protection and the temporal limitations on targeting found in 
the international law.  
The Targeted Killing Memorandum advances a status-based concept of self-defense as a 
justification for targeted killing. The Targeted Killing Memorandum states that when prohibited 
groups pose a threat to U.S. persons and interests, then any member of those groups, or any 
person who is associated with those groups, also poses a similar threat by virtue of their 
association.288 Declaring prohibited groups as hostile in this manner removes the necessity to 
determine whether the individual to be targeted is participating directly in hostilities. When 
status-based determinations of belligerency are combined with justifications based upon self-
defense, then this also removes the necessity to establish whether the individual to be targeted 
poses a threat of any kind.289 These decisions can then be made, not by observing acts that show 
that the person is participating in hostilities or posing a threat, but on the much simpler and much 
broader basis of observing acts that suggest membership in or association with particular groups. 
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This includes a number of characteristics that would not constitute participation in hostilities, 
such as family and tribal associations, physical proximity to suspected enemy locations, and the 
wearing of certain apparel. The following section will deal more specifically with these signature 
criteria in the context of the targeted killing program. Not only does the use of such criteria 
greatly facilitate mistaken killings of civilians, but these methods of targeting have particularly 
severe negative effects on the local population.  
 
4.4.2 Declared Hostile Forces & Signature Criteria in Targeting 
The targeting of ‘declared hostile forces’ or ‘unlawful enemy belligerents’ is based upon 
those individuals’ status as members of a prohibited group, and dispenses with the need to assess 
whether the individuals are participating in hostilities, or pose an imminent threat of serious 
harm. However, it does not dispense with the need for soldiers to observe the person’s actions 
and characteristics and use these to make a targeting decision during combat operations. U.S. 
forces have used a number of what are termed ‘signature criteria’ in order to make these 
decisions.290 Many of the targeted killings that are taking place are not of known or named 
individuals, but seek to target suspected members of insurgent or terrorist groups based upon 
certain signature behaviors. Signature criteria have been used throughout U.S. counterinsurgent 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are neither new nor unique to the targeted killing 
program. This manner of targeting is best understood not as the targeted killing of specific or 
named individuals, but of the targeting of suspicious or hostile populations and groups of 
persons. Accordingly, it has been shown to produce widespread terror, and serious psychological 
as well as social and cultural disruptions among the target groups.291  
The U.S. defines ‘militant groups’ and membership therein by using signature criteria that 
are over broad and poorly defined. For example, Columbia University’s Human Rights Clinic 
performed a study of three organizations that track drone strikes, the New America Foundation, 
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the Long War Journal, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, examining data from drone 
strikes in Pakistan in 2011.292 The Columbia Drone Study found that the more official and oft 
cited sources compiled by the New America Foundation and the Long War Journal significantly 
undercounted the number of those killed as being “civilians”, and significantly over counted 
those killed as being “militants.”293 The undercounting was found to have resulted from a 
reliance on official government sources and English-language news sources.294 When Columbia 
verified a greater variety of local news reports, they found that the New America Foundation had 
under reported civilian casualties by 2300 percent, and the Long War Journal by 140 percent.295 
The Columbia Drone Study used a methodology similar to that of the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, as they each verified local news reports and news reports not in English, and their 
civilian casualty counts were in close agreement.296 A special report from Reuters disclosed that 
“[o]f the 500 militants the agency believes have been killed since the summer of 2008, about 14 
are widely considered to be top tier militants, while another 25 are considered mid-to-high-level 
organizers.” 297 An estimate from Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation found that under 
Obama, less than 13% of all drone strikes killed a militant leader.298 The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism has published a data set in May 2014 that shows that out of 384 drone strikes in 
Pakistan, all but 24 targeted a domestic home, a vehicle, or a religious site.299 The majority of the 
drone strikes were of residential homes, constituting at least 241 of the named targets.300 
Overwhelmingly, therefore, the targets of drone strikes are of protected civilian objects and 
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infrastructure.301 
The Columbia Drone Study noted that the term ‘militant’ is itself a vague and undefined 
term, and that official sources often provided no evidence to support a claim that those killed 
were in fact active militants. Grut states that “identification of those killed as ‘militants’ or 
‘civilians’ is likely driven by political interests, and colored by the perspective and experiences of 
the source.”302 Grut also argues that these terms, and the ways in which they are used by official 
sources, denote not legal, but moral categories, stating, “they might be better understood as moral 
categories of who should and should not be killed. They are, to that extent, inherently limited and 
biased.”303 She also notes that government and official sources might be including in the category 
of ‘militant’ those civilians who “though not members of a militant group, are suspected of some 
affiliation or of providing some material support to militant groups.”304 The ICRC has stated that 
civilian sympathizers and supporters of armed groups are not lawful targets, and that this would 
violate the principle of distinction.305   
 Grut found that witnesses sometimes took issue with official and government sources’ 
characterizations of who was a militant. She states: 
On the one hand, governments may justify targeting based upon an individual’s provision of 
supplies to a local militant group, while on the other hand, local witnesses might characterize 
the individual as innocent and note that supplies were food or medicine, or provided only 
under duress. Likewise, governments may justify targeting local groups who are meeting or 
mixing with individuals identified as militants; yet local witnesses and observers might 
characterize those meetings and talks as attempts at reconciliation or peace-building[.]306 
In many cases, the Columbia Drone Study found that the U.S. employed few criteria to ensure 
that those targeted were, in fact, members of a militant group. Nor are there investigations after 
the strike to confirm the identity of casualties. A recent study by the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism states that an ISAF commander stated, “We only count that which we see... You can 
do a tremendous amount of forensics… [but] seldom do we see the actual bodies.”307 The drone 
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strike program is therefore liable to over-count casualties as being members of militant groups, 
and contains few safeguards either before or after the strikes to confirm the identities of those 
targeted. 
Similarly, the Stanford/NYU Drone Study found that government sources frequently 
mischaracterized civilian deaths in drone strikes.308 The Stanford/NYU Drone Study examined 
drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Their methodology 
consisted of fieldwork in Pakistan and interviews of witnesses, survivors, and experts, and a 
review of documentation and media reporting.309 Like the Columbia Drone Study, the 
Stanford/NYU Drone Study notes that ‘militants’ are defined by very loose criteria, and that not 
all those described as militants are lawful targets under international law.310 The authors report 
that the “frequent use of the word ‘militant’ to describe individuals killed by drones often 
obscures whether those killed are in fact lawful targets under the international legal regime.”311 
The word ‘militant’ is often used simply to imply that the killing was lawful.312 Becker and 
Shane report that the Obama administration has “embraced a disputed method for counting 
civilian casualties,” which, “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, 
according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 
proving them innocent.”313 Yet the U.S. does not conduct post-strike investigations that would 
determine this information.314 The Stanford/NYU Drone Study reports, “there is little evidence 
that U.S. authorities have engaged in any effort to visit drone strikes or to investigate the 
backgrounds of those killed.”315 Potential targets reportedly include individuals under eighteen 
years of age.316 
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Many ‘signature strikes’ do not require a positive identification of the target, but are rather 
based upon a “pattern of life analysis.”317 Both the U.S. military and the CIA make use of 
signature strikes. David Cloud reported that the CIA was cleared to begin using signature strikes 
in 2008 in the targeted killing program; previously, they were limited only to killing individuals 
who were known to U.S. authorities, and “whose names were on an approved list.”318 Unnamed 
government sources said that signature strikes are based upon “formations of fighters and other 
terrorists… people whose actions over time have made it obvious that they are a threat.”319 
Officials claimed that the vast majority of targets were either individuals whose names were 
unknown, or “about whom the agency had only fragmentary information.”320 Daniel Klaidman 
describes signature strikes as the targeting of “groups of men who bear certain signatures, or 
defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t known.”321 In 
this kind of targeting, individual soldiers are given a wide degree of subjective discretion in 
deciding whether an individual’s or a group’s pattern of conduct indicates that they are members 
of a declared hostile force. Targeting declared hostile forces therefore does often depend upon 
conduct-based criteria, but they are criteria that would not constitute direct participation in 
hostilities as required by Article 51(3) of Protocol I, and reverses the presumption of civilian 
status in cases of doubt, as required by Article 50(1).  
Heller proposes that signature strikes must meet two criteria in order to be lawful. First, the 
behavior in question must be legally adequate to establish that the person is a lawful target, by 
which he means that the person is either participating directly in hostilities or, adopting the 
definition from the Interpretive Guidance, is performing a continuous combat function.322 Both 
the ICRC’s ‘continuous combat function’ and the U.S.’s ‘declared hostile force’ seek to answer 
the question of whether the person is an active member of a militant group, but the U.S. uses a far 
less restrictive and more subjective collection of signature behavior than that permitted by the 
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ICRC.323 Heller argues that legally adequate signature behavior that the U.S. has used include 
planning attacks, transporting weapons, handling explosives, as well as presence at an al-Qaeda 
compound or training camp.324 Recall that the latter was rejected by the ICRC as a targeting 
criteria.325 Behaviors that Heller claims may indicate that the individuals are active militants 
include groups of armed men traveling toward a conflict zone, operating a training camp, training 
to join al-Qaeda, presence at a safe house or rest area, and facilitating or financing terrorist 
activities.326 Again, the ICRC specifically excluded all but the first criteria, yet the U.S. has used 
all of these to determine that targeted persons were ‘militants’, and have killed them on this 
basis.327  
Heller also points out that U.S. forces have used signature criteria that violate the principle 
of distinction on their face. This includes targeting military-aged-males in an area of known 
terrorist activity.328 Prohibited targeting criteria also include consorting with known militants, or 
sympathizing or collaborating with militants.329 Becker and Shane report that counterterrorism 
officials told them that “people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top al-
Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good,”330 indicating that the U.S. has targeted people 
simply because they are near a conflict zone, or are merely in the presence of suspected militants. 
Targeting armed men traveling in trucks is also, Heller claims, impermissible and he notes that 
even Michael Schmitt has agreed that this is so.331 Also impermissible is the targeting of 
compounds merely on the grounds that they are suspicious, and Heller notes that the U.S. State 
Department has protested that this practice violates the principle of distinction.332 Yet, on 26 
November 2011, US-led NATO forces targeted and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas near the Afghan border, on the grounds that their military checkpoint 
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resembled a suspicious militant compound.333 Therefore, U.S. and NATO forces do use these 
prohibited criteria to target suspected militants as part of a broader counterinsurgent strategy.  
The signature criteria employed in counterinsurgent operations has been shown by human 
rights researchers to have widespread and severely negative effects on the civilian population as a 
whole. The use of signature criteria therefore affects the wider community, and not only those 
individuals who are targeted. The Stanford/NYU Drone Study interviewed witnesses and 
survivors in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, and heard testimony from 
several individuals regarding the fear and terror that living under the frequent surveillance of 
drones, and the constant threat of drone strikes had imposed upon them.  Moreover, this 
significantly impacted their daily lives and lifestyles. The authors state that “those interviewed 
stated that the fear of strikes undermines people’s sense of safety to such an extent that it has at 
times affected their willingness to engage in a wide variety of activities, including social 
gatherings, educational and economic opportunities, funerals, and that fear has also undermined 
general community trust.”334 The authors also state that “the US practice of striking one area 
multiple times, and its record of killing first responders, makes both community members and 
humanitarian workers afraid to assist injured victims.”335 The Stanford/NYU Drone Study reports 
that such follow-up strikes seem to form a pattern, and they have killed numerous first 
responders, thus discouraging humanitarian work and hindering the provision of medical care to 
victims.336 The U.S. claims that its drones have excellent surveillance facilities, and this has led 
the Stanford/NYU team to conclude that the U.S. may be deliberately targeting those providing 
humanitarian assistance to casualties.337  
Many civilians living in and near strike zones reported feeling high levels of anxiety, fear 
and psychological stress, compounded by the fact that they felt powerless to “minimize their 
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exposure” to the strikes.338 Mental and physical symptoms of trauma were common, and one 
witness reported that he and others had taken to using medications and tranquilizers to deal with 
their symptoms.339 Many families have lost their primary breadwinner, and many children and 
young people have been forced to stay home from school or lose educational opportunities as a 
result of fear of drone strikes.340 Some witnesses also reported that drone strikes were 
significantly disrupting religious beliefs and practices; one witness stated that the U.S. had “even 
targeted funerals, they have targeted mosques, they have targeted people sitting together, so 
people are scared of everything.”341 Many witnesses stated that their community’s political and 
social gatherings have also been significantly limited due to fear of drone strikes.342 The authors 
believe that the traditional Pashtun way of life may be threatened by the drone strikes, and this 
includes such elementary community functions as political gatherings,343 religious practices, 
community trust,344 and humanitarian values. This is directly related to the kinds of signature 
behavior used by the U.S. to determine whether individuals in the Tribal Areas are associated 
with a declared hostile force, and these tactics would appear to violate the prohibitions against 
using indiscriminate force as found in Articles 51(4) and (5) of Protocol I, and using violence of 
which the primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population as found in Article 
51(2).  
 
4.5 The ICRC & Non-U.S.  Approaches to Targeting Civilian Participants 
The U.S.’s legal justifications for its targeted killing program depend primarily upon the 
2001 AUMF,345 and the status-based doctrine of the unlawful enemy combatant that was 
developed through litigation, the Boumediene Hearings,346 and the 2009 Military Commissions 
Act347 that had been used to justify the detentions at Guantanamo Bay, rather than on the 
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international laws of armed conflict. Therefore, the U.S. approach to targeted killings has been 
rejected in several non-U.S. legal fora that have examined this issue. Although the general idea 
that targeted killings may be lawful under some circumstances has received approval by the 
Israeli High Court of Justice, the United Nations Office of Human Rights, and the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance, these authorities have placed strict conditions on the use of targeted 
killings, and have rejected a status-based approach to targeting. Despite these safeguards, they 
may still be insufficient to prevent the mistaken killing of civilians. The following sections will 
describe how these non-U.S. fora have considered the U.S. approach to targeting civilian 
participants.  
 
4.5.1 Unlawful Enemy Combatants, Declared Hostile Forces & Continuous Combat Function 
These three categories are closely linked, as they seek to target individuals based upon 
behaviors that evidence the individual’s affiliation with a prohibited group, rather than on 
behaviors that evidence direct participation in hostilities. The recognition of a ‘hybrid’ category 
of combatant – one that is neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant - was rejected at the Brussels 
Conference of 1874, the Hague Peace Conferences of 1898 and 1907,348 the Diplomatic 
Conference at Geneva in 1949,349 and most recently at the Diplomatic Conference of 1977.350  
However, the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance has recently devised criteria for killing 
individuals based upon their performance of a continuous combat function as members of a 
militant group.351 If accepted, this criteria, like that of a declared hostile force, would permit the 
targeted killings of members of prohibited groups, simply on the basis of that membership. The 
White Paper and the Targeted Killing Memorandum set out even more permissive criteria for 
determining membership in a prohibited group, asserting that when a person has been a member 
of a prohibited group, then continuing future membership - and a continuing future threat - can be 
presumed. The White Paper states, “where the al-Qa’ida member in question has recently been 
involved in activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and 
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there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that 
member’s involvement in al-Qa’ida’s continuing terrorist campaign would support the conclusion 
that the member poses an imminent threat.”352 The White Paper does cite the Interpretative 
Guidance on this point to conclude that an “operation against a senior operational leader of al-
Qa’ida or its associated forces who poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United 
States would target a person who is taking ‘an active part in hostilities’ and therefore would not 
constitute a ‘grave breach’ of Common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions.]”353 However, 
status-based concepts of direct participation violate this rule precisely because they operate to 
target individuals who are not taking an active part in hostilities. Furthermore, the Department of 
Justice has broadened their definition of ‘defensive force’ in order to fit many targeted killings 
within the law, claiming that any person who may pose a threat of harm is thereby participating 
directly in hostilities. Nor does the feared harm need to be imminent; it can merely be presumed 
from evidence of past affiliation with a prohibited group. The White Paper states that mere 
membership in a prohibited group that has not been renounced constitutes evidence of an 
imminent threat of harm.354 Recall from Chapter One that such a standard would violate the U.S. 
military’s own rules for the use of defensive force as laid out in the Manual for Military Courts 
Martial.355 On the other hand, the ICRC’s definition of ‘continuous combat function’ is likely 
broad enough to encompass many of the targeted killings, and this is a further reason why this 
category of combatant ought to be rejected. Recall that an imminent threat is not required by the 
ICRC when targeting members of militant groups who perform a continuous combat function; 
membership allows for continuous targeting in the absence of any threat.356 This would violate 
the prohibitions on killing those not taking an active part in hostilities as found in Common 
Article 3, as well as Articles 51(3) and 13(3) of Protocols I and II respectively.   
Outside of U.S. practice, a recent precedent of a state policy of targeted killings is that 
undertaken by the Israeli government during the Second Palestinian Intifada. The High Court of 
                                                
352 White Paper, supra note 253 at 8.  
353 Ibid. at 16.  
354 Ibid. at 8.  
355 Department of the Army, Manual for Military Courts Martial, 2012 ed.  (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2012) s. 916(e), at p. II-111, supra Chapter One, note 98 and accompanying text. The 
Manual permits a defense of self-defense only if the threatened harm is “about to be “ wrongfully inflicted.  
356 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 64 at 1034.  
  243 
Justice examined the legality of these targeted killings in 2005.357 The court in Public Committee 
Against Torture upheld the long-standing categories of belligerent qualification, and required 
safeguards regarding the accuracy of intelligence and target identification that are absent from the 
U.S. program. Most importantly, the court refused to recognize the government’s assertion that 
such targets fell into a quasi- or “third category”, that of “unlawful combatant.”358 The court 
found that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions recognize only lawful combatants and 
civilians, and not irregular unqualified belligerents.359 The court therefore determined the legality 
of the killings by reference to the concept of ‘civilian direct participation in hostilities’ as found 
in the Protocols Additional.360 The court is thus upholding a conduct-based definition of ‘civilian 
direct participation in hostilities’, similar to that affirmed in the 1987 ICRC Commentary. The 
court also found that targeted killings of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities would only be 
lawful if the information was well-based,361 and ruled that a civilian taking a direct part in 
hostilities may not be targeted if a less harmful means can be employed, such as capture.362 After 
any killings are conducted, the court found that there must be a thorough investigation into the 
precision of the identification and the circumstances of the attack.363 These safeguards are absent 
from the U.S. program.364 Therefore, the Public Committee Against Torture case rejected the 
adoption of the doctrine of a third, status-based, category of belligerent, and upheld a traditional 
interpretation of belligerent qualification and civilian immunity. This case did not address the 
circumstances surrounding targeted killing outside of a ‘hot’ theater of conflict, and therefore 
does not support the proposition asserted in the Targeted Killing Memorandum that a government 
may authorize targeted killings at any time and place that they perceive a potential security threat. 
On the other hand, Public Committee Against Torture does support the proposition that non-state 
actors may be targeted for such time as they participate directly in hostilities, and that this would 
not necessarily violate the principle of distinction when such operations occur during wartime; 
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targeted killings would remain illegal in the absence of hostilities. In addition, the court’s 
instruction that the information used to adjudge direct participation be ‘well-based’ may not be 
sufficient to ensure accuracy in decision-making, and is a much lower standard than the 
requirement for ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that is proposed here. 
Despite the High Court of Justice’s stipulations that information leading to a targeted 
killing must be well-founded, and that a thorough investigation must be undertaken after the 
killing, human rights groups have criticized the Israeli government for failing to implement these 
criteria. In 2012, B’Tselem released a report stating that the Military Advocate General Corps, 
which pledged in 2011 to investigate every case in the West Bank in which a soldier killed a 
Palestinian, had not been doing so.365 B’Tselem criticized the Military Advocate General Corps 
on a number of grounds, stating that its “decision not to open Military Police investigations as a 
rule, the flaws in operational inquiries, and the negligent handling of the rare investigations that 
were opened, have all conveyed a message to commanders and soldiers that there is little chance 
that they will be held accountable even if they stray from the orders they receive and mistakenly 
kill innocent persons.”366 
In a report on U.S. drone strikes prepared in 2010, then Special Rapporteur on summary or 
arbitrary executions Philip Alston (August 2004-July 2010) rejected status-based targeting as 
being contrary to the international humanitarian law.367 Specifically regarding the ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance’s definition of ‘continuous combat function’, the Special Rapporteur stated 
that, “the creation of the CCF [continuous combat function] category is, de facto, a status 
determination that is questionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct 
participation to ‘for such time as’ as opposed to ‘all the time.’”368 The Special Rapporteur 
rejected the practice of targeting terrorism suspects outside of hostilities, stating that in such 
                                                
365 B’Tselem, “Military Police Investigations Regarding the Deaths of Palestinians” B’Tselem: The Israeli 
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (16 April 2012), available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/accountability/investigation_of_complaints (accessed 4 December 2014). 
366 Ibid. B’Tselem has also found that 56 Palestinian civilians have been killed in targeted killings in the Occupied 
Territories between Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge, primarily on the grounds that they were 
members of militant organizations. Of these, 11 had not participated in hostilities, including 4 children under the age 
of 10 years old. Five of those killed were attending at a training camp, and none of those killed were participating 
directly in hostilities at the time that they were killed. See: http://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/after-cast-
lead/by-date-of-death/wb-gaza/palestinians-killed-during-the-course-of-a-targeted-killing (accessed 4 December 
2014).  
367 U.N. Special Rapporteur 2010 Report, supra note 234 at para. 65-66.  
368 Ibid. at para. 65.  
  245 
cases the international laws of conflict would not apply, and states would be required to conform 
to ordinary legal standards regarding self-defense and law enforcement.369 Similarly, in March 
2013, Ben Emmerson, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, 
traveled to Waziristan to conduct an inquiry into the effects of the drone program. The Special 
Rapporteur similarly found the drone strikes in Waziristan to be unlawful, and a violation of 
Pakistan’s sovereignty. He called on the U.S. to cease drone strikes immediately.370  
However, in a more recent Report to the United Nations General Assembly, the new 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns (1 August 
2010-present) appeared more willing to accept the legitimacy of using status-based criteria in 
targeted killings. The Special Rapporteur notes that the effect of accepting the ICRC’s definition 
of ‘continuous combat function’ is that targeted killings of members of armed groups would then 
become consistent with the international laws of armed conflict.371 The Special Rapporteur also 
notes in this Report that the “ICRC test may rightly be criticized because of its lack of an 
authoritative basis in treaty law,” but has been followed in recent state practices concerning drone 
strikes.372 However, the Special Rapporteur cites only one example of state practice, a decision 
by the German Federal Prosecutor concerning drone strikes in Pakistan.373 The United States is at 
present the only state to undertake drone strikes against terrorism suspects outside of an armed 
conflict, and the U.S. itself has rejected the ICRC’s formulation of ‘continuous combat function.’ 
There is therefore very little evidence to date of state practice accepting the legitimacy of the 
ICRC’s concept of continuous combat function, or of status-based concepts of civilian direct 
participation more generally. However, this may change in the future, due to the continued 
advocacy of many states and legal academics to accept these doctrines.374 The Special Rapporteur 
notes that this is a controversial and rapidly developing area of the international law, stating that, 
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“It is too early to determine in which direction the controversy around this concept will be 
resolved.”375 Therefore, the overall trend at present is that there is a growing acceptance of the 
legitimacy of status-based methods of targeting prohibited groups, although this acceptance at the 
present time appears limited only to targeted killings committed during an ongoing armed 
conflict, and that, at a minimum, safeguards such as well-based information and post-killing 
investigations must be conducted.  
 However, these are minimum safeguards, and they do not adequately address what has 
long been a contentious issue in the international laws of war, namely how should states 
characterize an insurgent force that does not identify itself or carry arms openly. The ICRC 
concept of ‘continuous combat function’ is a novel concept, and therefore one that does not 
represent the state of international law as it now stands. In addition, signature strikes have been 
shown to cause widespread and systematic harm against the civilian population as a whole. 
Normalizing these practices by introducing ‘continuous combat function’ as a lawful and 
legitimate method of targeting would therefore represent a significant step backwards in the 
development of international humanitarian law. What the international community ought to do, 
and what would admittedly be much more difficult, is to continue the project begun with the 
Protocols Additional in the 1970s, and work to regularize the status of these forces. This could 
mean working to improve upon the procedures outlined in Article 96 of Protocol I that provide 
irregular belligerent forces an opportunity to bind themselves to international law. One possible 
solution is to enable states to specify a belligerent party with which it is engaged in an armed 
conflict, and then to qualify that party as a lawful belligerent. In this way, such a force could be 
targeted at all times, but would also be subject to the rights and responsibilities of a lawful 
combatant, such as following the laws of war and being entitled to prisoner of war status. This 
would be more in keeping with the development of international law, and would better address 
the humanitarian concerns that have long attended states’ treatment of such fighters and the 
population surrounding them. This may also give such fighters an incentive to distinguish 
themselves from the population that they are presently lacking. What should be avoided is a 
situation in which states are able to define and then target prohibited groups with few restrictions, 
while affording them no protections under the law. On the other hand, normalizing a new status-
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based category would regularize many of the abuses inherent in signature strikes and similar 
targeting methods, while simultaneously closing the door to more fruitful avenues of legal 
development.  
 
4.5.2 The ICRC Interpretive Guidance & Civilian Direct Participation in Hostilities 
The ICRC has also laid out criteria for when individual civilians can be said to be 
sporadically participating directly in hostilities. The Interpretive Guidance appears to recognize 
that signature criteria are playing a large role in making targeting decisions, and it has made some 
attempts to classify permissible versus impermissible criteria. The ICRC has stated that the 
activity must constitute a hostile act,376 and that it must be such as to hinder the military 
operations of a party through a direct causal step.377 Many of the signature criteria in use do not 
meet this test, primarily because the impugned behavior does not constitute a hostile act. The 
clear majority of drone strikes have targeted residential homes and civilian vehicles. Religious 
and cultural sites have also been targeted.378 These sites are all protected under Protocol I.379 In 
addition, the U.S. has targeted suspicious compounds, and the November 2011 NATO strike of a 
Pakistan military base demonstrates how uncertain these criteria are, and how few checks there 
are concerning the accuracy of targets.380 The U.S. has also targeted military-aged males solely 
on that basis - as they did during Objective Murray and Operation Phantom Fury. The majority of 
these killings would not meet the ICRC test of direct participation in hostilities, primarily 
because the signature criteria that led to the targeting did not constitute a hostile act.  
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance does not discuss escalation of force incidents, and this is 
a significant oversight given that these incidents are not only common in war, but also led to a 
significant loss of civilian lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The civilians killed in the above case 
studies of escalation of force incidents would not have met the ICRC’s criteria for direct 
participation in hostilities, primarily because they were not, at the time they were killed “engaged 
in a specific hostile act.”381 Protocols I and II clearly prohibit the killing of civilians who are not 
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participating directly in hostilities.382 The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, declarative of 
customary law,383 also mandate that states protect the lives of a population under occupation,384 
and they specifically prohibit the collective punishment of a population.385 These provisions 
would prohibit killing civilians who simply fail to obey orders, who violate curfew, or who flee 
security forces, as well as killings that are intended to ensure discipline among the local 
population.  
There is therefore some justification to claim that the killings discussed above are unlawful 
under the international laws of armed conflict, and that they would not meet the criteria for 
civilian direct participation set out in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, or the existing 
international laws of armed conflict. However, the parties involved in the above killings claimed 
the right to do so not because the civilians were participating directly in hostilities, but on 
grounds of self-defense, and the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance generally agreed that states 
and security personnel do have the right to use force in self-defense.386 The Interpretive Guidance 
has also stated that only minimal force may be used, and this goes some way towards 
encouraging, although not mandating, the proper use of escalation of force procedures; however, 
the law as it stands does not clearly require escalation of force procedures be used to favor the 
use of minimal force to resolve threats, and several states, including the U.S.’s own 
representatives at the expert process, have rejected this.387 
Because the ICRC’s criteria would give security forces a wide degree of discretion in 
conducting strikes that cause collateral civilian deaths, as well as the use of lethal force in self-
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defense,388 it is difficult to say that the Interpretive Guidance would clearly prohibit such killings, 
and this limits its utility in protecting civilians against these abuses. Nor has the Interpretive 
Guidance gained sufficient acceptance or moral authority among either states or human rights 
organizations such that it could convince states to abandon these abusive practices. This is at least 
in part due to the ICRC’s failures to set out a principled approach to civilian direct participation, 
as well as one that addresses defensive force, and that is consistent with the laws as laid down in 
the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols Additional. This represents a significant reversal of 
the ICRC’s earlier position at both the 1949 and 1977 Diplomatic Conferences, and this, too, 
serves to undermine the authority that the ICRC has long held on these issues.  
 
4.6 A Defensive Approach to Civilian Direct Participation 
States are increasingly choosing to regulate war through the prism of self-defense, and in 
both standard Rules of Engagement and the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, the use of defensive 
force has been interpreted as superseding other laws and policy goals, and is largely displacing 
the ‘direct participation in hostilities’ analysis required by Article 51(3) of Protocol I.  
Regulating the use of force through the prism of self-defense might provide the convergence 
necessary to gain a foothold for the rule of law at the present time, performing the same function 
as the regulation of war through the professional system of military command control did at the 
close of the nineteenth century. Justifying the use of force against civilian participants by 
reference to the rules regarding defensive force is useful because it is capable of providing the 
foundation for a principled approach to civilian immunity and its loss. Under this definition, a 
civilian forfeits his or her immunity from attack only when there is clear and convincing evidence 
that he or she is engaged in an act of aggression that wrongfully, i.e. without lawful authority, 
justification or excuse, poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to civilians or 
members of armed forces, and the use of force is necessary and proportionate to prevent that 
harm. Force will be necessary and proportionate only after escalation of force procedures have 
been diligently applied, and the consequences of the use of force on the surrounding population 
would not be indiscriminate or disproportionate, or be such as to spread terror. 
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4.6.1 The Civilian is Engaged in an Act of Aggression 
The first issue to be determined is whether the civilian is engaged in an act of aggression 
that wrongfully poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Many of the examples raised in 
the above case studies would fail even this initial test. Armed forces have argued in favor of the 
legality of targeting and killing civilians who engage in the following acts: 
! Geographical proximity to an insurgency, or living in a neighborhood close to where 
insurgent activity is suspected to have taken place;389  
! Familial relationships or social affiliations with persons or networks suspected of 
participating in insurgent or terrorist activity;390 
! Being a sympathizer or supporter of a particular group or ideology;391 
! Wearing certain brands of apparel;392 
! Ethnic markers, signified through one’s appearance, name or clothing;393 
! Engaging in cyber-attacks or disruptions of computer networks or communications;394 
! Shielding objects of attack, including objects of cultural or religious significance that are 
protected from direct military attack;395 
! Protesting military activities, or military detentions;396 
! Agricultural production and food preparation;397 
! Digging in fields;398 
! Recruiting, advertising, furnishing money or supplies,399 or supplying information to 
                                                
389 Peter Maas, “Professor Nagl’s War” The New York Times Magazine (11 January 2004), available at: 
http://newyorktimes/2004/01/11/magazine/professor-nagl-s-war.html?pagewanted-all&src=pm (accessed 17 January 
2013); Al-Adahi, supra note 183 at 1106. 
390 Ibid; Al-Adahi, supra note 183 at 1106-7; supra Chapter Three note 157.  
391 Al-Adahi, supra note 183 at 1106.  
392 Ibid. at 1109. 
393 Amnesty International, Mali: First Assessment of the Human Rights Situation after Three-Week Conflict (London: 
Amnesty International Publications, 2013) at 9-10. 
394 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 64 at 1017.  
395 Ibid. at 1024; Michael N. Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements” 
(2009) 42:3 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697 at 716.  
396 Ibid. at 724. 
397 Michael N. Schmitt, “The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis” (May 2010) 1 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 5 at 23.  
398 Supra Chapter One at note 7 and accompanying text.  
399 Eric T. Jensen, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” in William C. Banks, ed., New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical 
Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 85 at 98. 
  251 
armed groups;400 
! Driving delivery vehicles;401 
! Sabotaging military equipment;402 
! Clearing land mines and ordnance;403 
! Disrupting supply lines;404 
! Failing to respond to the instructions of security forces;405 
! Fleeing security forces;406 
! Providing humanitarian aid or relief to populations or groups of persons suspected of the 
above activities.407 
Persons performing these activities do not thereby forfeit their lives, on the grounds that – 
irrespective of whether they help or hinder the activities of armed forces or non-state armed 
groups - they do not constitute acts of aggression that pose a threat of death or serious bodily 
harm. Furthermore, lethal force is not justified when the impugned behavior is brought about by 
the actions of the security forces themselves.408 
 
4.6.2 The Aggression is Wrongful 
Aggression must be wrongful in order to justify defensive force. If a soldier provokes an act of 
aggression - such as by committing war crimes, illegal searches or detentions, the torture or 
mistreatment of detainees, or attacking sites that are protected under international law – then he 
or she may thereby lose the right to use lethal force in self-defense as in Behenna.409 In addition, 
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civilian activities that are lawful would not normally constitute evidence of wrongful aggression. 
This includes ordinary activities, such as driving vehicles, digging in fields, attending large 
gatherings, and riding in trucks, but also carrying weapons when this is lawful. Defending 
protected sites through shielding is also lawful, as are acts of expression in the media, political 
opinions, and the exercise of freedom of assembly. Performing humanitarian and aid work, 
removing land mines and unexploded ordnance, rescuing the wounded, collecting bodies, and 
obtaining the necessaries of life are all protected by the international laws of armed conflict, and 
therefore civilians do not forfeit their immunity from attack by engaging in these activities. States 
at war have often justified using military force to target aid workers and interfere with the 
provision of the necessities of life to a civilian population.410  
As the definition of wrongful aggression follows an evidence-based standard - rather than 
one of objective facts, subjective fear, or a reasonableness standard - the emphasis is on what the 
civilian must do to give rise to a belief that he or she is engaged in a wrongful act of aggression 
that threatens to cause a loss of life or serious bodily harm. There may be cases in which the act 
of aggression is not in fact wrongful, because the person is acting under duress, is not morally 
responsible for their actions, or otherwise has a justification or excuse. Wrongfulness may be 
especially difficult to determine when young children or child soldiers are participating in 
hostilities. Adults can be coerced into carrying out attacks,411 and very young children,412 
disabled persons, and those who are mentally ill have also been used in this way.413  
Security forces may therefore have permission to kill a person whose act of aggression is 
not in fact objectively wrongful. Security forces in the field are almost necessarily limited in what 
they can know, and must make decisions based upon what is often inadequate information. 
Security forces must judge based upon the actions of the civilian, and they may not have access 
to information that would justify or excuse the behavior. In particular, security forces may not be 
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able to know that a person who poses a threat lacks moral capacity, or is acting under duress.  
Children and mentally-ill persons acting under duress would often fall under the category of what 
McMahan has termed ‘non-responsible threats,’ which he defines as a person who “without 
justification threatens to harm someone in a way to which she is not liable, but who is in no way 
morally responsible for doing so.”414 McMahan argues that such persons are not liable to be 
killed, as they are not morally responsible for posing a threat of harm.415 However, he notes that 
there may be other justifications for using lethal force against persons who pose a non-
responsible threat, the most common of which is the lesser evil justification.416 This may permit 
the use of lethal force, for example, against an innocent child forced to wear a suicide vest which 
will be detonated in a public place, killing a large number of persons. Several such incidents took 
place in Nigeria throughout 2015, during which the Boko Haram militant group abducted young 
children, many of them girls, and then forced them to carry out suicide attacks against 
marketplaces and mosques.417 Such non-responsible threats may permissibly be killed to prevent 
a greater loss of life, but may not be killed on the grounds that their actions are wrongful.    
The issue of child soldiers has been most controversial, because it raises the question of 
whether a child - in this case acting of their volition and not under duress - may be killed if they 
pose a threat to others. McMahan has argued that even child soldiers are morally responsible for 
their actions,418 although this moral responsibility may be significantly diminished. He states that 
“[a]bduction and brutal mistreatment constitute duress through the implicit threat, to which 
explicit threats are usually added, of even greater harm in the event of disobedience; physical 
isolation and indoctrination produce profound ignorance; and youth, psychological manipulation, 
and drugs together diminish their capacity for responsible agency.”419 However, these abuses are 
often perpetrated against adult fighters, and there may be little difference between a child soldier 
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of 16 years of age and a regular soldier of 18 years.420 McMahan argues that security forces have 
a responsibility to judge whether, as in the above cases, a child combatant is acting under duress, 
and ought in all cases to use especial restraint.421 As above, where it is clear that a child soldier is 
not morally responsible for their actions, or has a justification or excuse, then they may not be 
killed on defensive grounds; however, there may be other reasons that permit force to be used 
against them, such as the prevention of greater harm.  
 
4.6.3 The Act of Aggression Must Meet the Threshold of Harm 
It must be shown that the civilian’s conduct meets the threshold of harm, such that it 
would lead one to believe that this conduct clearly and convincingly poses a risk of death or 
serious bodily harm. This would exclude many activities in which persons are carrying, storing, 
or trafficking in weapons generally, but have not manifested any intent to use those weapons to 
cause harm, including: 
! Keeping or storing weapons; 
! Carrying a weapon; 
! Delivering or selling weapons; 
! Throwing non-lethal projectiles.  
Simply carrying, storing, transporting, or even trafficking in weapons alone is not sufficient to 
demonstrate an intent to use those weapons to kill or injure another person. Many individuals in 
conflict zones carry weapons for personal protection, and the U.S. government even permitted 
Iraqi civilians the right to bear automatic weapons for this purpose.422 Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) Order No. 3 amended their previous order when they came under heavy 
criticism from Iraqi civilians for only allowing pistols and small arms, and prohibiting automatic 
weapons.423 Andrews reports that a spokesperson for L. Paul Bremer told him, “Yes, they will be 
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allowed to keep their AK-47s,” as this was a weapons control program, and “not a program for 
the disarmament of the Iraqi people.”424 The CPA distributed leaflets and flyers informing Iraqis 
that they were permitted to keep automatic weapons in their homes and businesses.425 On the 
other hand, U.S. forces then permitted the targeting of civilians based solely on the grounds that 
they were so armed. This indicates the failure of CPA policies at multiple levels: first, in 
permitting the widespread possession of such weapons; second, in not putting in place any 
mechanism to enforce the laws and policies in place that served to register and control small 
arms; and third, in targeting civilians based upon criteria that the CPA had itself informed them 
were lawful.  
 Many individuals in Iraq make money from storing and selling small arms on the black 
market.426 This is one of the harmful consequences of war and the damage it does to local 
economies, but many individuals who carry, store, or traffic in small arms never use or intend to 
use those weapons. Ka’ab Zuhir Ahmed describes how he earned a living selling guns in the 
aftermath of the invasion. He states: 
There was a huge number of Kalashnikovs available. Iraqi soldiers who died fighting the 
Americans entering Baghdad would have their guns and ammunition taken off their bodies 
by people who stashed the weapons in their houses. A lot of the Iraqi soldiers in the final 
days of the regime fled their posts in uniform. Out in the streets many of them traded their 
guns for civilian clothes so they would not be killed by either the Americans or the Ba’athist 
execution squads looking for deserters. Houses near military bases wound up with six or 
seven Kalashnikovs, because so many fleeing soldiers passed. People with a lot of guns in 
their houses started to get worried about being caught by the Americans with so many 
weapons, so they wanted to get rid of them quickly. Also, there was a huge arms depot in my 
neighborhood. Looters emptied it, and many of the weapons ended up in houses around the 
area. All of this made it easy to collect inventory for sale.427  
It is perhaps unsurprising that this situation would follow the collapse of the regular armed 
forces, and that these weapons would assist in fuelling the insurgency. It also demonstrates how 
the mere possession or sale of weapons by civilians can be very common during an armed 
conflict, and does not demonstrate a culpable intention to use those weapons. 
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The threshold of harm would also exclude the use of lethal force in the controversial cases 
in which armed forces claim the right to kill civilians who are throwing rocks or similar 
projectiles against them. These activities do not pose a threat to the lives of soldiers, and states 
have a responsibility to provide their security personnel with adequate protective gear to ensure 
their safety against such common and foreseeable activities.428 
 
4.6.4 The Civilian is Engaged in the Act of Aggression, and the Threatened Harm is Imminent 
There are two temporal limitations to targeting civilian participants. In order to comply 
with the Protocols Additional,429 civilians lose their immunity from attack only as long as and for 
such time as they engage in the impugned conduct. In order to comply with the ordinary rules 
regarding defensive force, the harm must be imminent, or close in time. The purpose of the 
imminence requirement is to turn security forces’ attention to harms that are merely potential or 
inchoate, and to decline to use lethal force in such cases.430 Ferzan’s cautions regarding the very 
real benefits of keeping the imminence requirement are important to keep in mind, as the 
imminence requirement can filter out many unjustified killings in which the threat posed is 
merely speculative.431 In many cases, the individual’s actions may not pose an imminent threat of 
harm, but may be contrary to domestic laws. This includes many activities related to planning 
attacks, manufacturing, storing and trafficking in weapons, or financing or supplying terrorist 
organizations. Many activities that play a supporting role in sustaining terrorist and insurgent 
violence can be dealt with through the enforcement of existing laws and regulations that tackle 
root causes, such as restricting the movement of small arms and explosive materials.432  
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4.6.5 Escalation of Force Procedures are Required to Ensure the Use of Force is Necessary 
Requiring that soldiers diligently undertake escalation of force procedures is an important 
step in eliminating the use of unnecessary force, and to promote the use of minimal force less in 
deterring or detaining a genuine perpetrator. The requirement to use minimal harm has also been 
discussed in the context of the U.S.’s targeted killing program, in which it has been formulated as 
the ‘kill or capture’ requirement. U.S. government officials claim that they abide by such a 
rule,433 and have recognized that they ought to capture and detain the impugned individual if 
circumstances permit this,434 but they have not demonstrated that the U.S. government has made 
attempts to detain suspects that it has killed in targeted killing operations.  In Public Committee 
Against Torture, the Israeli High Court of Justice stated that targets could only be killed if 
capture was not feasible,435 and the ICRC approved of this in its Interpretive Guidance.436  
Escalation of force procedures, however, go beyond the requirement to ‘kill or capture’, for 
they mandate that concrete steps be undertaken to mitigate the use of force. While the use of 
minimal force has not hitherto been an obligation imposed by international law, it is a long-
recognized principle that is consistent with international law, as well as an important goal of 
international humanitarian law.437 However, when states base their use of force not on the 
belligerent privileges granted to their armed forces under international law, but on the need for 
self-defense, then the requirement to use minimal force and to employ escalation of force 
procedures does become a requirement for the justified use of defensive force.  
In many of the above cases, escalation of force criteria were not properly employed to 
minimize the use of force, yet they would have been effective in averting many potential and 
actual threats. Many of the civilians in the above incidents simply could not see the U.S 
checkpoint, since it was not visible from the road or clearly marked. Others were too far from the 
checkpoint to be able to perceive hand or voice signals to stop. It is likely that many persons were 
not given sufficient time to respond to escalation of force procedures; recall that in the Calipari 
checkpoint shooting, the investigation found that these procedures were used at night, in 
                                                
433 Holder Speech, supra note 243.  
434 White Paper, supra note 253 at 40.  
435 Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 357 at 40.  
436 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 64 at section IX. 
437 Supra Chapter Three at s. 3.2.2.4 
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conditions of rain and low visibility, for only 3 seconds before lethal shots were fired.438 Other 
civilians had malfunctioning vehicles that were not able to stop. Others, such as the driver in the 
Calipari checkpoint shooting, simply panicked when shots began to be fired, as they did not 
know where the shots were coming from or why they were being fired. Simply using adequate 
signage and the emplacement of concertina wire would have prevented these deaths. Security 
forces must find clear and convincing evidence that imminent and serious harm will result from a 
wrongful act of aggression - not merely that one is possible – and the diligent application of 
escalation of force procedures is a useful means of ensuring that decisions are made to the 
required degree of accuracy.  
 
4.6.6 The Presumption of Civilian Immunity is Rebutted Only by Clear and Convincing 
Evidence 
Each of the elements of the justified use of defensive force must be established by evidence 
that is clear and convincing; if one element is unclear, then security forces do not have 
permission to use defensive force. This is higher than other standards that have been proposed - 
such as a mere probability, a well-based fear, or a reasonableness standard - and this higher 
standard is required in the context of armed conflict in order to comply with the presumption of 
civilian immunity as found in Article 50 of Protocol I. In many of the above case studies, a mere 
possibility of harm was seen as being sufficient to justify the detention or killing of a suspected 
militant. The targeted killing program is explicitly based upon reversing the presumption of 
civilian immunity, and replacing it with a presumption of guilt in any case where militancy or 
association with militant groups is suspected, or where the possibility of a future attack is merely 
speculative; this is clearly prohibited by Article 50 of Protocol I. Several incidents of lethal force 
in Afghanistan involved U.S. forces shooting local Afghans who were digging in fields or near 
roads. In one incident, village elders from Pashmul demanded an end to overflights after a 
helicopter strike killed two men who were digging in a field.439 Lt. Col. Reik Anderson stated, 
                                                
438 Calipari Shooting Investigation, supra note 46 at 32.  
439 Yaroslav Trofimov, “New Battles Test U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Focus on Safeguarding Civilian Lives 
Frustrates Troops in Taliban Territory” The Wall Street Journal (9 February 2010), available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704140104575057630668291288 (accessed 26 November 2014). 
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“Could that guy be emplacing an IED? He could be. Is he? Unlikely.”440 He therefore recognized 
that there was not sufficient evidence of an act of aggression in the mere act of digging. Instead 
of using lethal force, he promised the elders that his soldiers would use smoke to discourage 
digging in certain areas,441 thus applying less-than-lethal means to repel potential threats. This 
demonstrates how easy it can be for commanding officers to choose alternatives to the use of 
force that give effect to the principle of minimal harm without placing their forces at greater risk.  
In the conditions of uncertainty that prevail in armed conflict, both parties are being asked 
to adjudge something that cannot be proven to the standard of objective fact: the defender cannot 
prove that the target will certainly kill them if lethal force is not deployed; on the other hand, the 
target cannot prove his or her innocence. The outcome of such encounters therefore depends very 
heavily on precisely where this burden of proof is placed. Shifting the burden onto civilians to 
prove that they are not members of militant groups, or that they pose no threat of harm is simply 
too high a burden for any individual to meet. Moreover, it can be seen that the civilians in the 
above encounters were in fact given no opportunity to do so. Shifting the burden onto civilians in 
this manner also has significant consequences for the population as a whole, and not only in 
micro-encounters between individual soldiers and civilians. Over many thousands, and even tens 
of thousands of interactions between civilians and security forces, the rules employed will have 
far-ranging consequences that can materially shift the nature of the conflict, destroy trust and 
cooperation between the local population and security forces, and even undermine nascent 
government authority.  
 
4.6.7 The Use of Force is Not Indiscriminate, or Disproportionate, or Such as to Spread Terror 
In order to comply with Article 51 of Protocol I, the use of force must not be arbitrary, 
indiscriminate, or such as to spread terror. The use of force must be justified not only in the 
micro-encounter at hand, but must be macro-justified as well, which means that armed forces 
must consider the overall and longer-term consequences of particular strategies and tactics, and 
their effects on the local civilian population. Armed forces might conduct their operations in such 
a way as to provoke reprisals, or escalate conflict violence, such as through illegal detentions, 
                                                
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 
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torture, arbitrary or indiscriminate force, or though impunity for the mistaken killing of civilians. 
Certain tactics are especially likely to create terror among the civilian population, such as the use 
of arbitrary and indiscriminate force, using force against lawful or ordinary daily activities, and 
using lethal force in order to coerce civilians to obey military orders. It also includes the unlawful 
tactic of timing strikes close together so as to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching casualties. 
Many of the above case studies show evidence of these tactics being used and, even when it 
cannot be shown that spreading terror is the “primary purpose” of the tactics,442 they can create 
extreme psychological trauma and social dislocation in the target population that go far beyond 
the specific escalation of force incidents or drone strikes involved. Again, civilians are left not 
knowing how to protect themselves and maintain their immunity. In many of the cases discussed 
above, not only were civilians given no opportunity to do so, but it would simply not have been 
possible for them to do so.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This dissertation has discussed the problem of the mistaken killing of civilians during 
armed conflict that result from self-defensive and status-based interpretations of civilian direct 
participation in hostilities. At present, standard Rules of Engagement in use by the U.S. would 
not meet either the requirements for determining civilian direct participation as defined in the 
Protocols Additional,443 or the ordinary rules governing self-defense - including those already in 
use by the U.S. military.444 Self-defense is a compelling, and perhaps because of this, a growing 
rationale that states and security forces proffer for killing in war, and therefore it ought to be 
governed by well-established rules in order to ensure that the use of defensive force is justified. 
Furthermore, this dissertation has sought to show that the problems posed by defensive force in 
armed conflict can best be resolved not only by adopting ordinary rules governing defensive 
force, but by merging these rules with the existing international laws of armed conflict. 
Accordingly, it has discussed a definition of ‘civilian direct participation in hostilities’ that is 
based upon the rules for self-defense. In this way, a civilian will forfeit his or her life only when 
                                                
442 Article 51(2) of Protocol I, supra note 287, outlaws only those acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population.  
443 Ibid. at Article 51(3); Protocol II, supra note 175 at Article 13(3). 
444 United States Department of the Army, Manual for Military Courts Martial, 2012 Edition (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2012) at s. 916(e), at p. II-111.  
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there is clear and convincing evidence that he or she is engaged in an act of aggression that 
wrongfully - i.e. without lawful authority, justification or excuse - poses an imminent threat of 
death or serious bodily harm to civilians or member of armed forces, and the use of force is 
necessary and proportionate to prevent that harm. Force will be necessary and proportionate only 
after escalation of force procedures have been diligently applied, and the consequences of the use 
of force on the surrounding population would not be indiscriminate or disproportionate, or be 
such as to spread terror. This definition adapts ordinary rules for defensive force to the specific 
requirements of international law, including the requirement in Article 50 of Protocol I that there 
be a presumption of civilian immunity, which presumption can only be sufficiently rebutted by 
clear and convincing evidence, as well as the requirements of Article 51(3) of Protocol I that 
civilians lose their immunity from attack only for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities. It also includes the implication that the overall, or macro effects of the military tactics 
currently used are such as to constitute indiscriminate force, which is prohibited by Articles 51(4) 
and (5), or are primarily intended to spread terror among the civilian population, as prohibited by 
Article 51(2). These requirements are largely mirrored in Protocol II governing non-international 
armed conflict, and they largely codify long-standing customary principles of the international 
laws of armed conflict.  
Merging the rules for defensive force with the laws of armed conflict possesses several 
advantages over the present practice of treating self-defensive killings as being separate from, 
and largely superseding, international law and its norms protecting civilians. First, this approach 
solves the problem of providing a principled definition of civilian direct participation in 
hostilities, which has long been the subject of controversy and contention among states and 
international organizations. Second, this approach provides an explanation for why pre-emptive 
and status-based interpretations of civilian direct participation result in unjustified killings. 
Hopefully, this will be a first step in quelling the growing practice of targeting persons based 
upon group affiliations, both real and perceived, that has recently been gaining legitimacy.  At the 
same time, this approach also addresses the growing problem of mistaken killings during 
escalation of force incidents. At present, the international laws of armed conflict do not obligate 
states to use minimal force when dealing with civilians and suspected civilian participants. 
However, if civilian direct participation were to be based upon rules for defensive force, then 
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minimal force and escalation of force procedures would become mandatory, rather than merely 
recommended, as this ensures that the killing is necessary – a fundamental component of justified 
defensive force.  Furthermore, this provides an analytical framework that can be used to analyze 
novel or controversial cases of civilian participation, rather than allowing states to make these 
decisions on an ad hoc, and largely discretionary, basis.  
Although a novel approach, justifying the forfeiture of civilian immunity based upon the 
need for self-defense is in fact consistent with the international law governing belligerent 
qualification and civilian immunity as it has grown up in the past two centuries. These rules 
largely grew out of Enlightenment ideals that elevated the value of individual rights over and 
above the prerogatives of the state; accordingly, those not bearing arms or posing a threat could 
not be harmed. At the time, states saw many advantages to adopting these rules, many of which 
remain important today. Great powers enforce their preferred means of military administration 
within the law, which gives them an additional advantage over lesser powers that are forced to 
fight on these terms, but with fewer resources. In addition, when states fight according to the 
rules created by the international law, they give themselves permission to claim the moral high 
ground. What the U.S. has attempted to do through standard Rules of Engagement and the 
targeted killing program is to create new norms, through their own civilian and military legal 
systems, that skirt the international law, while encouraging more states to adopt their own legal 
interpretations; this enables them to rewrite the rules, while still claiming that they are following 
the norms favored by a community of nations. The ICRC has largely validated this process, and 
the rules it has generated. Both this approach and the rules it has produced for killing civilians 
ought to be rejected as falling afoul of both the international laws governing civilian immunity, as 
well as generally accepted legal principles that set out the conditions under which defensive force 
is justified. If both bodies of law were in fact to be followed, then more mistaken killings would 
be prevented, and the well-being of civilians would be improved. This serves the broader, and 
more important goals, of protecting civilians during armed conflict and de-escalating armed 
violence and bringing it to a speedier resolution.  
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Appendix A: Selected Texts Relating to the Qualification of Belligerents 
 
 
1. Treaty of Westphalia (1648): 
 
Article XVI, §19 
Finally, the Troops and Armys of all those who are making War in the Empire, 
shall be disbanded and discharg’d; only each Party shall send to and keep up as 
many Men in his own Dominion, as he shall judge necessary for his Security. 
 
~ Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective 
Allies (Treaty of Westphalia) (24 October 1648) at article XVI, §19. 
 
2. Emmer de Vattel The Law of Nations (1760): 
 
Book III, Chapter II, §9 
In former times, and especially in small states, immediately on a declaration of 
war, every man became a soldier; the whole community took up arms, and 
engaged in the war. Soon after, a choice was made, and armies were formed of 
picked men, - the remainder of the people pursuing their usual occupations. At 
present the use of regular troops is almost every-where adopted, especially in 
powerful states. The public authority raises soldiers, distributes them into different 
bodies under the command of generals and other officers, and keeps them on foot 
as long as it thinks necessary. As every citizen or subject is bound to serve the 
state, the sovereign has a right, in case of necessity, to enlist whom he pleases. But 
he ought to choose such only as are fit for the occupation of war; and it is highly 
proper that he should, as far as possible, confine his choice to volunteers, who 
enlist without compulsion.  
 
~ B. Kapossy & R. Whatmore, eds., Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the 
Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three 
Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2008) at Book III, Chapter II, s. 9.  
 
3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762): 
 
Book I, Chapter IV 
But it is clear that this supposed right to kill the conquered is by no means 
deducible from the state of war. Men, from the mere fact that, while they are 
living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable 
enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be 
naturally enemies. War is constituted by a relation between things, and not 
between persons; and, as the state of war cannot arise out of simple personal 
relations, but only out of real relations, private war, or war of man with man, can 
exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no constant property, nor in the 
social state, where everything is under the authority of the laws… 
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War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, 
and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, 
but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders. Finally, each 
State can have for enemies only other States, and not men; for between things 
disparate in nature there can be no real relation. 
 
~ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) at Book 
I, Chapter IV. 
 
4. Georg Friedrich von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations (1802): 
 
Book VIII, Chapter III, s. 2 
Soldiers, by the order of their commanders, and such other subjects as may obtain 
express permission for the purpose from their sovereign, may lawfully exercise 
hostilities, and are looked upon by the enemy as lawful enemies; but those, on the 
contrary who, not being so authorised, take upon them to attack the enemy, are 
treated by him as banditti; and even the state to which they belong ought to punish 
them as such. 
 
~ Georg Friedrich von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations, William Corbett, trans. 
(London: Corbett and Morgan, 1802) at Book VIII, Chapter III, s. 2.  
 
5. Lieber Code (24 April 1863): 
 
Article 57 
So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath 
of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding or other warlike acts are not 
individual crimes or offences. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of 
a certain class, color, or condition, when properly organized as soldiers, will not 
be treated by him as public enemies [and therefore entitled to be treated as 
prisoners of war].  
 
Article 81  
Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging 
to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making 
inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are entitled to 
all of the privileges of the prisoner of war. 
 
Article 82 
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for 
destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being 
part and portion of the organized hostile army, but who do so with intermitting 
returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the 
semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or 
appearance of soldiers – such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and, 
therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but 
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shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates. 
 
~ Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
Lincoln Administration General Order No. 100 (24 April 1863). 
 
6. Henry Richmond Droop, paper read before the Juridical Society of London (30 
November 1870): 
 
The conditions which, in my opinion, combatants may reasonably be required to 
satisfy, in order to be entitled to the same treatment as regular soldiers, may be 
briefly summed up thus :-  
 
1. They must have an authorization from an established Government or from 
some de facto substitute for such a Government. 
2. They must be under the actual control of officers who are recognized by and 
responsible to the chief military authorities of the state. 
3. They must themselves observe the rules of war. 
4. All combatants intended to act singly or in small parties must have a permanent 
distinctive uniform, but this is not indispensable for troops acting together in 
large bodies. 
5. Levies en masse of the whole population are legitimate combatants provided 
they comply with the above conditions, but not otherwise. 
 
~ H.R. Droop, “The Relations Between an Invading Army and the Inhabitants, and the 
Conditions Under Which Irregular Combatants are Entitled to the Same Treatment as 
Regular Troops” (30 November 1870) in Papers Read Before the Juridical Society: 1863-
1870, Vol. III (Wildy & Sons Law Booksellers and Publishers, 1871) 705 at 715. 
 
7.  Original Project of the Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (27 
July1874): 
 
Article 9 
The rights of belligerents shall not only be enjoyed by the army, but also by the 
militia and volunteers in the following cases: 
 
1. If, having at their head a person responsible for his subordinates, they are at the 
same time subject to orders from headquarters; 
2. If they wear some distinctive badge, recognizable at a distance; 
3. If they carry arms openly; and 
4. If, in their operations they conform to the laws, customs, and procedure of war.  
 
Armed bands not complying with the above-mentioned conditions shall not 
possess the rights of belligerents; they shall not be considered as regular enemies, 
and in the case of capture shall be proceeded against judicially. 
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~ Original Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
(Brussels, 27July 1874). 
 
8. Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (27 August 1874): 
 
Article 9 
The laws, rights and duties of war, apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
 
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance; 
3. That they carry arms openly; and 
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
 
~ Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels, 
27 August 1874). 
 
9. Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (1880): 
 
Article 1 
The state of war does not admit of acts of violence save between the armed forces 
of belligerent States. Persons not forming part of a belligerent armed force should 
abstain from such acts. 
 
Article 2 
The armed force of a State includes: 
1. The army properly so called, including the militia; 
2. The national guards, landsturm, free corps, and other bodies which fulfill the 
three following conditions: 
(a) That they are under direction of a responsible chief; 
(b) That they must have a uniform, or a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance, and worn by individuals composing such corps; 
(c) That they carry arms openly; 
3. The crews of men-of-war and other military boats; 
4. The inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who, on the approach of the enemy, 
take up arms spontaneously and openly to resist the invading troops, even if they 
have not had time to organize themselves. 
 
Article 3 
Every belligerent armed force is bound to conform to the laws of war.  
 
~ Institut de Droit International, Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (Oxford: 
Institut de Droit International, 1880). 
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10. The Hague Regulations (1899), Annex B: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land: 
 
Chapter 1 On the Qualification of Belligerents 
 
Article 1 
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
In countries where militia and volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of 
it, they are included under the denomination “army.”  
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, 29 July 1899, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land. 
 
11. The Hague Regulations (1907), Annex B: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land: 
 
Chapter 1 On the Qualification of Belligerents 
 
Article 1 
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
In countries where militia and volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of 
it, they are included under the denomination “army.”  
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, 18 October 1907, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
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12. Third Geneva Convention (1949): 
 
Article 4 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging 
to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the 
enemy: 
 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and 
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, 
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance 
movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or 
an authority not recognized by the detaining power. 
 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members 
thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, 
supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the 
welfare of armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the 
armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with 
an identity card similar to the annexed model. 
 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant 
marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the conflict, who do not 
benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international 
law. 
 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time 
to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war.  
 
Article 5 
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the 
time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and 
repatriation. Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
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belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any 
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the 
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.  
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
135. 
 
13. Protocol I (1977): 
 
Article 43 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the 
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or 
an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be 
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, ‘inter alia’, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
 
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical 
personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are 
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 
 
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or law enforcement 
agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict. 
 
Article 44 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed 
conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot 
so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in 
such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and  
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to 
participate. 
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be 
considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).  
… 
6. This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States 
with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, 
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.  
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Article 45 
1. A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse 
Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall be protected 
by the Third Convention, if he claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he 
appears to be entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he depends claims 
such status on his behalf by notification to the detaining Power or to the 
Protecting Power. Should any doubt arise as to whether any such person is entitled 
to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to have such status and, 
therefore, to be protected by the Third Convention and this Protocol until such 
time as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 
 
2. If a person who has fallen into the power of an adverse Party is not held as a 
prisoner of war and is to be tried by that Party for an offence arising out of the 
hostilities, he shall have the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status 
before a judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated. Whenever 
possible under the applicable procedure, this adjudication shall occur before the 
trial for the offence. The representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled 
to attend the proceedings in which that question is adjudicated, unless, 
exceptionally, the proceedings are held ‘in camera’ in the interest of State 
security. In such a case, the detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power 
accordingly.  
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
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Appendix B: Selected Texts Relating to the Qualification of Levées en Masse 
 
 
1. Emmer de Vattel The Law of Nations (1760): 
 
Book III, Chapter XV, §223 
A subject may repel the violence of a fellow-citizen when the magistrate’s 
assistance is not at hand; and with much greater reason may he defend himself 
against the unexpected attacks of foreigners. 
 
Book III, Chapter XV, §228 
There are occasions, however, when the subjects may reasonably suppose the 
sovereign’s will, and act in consequence of his tacit command. Thus, although the 
operations of war are by custom generally confined to the troops, if the inhabitants 
of a strong place, taken by the enemy, have not promised or sworn submission to 
him, and should find a favourable opportunity of surprising the garrison and 
recovering the place for their sovereign, they may confidently presume that the 
prince will approve of this spirited enterprise. And where is the man that shall dare 
to censure it? 
 
~ B. Kapossy & R. Whatmore, eds., Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the 
Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three 
Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2008) at Book III, Chapter XV, ss. 223, 228.  
 
2. Lieber Code (24 April 1863): 
 
Article 51 
If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not yet occupied by the 
enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of a hostile army, rise, under a duly 
authorized levy en masse to resist the invader, they are now treated as public 
enemies, and, if captured, are prisoners of war.  
 
Article 52 
No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every captured man in arms 
of a levy en masse as a brigand or bandit. If, however, the people of a country, or 
any portion of the same, already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are 
violators of the laws of war, and are not entitled to their protection.  
 
~ Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
Lincoln Administration General Order No. 100 (24 April 1863). 
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3. Henry Richmond Droop, paper read before the Juridical Society of London (30 
November 1870): 
 
The conditions which, in my opinion, combatants may reasonably be required to 
satisfy, in order to be entitled to the same treatment as regular soldiers, may be 
briefly summed up thus:- 
… 
 
5. Levies en masse of the whole population are legitimate combatants provided they 
comply with the above conditions, but not otherwise. 
 
~ H.R. Droop, “The Relations Between an Invading Army and the Inhabitants, and the 
Conditions Under Which Irregular Combatants are Entitled to the Same Treatment as 
Regular Troops” (30 November 1870) in Papers Read Before the Juridical Society: 1863-
1870, Vol. III (Wildy & Sons Law Booksellers and Publishers, 1871) 705 at 715.  
 
4. Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (27 August 1874): 
 
Article 10 
The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach 
of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without 
having had time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 9, shall be 
regarded as belligerents if they respect the laws and customs of war. 
 
~ Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels, 
27 August 1874). 
 
5. Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (1880): 
 
Article 2 
The armed forces of a State includes: 
… 
4. The inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who, on the approach of the enemy, 
take up arms spontaneously and openly to resist the invading troops, even if they 
had not had time to organize themselves. 
 
- Institut de Droit International, Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (Oxford: Institut 
de Droit International, 1880). 
 
6. The Hague Convention (II) (1899): 
 
Chapter 1 On the Qualification of Belligerents 
 
Article 2 
The population of a territory which has not been occupied who, on the enemy’s 
approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having 
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time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as 
belligerents, if they respect the laws and customs of war.  
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, 29 July 1899. 
 
7. The Hague Convention (IV) (1907): 
 
Chapter 1 On the Qualification of Belligerents 
 
Article 2 
The population of a territory which has not been occupied who, on the enemy’s 
approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having 
time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as 
belligerents, if they respect the laws and customs of war.  
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
  
8. Third Geneva Convention (1949): 
 
Article 4 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging 
to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the 
enemy: 
… 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time 
to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war.  
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
135. 
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Appendix C: Selected Texts Relating to Civilian Immunity 
 
1. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (1625): 
 
Book III, Chapter IV, s. VI 
This right of making lawful what is done in war is of great extent. For in the first 
place it comprises, in the number of enemies, not only those who actually bear 
arms, or who are immediately subjects of the belligerent power, but even all who 
are within the hostile territories, as appears from the form given by Livy, who says, 
that “war is declared against the sovereign, and all within his jurisdiction.” For 
which a very good reason may be assigned; because danger is to be apprehended 
even from THEM, which, in a continued regular war, establishes the right now 
under discussion. 
 
Book III, Chapter IV, s. VIII 
But the persons of natural-born subjects, who owe permanent allegiance to the 
hostile power may, according to the law of nations, be attacked, or seized, wherever 
they are found. For whenever, as it was said before, war is declared against any 
power, it is at the same time declared against all the subjects of that power. And the 
law of nations authorizes us to attack an enemy in every place: An opinion 
supported by most legal authorities: thus Marcian says “that deserters may be killed 
in the same manner as enemies, wherever they are found.” They may be lawfully 
killed there, or in their own country, in the enemy’s country, in a country belonging 
to no one, or on the sea. But as to the unlawfulness of the killing, or violently 
molesting them in a neutral territory, this protection does not result from any 
personal privileges of THEIR OWN, but from the rights of the SOVEREIGN of 
that country. For all civil societies had an undoubted right to establish it as a 
standing maxim that no violence should be offered to any person within their 
territories, nor any punishment inflicted but by due process of law. For where 
tribunals retain their authority in full vigour, to try the merits of every offence, and, 
after impartial inquiry to acquit the innocent, or condemn the guilty, the power of 
the sword must be restrained from inflicting promiscuous death. 
 
Book III, Chapter IV, s. IX 
But to return to the subject, which is, to decide how far the power of lawfully 
destroying an enemy, and all that belongs to him, extends. An extent of which we 
may form some conception from the very circumstance, that even women and 
children are frequently subject to the calamities and disasters of war.  
 
~ Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (1625), A.C. Campbell, trans. (Kitchener: Batoche 
Books, 2001). 
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2. Emmer de Vattel The Law of Nations (1760): 
 
Book III, Chapter XV, §226 
If we confine our view to the law of nations, considered in itself, - when once two 
nations are engaged in war, all the subjects of the one may commit hostilities 
against those of the other, and do them all the mischief authorised by the state of 
war. But should two nations thus encounter each other with the collective weight 
of their whole force, the war would become much more bloody and destructive, 
and could hardly be terminated otherwise than by the utter extinction of one of the 
parties. The examples of ancient wars abundantly prove the truth of this assertion 
to any man who will for a moment recall to mind the first wars waged by Rome 
against the popular republics by which she was surrounded. It is therefore with 
good reason that the contrary practice has grown into a custom with the nations of 
Europe, - at least those that keep up regular standing armies or bodies of militia. 
The troops carry on the war while the rest of the nation remain in peace. And the 
necessity of a special order to act is so thoroughly established, that, even after a 
declaration of war between two nations, if the peasants of themselves commit any 
hostilities, the enemy shows them no mercy, but hangs them up as he would so 
many robbers or banditti. The crews of private ships of war stand in the same 
predicament: a commission from the sovereign or the admiral can alone, in case 
they are captured, insure them such treatment as is given to prisoners taken in 
regular warfare.  
 
- B. Kapossy & R. Whatmore, eds., Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the 
Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three 
Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2008) at Book III, Chapter XV, s. 226.  
 
3. Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762): 
 
Book I, Chapter IV 
Furthermore, this principle is in conformity with the established rules of all times 
and the constant practice of all civilised peoples. Declarations of war are 
intimations less to powers than to their subjects. The foreigner, whether king, 
individual, or people, who robs, kills or detains the subjects, without declaring 
war on the prince, is not an enemy, but a brigand. Even in real war, a just prince, 
while laying hands, in the enemy's country, on all that belongs to the public, 
respects the lives and goods of individuals: he respects rights on which his own 
are founded.  
 
~ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) at Book 
I, Chapter IV. 
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4. Lieber Code (24 April 1863): 
 
Article 17 
War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, 
armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy. 
 
Article 18 
When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to 
lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, 
though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender. 
 
Article 20 
Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments. 
It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live in political, continuous 
societies, forming organized units, called states or nations, whose constituents 
bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war. 
 
Article 21 
The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the 
constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships 
of the war. 
 
Article 22 
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has 
likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the 
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, 
with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that 
the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the 
exigencies of war will admit. 
 
Article 23 
Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, 
and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the 
commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of 
a vigorous war. 
 
Article 24 
The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be with barbarous 
armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every 
privation of liberty and protection, and every disruption of family ties. Protection 
was, and still is with uncivilized people, the exception. 
 
Article 25 
In modern regular wars of the Europeans, and their descendants in other portions 
of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule; 
privation and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions. 
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~ Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
Lincoln Administration General Order No. 100 (24 April 1863). 
 
5. Henry Richmond Droop, Paper Read at Lincoln’s Inn Fields (30 November 1870): 
 
It is impossible to carry out the principle of as far as possible protecting non-
combatants from the consequences of war, unless combatants and non-combatants 
are to a certain degree kept distinct… In the heat of an assault it is impossible for 
foreign soldiers to investigate whether a man is a combatant or a non-combatant 
unless they can distinguish him by some distinct external mark.  
 
~ H.R. Droop, “The Relations Between an Invading Army and the Inhabitants, and the 
Conditions Under Which Irregular Combatants are Entitled to the Same Treatment as 
Regular Troops” (30 November 1870) in Papers Read Before the Juridical Society: 1863-
1870, Vol. III (Wildy & Sons Law Booksellers and Publishers, 1871) 705 at 715-6.  
 
6. Original Project of the Brussels Declaration (27 July 1874): 
 
Article II 
Operations of war must be directed exclusively against the force and means of 
making war of the hostile State, and not against its subjects, so long as the later do 
not themselves take any active part in the war. 
 
~ “General Principles, Project for an International Convention on the Laws and Customs of 
War Presented by the Russian Government,” reprinted in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Documents Relating to the Program of the First Hague Peace Conference 
Laid Before the Conference by the Netherlands Government (London and Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1921) at 40. 
 
7. Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (27 August 1874): 
 
Article 38 
Family honour and rights, the lives and property of persons, as well as their 
religious convictions and their practice must be respected.  
 
~ Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels, 
27 August 1874). 
 
8. Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (1880): 
 
Article 4 
The laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an unlimited liberty as to the 
means of injuring the enemy. They are to abstain especially from all needless 
severity, as well as from all perfidious, unjust, or tyrannical acts. 
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Article 7 
It is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive populations. 
 
Article 49 
Family honour and rights, the lives of individuals, as well as their religious 
convictions and practice, must be respected. 
 
~ Institut de Droit International, Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (Oxford: 
Institut de Droit International, 1880). 
 
9. The Hague Convention (II) (1899): 
 
Preamble 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the 
requirements of the public conscience. 
 
Article 46 
Family honours and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as 
religious convictions and liberty, must be respected. Private property cannot be 
confiscated. 
 
Article 50  
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted on the population on 
account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively 
responsible.  
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, 29 July 1899. 
 
10. The Hague Convention (IV) (1907): 
 
Preamble 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the 
requirements of the public conscience. 
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Article 46 
Family honours and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as 
religious convictions and liberty, must be respected. Private property cannot be 
confiscated. 
 
Article 50  
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted on the population on 
account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively 
responsible.  
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
 
 
11. Third Geneva Convention (1949): 
 
Common Article 3 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
135. 
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12. Fourth Geneva Convention (1949): 
 
Common Article 3 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
Article 5 
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an 
individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities 
hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to 
claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if 
exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of 
such State. 
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or 
saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security 
of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military 
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication 
under the present Convention. 
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case 
of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by 
the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of 
a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent 
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
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13. Protocol I (1977):  
 
Article 50 
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons 
referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in 
Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
 
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come 
within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian 
character. 
 
Article 51  
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, 
the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international 
law, shall be observed in all circumstances. 
 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 
 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at 
a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot 
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of 
a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction. 
 
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate: 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single 
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives 
located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of 
civilians or civilian objects; and 
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
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6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are 
prohibited. 
 
7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians 
shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not 
direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to 
attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations. 
 
8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict 
from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, 
including the obligation to take the precautionary measures provided for in Article 
57. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
 
14. Protocol II (1977):  
 
Article 4 
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect 
for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is 
prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors. 
 
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against 
the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever: 
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form 
of corporal punishment; 
(b) collective punishments; 
(c) taking of hostages; 
(d) acts of terrorism; 
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; 
(g) pillage; 
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
 
Article 13 
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this 
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protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 
 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 
 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 
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Appendix D: Selected Texts Relating to Civilian Direct Participation in Hostilities 
 
1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762): 
 
Book I, Chapter IV 
The object of the war being the destruction of the hostile State, the other side has a 
right to kill its defenders, while they are bearing arms; but as soon as they lay 
them down and surrender, they cease to be enemies or instruments of the enemy, 
and become once more merely men, whose life no one has any right to take. 
Sometimes it is possible to kill the State without killing a single one of its 
members; and war gives no right which is not necessary to the gaining of its 
object. These principles are not those of Grotius: they are not based on the 
authority of poets, but derived from the nature of reality and based on reason. 
 
~ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) at Book 
I, Chapter IV. 
 
2. Georg Friedrich von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations (1802): 
 
Book VIII, Chapter III, s. 2  
Soldiers, by the order of their commanders, and such other subjects as may obtain 
express permission for the purpose from their sovereign, may lawfully exercise 
hostilities, and are looked upon by the enemy as lawful enemies; but those, on the 
contrary who, not being so authorised, take upon them to attack the enemy, are 
treated by him as banditti; and even the state to which they belong ought to punish 
them as such. 
 
Book VIII, Chapter III, s. 4 
From the moment we are at war, all those who belong to the hostile state become 
our enemies, and we have a right to act against them as such; but our right to 
wound and kill being founded on self-defence, or on the resistance opposed to us, 
we can, with justice wound or take the life of none except those who take an 
active part in the war. So that, 1. Children, old men, women, and in general all 
those who cannot carry arms, or who ought not to do it, are safe under the 
protection of the law of nations, unless they have exercised violence against the 
enemy. 2. Retainers to the army, whose profession is not to kill or directly injure 
the enemy, such as chaplains, surgeons, and, to a certain degree, drummers, fifers, 
trumpeters, &c ought not to be killed or wounded deliberately. 3. Soldiers, on the 
contrary, being looked upon as ever ready for defence or attack, may at any time 
be wounded or killed; unless when it is manifest that they have not the will, or 
have lost the power to resist. When this is the case; when wounded, surrounded, or 
when they lay down their arms and ask for quarter; in short, from the moment 
they are reduced to a state in which it is impossible for them to exercise further 
violence against the conqueror, he is obliged, by the laws of war, to spare their 
lives; except, however, 1. when sparing their lives be inconsistent with his own 
safety; 2. in cases where he has a right to exercise the talio or to make reprisals; 3. 
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when the crime committed by those who fall into his hands justifies the taking of 
their lives. 
 
~ Georg Friedrich von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations, William Corbett, trans. 
(London: Corbett and Morgan, 1802).  
 
3. Henry Halleck, International Law (1861):  
 
Chapter XVIII, §4 
If the peasantry or common people of a country use force, or commit acts in 
violation of the milder rules of modern warfare, they subject themselves to the 
common fate of military men, and sometimes to a still harsher treatment… even if 
a portion of the non-combatant inhabitants of a particular place become active 
participants in the hostile operations, the entire community are sometimes 
subjected to the more rigid rules of war. 
 
~ Henry Halleck, International Law; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States, In Peace 
and War (San Francisco: H.H. Bancroft & Company, 1861) at Chapter XVIII, §4, p. 428.  
 
4. Lieber Code (24 April 1863): 
 
Article 85 
War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against the 
occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by the same. 
If captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large 
bands, and whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government 
or not. They are not prisoners of war; nor are they if discovered and secured 
before their conspiracy has matured to an actual rising or armed violence. 
 
~ Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
Lincoln Administration General Order No. 100 (24 April 1863). 
 
5. Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1863): 
 
Part IV, Chapter 2, §2 
Those who are actually in arms, and continue to resist, may be lawfully killed; but 
the inhabitants of the enemy’s country who are not in arms, or who, being in arms, 
submit and surrender themselves, may not be slain, because their destruction is 
not necessary for obtaining the just ends of war. 
 
~ Henry Wheaton, and William Beach Lawrence, Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, 
2nd ed. (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1863) at Part IV, Chapter 2, §2, p. 588. 
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6. Original Project of the Brussels Declaration (27 July 1874): 
 
Article II 
Operations of war must be directed exclusively against the force and means of 
making war of the hostile State, and not against its subjects, so long as the later do 
not themselves take any active part in the war 
 
Article III 
In order to attain the object of the war, all means and all measures in conformity 
with the laws and customs of war shall be permitted. The laws and customs of war 
forbid not only useless cruelty and acts of barbarity committed against the enemy; 
they furthermore require from the competent authorities the immediate 
punishment of those guilty of such acts, provided they have not been provoked by 
absolute necessity. 
 
Article IV 
The necessities of war cannot justify either treachery towards the enemy, or 
declaring him an outlaw, or the employment of violence and cruelty towards him.  
 
~ “General Principles, Project for an International Convention on the Laws and Customs of 
War Presented by the Russian Government,” reprinted in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Documents Relating to the Program of the First Hague Peace Conference 
Laid Before the Conference by the Netherlands Government (London and Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1921) at 40. 
 
7. Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (27 August 1874): 
 
Article 13 
According to this principle are especially forbidden: 
… 
(c) Murder of an enemy who, having laid down his arms or having no longer 
means of defence, has surrendered at discretion[.] 
 
- Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels, 
27 August 1874). 
 
8. Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (1880): 
 
Article 4 
The laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an unlimited liberty as to the 
means of injuring the enemy. 
They are to abstain especially from all needless severity, as well as from all 
perfidious, unjust, or tyrannical acts.  
 
Article 9 
It is forbidden: 
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… 
(b) To injure or kill an enemy who has surrendered at discretion or is disabled, and 
to declare in advance that quarter will not be given, even by those who do not ask 
for it themselves. 
 
Article 47 
The population of the invaded district cannot be compelled to swear allegiance to 
the hostile Power; but inhabitants who commit acts of hostility against the 
occupant are punishable. 
 
- Institut de Droit International, Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (Oxford: Institut 
de Droit International, 1880). 
 
9. The Hague Convention (II) (1899): 
 
Preamble 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the 
requirements of the public conscience. 
 
Article 23 
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially 
forbidden 
(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no 
longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; 
 
~ International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, 29 July 1899. 
 
10. The Hague Convention (IV) (1907): 
 
Preamble 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the 
requirements of the public conscience. 
 
Article 23 
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially 
forbidden 
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(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no 
longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; 
 
- International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
 
11. Davis’ Elements of International Law (1900): 
 
It has been seen that the subjects of two belligerent states become enemies at the 
outbreak or declaration of war. They continue in this hostile relation during its 
continuance. This status does not authorize them to commit acts of hostility, 
however, which can only be undertaken by persons having the express 
authorization of the belligerent governments. The rest of a population of a 
belligerent territory are not only forbidden to take an active part in military 
operations, but are entitled to personal immunity and protection so long as they 
refrain, in good faith, from taking part in the war… This exemption from the 
operations of war they continue to enjoy so long as they take no active part in 
hostile operations.  
 
~ George B. Davis, The Elements of International Law with an Account of its Origin, Sources 
and Historical Development (New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1900) 
at 312-3.  
 
12. Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1916): 
 
The instruments of warfare should be such as do not inflict unnecessary or 
superfluous injury or damage. The object of a belligerent is obviously attained if 
he puts hors de combat the adversary; the infliction of unnecessary suffering is not 
indispensable to achieve this object. 
 
~ Coleman Phillipson, Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, 5th ed. (London: Stevens 
and Sons, 1916) at 470. 
 
13. Third Geneva Convention (1949): 
 
Common Article 3 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
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To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
135. 
 
14. Fourth Geneva Convention (1949): 
 
Common Article 3 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
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15. Protocol I (1977):  
 
Article 51(3) 
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
 
16. Protocol II (1977):  
 
Article 13(3)  
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time 
as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
Article 6(5) 
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, 
or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether 
they are interned or detained. 
 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 
 
17. Rome Statute (1998): 
 
Article 8(2)(b) 
Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or 
against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities; 
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which 
are not military objectives; 
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units 
or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international laws of 
armed conflict; 
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and sever damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated; 
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~ United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended 2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6. 
 
18. Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001): 
 
Section 2 – Authorization For Use of United States Armed Force 
(a) IN GENERAL – That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons. 
 
~ Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 50 U.S.C. 1541 (2001). 
 
19. The Wolfowitz Order (2004): 
 
a. Enemy Combatant. For the purposes of this Order, the term “enemy combatant” 
shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces 
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act 
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. Each detainee 
subject to this Order has been determined to be an enemy combatant through 
multiple levels of review by officers of the Department of Defense. 
 
g. (9) The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a 
court of law. Instead, the Tribunal shall be free to consider any information it 
deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue before it. At the discretion 
of the Tribunal, for example, it may consider hearsay evidence, taking into 
account the reliability of such evidence in the circumstances. The Tribunal does 
not have the authority to declassify or change the classification of any national 
security information it reviews. 
 
g. (12) Following the hearing of testimony and the review of documents and other 
evidence, the Tribunal shall determine in closed session by majority vote whether 
the detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant. Preponderance of 
evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this determination, but there shall 
be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence.  
 
~ Paul Wolfowitz, “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy Subject: Order Establishing 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal,” Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. (7 
July 2004), available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf 
(accessed 5 December 2012). 
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20. Military Commissions Act (2006): 
 
Section 948b. (g) 
Geneva Conventions Not Establishing Source of Rights – No alien unlawful 
enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this Chapter may 
invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.  
 
Section 948a. 
The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ means –  
(i)  a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a 
lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al-Qaida, 
or associated forces); 
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to by an unlawful enemy 
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal 
established under the authority of the President or Secretary of Defense. 
 
~ Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17 2006). 
 
21. Military Commissions Act (2009): 
 
 Section 948a.(7) UNPRIVILEGED ENEMY BELLIGERENT.- 
The term ‘unprivileged enemy belligerent’ means an individual (other than a 
privileged belligerent) who – 
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; 
(B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners’ or 
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offence under this chapter. 
 
Section 948b.(e) GENEVA CONVENTIONS NOT ESTABLISHING PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION.- No alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by 
military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a 
basis for a private right of action.  
 
~ Title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, 
H.R. 2647, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) at s. 948a.(7).  
 
22. ICRC Interpretive Guidance (2009): 
 
For the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict, 
all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups 
of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against 
direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In 
non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed 
forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose 
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continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat 
function”). 
~ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law” (2008) 90:872 
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 991 at 1002. 
 
